State of Connecticut v. John K. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON PETITION FOR DISCLOSURE AND USE OF JUVENILE COURT RECORD

The defendant John K.¹ was arrested in September 2012 and charged with manslaughter in the second degree, General Statutes § 53a–56.   The offense was alleged to have been committed in June 2008, when the defendant was eleven years old, and the victim, Nicholas P., was thirteen years old.   On August 27, 2013, the defendant entered a guilty plea under the Alford ² doctrine to one count of criminally negligent homicide, General Statutes § 53a–58.   The plea was accepted, and a conviction of delinquency was entered.   The case was continued for preparation of a predispositional study.   The disposition was scheduled to be entered on October 29, 2013.

The parents of the victim, Ricardo P. and Katherine T., as co-administrators of the estate of their son, commenced a civil wrongful death action against the defendant and his parents, Glenn and Barbara K., in June 2009 (the wrongful death action).   Anticipating that the defendant would enter a guilty plea on August 27, 2013, the victim's parents filed a petition that day pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–124(f) for the further disclosure and use of the defendant's guilty plea in the wrongful death action.

The defendant objected to the petition and filed a memorandum in opposition on September 30, 2013.   The state submitted a memorandum on October 29, 2013 that set forth its views with respect to permitting the petitioners to use the defendant's Alford plea in the wrongful death action.

The defendant returned to court on October 29, 2013 for entry of the disposition.   Pursuant to Practice Book § 30a–6, the victim's parents appeared and addressed the court concerning the proposed disposition.   After the victim's parents spoke, the court entered the disposition.   Once the disposition was concluded, the court heard argument from counsel for the petitioners, counsel for the defendant, and the assistant state's attorney for juvenile matters regarding the victim's parents' petition for disclosure and use of the defendant's Alford plea in the wrongful death action.

For the reasons set forth below, the petition is granted.   The petitioners, as co-administrators of the victim's estate, are entitled to disclosure of the defendant's Alford plea pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–124(f).  By order of the court, they are specifically authorized to further disclose and use the plea in the wrongful death action, subject to the conditions set forth herein.

I

All records and proceedings in the Superior Court for juvenile matters are presumed to be confidential.   See In re Brianna B., 66 Conn.App. 695, 699, 785 A.2d 1189 (2001).  Practice Book § 30a–8(a) provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all records maintained in juvenile matters brought before the judicial authority, either current or closed, including transcripts of hearings, shall be kept confidential.”  Practice Book § 30a–8(a).   Under General Statutes § 46b–124(c), “[a]ll records of cases of juvenile matters involving delinquency proceedings, or any part thereof, shall be confidential and for the use of the court in juvenile matters and shall not be disclosed except as provided in this section.”  General Statutes § 46b–124(c).  “Records of cases of juvenile matters” include “court records.”   General Statutes § 46b–124(a).  “Court records” in the juvenile court include the delinquency case records on file with the juvenile court clerk's office.  In re James B., Jr., 45 Conn.Sup. 315, 319, 714 A.2d 735 (1998).   A plea entered in a juvenile delinquency matter is part of the juvenile court record.  Id.

Article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut, as amended by article twenty-nine of the amendments, provides that “a victim, as the general assembly may define by law, shall have ․ the right to information about the arrest, conviction, sentence, imprisonment and release of the accused.”   Conn. Const., amend.   XXIX. A victim in a juvenile delinquency matter has the same right of access to information as the victim would have if the case were handled in the regular criminal court.  In re James B., Jr., supra, 45 Conn.Sup. at 319.  General Statutes § 46b–124(f) provides in pertinent part that “[r]ecords of cases of juvenile matters involving delinquency proceedings, or any part thereof, shall be available to the victim of the crime committed by such child to the same extent as the record of the case of a defendant in a criminal proceeding in the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court is available to a victim of the crime committed by such defendant ․” General Statutes § 46b–124(f).  A victim in a regular criminal case is entitled to be notified of “any judicial proceedings relating to the victim's case including (1) the arrest of the defendant, (2) the arraignment of the defendant, (3) the release of the defendant pending judicial proceedings, and (4) proceedings in the prosecution of the defendant, including the dismissal of the charges against the defendant, the entry of a nolle prosequi to the charges against the defendant, the entry of a plea of guilty by the defendant, and the trial and sentencing of the defendant.”  General Statutes § 51–286e(b).  Unlike a victim in a regular criminal proceeding, however, a victim in a juvenile delinquency matter is not permitted to further disclose information obtained from a juvenile court record, “except as specifically authorized by a subsequent order of the court.”  General Statutes § 46b–124(f).

General Statutes § 1–1k states that, except as otherwise provided in the General Statutes, a “victim of crime” or “crime victim” is defined as “an individual who suffers direct or threatened physical, emotional or financial harm as a result of a crime and includes immediate family members of a minor, incompetent individual or homicide victim.”  General Statutes § 1–1k.   General Statutes § 51–286e(a) provides that the term “ ‘victim’ includes the legal representative of the victim or a member of the deceased victim's immediate family.”  General Statutes § 51–286e(a).

II

The right of the petitioners to have access to the defendant's Alford plea is not in dispute.   The defendant's Alford plea is part of the juvenile court record in the defendant's juvenile delinquency case,³ and General Statutes § 46b–124(f) expressly provides that the record “shall be available to the victim of the crime committed by such child ․” General Statutes § 46b–124(f).  The petitioners, as members of the victim's immediate family and as his legal representatives, are “victims” as defined in General Statutes §§ 1–1k and 51–286e(a).   The sole issue here is whether the petitioners may further disclose or use the defendant's Alford plea in the wrongful death action.   They are seeking an order of the court, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–124(f), specifically authorizing them to do so.

This appears to be a case of first impression.   The last clause of § 46b–124(f), providing for further disclosure of juvenile court records upon a subsequent court order, was added to subsection (f) in the 2011 legislative session and became effective on October 1, 2011.⁴  Since the effective date, no decision, reported or unreported, appears to have set forth the standards or circumstances under which the court will specifically authorize a victim to further disclose or use confidential information from a juvenile court record pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–124(f).  Prior decisions relating to the initial disclosure of juvenile court records are instructive, however, in articulating the factors to be considered in deciding whether to authorize the further disclosure of confidential material from juvenile court files under § 46b–124(f).

In State v. Rashad C., Superior Court for juvenile matters at Tolland, Docket No. DO2764167 (Feb. 26, 2013;  Simon, J.) (55 Conn. L. Rptr. 642), the court determined that a victim's motion for disclosure and use of a juvenile defendant's police report was properly addressed under General Statutes § 46b–124(e), rather than under § 46b–124(f), because § 46b–124(f) applied only to information contained in the juvenile court file, which did not include the police report.  General Statutes § 46b–124(e) provides that “[r]ecords of cases of juvenile matters involving delinquency proceedings, or any part thereof, may be disclosed upon order of the court to any person who has a legitimate interest in the information and is identified in such order.   Records disclosed pursuant to this subsection shall not be further disclosed, except as specifically authorized by a subsequent order of the court.”   General Statutes § 46b–124(e).   The court explained that this subsection of the statute “provides an avenue to all third parties seeking disclosure, including victims, who have a ‘legitimate interest’ in the information.”   Rashad C., supra, 55 Conn. L. Rptr. 642.

To determine what constitutes a “legitimate interest” for purposes of disclosing a juvenile court record under § 46b–124(e), the court in Rashad C. began its analysis with our Supreme Court's decision in In re Sheldon G., 215 Conn. 563, 583 A.2d 112 (1990).⁵  In Sheldon G., the victim of a sexual assault sought access to all of the defendant's juvenile court records in connection with her civil action against the defendant and his father.   She sought disclosure of the records pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1982) § 46b–124(a),⁶ which provided in pertinent part that “records of cases of juvenile matters ․ shall be confidential and for the use of the court in juvenile matters, and open to inspection or disclosure to any third party, ․ only upon order of the superior court ․” General Statutes (Rev. to 1982) § 46b–124(a).   The court observed that, “[o]n its face, the statute enjoins confidentiality without precisely delineating the scope of the disclosure that the Superior Court may nonetheless order.”  Sheldon G., supra, 216 Conn. at 568.   After reviewing the legislative history of the statute as a whole, however, the court determined that “[t]he present language and structure of § 46b–124 reflects the legislature's frequent reconsideration of the competing interests involved in protecting the confidentiality of records regarding juveniles who have caused harm to others ․ Although the court has some residual discretion to order disclosure of records in circumstances not precisely addressed by the statute, its discretion must be informed by the policies that the statute is intended to advance.”  Id. at 584.

In Sheldon G., the court rejected the victim's argument that § 46b–124 of the General Statutes (Rev. to 1982) did not require a litigant to exhaust all other means of discovery before seeking disclosure of confidential juvenile court records.  Id. at 583.   The court noted that “[i]t is doubtful that any civil litigant pursuing a claim against a juvenile or his family could establish a need compelling enough to persuade a court to allow the litigant unrestricted access to all the information contained in juvenile records.   At most, on a sufficient showing of exhaustion of other sources of information, the litigant might seek an in camera review by the court to determine the existence of specific evidence.”  Id. at 584, n.17. A “bona fide good faith interest” was not enough for a litigant to have access to confidential juvenile court files.  Id. at 584.   The court concluded that “only a showing of compelling need could justify nonconsensual disclosure of any information contained in juvenile records for the purposes of civil litigation ․” Id.

The court in Rashad C. observed that in Sheldon G., the court highlighted three important factors in deciding whether to permit disclosure of confidential juvenile court files:  “1) the exhaustion of other resources;  2) the articulation of specific need for evidence;  and 3) an in camera review of the documents prior to disclosure.”  Rashad C., supra, 55 Conn. L. Rptr. 642.   The court noted that, although Sheldon G. was decided before subsections (e) and (f) of § 46b–124 were enacted,⁷ “these factors have been applied, either directly or indirectly, by subsequent courts in deciding similar disclosure issues in the context of 46b–124(e) and (f).”  Id. (citing and discussing Collins v. Carbee, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 529623 (June 28, 1995;  Hurley, J.) (15 Conn. L. Rptr. 66);  In re James B., Jr., supra, 45 Conn.Sup. 315 (1998);  In re Jessica, Superior Court, judicial district of Middletown (April 30, 1999;  Goldstein, J.) (25 Conn. L. Rptr. 388);  and Doe v. Castrovinci, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV–020087513–S (June 2, 2003;  Frazzini, J.) (34 Conn. L. Rptr. 662)).

In Collins v. Carbee, supra, 15 Conn. L. Rptr. 66, the court in a civil action granted the plaintiff's motion for release of police reports and any related statements from the defendant's juvenile court file.   The court found that the plaintiff had demonstrated a “compelling need” under General Statutes (Rev. to 1982) § 46b–124 because the information was only available in the juvenile court record, and the juvenile court had denied the plaintiff's request for disclosure.

In In re James B., Jr., supra, 45 Conn.Sup. at 321–22, the court addressed the issues of whether and to what extent a victim should have access to juvenile court records under General Statutes (Rev. to 1996) § 46b–124(e), and whether any records released to a victim could be used in a civil action.   The court observed that under the “recent expansion of victim rights” in General Statutes § 46b–124(e),⁸ a victim in the juvenile court had the same right to information as a victim in the regular adult court had.  Id. at 319, n.4. A victim had access to the record on file in the juvenile court clerk's office, but was not entitled to the information in the prosecutor's case file, unless the victim demonstrated a “legitimate interest” in a specific document, such as a police report, to satisfy General Statutes § 46b–124(d).  Id. at 323.   The court also found that, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1996) § 46b–124(d),⁹ a victim was “not permitted to use the actual records or documents released by the juvenile court in a civil action for damages.   The victim may, however, use the information contained in released documents to uncover evidence which is admissible in the civil case.”  Id. at 323–24.¹⁰

The court in In re Jessica, supra, 25 Conn. L. Rptr. 388, held that a defendant teacher in a civil action brought by four students and their parents had a “legitimate interest” under General Statutes (Rev. to 1998) § 46b–124(d) in the records of the underlying police investigation.¹¹  The court observed that, “[p]resumably, the juveniles have shared with their lawyer the information they gave the police.   To bar the teacher from that same information is to give the juveniles an unfair advantage in the civil lawsuit.   The teacher has a direct bona fide good faith personal interest, logical and reasonable, in the police records which are clearly relevant to the teacher's legal situation ․ The teacher has a ‘legitimate interest’ in the records which cannot be satisfied from any other source.”  Id.¹²

In Doe v. Castrovinci, supra, 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 662, the plaintiffs sought discovery of a defendant's juvenile court records in a civil action for damages resulting from an alleged sexual assault.   The plaintiffs claimed that their “legitimate interest” in the information entitled them to the release of the juvenile court records under General Statutes (Rev. to 2002) § 46b–124(d).  The court found that “the same caution exercised by the court in Sheldon regarding the release of juvenile records for use in civil damages actions remains valid today.   Before plaintiffs can show a ‘legitimate interest’ in disclosure of confidential juvenile records, they must, at minimum, display an inability to gain elsewhere the information they need to establish their case in other ways.”  Id.

After discussing these decisions, the court in Rashad C. concluded that “the underlying foundation of these cases ․ is the need to show a ‘compelling’ or ‘legitimate’ need for the information.”  Rashad C., supra, 55 Conn. L. Rptr. 642.   The court determined that the victim, who sought disclosure of the police report for use in a possible civil action, had not satisfied that requirement.  “A bare assertion of a potential lawsuit is not sufficient to meet the legitimate need standard.   The court is therefore unable to take the next step and conduct an in-camera review of the documents for relevant information if the nature of the information and its intended use remains obscure.”  Id. The court also declined to address the “appropriate use” of any information that might be disclosed to the victim in the future under General Statutes § 46b–124(e).  Id.

III

The standard articulated in Sheldon G. and its progeny—that a victim seeking disclosure of juvenile court records under General Statutes § 46b–124(e) ¹³ is required to demonstrate a “compelling need” or a “legitimate interest” to warrant the initial release of such information—should also be applied to a victim's petition for a court order specifically authorizing the subsequent use or further disclosure of juvenile court records that are released under General Statutes § 46b–124(f).  Nothing in the legislative history of the 2011 amendments to General Statutes §§ 46b–124(e) and (f) suggests that the court should depart from the principles set forth in Sheldon G.¹⁴ Therefore, before the court will specifically authorize the petitioners to use the defendant's Alford plea in the wrongful death action, the petitioners must demonstrate that they have a compelling need to use the plea in their civil case, and that they have exhausted all other avenues for obtaining and disclosing this information.¹⁵

The petitioners maintain that their request is a “targeted effort to obtain a single record—the record reflecting [the defendant's] guilty plea.” ¹⁶  They claim that they need to use the defendant's Alford plea to pursue the wrongful death action.   They indicate that the defendant has frustrated their inquiry by invoking his privilege against self-incrimination ¹⁷ in response to virtually all of the questions at his deposition, and that his parents, who are also defendants in the wrongful death action, have not been forthcoming.   Despite diligently pursuing discovery in the wrongful death action, the petitioners state that they have been unable to obtain information comparable to the juvenile court record of the defendant's Alford plea.   They argue that it simply “does not make sense” to give them access to the defendant's Alford plea but not to permit them to use the plea in the wrongful death action, citing Judge Quinn's April 1, 2011 testimony before the Judiciary Committee.¹⁸

In response, the defendant argues that there is no compelling need for the petitioners to use the defendant's Alford plea in the wrongful death action.   He maintains that they have not exhausted their resources or interviewed all potential witnesses.   The defendant also notes that there is no claim that the privilege against self-incrimination will extend beyond the conclusion of the juvenile court proceeding.¹⁹  The defendant observes that “[t]he petitioners do not claim that they are unable to proceed with their civil case, but rather that it is more difficult without a collateral estoppel argument based upon the desired publication and dissemination of confidential juvenile records.” ²⁰  The defendant also points out that the petitioners' counsel has had access to the prosecutor's file in this case,²¹ which has provided a “wealth of information.” ²²

In the state's view, “if the court is considering the further release of juvenile records the court should examine the petitioner's need to obtain the records (in this case a plea) while taking into consideration the expanded rights of victims in juvenile matters.” ²³  The state noted that the court in Rashad C. did not appear to be opposed to releasing the information to the victim following an in camera review if the victim satisfied the standards set forth by the court.

The court finds that the petitioners have shown a compelling need to further disclose or use the defendant's Alford plea in the wrongful death action.   No amount of fact discovery will uncover probative evidence comparable to the defendant's guilty plea under the Alford doctrine, which the petitioners themselves witnessed on August 27, 2013.   While the defendant was not required to admit his guilt when he entered the Alford plea, the defendant conceded, by entering an Alford plea, that the state's evidence against him was so strong that he was prepared to accept the entry of a guilty plea.²⁴  Undoubtedly, the petitioners' use of the defendant's Alford plea may affect the defense as well as the prosecution of the wrongful death action.  “[A] strong argument can be made that a guilty plea should absolutely foreclose a post-conviction claim of actual innocence ․” Johnson v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV–114003874 (Oct. 7, 2013;  Newson, J.).   In addition, because the defendant waived the privilege against self-incrimination when he entered the Alford plea,²⁵ the plea may have procedural as well as evidentiary significance in the wrongful death action, should the defendant choose to testify at the trial.

The defendant also argues that his Alford plea may not be used against him as an admission in the wrongful death action, citing State v. Rish, 17 Conn.App. 447, 553 A.2d 1145, cert. denied, 211 Conn. 802, 559 A.2d 1137 (1989).   The court in Rish held that “[a]s a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is the “functional equivalent” of a plea of nolo contendere, an Alford plea may not be used against the defendant as an admission in a subsequent civil case.”  Id. at 456.   In response, the state cites State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 205, 842 A.2d 567 (2004), in which our Supreme Court said that “[t]he entry of a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine carries the same consequences as a standard plea of guilty.”   The court in Faraday also noted, in comparing the legal effect of a guilty plea, an Alford plea, and a plea of nolo contendere, that “[t]he only practical difference is that the plea of nolo contendere may not be used against the defendant as an admission in a subsequent criminal or civil case.”  Id. at 205, n.17.

Ultimately, it is within the purview of the trial judge in the wrongful death action to determine whether and for what purpose the defendant's Alford plea will be admitted into evidence at trial.   See, e.g., State v. Simms, 211 Conn. 1, 557 A.2d 914, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 843, 110 S.Ct. 133, 107 L.Ed. 93 (1989) (trial court properly admitted transcript of Alford plea canvass of co-participant in the original crime for impeachment purposes, as a prior statement inconsistent with his trial testimony);  In re Tyshon H., Superior Court for juvenile matters at Windham, Docket Nos. W10CP1216263–66A (Jan. 28, 2013;  Dyer, J.) (court in child protection case found defendant's Alford plea to assault charge was probative evidence of neglect of child);  CPS Properties, Inc. v. Serrano, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. NBSP–056244 (Oct. 21, 2011;  Oliver, J.) (in summary process case, court held defendant's Alford plea to criminal possession of firearm showed defendant's actions constituted “serious nuisance”).   The role of this court is simply to decide whether the petitioners may further disclose or use the defendant's Alford plea pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–124(f) in the wrongful death action, and the court finds that they may do so.

IV

In granting the petition of the victim's parents, the court observes that the defendant is not foreclosed from moving under Practice Book § 11–20 (closure of courtroom in civil cases), Practice Book § 11–20A (sealing files or limiting disclosure of documents in civil cases), or Practice Book § 11–20A(h) (permission to use pseudonyms in civil cases) in the wrongful death action to preserve the confidentiality of the Alford plea that he entered in the juvenile court proceedings.   See Doe v. Roe, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV–116010525 (Jan. 7, 2013;  Taylor, J.) (55 Conn. L. Rptr. 323).   In Doe, the parents of a child who had been sexually assaulted by two other children brought a personal injury action against the juvenile defendants and their mother.   Eighteen months after the case was filed, the personal injury action and a related declaratory judgment action, brought by the defendants' insurance carrier, were settled.   The parties' settlement agreement provided that the files in both cases would be sealed.   From the time the personal injury case was commenced until a month after both cases were settled, all court filings included the names of all parties other than the victim, who was identified as “the Child.”   The defendants, and their insurance carrier on their behalf in the declaratory judgment action, belatedly moved for the use of pseudonyms in place of their legal names.²⁶  Rather than sealing the files as requested by the parties, the court entered an order for the plaintiffs to use pseudonyms to protect the identity of the victim and granted the motions for the defendants' use of pseudonyms.   The court found that “there is a protected interest associated with the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings, leading the court to conclude that there is an overriding public interest in protecting children and preserving their reputations from public exposure, despite the fact that the allegations against them may be abhorrent.”  Id. The court ordered the parties to prepare copies of all pleadings, which were to be identical to the pleadings that they had previously filed, except that they were to replace the parties' names with pseudonyms.   The new pleadings were to be substituted for the existing pleadings in the court file.  Id.

The court has taken judicial notice of the court file in the wrongful death action.   To date, it does not appear that the defendant and his parents have sought in that case to conceal the identity of the defendant or to preserve the confidentiality of the underlying facts, which were protected from public disclosure in the juvenile court proceedings.   Nothing in this decision precludes the defendant and his parents from moving under the applicable provisions of the Practice Book, if they choose to do so, to close the courtroom, to seal the court file, or to proceed under pseudonyms in the wrongful death action.   Ruling on such motions shall be solely within the province of the trial court.

V

For the reasons set forth above, the petition pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–124(f) of Ricardo P. and Katherine T., as co-administrators of the estate of their son, Nicholas P., to further disclose the juvenile court record of the defendant John K.'s guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is GRANTED, and it is hereby ORDERED that the petitioners are specifically authorized to further disclose the defendant's Alford plea in the petitioners' wrongful death action against the defendant and his parents, Glenn and Barbara K., as follows:

1. The petitioners may disclose the defendant's Alford plea during pre-trial discovery, trial preparation, and settlement negotiations.

2. The petitioners may disclose the defendant's Alford plea at trial, provided that the trial judge will determine whether and for what purpose the defendant's Alford plea may be admitted into evidence.

3. The petitioners may not otherwise disclose the defendant's Alford plea without a subsequent order of the court specifically authorizing such further disclosure.

BY THE COURT

HELLER, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. In accordance with General Statutes § 46b–124 and Practice Book § 32a–7, the names of the parties are not disclosed, and the records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest in the matter and only upon order of the court..  FN1. In accordance with General Statutes § 46b–124 and Practice Book § 32a–7, the names of the parties are not disclosed, and the records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest in the matter and only upon order of the court.

FN2. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)..  FN2. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).

FN3. The victim's parents and other immediate family members were also present in the courtroom when the defendant entered a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine.   The Connecticut constitution provides that a victim has the right to attend a trial and all other court proceedings that the accused has the right to attend.   Conn. Const., amend.   XXIX..  FN3. The victim's parents and other immediate family members were also present in the courtroom when the defendant entered a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine.   The Connecticut constitution provides that a victim has the right to attend a trial and all other court proceedings that the accused has the right to attend.   Conn. Const., amend.   XXIX.

FN4. Public Acts 2011, No. 11–157, Sec. 14.   The same clause was added to subsection (e) of General Statutes § 46b–124..  FN4. Public Acts 2011, No. 11–157, Sec. 14.   The same clause was added to subsection (e) of General Statutes § 46b–124.

FN5. When Sheldon G. was decided, General Statutes (Rev. to 1982) § 46b–124 did not specifically provide for disclosure of juvenile court records to victims..  FN5. When Sheldon G. was decided, General Statutes (Rev. to 1982) § 46b–124 did not specifically provide for disclosure of juvenile court records to victims.

FN6. The court noted that Sheldon G. was sentenced as an adult for the sexual assault on the movant.   If the case had been adjudicated in the juvenile court, disclosure to the victim under General Statutes (Rev. to 1982) § 46b–124 would have been limited to information concerning the disposition of the case and, under certain circumstances, the identity of the defendant.  Sheldon G., supra, 216 Conn. at 576, 584..  FN6. The court noted that Sheldon G. was sentenced as an adult for the sexual assault on the movant.   If the case had been adjudicated in the juvenile court, disclosure to the victim under General Statutes (Rev. to 1982) § 46b–124 would have been limited to information concerning the disposition of the case and, under certain circumstances, the identity of the defendant.  Sheldon G., supra, 216 Conn. at 576, 584.

FN7. These subsections were added as subsections (d) and (e), respectively, in the 1995 revision of General Statutes § 46b–124.   Public Acts 1995, No. 95–225..  FN7. These subsections were added as subsections (d) and (e), respectively, in the 1995 revision of General Statutes § 46b–124.   Public Acts 1995, No. 95–225.

FN8. The court noted the legislative history for Public Acts 1995, No. 95–225, with particular reference to the remarks of Representative Michael P. Lawlor indicating that the purpose of the bill was to provide victims with the same rights in the juvenile court as they had in the adult criminal court.  In re James B., Jr., supra, 45 Conn.Sup. at 318 (citing and quoting 38 H.R. Proc., Pt. 8, 1995 Sess., p. 2939, remarks of Representative Michael P. Lawlor)..  FN8. The court noted the legislative history for Public Acts 1995, No. 95–225, with particular reference to the remarks of Representative Michael P. Lawlor indicating that the purpose of the bill was to provide victims with the same rights in the juvenile court as they had in the adult criminal court.  In re James B., Jr., supra, 45 Conn.Sup. at 318 (citing and quoting 38 H.R. Proc., Pt. 8, 1995 Sess., p. 2939, remarks of Representative Michael P. Lawlor).

FN9. When In re James B., Jr. was decided, further disclosure of confidential information from juvenile court records was prohibited under both subsections (d) and (e) of General Statutes (Rev. to 1996) § 46b–124..  FN9. When In re James B., Jr. was decided, further disclosure of confidential information from juvenile court records was prohibited under both subsections (d) and (e) of General Statutes (Rev. to 1996) § 46b–124.

FN10. As discussed herein, effective October 1, 2011, a victim may further disclose records of juvenile delinquency proceedings as specifically authorized by subsequent order of the court.  General Statutes § 46b–124(f).  The petitioners are seeking a court order specifically authorizing them to do so..  FN10. As discussed herein, effective October 1, 2011, a victim may further disclose records of juvenile delinquency proceedings as specifically authorized by subsequent order of the court.  General Statutes § 46b–124(f).  The petitioners are seeking a court order specifically authorizing them to do so.

FN11. Because the charges against the juveniles were nolled, there was no juvenile court file.   The only existing record was that of the police investigation.  Id..  FN11. Because the charges against the juveniles were nolled, there was no juvenile court file.   The only existing record was that of the police investigation.  Id.

FN12. Judge Goldstein noted that “[a] review of Connecticut cases back to 1904 did not produce any definition of ‘legitimate interest.’  “ Id. The court reviewed decisions from other states that had adopted the “legitimate interest” test in determining whether to allow disclosure of juvenile court records.   See, e.g., Ex Parte State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 529 So.2d 975 (Alabama 1988);  Hickey v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 782 P.2d 1136 (Nev.1989)..  FN12. Judge Goldstein noted that “[a] review of Connecticut cases back to 1904 did not produce any definition of ‘legitimate interest.’  “ Id. The court reviewed decisions from other states that had adopted the “legitimate interest” test in determining whether to allow disclosure of juvenile court records.   See, e.g., Ex Parte State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 529 So.2d 975 (Alabama 1988);  Hickey v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 782 P.2d 1136 (Nev.1989).

FN13. See, e.g., Rashad C., supra, 55 Conn. L. Rptr. 642.  General Statutes § 46b–124(e) is the applicable statute when a victim is seeking information, such as a police report, that is not maintained in the juvenile delinquency case file in the juvenile court clerk's office..  FN13. See, e.g., Rashad C., supra, 55 Conn. L. Rptr. 642.  General Statutes § 46b–124(e) is the applicable statute when a victim is seeking information, such as a police report, that is not maintained in the juvenile delinquency case file in the juvenile court clerk's office.

FN14. The Chief Court Administrator, the Hon. Barbara M. Quinn, explained in her April 1, 2011 testimony before the Judiciary Committee that the purpose of the amendment was simply to “[a]uthorize judges to fashion orders allowing for further disclosure of records to persons specified by the judge.   There are times when it does not make sense, for example, to allow a victim access to juvenile records but forbid them from using that information.”   Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 18, 2011 Sess., p. 5932, testimony of Hon. Barbara M. Quinn, Chief Court Administrator..  FN14. The Chief Court Administrator, the Hon. Barbara M. Quinn, explained in her April 1, 2011 testimony before the Judiciary Committee that the purpose of the amendment was simply to “[a]uthorize judges to fashion orders allowing for further disclosure of records to persons specified by the judge.   There are times when it does not make sense, for example, to allow a victim access to juvenile records but forbid them from using that information.”   Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 18, 2011 Sess., p. 5932, testimony of Hon. Barbara M. Quinn, Chief Court Administrator.

FN15. A separate in camera review of the juvenile court record is not necessary.   The court accepted the defendant's Alford plea on August 27, 2013, and the plea is part of the court record..  FN15. A separate in camera review of the juvenile court record is not necessary.   The court accepted the defendant's Alford plea on August 27, 2013, and the plea is part of the court record.

FN16. Petition Pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46b–124 for the Disclosure of Records of a Juvenile Matter (Petition), dated August 27, 2013, at 10..  FN16. Petition Pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46b–124 for the Disclosure of Records of a Juvenile Matter (Petition), dated August 27, 2013, at 10.

FN17. The privilege against self-incrimination is protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution.   The privilege is also set forth in article first, § 8 of the Connecticut constitution and in General Statutes §§ 51–35(b) and 52–199(a)..  FN17. The privilege against self-incrimination is protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution.   The privilege is also set forth in article first, § 8 of the Connecticut constitution and in General Statutes §§ 51–35(b) and 52–199(a).

FN18. Petition at 9..  FN18. Petition at 9.

FN19. “When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives important fundamental constitutional rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination ․” (Citations omitted.)  State v. Johnson, 253 Conn. 1, 34, 751 A.2d 298 (2000)..  FN19. “When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives important fundamental constitutional rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination ․” (Citations omitted.)  State v. Johnson, 253 Conn. 1, 34, 751 A.2d 298 (2000).

FN20. Memorandum in Opposition to the Petition to Disclose Records, dated September 30, 2013, at 3–4 (Memorandum in Opposition)..  FN20. Memorandum in Opposition to the Petition to Disclose Records, dated September 30, 2013, at 3–4 (Memorandum in Opposition).

FN21. Affidavit of David S. Golub in Support of Petition Pursuant to Gen.Stat. § 46b–124 for the Disclosure of a Juvenile Record, dated August 27, 2013, at 2..  FN21. Affidavit of David S. Golub in Support of Petition Pursuant to Gen.Stat. § 46b–124 for the Disclosure of a Juvenile Record, dated August 27, 2013, at 2.

FN22. Memorandum in Opposition at 3. The defendant notes that he was unaware of and, therefore, did not consent to the petitioners' access to the prosecutor's file.  Id. at 3, n.2. Whether the petitioners may have access to the prosecutor's file should be determined by the court pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–124(e)..  FN22. Memorandum in Opposition at 3. The defendant notes that he was unaware of and, therefore, did not consent to the petitioners' access to the prosecutor's file.  Id. at 3, n.2. Whether the petitioners may have access to the prosecutor's file should be determined by the court pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–124(e).

FN23. State's Memorandum Regarding Disclosure of a Guilty Plea in a Juvenile Matter to a Civil Court, dated October 29, 2013, at 4..  FN23. State's Memorandum Regarding Disclosure of a Guilty Plea in a Juvenile Matter to a Civil Court, dated October 29, 2013, at 4.

FN24. “Under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), a criminal defendant is not required to admit his guilt, but consents to being punished as if he were guilty to avoid the risk of proceeding to trial ․ A guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is a judicial oxymoron in that the defendant does not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state's evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to accept the entry of a guilty plea nevertheless.”  (Citation omitted;  emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Daniels, 248 Conn. 64, 66–67, n.2, 726 A.2d 520 (1999)..  FN24. “Under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), a criminal defendant is not required to admit his guilt, but consents to being punished as if he were guilty to avoid the risk of proceeding to trial ․ A guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is a judicial oxymoron in that the defendant does not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state's evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to accept the entry of a guilty plea nevertheless.”  (Citation omitted;  emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Daniels, 248 Conn. 64, 66–67, n.2, 726 A.2d 520 (1999).

FN25. See State v. Johnson, supra, 253 Conn. at 34;  Williams v. Reincke, 157 Conn. 143, 147–49, 249 A.2d 252 (1968) (“A guilty plea, when entered knowingly, voluntarily and on the advice of counsel, constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defenses”)..  FN25. See State v. Johnson, supra, 253 Conn. at 34;  Williams v. Reincke, 157 Conn. 143, 147–49, 249 A.2d 252 (1968) (“A guilty plea, when entered knowingly, voluntarily and on the advice of counsel, constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defenses”).

FN26. The court in Doe observed that, “[s]omewhat ironically, the plaintiffs [had] never sought an order for pseudonyms to protect the name of the victim from being discovered through the names of his parents.”   Id..  FN26. The court in Doe observed that, “[s]omewhat ironically, the plaintiffs [had] never sought an order for pseudonyms to protect the name of the victim from being discovered through the names of his parents.”   Id.

Heller, Donna Nelson, J.