Darran M. Bornn v. Brittany D. Bornn (2014)

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

All dissolution of marriage cases are sad especially when a custody dispute is involved.   This matter is sadder than most.   It is sadder than most cases because there was no dispute between the parents as to how to raise the children, what their religious upbringing might be, or any other significant parenting issue.   Both parents were actively involved in the raising of their two sons and the boys were doing well.   The testimony of all the various witnesses for both sides agreed that each was a loving and more than competent parent.   They owned a nice house and did not have any significant financial problems.   There was only one dispute:  whether the children be raised in Connecticut or in Boise, Idaho.

The defendant testified without equivocation that she was planning to return to her hometown even if it meant going without her two children.   She was not happy living in South Kent, Connecticut, where she and her husband and first child had resided since the summer of 2007.   She was not happy living there after the birth of her second child in 2009.   It was not that there was anything really wrong with that location other than it was not Boise, Idaho, where her immediate and extended family resides.   In his closing argument to the court, counsel for the plaintiff argued that the defendant's insistence on relocating was evidence of poor judgment and perhaps even selfish.   The court agrees.

The trial was handled extremely competently by both counsel and proceeded more quickly than originally estimated.   Testimony began on Monday January 6, 2014 and was completed on Wednesday January 8, 2014.   The court heard testimony from both parties, the paternal grandparents, the sister of the plaintiff (the paternal aunt), the maternal grandfather, the brother of the defendant (the maternal uncle), the defendant's best and oldest friend, the family relations evaluator, a vocation expert, a psychologist, and the guardian ad litem (GAL).   Numerous exhibits were offered and accepted into evidence, all without objection by either party.   There were no disputes over most of the factual information presented and very few objections raised by counsel.   These are very nice people with very nice families who have raised two young boys extremely well;  they just could not agree on where they should live.   All of the witnesses, both fact and expert, were completely credible in their testimony.

The plaintiff is a corporate pilot employed by a family-run investment company.   His base airport is in Oxford, Connecticut, which he testified is approximately a forty-five-minute commute.   The nature of his employment was such that he was actively working away from home on an annual average of approximately ten out of the thirty days in any given month, and correspondingly he was home for the twenty days in that average month.¹  When he flew, his absence from home typically lasted four to five days at a time or less, but there have been assignments in which he has been away for as long as two to three weeks.   There have also been several months during which he was away for about one-half of the time or even, on occasion, more than half of the days.   He testified that there were two factors that would minimize his longer assignments in the future.   First, most of the very long assignments had been training for qualification on a new aircraft mandated by the Federal Aviation Authority and his company policy.   He was now rated on all the aircrafts owned by his company and he testified that the company was working to limit the different types of aircrafts they maintained as part of their corporate fleet.   Accordingly, he claimed that long training assignments were not likely in the predictable future.   Secondly, he had recently been promoted and given more administrative duties, which would reduce his flying time.

The plaintiff is in his early forties and in excellent health according to his testimony.   He has been employed by his present company since late March 2009.   Prior to his current position, he was a corporate pilot for Citigroup, Inc., but had been laid off in late 2008 during the economic crisis that began that fall.   In earlier years, he had worked as an airline pilot for Mesa Airlines, and prior to that he was a fitness trainer and gymnasium manager.   In his current position, he earns approximately $174,000 gross annually.

The defendant is in her mid-thirties and states that she is in good health.   She holds a master's degree in occupational therapy and has worked in that field in the past.   Since she has been in Connecticut, she has been a full-time mother and homemaker, but did work in a local school system as an occupational therapist for a period of time when the plaintiff was out of work.   This past July, she accepted a flex time position as an occupational therapist with the Idaho Elks Rehabilitation Hospital in Boise, Idaho.   She did work a four-hour shift as part of her orientation for that position, but that is the only earnings she has had for the entire year of 2013 and to date this year.   The position she obtained pays her an hourly salary of $33.28 and is pro re nata (P.R.N.), “as needed,” position.   If she worked a forty-hour week, her gross income would be $1,331.20, which would translate to an annual income of approximately $69,000.   The plaintiff presented expert testimony that if employed in this area as an occupational therapist, the defendant could earn $70,000 to $110,000 gross annually.   The defendant did not take exception to that salary range when questioned about the expert's opinion.   That expert also testified to the very healthy employment prospects for occupational therapists in this geographical area, which again was not disputed.   There is, therefore, no controversy over whether the defendant could be meaningfully employed in her profession in this area.   One problem to that, however, is that the defendant did not maintain her Connecticut license to practice in her profession.   She did maintain her national license and her Idaho license, but her Connecticut license apparently expired July 31, 2009.   The defendant explained that lapse on the more demanding nature of the continuing educational requirements of the Connecticut licensing.   She testified that she could not do online course work to meet her requirements in Connecticut, but could do that for the Idaho licensing.   The plaintiff's vocational expert testified that online work would be acceptable for Connecticut continuing education.   She also testified that re-certification would require the defendant earning a total of twenty-four credits of continuing educational course work.   One must wonder why the Connecticut license was allowed to lapse and wonder what the motivation for doing that might have been.

The essence of the defendant's position is that she cannot rely on the plaintiff to maintain a consistent parenting schedule due to the demands of his employment.   Further, she believes that because he is unable to maintain any schedule, she must be in Boise where she would enjoy an extensive support system of family and friends that she does not have in Connecticut.   It was her position that her proposed schedule offered the plaintiff specific holidays and vacation time, which would be easier for him to follow than a regular access schedule.   When asked by the court, the defendant testified that a flight from Connecticut to Boise, Idaho requires two three-hour flights with a plane change in Minneapolis and the best price for the ticket ordering in advance ranges from $500 to $600.   Since these children are far too young to travel alone, especially with a stopover, it will require three tickets to bring the children to Connecticut.   Even if the plaintiff travels to Idaho to spend time with the children, such travel for a three- or four-day weekend around a school holiday would be questionable, especially during the winter months, and at best require a day's travel in each direction.   Given the weather conditions we have experienced the past few years, regular holiday access by the plaintiff, even in Idaho, is questionable and uncertain except for the summer months.   It is very difficult to justify depriving the children of their father based on such a schedule and the realities of modern travel.

The defendant further testified that she was not doing well living in Connecticut, she would be better in Idaho, and the children would be better if she is doing better.   She offered testimony and numerous exhibits about the many benefits of living in Boise, Idaho, including recreational benefits, educational services, and cultural advantages.   Additionally, the defendant presented evidence that the children had spent many vacations in Boise with extended family and friends and, as a result, they are very comfortable with many, if not all, these people.   In fact, some of her family and one friend actually traveled to Connecticut to participate as character witnesses for the defendant during the trial.²

The plaintiff did not question that Boise is a wonderful place to grow up and that the defendant has a wonderful extended family and many dedicated friends.   He does question that the defendant lacks support in Connecticut.   The evidence indicated that his parents and sister have been available and supportive of his family ever since the family moved to Connecticut.   The paternal grandparents live very close to the family and the children have spent considerable time with them.   That was not disputed by the defendant.   Additionally, the defendant testified on cross examination of at least two close friends in the area that have been able to assist her from time to time.   It was his position that although his schedule could be changed at the last minute from time to time, he was actively involved with both his children and home two-thirds of the time.

The family relations evaluation did not support the defendant's desire to relocate out of state.   The counselor who did the work, Gayle Anderson, testified about her protocol in approaching this family's conflict and how she reached the conclusions she offered to the court for its consideration.   Her qualifications and efforts were impressive to the court and her evaluation report and testimony were found to be credible.   The recommendation against the relocation was based on the counselor's opinion that while the move would benefit the defendant it would not be in the best interests of the two minor children.   She opined:

[G]iven [the children's] age and level of maturity, [i]t will be very difficult for them to cognitively and emotionally process the dissolution of their intact family unit ․ This disruption and accompanying stress experienced by the children resulting from the parent's divorce will be compounded should this event coincide with significant reduction in the frequency of their interactions with the father.   It is not appropriate to put any child through such stress if it is avoidable.3

Plaintiff's Exhibit # 16, 10.

This opinion was supported and seconded by the testimony of the GAL. Attorney Snearly was appointed by the court to act as GAL on the agreement of the parties and started her work for the benefit of the children in July 2012.⁴  She reviewed her efforts and the contacts she made over the last eighteen months.   The GAL testified that relocating the children to Idaho and separating them from regular and consistent access with their father would be potentially harmful to them at this stage of their development.   It would be very risky, she noted, to separate them from either parent;  this was in response to the defendant's position that she would leave Connecticut with or without the children.

The plaintiff called Sidney Horowitz, Ph.D., as an expert witness on the possible affect of a relocating to Idaho on the children.   The defendant did not object to Dr. Horowitz's qualifications as an expert in this matter.   He opined that there were no indications in this case that the children's time with either parent needed to be restricted given that there was no domestic violence, no substance abuse, or even outward hostility between the parents that the children have observed.   Distance from their father, or either parent, at this point in their development would be upsetting and detrimental to their emotional growth.   The defendant did not object to this opinion other than to point out that the divorce will require the family unit to divide into two family units;  that some disruption in the children's lives is inevitable whether the parents are in two different states or across the street from one another.

The defendant's response to these opinions is that the children are resilient and will be fine because they will have a wonderful support group who love them in Boise.   She testified that her parents were divorced early in her childhood and she not only survived the split, but has wonderful relationships with both parents to this day.   She also testified that she moved numerous times during her childhood and that was a benefit to her in her growth and education.   She further believes that the lack of consistent schedule for the access of the children and their father is more harmful to the children than living in Idaho.   She also argued that the plaintiff's parenting with the children has been more play and fun oriented rather than the more routine duties until the dissolution commenced.   She was not sure he had the appropriate parenting skills to care for the children full time.

This testimony was not supported by the facts presented to the court and, in fact, she left the children with the plaintiff for an extended period of time when she traveled to Idaho this past summer without the children.   It is not uncommon for parental roles to change once the family structure is changed due to a dissolution of marriage action;  that is certainly the case with this family.

Although the court has a clear constitutional and statutory obligation to be fair and equitable in its decision to the parties, its over-riding duty is to protect the best interests of the minor children.   In devising its orders, the court must look to the criteria of the various statutes dealing with custody of minor children.⁵  General Statutes § 46b–56(b) directs the court to enter custody orders “that serve the best interests of the child and provide the child with active and consistent involvement of both parents commensurate with their abilities and interests.”   That statute goes on to enumerate sixteen separate factors for the court to consider in devising such orders.   Some of those factors that seem most pertinent to this case would include “the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child ․ the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent ․ [and] the mental ․ health of all individuals involved ․” General Statutes § 46b–56(c).

The “best interest of the child” standard is the ultimate basis of a court's custody decision.  Knock v. Knock, 224 Conn. 776, 789, 621 A.2d 267 (1993).   The gender of the parents is not considered by the court and there is no automatic presumption favoring the mother as custodial parent.  Presutti v. Presutti, 181 Conn. 622, 627–28, 436 A.2d 299 (1980);  Hurtado v. Hurtado, 14 Conn.App. 296, 301–02, 541 A.2d 873 (1988).   Either parent can be awarded custody and the issue “is not which parent was the better custodian in the past but which is the better custodian now.”  Yontef v. Yontef, 185 Conn. 275, 283, 440 A.2d 899 (1981).

Furthermore, a proposed residence in a new area is clearly a relevant factor for the court to consider, but there is no automatic presumption in favor of having children remain within the state.  Presutti v. Presutti, 181 Conn. 622, 436 A.2d 299 (1980) (seen in the context of residence outside United States).   Courts have found that residence outside Connecticut is just one factor to be considered in deciding whether it is in the best interest of the child to be in the custody of the individual in question.  Id., 635 (with respect to upbringing of child and parental functions of meeting on ongoing basis emotional, physical, psychological and spiritual needs of child, question of which parent can better fulfill role as custodial parent is more significant in determining best interests of child than particular country in which role will be fulfilled).   See also Blake v. Blake, 207 Conn. 217, 541 A.2d 1201 (1988).   A parent's proposed relocation with the children outside the state does not preclude an award of joint legal custody pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–56(a).   In the view of our Supreme court, the parents need not reside within close proximity of each other in order to share decision making with respect to the child in question.  Blake v. Blake, supra, 221–23.

All of the professionals in this matter continue to recommend that the defendant be the primary parent if she remains in Connecticut.   There is no doubt that she is a wonderful and committed mother, which makes her stated plans all the more surprising.   Her testimony was that she is perfectly healthy, both mentally and physically, but that her mental health may not continue to be positive if she remains in Connecticut.   How she might react to future events is too speculative for the court to consider;  her parenting skills and abilities are well established.   The court must accept the defendant at her word and rule accordingly, while hoping that the defendant will do what is best for her children when she is faced with the reality of the situation.   It is certainly clear that the best interests of the children would not be served by relocating them to a far distant state without their father, and those best interests would not be served by their mother moving without them.   Cf. Blake v. Blake, supra, 207 Conn. 223–37 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that best interests of children would be promoted by allowing plaintiff to live near family in California, where all of children had been born and had lived until 1983, and by providing liberal rights of visitation to defendant, whose financial resources were ample to enable him to exercise them).   This decision must be made on those best interests.   Future motions to modify the orders entered by this decision should certainly look back on what actions each party will have taken after receiving those orders to protect the best interests of their two minor children.⁶

Before delving into the financial issues, it would be grossly unfair to these parties not to comment on their behavior during the pendency of this litigation.   Most files that reach the Regional Family Trial Docket are multi-volume and the docketing numbers for motions files are well into the two hundreds, or even in the four hundreds.   In this case, the file is extremely thin and contains little beyond the pleadings required by the rules of practice.   The docket numbering ends in the one hundred thirties, which means that less than forty different items were filed in the entire eighteen-month litigation period and most of those filings were procedural in nature or compliance type filings.   There are no pendente lite orders for support or parenting.   These parties have lived together and co-parented their two small children totally on their own.   This is of great significance to the court and is an excellent predictor of their ability to co-parent their children in the post-dissolution stage of their lives.   The court commends the parties for acting in the best interests of their children and for protecting them from the issues associated with the end of a marriage and the splitting of the family unit.   The fact that by all accounts the children are totally unaware that a dissolution action is even pending will require the court to issue some interim orders to create a transition period to allow the parties to separate in a reasonable period and in a calm environment.

As to the financial issues, the defendant is asking for alimony, child support, and the return of the money she invested in their first home in Idaho as the down payment.   The plaintiff agrees that some limited alimony would be appropriate given the fact that she is not currently employed and is not currently licensed in this state.   He contests the amount that the defendant has requested and contests the term she has proposed.

“[T]he trial court may under appropriate circumstances in a marital dissolution proceeding base financial awards on the earning capacity of the parties rather than on actual earned income ․ Earning capacity, in this context, is not an amount which a person can theoretically earn, nor is it confined to actual income, but rather it is an amount which a person can realistically be expected to earn considering such things as his vocational skills, employability, age and health ․ [I]t also is especially appropriate for the court to consider whether the defendant has wilfully restricted his earning capacity to avoid support obligations ․ Moreover, [l]ifestyle and personal expenses may serve as the basis for imputing income where conventional methods for determining income are inadequate.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Auerbach v. Auerbach, 113 Conn.App. 318, 334–35, 966 A.2d 292, cert. denied, 292 Conn. 901, 971 A.2d 40 (2009).   As was stated above, there is no dispute as to the ability of the defendant to be meaningfully employed with an ability to earn an annual gross income of at least $70,000.   That capacity cannot be immediately realized if the defendant remains in Connecticut, given her lack of current accreditation to practice her profession.   Clearly, the amount and term of any such rehabilitative alimony would be very different depending on where the defendant elected to reside.   She would need some financial support regardless of whether the defendant moves or stays, but she would need additional help in Connecticut due to the higher cost of living and the fact that her license is not currently valid.

As for the original down payment for their first home, the plaintiff does not contest the fact that approximately $32,000 out of a $40,000 inheritance was used as the defendant stated.   It is his position that the home was sold for a profit and that profit, along with money the couple saved by living with his parents for eight months, was used to buy their present home.   The parties do not dispute that there is no substantial equity in the marital home and few other assets that could be liquidated to repay the inheritance.   The current fair market value of the marital home based on the undisputed appraisal of the property presented by the plaintiff is $272,000 as of early November 2013 and the present balance of the mortgage is $273,581.⁷  It is clear that there is no equity in the property at this time, but there had been some significant equity earlier in the year.

Having reviewed carefully the testimony of the parties and the other witnesses including their demeanor while on the stand, as well as the items presented to the court as evidence and the statutory criteria of the appropriate statutes and case law of our state, the court makes the following findings of fact:

A. The court has jurisdiction over this matter;

B. All statutory stays have expired;

C. The allegations of the complaint have been proven;

D. The marriage has broken down irretrievably and there is no reasonable hope of reconciliation;

E. The court cannot attribute the fault for the breakdown of this marriage to either parent more than the other;

F. There are two children issue of the marriage, to wit:  Coleton born April 5, 2007 and Bennett born April 18, 2009;

G. Neither party nor the children has been the recipient of any state or municipal assistance during the marriage;

H. Joint legal custody would be in the best interests of the minor children given the quality of parenting skills and co-parenting communication exhibited by these parties;

I. It would not be in the best interests of the minor children for them to leave the state of Connecticut unless both parents relocated with them;

J. It would not be in the best interests of the minor children to be separated from either parent;

K. The plaintiff earns a gross salary of $174,000 annually;

L. The defendant has an earning capacity of $70,000 gross annually, but that capacity could not be accomplished immediately should the defendant remain in the state of Connecticut;

M. The Child Support Guidelines ⁸ state a presumed support of $403 per week if support is paid by the plaintiff to the defendant and $157 per week if support is paid by the defendant to the plaintiff; ⁹

N. Had the family remained intact, it is more likely than not that the parents would have supported their children in their post-secondary educational efforts;

O. In the event the defendant relocates to the state of Idaho, it would be inequitable and inappropriate to follow the presumed support given the high cost of transportation that will be necessary to allow an ongoing relationship between the plaintiff and the minor children;

P. A period of rehabilitative alimony would be appropriate to assist the defendant transition back into the workforce whether in Connecticut or in Idaho;

Q. The plaintiff has liquid assets in the amount of $21,678, not counting minimal bank accounts;

R. The defendant has liquid assets in the amount of $14,000, not counting minimal bank accounts;

S. The plaintiff has deferred income assets in the amount of $182,463;

T. The defendant has deferred income assets in the amount of $37,657;  and

U. The GAL's affidavit of fees in the amount of $29,347.50, representing 90.30 hours at the rate of $325 per hour, is found to be fair and reasonable given the nature of this case and both parties joined in that conclusion.

In light of the findings of the court and in consideration of all of the factors enumerated above, the court hereby

ORDERS

I. The marriage of the parties is dissolved;

II. The parties shall share joint legal custody of the two minor children;

III. If both parents remain in the state of Connecticut, the parties shall share primary custodial duties on the following rotating two-week schedule:

A.  The children shall be with the plaintiff from after school on Thursdays through return to school on Monday in the first week;

B. They shall be with the plaintiff from after school on Wednesday the following week and return to school on Friday;

C. In the event that there is no school on any exchange day, the parent whose custodial time is starting shall pick up the children from the other parent's home at 6 p.m.;

IV. If both parents remain in the state of Connecticut, the parents shall share holidays and vacations as follows:

A.  The children shall spend the Thanksgiving holiday weekend, from Wednesday after school to return to school on the following Monday morning, with the plaintiff;

B. The children shall spend the Christmas holiday with the defendant and said holiday shall be defined as from release from school at the start of the Christmas vacation to the return to school at the end of said vacation;

C. The children shall spend the Easter weekend with the plaintiff commencing on release from school on Thursday before Good Friday to the return to school on the following Monday;

D. Each parent shall spend their parent's day, i.e., Mother's Day or Father's Day, with the children from Saturday at 6 p.m. to return to school on Monday;

E.  The parties shall alternate other extended or week long school vacations with the plaintiff having the first to occur and alternating thereafter;

F. Each party shall be entitled to four weeks of vacation during the summer period;

1.  Each party shall propose their requested vacation schedule to the other party in writing no later than May 1st of each year;

2.  If there is a conflict of schedules that cannot be resolved, the plaintiff's schedule shall prevail in all even years and the defendant's schedule shall prevail in all odd years;

V. If the defendant relocates to Idaho as indicated, the parties shall adhere to the following schedule:

A.  The defendant shall have liberal and flexible access to the children both in the state of Connecticut and the state of Idaho as the parties may agree and agreement shall not be unreasonably denied by the plaintiff;

B. In the absence of an agreement, the defendant shall have the minor children for the Christmas holiday, as detailed in § IV.B above;

C. The defendant shall have the spring school vacation if there is one in the school's calendar;

D. The defendant shall have six (6) continuous weeks vacation during the summer and she shall control the scheduling of those six weeks except that the plaintiff shall have access to the children in the state of Idaho for a period not less than six consecutive days at his election;

E.  The cost and the responsibility for transportation related to custodial access shall be the defendant's except for the plaintiff's travel to Idaho;

F. The minor children are not to travel to or from Idaho alone until further order of the court;

G. No summer vacation schedule shall keep the minor children away from their primary residence for the last five (5) days prior to the start of the school year;

VI. Miscellaneous custodial orders:

A.  Neither parent shall relocate either minor child outside of the state of Connecticut without the express written consent of the other parent or by further order of the court;

B. Both parents shall have reasonable telephone access to the children when they are not in his/her respective custody;

1.  In no event shall a parent withhold telephone contact with the children from the other parent;

2.  Each parent shall instruct any child care provider not to withhold such contact as a form of discipline or otherwise;

C. The parents may alter the above schedule by mutual agreement;

D. When a parent exercises vacation or holiday time with the minor children that includes commercial or private travel away from that parent's residence for more than one overnight stay, a complete itinerary, address, telephone number and names of others traveling with the minor children shall be provided to the other parent as soon as such arrangements are made, or in no event later than seven (7) days before the intended travel;

E.  Both parents shall keep each other reasonably informed of their respective addresses, changes in telephone numbers, employment, and marital status;

F. Each parent shall make reasonable provisions for the opportunity for the children to “Skype” or “FaceTime” with the other parent whenever the children are away from the other parent for at least five (5) consecutive days or on significant days of celebration such as birthdays, graduations and the like;

G. The parents shall consult with one another on all significant decisions relating to the education, health, religious upbringing and general welfare of the minor children, and shall not engage in any unilateral decisions of this type other than in an emergency situation;

H. Each parent shall keep the other parent fully and timely informed regarding the education, health, religious upbringing and general welfare of the minor children;

I.  Each parent shall cooperate with the other parent to assure that all providers of professional services to the minor children are aware of the custodial orders and have the other parent's contact information;

J. Each party shall work to ensure that the minor children enjoy a positive relationship with their extend families on both sides, they shall refrain from making any derogatory or negative comments about the other parent and the other parent's family and shall ensure that their extended family and friends do not engage in such comments as well;

VII. In the event the defendant relocates to the state of Idaho, the court shall not issue an immediate child support order, but shall deviate from the Guidelines in consideration of the significant travel expenses the defendant will incur under the above orders;

VIII. In the event the defendant does not relocate to the state of Idaho, the court orders the plaintiff to pay to the defendant as weekly child support the sum of $403 in accordance with the Guideline determination;

IX. The plaintiff shall continue to provide medical and dental insurance coverage for the minor children as it is available to him through his employment at reasonable expense;

A.  If the defendant relocates to the state of Idaho and insurance coverage in that state is more appropriate, this order shall be modified to accomplish the best coverage for the children that is available;

B. If the defendant is residing in Idaho, the parties shall share equally all of the unreimbursed and/or uncovered medical and dental expenses for the minor children as well as any child care expenses incurred to allow the custodial parent to be employed as is defined in the Guidelines;

C. If the defendant is residing in Connecticut, the plaintiff shall contribute 47 percent of the unreimbursed and/or uncovered medical and dental expenses for the minor children and 47 percent of necessary child care;

D. No activity shall be proposed to the children without first reaching agreement as to such activity with the other parent;

E.  No activity shall be proposed or engaged in if such activity shall negatively impact the access schedule detailed above unless specifically agreed to by the parent whose access time will be affected;

X. The court shall retain jurisdiction for post-secondary educational orders pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–56c;

XI. The plaintiff shall be entitled to claim both children as dependents for income tax filings and the defendant shall execute and deliver to the plaintiff the necessary IRS form 8332 or its replacement for use in all filings commencing with the tax year 2013;

XII. If the defendant relocates to the state of Idaho, the plaintiff shall pay to her periodic alimony at the rate of $250 per week;

A.  Said alimony shall terminate upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the defendant;

B. Said alimony shall terminate after 104 weekly payments;

C. Said alimony shall be subject to changes as set forth in General Statues § 46b–86(b);

D. Said alimony shall be taxable income to the defendant and shall act to reduce the plaintiff's adjusted gross income;

XIII. If the defendant remains in the state of Connecticut, or if she leaves and returns to reside here after a period not to exceed ninety (90) days, the plaintiff shall pay to her periodic alimony at the rate of $350 per week;

A.  Said alimony shall terminate upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the defendant;

B. Said alimony shall terminate after 260 weekly payments;

C. Said alimony shall be subject to changes as set forth in General Statues § 46b–86(b);

D. Said alimony shall be taxable income to the defendant and shall act to reduce the plaintiff's adjusted gross income;

XIV. As long as either party has any financial obligation to the other party or to the children under the provisions of these orders, they shall each maintain life insurance on their own life in the amount of $500,000 so long as they can purchase such insurance without having to pay a rated premium;

A.  In the event that they cannot purchase that level of coverage without a rated premium, they shall purchase as much as they can for a premium that is not rated;

B. They shall each provide the other with proof of such coverage on the anniversary of this judgment;

C. Said insurance shall name the other parent as the irrevocable beneficiary of said policy;

D. This provision shall be modifiable;

XV. The defendant shall transfer to the plaintiff by quit claim deed all of her right, title and interest in the marital home located at 40 Highland Road, South Kent, Connecticut within thirty (30) days of this judgment;

A.  The plaintiff shall be solely liable for all costs of said real property both past, present and future and shall hold the defendant harmless and shall indemnify her from all such liability;

B. The plaintiff shall take all reasonable steps to refinance the current mortgage obligation on said property or otherwise remove the defendant's name from the mortgage note and deed;

C. All reasonable steps shall be defined as applying to at least two mortgage lenders annually for the five consecutive years commencing with January 2016;

XVI. Notwithstanding the language of ¶ XV above, the defendant shall have exclusive use and occupancy of the marital home for a period not to exceed sixty (60) days from the date of the judgment;

A.  During this interim period, the parties shall work to divide and allocate their personal property and household furnishings in an equitable manner;

1.  In the event they are unable to achieve that goal, the matter shall be referred to binding arbitration for resolution;

2.  The arbiter shall be selected by the two counsel and the GAL;

3.  The parties shall share equally the cost of said arbitration;

B. The parties shall also, with the assistance of the GAL, inform the children of the court's orders to a degree and in language appropriate to their age and maturity;

C. The financial orders shall be in full force and effect during said interim period;

D. The parties shall follow the Connecticut access orders during the interim plan, but may informally modify said schedule as agreed among them;

XVII. By way of a property settlement:

A.  The parties shall divide equally the Charles Schwab account # 1846–6664 as of February 19, 2014 adjusted for gains and losses as of that date;

B. The plaintiff shall transfer to the defendant by qualified domestic relations order (QDRO), if required, one-half of the value of his 401(k) plan listed on his financial affidavit with a balance of $178,956 adjusted for gains and losses as of the date of the judgment;

XVIII. Each party shall be liable for their own legal fees and expenses;

XIX. Each party shall be liable for their debts and shall hold harmless and indemnify the other;

XX. The GAL's total fee of $29,347.50 is approved;

A.  There is an outstanding balance of $8,832 after crediting all payments made by the parties prior to the end of the trial;

B. Each party shall pay one half (1/2) of said amount or $4,416;

C. They shall each pay a minimum of $100 monthly on the 15th of each month commencing with March 2014;

D. The total amount due must be paid in full no later than February 15, 2017;  and

E.  In the event that either party has not paid the full principal amount of $4,416 as of February 16, 2017, then compound interest shall accrue, on a monthly basis, on the full, original principal balance at the rate of 10 percent per annum;

1.  Said interest shall accrue and compound from the date of the judgment;

2.  Said interest shall continue to so accrue and compound on the original principal amount regardless of the actual balance due and owing until the full, principal balance plus all accrued interest is paid in full.

Adelman, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Based on the four full years of his employment, he averaged 114.5 work days out of 365 with a high of 131 out of 365 and a low of 105 out of 365..  FN1. Based on the four full years of his employment, he averaged 114.5 work days out of 365 with a high of 131 out of 365 and a low of 105 out of 365.

FN2. The defendant's friend actually sacrificed being home for her own daughter's sixth birthday to support the defendant.   There is no doubt that the defendant has a strong and dedicated network of family and friends in Boise..  FN2. The defendant's friend actually sacrificed being home for her own daughter's sixth birthday to support the defendant.   There is no doubt that the defendant has a strong and dedicated network of family and friends in Boise.

FN3. The family relations evaluation ended with the final joint meeting at which the recommendations were presented to the parties on March 22, 2013 and no further contact with the family on the part of the family relations counselor after that date..  FN3. The family relations evaluation ended with the final joint meeting at which the recommendations were presented to the parties on March 22, 2013 and no further contact with the family on the part of the family relations counselor after that date.

FN4. Although the formal order appointing the GAL was not entered until September 10, 2012, she began her work informally when asked to begin by the counsel for both parties..  FN4. Although the formal order appointing the GAL was not entered until September 10, 2012, she began her work informally when asked to begin by the counsel for both parties.

FN5. Some reference was made during the trial to General Statutes § 46b–56d which deals with relocation issues.   That statute, however, deals with postjudgment motions to relocate and does not involve any request to relocate that is made as a part of the dissolution of marriage hearing.   That distinction was also recognized by the Appellate Court in its 2002 decision in Ford v. Ford, 68 Conn.App. 173, 789 A.2d 1104, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 910, 796 A 2d 556 (2002)..  FN5. Some reference was made during the trial to General Statutes § 46b–56d which deals with relocation issues.   That statute, however, deals with postjudgment motions to relocate and does not involve any request to relocate that is made as a part of the dissolution of marriage hearing.   That distinction was also recognized by the Appellate Court in its 2002 decision in Ford v. Ford, 68 Conn.App. 173, 789 A.2d 1104, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 910, 796 A 2d 556 (2002).

FN6. The court makes no findings regarding any effort to relocate the children to Boise when they are older and have attained further developmental growth and maturity..  FN6. The court makes no findings regarding any effort to relocate the children to Boise when they are older and have attained further developmental growth and maturity.

FN7. The court was presented two earlier appraisals done by the same professional.   One dated February 2013 found a value of $336,000 and one dated July 2013 with a value of $294,000.   The value of the property dropped 19 percent between the different appraisals in approximately nine months.   The final appraisal includes as a comparable sale a property a few doors down the street from the marital home and built around the same time and by the same builder..  FN7. The court was presented two earlier appraisals done by the same professional.   One dated February 2013 found a value of $336,000 and one dated July 2013 with a value of $294,000.   The value of the property dropped 19 percent between the different appraisals in approximately nine months.   The final appraisal includes as a comparable sale a property a few doors down the street from the marital home and built around the same time and by the same builder.

FN8. The guidelines are official regulations established by the Commission for Child Support Guidelines pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–215a and approved by the legislative regulation review committee pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–215c.   See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b–215a–1 et seq..  FN8. The guidelines are official regulations established by the Commission for Child Support Guidelines pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–215a and approved by the legislative regulation review committee pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–215c.   See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b–215a–1 et seq.

FN9. The calculation of child support and of any alimony order has been based on the net incomes of the respective parties and not on their gross incomes..  FN9. The calculation of child support and of any alimony order has been based on the net incomes of the respective parties and not on their gross incomes.

Adelman, Gerard I., J.