Beth A. Sampson v. Todd R. Wesoloski (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The parties in the above entitled action were married on September 11, 2011 at Glastonbury, Connecticut.   The plaintiff filed a complaint whose sole count seeks an annulment of her marriage to the defendant.   The matter was heard on February 14, 2014, with both parties in attendance.

FINDINGS OF FACT

There is little in dispute factually.   Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 sets forth a written statement of facts claimed by the plaintiff.   By his signature on the written statement and his testimony at the hearing, the defendant agreed to the truth of the matters set forth therein.   The court considers Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 to be the equivalent of a written stipulation of facts by the parties and accepts it as such.   While there was one other exhibit and some brief additional testimony from the plaintiff's mother, the court did not glean any additional relevant facts from that exhibit or testimony.

The gist of the plaintiff's evidence is that, in her words, the defendant “intentionally misled me by creating an appealing male persona in order to get close to me and form a relationship with me.”   Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.

The written statement of facts describes the many ways in which the defendant misled the plaintiff.   The majority of the misrepresentations concerned financial issues, including the details of the defendant's employment and salary, the nature and extent of his assets, the degree of his indebtedness, the quality and value of the engagement ring he gave to the plaintiff, and a supposed but nonexistent advance on the defendant's inheritance from his father (whom the defendant falsely claimed to be afflicted with cancer).

The defendant's deceit was not limited to financial matters.   He created alias email accounts from which he sent fake emails to the plaintiff.   He mischaracterized his relationship with his former wife.   Prior to the marriage he falsely claimed to suffer from a medical condition which might impair his ability to father more children;  the plaintiff later learned this was not true.

CONCLUSIONS

Section 46b–40(b) of the Connecticut General Statutes provides that the court shall grant an annulment of marriage “if the marriage is void or voidable under the laws of this state or of the state in which the marriage was performed.”   As the marriage in the present case was performed in Connecticut, the law of this state determines whether the marriage is void or voidable.

Certain sections of the Connecticut General Statutes specify grounds for annulment, such as Section 46b–21 (marriage of certain related persons) and Section 46b–22 (marriage attempted to be celebrated by an unauthorized person).   The complaint in the present case alleges no such statutory grounds.

Rather, the complaint rests on the common-law grounds of fraud.   The plaintiff alleges that the defendant's misrepresentations rise to the level of fraud rendering the marriage void or voidable.   The burden is on the plaintiff to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of fraud that would nullify the marriage contract.  Fattibone v. Fattibone, 183 Conn. 433, 438 (1981).

The Connecticut courts have stated that the presumption of the validity of a marriage is very strong.  Carabetta v. Carabetta, 182 Conn. 344 (1980).   A party to a marriage is entitled to an annulment on the grounds of fraud only where it is proven that the fraud relates to what has been called the “essentialia of the marriage relation.”  Lyman v. Lyman, 99 Conn. 399, 402 (1916).   In providing an example, the court has stated:

Such a fraud is accomplished whenever a person enters into that contract knowing that he is incapable of sexual intercourse, and yet, in order to induce the marriage, designedly and deceitfully concealing that fact from the other party, who is ignorant of it and has no reason to suppose it to exist.

Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn. 242, 250 (1905).

In the present case, the defendant clearly engaged in a persistent pattern of untruthfulness in an attempt to make himself more attractive to the plaintiff.   Much of the alleged misrepresentation occurred after the time of the marriage, and for that reason cannot be considered as “fraud in the inducement” which might warrant an annulment.

There was, of course, significant misrepresentation that predated the marriage as well.   However, the court finds no legal basis to grant an annulment based on the nature of the deceit in this case, which was first and foremost about financial matters.   The court does not find the existence of fraud which goes to the essential purposes of the marriage relationship.  (Ironically, the assertion by the defendant that he could not have more children, when in fact he could, would have come the closest to the type of fraud required by case law if it had been the reverse;  i.e., if he had claimed he could have children only to disclose to the plaintiff after the marriage that he could not.)

This is not in any way to condone the defendant's conduct, which the court considers to be reprehensible.   It is rather to state that the misrepresentations demonstrated in this case do not constitute the kind of fraud for which the annulment of the marriage is an available remedy.   The fact that both parties expressed at the hearing a desire to have the marriage annulled does not empower the court to grant a remedy which the law does not allow.

ORDER

The plaintiff's complaint seeking an annulment is denied and dismissed, without prejudice to her right to seek the dissolution of her marriage to the defendant.

SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT,

Albis, J.

Albis, Michael A., J.