Richard Spradley v. Ellen Gleason, Administrator (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The plaintiff, Richard Spradley, brought this action against Ellen Gleason, as administrator of the estate of Andrew Gleason and as administrator of the estate of Andrew Gleason d/b/a Valley Lawn Sprinkler Service Company, to recover for injuries the plaintiff sustained in a motor vehicle accident.   The defendant has moved for summary judgment, asserting that the action is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31–284(a).   The court agrees, and accordingly, as explained below, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.

I

Undisputed Facts

The parties agree that the following facts are undisputed.   The defendant's decedent, Andrew Gleason, was the sole proprietor of Valley Lawn Sprinkler Service and was the plaintiff's employer.   On July 1, 2011, the plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle operated by Andrew Gleason when a collision occurred in which the plaintiff sustained injuries.   The injuries were sustained in the course and scope of his employment.   The plaintiff has received workers' compensation benefits for medical treatment and for various injuries and losses arising from the accident.   Andrew Gleason died on April 14, 2012, and the defendant was appointed administrator of his estate on May 29, 2012.

The only dispute is a question of law.   The defendant contends that the exclusivity provision of General Statutes § 31–284(a) bars recovery against Gleason's estate because it is undisputed that Gleason was the plaintiff's employer and the plaintiff received benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. The plaintiff acknowledges that under Velardi v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 178 Conn. 371, 377, 423 A.2d 77 (1979), “[s]o long as the employer and the alleged tortfeasor are one, the plaintiff is limited to the benefits provided by workmen's compensation.”   He argues, however, that a subsequent amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act should be construed to overrule Velardi.   He relies on General Statutes §§ 31–275(9)(A)(ii) and § 31–293a, arguing that under those sections, Gleason should be regarded as a fellow employee to whom an exception applies.   Because the question presented is one of statutory interpretation, the matter is appropriate for summary judgment.

II

Applicable Law

The standard for summary judgment is well established.  “Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  LaFlamme v. Dallessio, 261 Conn. 247, 250, 802 A.2d 63 (2002).  “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ․ The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Connell v. Colwell, 214 Conn. 242, 246–47, 571 A.2d 116 (1990).  “It is well established, moreover, that where it is undisputed that the plaintiff was engaged in the course of his employment at the time of the accident, whether he is barred by the Workmen's Compensation Act from maintaining an action against a tortfeasor is a question of law for the court.”  Velardi v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., supra, 178 Conn. 375.

Four statutory provisions are relevant to the question presented here:

First, General Statutes § 31–284(a) establishes the general rule that workers' compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy of workers for whom it is provided.  Section 31–284(a) provides in relevant part:  “An employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained, but an employer shall secure compensation for his employees as provided under this chapter ․ All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter ․”

Next, General Statutes § 31–275(10)(D) provides in relevant part:  “A person who is the sole proprietor of a business may accept the provisions of this chapter by notifying the commissioner, in writing, of his intent to do so.   If such person accepts the provisions of this chapter he shall be considered to be an employer and shall insure his full liability in accordance with subdivision (2) of subsection (b) of section 31–284.”

General Statutes § 31–275(9)(A), however, provides in relevant part as follows:  “ ‘Employee’ means any person who ․ [i]s a sole proprietor or business partner who accepts the provisions of this chapter in accordance with subdivision (10) of this section ․”

Finally, General Statutes § 31–293a states in relevant part:  “If an employee ․ has a right to benefits or compensation under this chapter on account of injury or death from injury caused by the negligence or wrong of a fellow employee, such right shall be the exclusive remedy of such injured employee or dependent and no action may be brought against such fellow employee unless such wrong was wilful or malicious or the action is based on the fellow employee's negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle as defined in section 14–1 ․ No insurance policy or contract shall be accepted as proof of financial responsibility of the owner and as evidence of the insuring of such person for injury to or death of persons and damage to property by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles required by chapter 246 if it excludes from coverage under such policy or contract any agent, representative or employee of such owner from such policy or contract.   Any provision of such an insurance policy or contract effected after July 1, 1969, which excludes from coverage thereunder any agent, representative or employee of the owner of a motor vehicle involved in an accident with a fellow employee shall be null and void.”

In construing these provisions, the court is required to consider both the text of the individual provisions and the interrelationships between provisions in the same statutory scheme.  “The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.   If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.”  General Statutes § 1–2z.   In this case, the statutory scheme contains an inherent ambiguity with respect to sole proprietors.   Under subsection (10)(D) of General Statutes § 31–275, a sole proprietor who accepts the provisions of the act is an “employer,” while under subsection (9)(A)(ii) of the same section, a sole proprietor who accepts the provisions of the act under subsection (10)(D) is an “employee.”   The question then is whether the legislature intended a sole proprietor who is both an “employer” and an “employee” under § 31–275 to be deemed a “fellow employee” for purposes of the motor vehicle exception under § 31–293a.

The defendant relies principally on Velardi v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., supra, 178 Conn. 375.  Velardi, like this case, involved a claim made by an employee against his employer, a sole proprietor, under the motor vehicle exception of § 31–293a.   In Velardi, the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that a sole proprietor should be considered to be a “fellow employee” under § 31–293a.   But the Supreme Court's decision in Velardi does not address the question of statutory construction presented here because subsections (9)(A)(ii) and (10)(D) of § 31–275 had not taken effect when Velardi was decided.   These subsections entered the Workers' Compensation Act through Public Acts 1979, No. 79–113 (P.A. 79–113), which was enacted by the legislature in April 1979, and signed by the governor on May 8, 1979, but did not take effect until October 1, 1979.   The Supreme Court's decision in Velardi was issued on July 17, 1979, after the enactment of P.A. 79–113 but before its effective date.   The Supreme Court's decision does not mention the impending change in the law, nor was it mentioned in the briefs filed in the Supreme Court in the Velardi case.

The legislative history of P.A. 79–113 suggests that the inclusion of a sole proprietor within the definition of both “employee” and “employer” was intended to make it possible for sole proprietors to obtain coverage for themselves as insureds under a workers' compensation policy.   The statement of purpose on proposed House Bill No. 6683, the first iteration of what was to become P.A. 79–113, stated that it was intended “[t]o allow sole proprietors and partners to be covered by workmen's compensation if they so elect.   Insurers make such coverage available where state laws make provision for it.”   A representative of an association of insurance agents, addressing the Labor and Public Employees Committee in support of the bill, commented that the proposed bill would put the sole proprietor on the same standing as the owner of a corporation.  “[M]any people don't start out by affording the corporate shell which makes them an employee.   Anybody who works for a corporation, whether they own it or not, is an employee.   We would support the individual's right to elect to come under that coverage.”   Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Labor & Public Employees, Pt. 1, 1979 Sess., p. 308.   Similarly, its sponsor in the Senate stated that:  “This bill merely allows the sole proprietor of an establishment to place himself on workmen's compensation.”   22 S. Proc., Pt. 5, 1979 Sess., p. 1573, remarks of Senator Michael Skelley.

Although no appellate decision appears to have addressed the precise question presented here, several appellate decisions since the enactment of P.A. 79–113 have reiterated the rule stated in Velardi as applied to individual and corporate employers.   In Hoyt v. Second Taxing District, 183 Conn. 508, 509, 439 A.2d 428 (1981), the Supreme Court rejected a plaintiff's argument that one Fred Fullin, an employer whose allegedly negligent operation of a motor vehicle caused the death of the plaintiff's decedent, was liable under § 31–293a as a “fellow employee.”   Similarly, in Szczapa v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 56 Conn.App. 325, 743 A.2d 622, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 951, 748 A.2d 299 (2000), the Appellate Court affirmed a judgment striking an employee's claim that an employee can assert a direct cause of action against his employer on the basis of vicarious liability for the negligence of a fellow employee in the operation of a motor vehicle.   In Szczapa, the Appellate Court relied on Velardi and Hoyt in concluding:  “While it is true that employers are generally liable for the actions of their employees, we cannot conclude that the legislature intended employees and employers to be treated alike for the purposes of § 31–293a.   Indeed, as articulated in Velardi, if ‘the employer and the alleged tortfeasor are one, the plaintiff is limited to the benefits provided by [workers'] compensation.’  “ Szczapa v. United Parcel Service, Inc., supra, 331.

Finally, the only trial court decision that expressly addresses the relationship between the definition of a sole proprietor as an “employee” under § 31–275(9)(A)(ii) and the “fellow employee” exception in § 31–293a holds that Velardi and Szczapa are controlling.   See Hubbard v. Powell, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at Norwich, Docket No. 119343 (April 11, 2001, Martin, J.) (29 Conn. L. Rptr. 700).   The Hubbard decision reflects the overarching principle that, where workers' compensation benefits are available, the employer may not be sued in negligence.  “A central feature of our statutory law of workers' compensation ․ is the principle of the exclusivity of workers' compensation benefits.   Pursuant to General Statutes § 31–284, an employee who is covered by workers' compensation is barred from bringing a personal injury action against his or her employer.”   (Footnote omitted.)  Melanson v. West Hartford, 61 Conn.App. 683, 684–85, 767 A.2d 764, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 901, 772 A.2d 595 (2001).

The plaintiff's argument that the legislature has expressed a preference towards allowing actions by employees who are injured by the negligence of others in motor vehicle accidents, where motor vehicle insurance is generally available, is not implausible and is not inconsistent with the literal text of §§ 31–293a and 31–275(9)(A)(ii).   Nevertheless, the overall statutory structure, the consistently limited interpretation of the exception in § 31–293a by the appellate courts of the state, and the overarching principle protecting employers from tort liability when they have provided workers' compensation benefits all lead to the same conclusion:  that, as Velardi states, when the alleged tortfeasor and the employer that has provided workers' compensation benefits are the same person, an action against the employer is precluded by the exclusivity provision of § 31–284(a).   Accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.

BY THE COURT,

Sheila A. Huddleston, Judge

Huddleston, Sheila A., J.