John Giano v. Vanna Salvatore et al. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT PAUL RACZYNSKI'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 226)

The defendant, Paul Raczynski, moves for summary judgment as to counts one through fourteen and sixteen of the complaint brought against him by the plaintiff, John Giano.¹

FACTS

The present action arises out of a financial dispute between the co-owners and officers of Villa Construction, Inc., LaCasa Developers, LLC, and LaCasa Construction, LLC (the LLCs).  On June 15, 2010, the plaintiff, John Giano, filed a sixteen-count complaint against the defendant, Paul Raczynski, as well as against co-defendants Vanna Salvatore and TD Bank, N.A. The plaintiff's complaint alleges a variety of claims based on the improper diversion and transfer of monies, assets, and other property without the authority or consent of the plaintiff as well as interference with business expectancies, accounting, and other related information and data regarding the LLCs. According to the complaint, the plaintiff, an owner of the LLCs, was defrauded of monies and property by Salvatore, an officer and principal of the LLCs, and the defendant, an accountant and tax service professional.   The plaintiff's allegations against the defendant specifically concern the defendant's conduct and complacency in aiding Salvatore in fraudulent activities whereby assets and property belonging to the plaintiff and the LLCs were improperly transferred and diverted to Salvatore and the defendant.   As a result of these alleged activities, the plaintiff has suffered significant financial harm.

On July 14, 2010, the plaintiff filed a sixteen-count complaint alleging a variety of claims based on the foregoing.   Counts one and two set forth the basic allegations of misconduct and assert a claim for negligence based on errors, omissions, misleading statements, misstatements, breach of duty, breach of fiduciary duty, and other conduct.   Count three alleges that the defendant was unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff.   Count four alleges that the defendant breached a fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff in relation to the LLCs, and, similarly, count five alleges the defendant knew, encouraged, and was a substantial factor in the conduct constituting the alleged breach of the fiduciary duty.   Count six alleges the defendant exercised unauthorized control and ownership over funds, assets, and other property to the exclusion of the rights of the plaintiff and the LLCs. Count seven alleges the defendant intentionally withheld property from the plaintiff in violation of General Statutes § 52–564.   Count eight alleges that the defendant's conduct constitutes usurpation of corporate opportunity to the harm and detriment of the plaintiff.   Count nine alleges that the defendant's conduct constitutes unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42–110.   Count ten alleges that the defendant violated various state statutes, regulations, and laws including, but not limited to, truth in lending, breach of trustee and trustee account obligations, unfair trade practices, breach of loyalty, improper transactions, and conflict of interest.   Counts eleven and twelve allege that the defendant's conduct in the transfer of certain assets and property were made without adequate consideration, deprived sufficient means to satisfy the monies due to the plaintiff, and amount to a defrauding of the plaintiff in violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, General Statutes §§ 52–552a to 52–552l, and General Statutes § 52–562.   Count thirteen alleges that the defendant was negligent and breached a duty of care in accepting and participating in the transfers of assets, monies, funds, and property, committing misrepresentation, hiding and concealing assets, and failing to disclose information to the plaintiff.   Count fourteen alleges the defendant made material, fraudulent, and reckless omissions and misrepresentations to the detriment of the plaintiff.   Finally, count sixteen alleges that the defendant's conduct violated the Connecticut Business Opportunity Investment Act (Business Opportunity Act), General Statutes § 36b–60 et seq.²

On September 13, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the defendant's scope of employment with the LLCs was limited to tax preparation services and that he lacked access and authority over financial accounts and other business property belonging to the plaintiff or the LLCs. In support, the defendant submits his own affidavit.   On November 15, 2013, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant's motion for summary judgment.³  The plaintiff objects on the grounds that genuine issues of material fact exist as to the defendant's employment status with the LLCs and the defendant's involvement with respect to the previously mentioned conduct.   In support, the plaintiff submits his own affidavit and the deposition testimony of the defendant.

DISCUSSION

“Practice Book [§ 17–49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Patel v. Flexo Converters U.S.A., Inc., 309 Conn. 52, 56–57, 68 A.3d 1162 (2013).  “Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact ․ The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried ․ However, since litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury ․ the moving party for summary judgment is held to a strict standard ․ of demonstrating his entitlement to summary judgment.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534–35, 51 A.3d 367 (2012).

“[T]he ‘genuine issue’ aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred ․ A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case.”   (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002).  “In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact ․ but rather to determine whether any such issues exist.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  RMS Residential Properties, LLC v. Miller, 303 Conn. 224, 233, 32 A.3d 307 (2011).

“In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10–11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).  “As the party moving for summary judgment, the [movant] is required to support its motion with supporting documentation, including affidavits.”  Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 796, 653 A.2d 122 (1995).   Likewise, “[t]he existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counteraffidavits and concrete evidence.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Shivers, 136 Conn.App. 291, 296, 44 A.3d 879, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 938, 56 A.3d 950 (2012).  “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  Patel v. Flexo Converters U.S.A., Inc., supra, 57.

COUNTS ONE THROUGH EIGHT, TEN, THIRTEEN, AND FOURTEEN

The defendant's motion for summary judgment seeks dismissal of counts one through eight, ten, thirteen, and fourteen.   The defendant's memorandum of law in support, however, does not address these counts.  “A memorandum of law briefly outlining the claims of law and authority pertinent thereto shall be filed and served by the movant with the following motions and requests:  ․ (5) motions for summary judgment” Practice Book § 11–10.  “[T]he rules of practice require a party to file a written motion to trigger the trial court's determination of a dispositive question of law.   The rules of practice do not provide the trial court with authority to determine dispositive questions of law in the absence of such a motion.”  Vertex, Inc. v. Waterbury, supra, 278 Conn. 564–65.   Since “it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact”;  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., supra, 285 Conn. 10–11;  the defendant's failure to address these counts in his memorandum of law necessarily warrants a denial of the motion as to these counts in light of the fact that the defendant has failed to establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists.

The defendant's motion as to counts one through eight, ten, thirteen, and fourteen is denied.

COUNT NINE

Count nine of the plaintiff's complaint alleges that the defendant's conduct constitutes unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of CUTPA.   The plaintiff alleges that the defendant “engaged in ․ unfair, deceptive, and/or misleading acts and/or practices in violation of [CUTPA], including but not limited to any of the conduct alleged in this complaint, misrepresentation, deceit, omission, failures to disclose required information, wrongful usurpation of corporate opportunities, and/or unfair practices.”  (Complaint, ninth count, ¶ 7.)   The defendant argues that he did not violate CUTPA since he was hired by the LLCs for tax preparation purposes only and had no authority, access, or involvement in the daily business operations and finances of the LLCs. The plaintiff counters that the defendant's status and title in relation to the LLCs is a question of fact and that the defendant's conduct in performing services for the LLCs was improper and amounts to deceptive and unfair trade practices under CUTPA.

“[General Statutes § ]42–110b(a) provides that [n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.   It is well settled that in determining whether a practice violates CUTPA we have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the federal trade commission for determining when a practice is unfair:  (1)[W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness;  (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;  (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers, [competitors or other businesspersons] ․ All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of unfairness.   A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three ․ Thus a violation of CUTPA may be established by showing either an actual deceptive practice ․ or a practice amounting to a violation of public policy.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., supra, 285 Conn. 18–19.

“[T]rial courts in Connecticut have found CUTPA inapplicable for accountants, except in cases relating to the commercial or entrepreneurial aspects of an accounting practice ․ We are not bound by these cases, but we find their logic, derived from our Supreme Court's decision in Haynes v. Yale–New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17, 34, 699 A.2d 964 (1997) ․ persuasive.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Stuart v. Freiberg, 142 Conn.App. 684, 708–09, 69 A.3d 320, cert. granted, 310 Conn. 921, 77 A.3d 142 (2013) (applying same standard to accounting professionals and affirming summary judgment on CUTPA claims against the defendant accountant since claims were based on negligence and “poor judgment”).   In Haynes, supra, 34, the Supreme Court concluded, with regard to medical professionals, that “professional negligence—that is, malpractice—does not fall under CUTPA.   Although physicians and other health care providers are subject to CUTPA, only the entrepreneurial or commercial aspects of the profession are covered, just as only the entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of law are covered by CUTPA.”   Our appellate courts have defined “entrepreneurial” in the context of a CUTPA claim as “aspects of practice, such as the solicitation of business and billing practices, as opposed to claims directed at the competence of and strategy employed by the defendant.”  Stuart v. Freiberg, supra, 709;  see Haynes v. Yale–New Haven Hospital, supra, 35.

Although there may be a question of fact regarding whether the defendant was employed as either a tax preparer or accountant, § 42–110b(a) makes clear that it is the conduct of the defendant that must support a cause of action based on CUTPA.   Regarding the portion of the plaintiff's claim that alleges the improper transfer and concealment of assets and property not belonging to the defendant as well as deceit, misrepresentation, and the usurpation of corporate opportunities, the defendant has established by way of his affidavit and deposition testimony that he had no involvement in any financial losses suffered by the plaintiff.   The defendant's affidavit and deposition testimony make clear that the defendant did not have access, authority, or otherwise have any involvement in the transfer and concealment of assets or property belonging to the plaintiff or the LLCs. The plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence that counters the defendant's assertion and implicates the defendant in any fraudulent or otherwise improper transfer and concealment of assets or property.   The plaintiff's affidavit claims that the defendant had access to business, banking, and financial account information, records, and documentation belonging to the LLCs as well as indicates that the defendant had a close relationship with Salvatore.   The plaintiff's affidavit, however, falls short of offering any proof, circumstantial or otherwise, that implicates the defendant in any wrongful or tortious conduct regarding the improper transfer and concealment of assets or property belonging to the plaintiff or the LLCs.

The defendant's conduct in failing to disclose required information and keeping the plaintiff informed and apprised of work performed for the LLCs, however, does create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether such conduct amounts to a deceptive or unfair trade practice in violation of CUTPA.   The deposition testimony of the defendant clearly establishes that the defendant did not and purposely refused to provide pertinent accounting and tax information to the plaintiff.   This conduct on the part of the defendant certainly falls within the “entrepreneurial aspects” of the practice of accounting.   Further, the defendant has failed to establish that his conduct in failing and refusing to provide the plaintiff with accounting and tax information does not violate any statutes, regulations, rules, or other laws and that no “penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness” was violated.  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., supra, 285 Conn. 19.   Nor has the defendant established that this conduct was not deceptive nor amounted to a violation of public policy.   Therefore, the defendant has failed to meet his burden of establishing that his conduct does not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the CUTPA claim.

The defendant's motion for summary judgment as to count nine is denied.

COUNTS ELEVEN AND TWELVE

Counts eleven and twelve allege that the defendant's conduct in the transfer of certain assets and property were made without adequate consideration, deprived sufficient means to satisfy the monies due to the plaintiff, and amount to a defrauding of the plaintiff in violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and § 52–562.⁴  The defendant argues that he did not retain any ownership nor did he have access or was signatory to any banking or financial accounts belonging to the plaintiff or the LLCs and that, therefore, he could not have violated the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act or § 52–562.   The plaintiff argues that the defendant has not denied involvement in any fraudulent transfer or concealment of money and that there is a question of intent which requires determination by a trier of fact.

“[T]he Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is largely an adoption and clarification of the standards of the common law of [fraudulent conveyances].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Cooperman, 289 Conn. 383, 395, 957 A.2d 836 (2008).  “A party alleging a fraudulent transfer or conveyance under the common law bears the burden of proving either:  (1) that the conveyance was made without substantial consideration and rendered the transferor unable to meet his obligations or (2) that the conveyance was made with a fraudulent intent in which the grantee participated ․ The party seeking to set aside a fraudulent conveyance need not satisfy both of these tests ․ These are also elements of an action brought pursuant to [The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act].” (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 394–95.

Section 52–562 is captioned “Liability for fraud in contracting debt;  concealing property” and states in relevant part:  “When any person is guilty of fraud in contracting a debt, or conceals, removes or conveys away any part of his property, with intent to prevent it from being taken by legal process, or refuses to pay any debt ․ established by a valid judgment, while having property, not exempt from execution, sufficient to discharge the debt, concealed or withheld by him so that the property cannot be taken by legal process, or refuses to disclose his rights of action, with intent to prevent the rights of action from being taken by foreign attachment or garnishment, any creditor aggrieved thereby may institute an action against him, setting forth his debt and the fraudulent act or acts particularly in the complaint.”

“[Section 52–562] has been on the books for years, with its origins stretching back to the nineteenth century.   It has been held to be ‘closely akin to a common-law action of fraud ․’ Farley–Harvey Company v. Madden, 105 Conn. 679, 681, 136 A. 586 (1927).  ‘Its essence is the wrongful concealment or removal of his personal property by a debtor, so that it may not be subjected to the just demands of his creditor.’  “ Final Cut, LLC v. Sharkey, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X05–CV–08–5007365–S (November 8, 2010).   In Sharkey, the court ruled the defendant's removal of property from the state to an out-of-state bank was a violation of § 52–562.   The court found that the PJR order in the case constituted a debt established by a valid judgment within the meaning of § 52–562 and that the removal of property from the state was done with the intent to prevent it from being taken away by valid legal process as prohibited by § 52–562.  Id.

Both the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and § 52–562 require that a transfer of assets or property take place in order to determine whether such transfer is fraudulent within the meaning of these statutes.   The affidavit and deposition testimony of the defendant establishes that the defendant did not retain any ownership nor did he ever have access or was signatory to any banking or financial accounts belonging to the plaintiff or the LLCs. The defendant's affidavit also establishes that he never took or attempted to take possession of any real or personal property or ever knowingly performed or assisted in the improper transfer of assets or property belonging to the plaintiff or the LLCs. Neither the plaintiff's affidavit nor the defendant's deposition testimony points to any evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, which creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the defendant actually removed, transferred, or concealed any assets or property belonging to the plaintiff or the LLCs.

The defendant's motion for summary judgment as to counts eleven and twelve is granted.

COUNT SIXTEEN

Count sixteen of the plaintiff's complaint alleges violations of the Business Opportunity Act. The plaintiff alleges that the violations arise out of the defendant's conduct which includes, but is not limited to “misrepresentation, omission, improper solicitation and/or discussion, and/or directly or indirectly misleading and/or engaging in any act, practice or course of business which would or did operate by way of deceit or concealment, all to the harm and detriment of the plaintiff.”  (Complaint, sixteenth count, ¶ 5.)   The defendant argues that since he is neither an owner of the LLCs nor ever had access or was a signatory to any banking or financial accounts belonging to the LLCs, that he could not have had any involvement in any sales or investments on behalf of the LLCs. The plaintiff counters that ownership is not required under the Business Opportunity Act and that the claims are based on the defendant's involvement and complacency in the transfer and concealment of the plaintiff's assets and property.

General Statutes § 36b–62(a) provides in relevant part:  “No person shall sell or offer a business opportunity in this state unless such business opportunity is registered under this section or is exempt from registration under section 36b–65.”  (Emphasis added.)  “[T]he [business opportunity act] was enacted with the purpose of preventing the misrepresentations and fraudulent practices involved in business opportunity investment sales and the financial losses and hardships to investors which result therefrom ․ Its requirements include registration of business opportunities with the Connecticut Banking Commissioner ․ prior to sale [and] disclosure of information to prospective purchasers to enable them to make a rational purchase decision.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cohen v. Roll–A–Cover, LLC, 131 Conn.App. 443, 455, 27 A.3d 1, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 915, 33 A.3d 739 (2011).  General Statutes § 36b–61(2) defines “business opportunity” as “the sale or lease, or offer for sale or lease, of any product, equipment, supply or service which is sold or offered for sale to the purchaser-investor for the purpose of enabling the purchaser-investor to start a business ․”

The defendant's argument that he is neither an owner of the LLCs nor ever had access or was a signatory to any banking or financial accounts belonging to the LLCs is inapposite to the issue of whether the defendant's conduct is in violation of the Business Opportunity Act. The issue presently is whether the defendant's conduct including misrepresentation, omission, improper solicitation and engaging in acts, practices or a course of business which operated by way of deceit or concealment violated the Business Opportunity Act registration and disclosure requirements set forth in §§ 36b–60, et seq.   Section 36b–62(a) makes clear that ownership of the business opportunity in question or control over the financial instruments of the business is not required to bring an individual under the purview of the Business Opportunity Act. Since the defendant's arguments are irrelevant to the plaintiff's claimed violation under the Business Opportunity Act, the defendant has failed to establish grounds for granting summary judgment.

The defendant's motion for summary judgment as to count sixteen is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to counts eleven and twelve is granted.   The motion as to all other remaining counts is denied.

Swienton, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The defendant, Vanna Salvatore, was previously defaulted and judgment entered against her (Pittman, J., October 28, 2010).   As to the defendant, TD Bank, N.A., the court granted its motion to dismiss any claims against it (Swienton, J., January 30, 2014).   Thus, the defendant shall only refer to Paul Raczynski..  FN1. The defendant, Vanna Salvatore, was previously defaulted and judgment entered against her (Pittman, J., October 28, 2010).   As to the defendant, TD Bank, N.A., the court granted its motion to dismiss any claims against it (Swienton, J., January 30, 2014).   Thus, the defendant shall only refer to Paul Raczynski.

FN2. Count fifteen, which requests declaratory relief for violations involving the maintenance and management of certain banking accounts and other financial instruments, is directed at TD Bank, N.A. as co-defendant and is not directed at the defendant..  FN2. Count fifteen, which requests declaratory relief for violations involving the maintenance and management of certain banking accounts and other financial instruments, is directed at TD Bank, N.A. as co-defendant and is not directed at the defendant.

FN3. The plaintiff's objection also requests, in the alternative, that the defendant's present motion should be continued until discovery has concluded in the case pursuant to Practice Book § 17–44.   The plaintiff contends that additional time to complete discovery is needed in order to properly respond to the defendant's motion for summary judgment and that the defendant has failed to produce documentation as required in response to plaintiff's request for production of documents.  (See Exhibit B attached to plaintiff's objection.)Section 17–44 states in relevant part:  “In any action ․ any party may move for a summary judgment at any time, except that the party must obtain the judicial authority's permission to file a motion for summary judgment after the case has been assigned to trial.”   Furthermore, “[t]he trial court has wide discretion under [Practice Book] § [17–47] to determine whether the party seeking additional time to conduct discovery already has had a sufficient opportunity to establish facts in opposition to the summary judgment motion.”  Peerless Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 241 Conn. 476, 489, 697 A.2d 680 (1997).Per the scheduling order (# 213) dated July 24, 2013, Abrams, J., the parties were given permission to file motions for summary judgment on or before September 15, 2013.   The present motion was filed on September 13, 2013.   The plaintiff's contention that the defendant has failed to produce documents is supported by the letter sent to the defendant and referenced as Exhibit B. That letter requests production of documents and is dated August 30, 2010.   Since that date, the plaintiff has failed to seek an order of compliance from the court.   The plaintiff has had ample time and opportunity to seek discovery in the three years between sending that letter and the filing of this motion.   Therefore, since the defendant has complied with the scheduling order and the plaintiff has had ample opportunity to conduct discovery, the plaintiff's request is denied..  FN3. The plaintiff's objection also requests, in the alternative, that the defendant's present motion should be continued until discovery has concluded in the case pursuant to Practice Book § 17–44.   The plaintiff contends that additional time to complete discovery is needed in order to properly respond to the defendant's motion for summary judgment and that the defendant has failed to produce documentation as required in response to plaintiff's request for production of documents.  (See Exhibit B attached to plaintiff's objection.)Section 17–44 states in relevant part:  “In any action ․ any party may move for a summary judgment at any time, except that the party must obtain the judicial authority's permission to file a motion for summary judgment after the case has been assigned to trial.”   Furthermore, “[t]he trial court has wide discretion under [Practice Book] § [17–47] to determine whether the party seeking additional time to conduct discovery already has had a sufficient opportunity to establish facts in opposition to the summary judgment motion.”  Peerless Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 241 Conn. 476, 489, 697 A.2d 680 (1997).Per the scheduling order (# 213) dated July 24, 2013, Abrams, J., the parties were given permission to file motions for summary judgment on or before September 15, 2013.   The present motion was filed on September 13, 2013.   The plaintiff's contention that the defendant has failed to produce documents is supported by the letter sent to the defendant and referenced as Exhibit B. That letter requests production of documents and is dated August 30, 2010.   Since that date, the plaintiff has failed to seek an order of compliance from the court.   The plaintiff has had ample time and opportunity to seek discovery in the three years between sending that letter and the filing of this motion.   Therefore, since the defendant has complied with the scheduling order and the plaintiff has had ample opportunity to conduct discovery, the plaintiff's request is denied.

FN4. The plaintiff argues that the declaratory relief sought in count eleven is not addressed by the defendant's motion and, therefore, summary judgment should be denied as to that count.  “The purpose of a declaratory judgment action, as authorized by General Statutes § 52–29 and Practice Book § [17–55], is to secure an adjudication of rights [when] there is a substantial question in dispute or a substantial uncertainty of legal relations between the parties.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   New London County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nantes, 303 Conn. 737, 747, 36 A.3d 224 (2012).  “[Section] 17–55 requires that the plaintiff be in danger of a ‘loss or of uncertainty as to [his] rights or other jural relations ․’ “ Byszewicz v. Dinardo, 298 Conn. 748, 756, 6 A.3d 726 (2010).   By requiring a danger of loss or uncertainty of legal relations, § 52–29 “enable[s] parties to have their differences authoritatively settled in advance of any claimed invasion of rights, that they may guide their actions accordingly and often may be able to keep them within lawful bounds, and so avoid the expense, bitterness of feeling and disturbance of the orderly pursuits of life which are so often the incidents of law suits.”  Id., 757.   In the present case, there is no danger of loss or anticipation that one party will exceed his or her lawful bounds to the detriment to the other.   The alleged injuries have already occurred.   Therefore, the declaratory action sought here does not affect the substantive claims put forward by the plaintiff since the rights and obligations of the parties will be determined by way of the normal course of proceedings..  FN4. The plaintiff argues that the declaratory relief sought in count eleven is not addressed by the defendant's motion and, therefore, summary judgment should be denied as to that count.  “The purpose of a declaratory judgment action, as authorized by General Statutes § 52–29 and Practice Book § [17–55], is to secure an adjudication of rights [when] there is a substantial question in dispute or a substantial uncertainty of legal relations between the parties.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   New London County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nantes, 303 Conn. 737, 747, 36 A.3d 224 (2012).  “[Section] 17–55 requires that the plaintiff be in danger of a ‘loss or of uncertainty as to [his] rights or other jural relations ․’ “ Byszewicz v. Dinardo, 298 Conn. 748, 756, 6 A.3d 726 (2010).   By requiring a danger of loss or uncertainty of legal relations, § 52–29 “enable[s] parties to have their differences authoritatively settled in advance of any claimed invasion of rights, that they may guide their actions accordingly and often may be able to keep them within lawful bounds, and so avoid the expense, bitterness of feeling and disturbance of the orderly pursuits of life which are so often the incidents of law suits.”  Id., 757.   In the present case, there is no danger of loss or anticipation that one party will exceed his or her lawful bounds to the detriment to the other.   The alleged injuries have already occurred.   Therefore, the declaratory action sought here does not affect the substantive claims put forward by the plaintiff since the rights and obligations of the parties will be determined by way of the normal course of proceedings.

Swienton, Cynthia K., J.