Marina Minoli v. Enrico Minoli (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO MODIFY ALIMONY, POSTJUDGMENT, AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CONTEMPT, POSTJUDGMENT

On May 9, 2013, the defendant Enrico Minoli filed an application for an order of hearing and notice (# 252.00) and a motion pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–86 to modify alimony, postjudgment, and for related relief (# 252.01).   The defendant sought to reduce his monthly alimony obligation to the plaintiff Marina Minoli, his former wife ¹ and to receive credit for or repayment of amounts that he claimed to have overpaid between 2006 and 2012.   The plaintiff was served in hand on June 26, 2013 (# 254.00).   On June 13, 2013, the plaintiff moved for contempt, postjudgment, due to the defendant's failure to pay monthly alimony in full since November 2012 (# 253.00).   For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion to modify alimony, postjudgment, and for related relief is denied, and the plaintiff's motion for contempt, postjudgment, is granted.

I

The parties were married on April 23, 1984 in the Dominican Republic.²  They were divorced on November 7, 2003, after nineteen years of marriage.   They are the parents of two sons, both of whom have reached the age of majority:  Alexandro, born on February 6, 1983, and Michele, born on March 4, 1985.   Michele suffers from Down syndrome.   He is unable to live by himself, and he resides with the plaintiff.

At the time of the dissolution of the parties' marriage, the defendant reported that he had no earned income, and that he had not earned any income over the previous three years.³  The court (Novack, J.) found that, notwithstanding the absence of earned income, the parties' lifestyle had not suffered during that period.⁴  Judge Novack noted there was “a pattern of the defendant's receiving funds from at least two sources.   One is from transfers from the corporations [in which] he has a controlling interest and the second source is an investor friend who supplies funds without requesting repayment.” ⁵

Judge Novack observed that the plaintiff had attempted to prove that the defendant was not revealing his true net worth, while the defendant had claimed that his investments sustained significant losses.   According to the defendant's June 2003 financial affidavit, he had assets worth almost $2.7 million and liabilities of $100,000.   Judge Novack concluded that “[a]lthough the Court has not been convinced that the defendant's testimony is completely credible, it is unable to speculate as to the defendant's net worth suggested by plaintiff.   The Court finds that the defendant suffered severe business losses in recent years that dramatically reduced his assets.” ⁶

Judge Novack found that “[w]ith no earned income, the defendant indicates on his financial affidavit weekly expenses of $5,620, which is $292,000 per year.” ⁷  Judge Novack awarded periodic alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $7,500 per month, tax-free, in the November 7, 2003 dissolution judgment (the November 2003 dissolution judgment).   The alimony payments were to commence on December 1, 2003 and continue until the death of either party or the plaintiff's remarriage, whichever first occurred.   The order was expressly subject to the provisions of General Statutes § 46b–86(b).⁸

Pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–84(c), Judge Novack also ordered the defendant to provide support for Michele in the amount of $2,500 per month in the November 2003 dissolution judgment.   The support payments were to commence on December 1, 2003 and continue until Michele reached the age of twenty-one or no longer resided with the plaintiff, whichever first occurred.⁹

II

The parties were before the court on October 22, 2013 on the defendant's motion for modification, postjudgment, and related relief and the plaintiff's motion for contempt, postjudgment.   The plaintiff was represented by counsel, and the defendant represented himself.   The court heard testimony from both parties and reviewed the exhibits that were admitted into evidence.

The defendant maintained that his circumstances had changed substantially since the dissolution decree was entered in November 2003.   He testified that he had no earned income, no pension, and no assets.   His current financial affidavit reflects $2,014 in net weekly income, comprised of $1,150 lent to him by his brother and $900 from the sale of stock.

The defendant said that his interest in Detroy Holdings Limited, which he valued at $1,717,651 on his June 2003 financial affidavit, was now worthless.   He testified that Detroy Holdings had been liquidated.   His interest in 25–27 Beekman Place Corporation also had no value after the distress sale of the two luxury apartments it owned in New York City.

The defendant said that he had sold his boat, which he valued at $450,000 on his June 2003 financial affidavit, for 80,000 ($110,229).¹⁰  He was planning to sell four paintings at auction in early 2014, which he hoped would generate $100,000 to $125,000.   He described a renewable energy investment in Italy that appeared to be very promising initially, but then had to be closed because it was not sustainable.

The defendant testified that all that he had left of the millions that he had in 2003 was 60,000 ($82,671) in cash and a house in Greece, worth approximately $800,000 according to his current financial affidavit.   He said that he tries to rent the house during the summer to generate income.   He rented the house for fifteen days for 20,000 ($27,557) in 2012, but he was unable to rent the house to anyone in the summer of 2013.   He also had to pay a 30,000 ($41,336) fine because the previous owner did not have the proper building permits.

The defendant's current financial affidavit reflects a ninety-percent ownership interest in Sofinel S.R.L. (Italy), valued at $50,000 and a ninety-percent ownership interest in Manzoni 43, valued at $1,000.   Manzoni 43 is in liquidation.¹¹  The defendant values his eighty percent interests in 25–27 Beekman Place Corporation and Detroy Holdings Limited at zero.   The defendant also owns a 2005 Fiat, worth $1,000.

The defendant testified that he may recover some money as a result of litigation that has been pending since 1998 against an insurance company that went into bankruptcy.   He said that he will not see those funds, if at all, until sometime in 2015 or thereafter.   This potential recovery was not reflected on his current financial affidavit.

The defendant said that he had completely changed his lifestyle in the past few years.   He now lives with his second wife and their two young daughters in a small town in Greece, where they rent an apartment for 600 ($827) per month.   He reported that he had injured his leg and had a hip implant recently.   He said that he was in the hospital in November and December 2012.

The defendant testified that he pays his bills monthly and does not carry any debt.   He explained that in Greece everything is paid with cash, not with credit cards.   He said that his brother recently gave him 30,000 ($41,336).   According to the defendant's current financial affidavit, he owes his brother $60,000, and he expects to owe him $180,000 by 2015.

The defendant's current financial affidavit reflects weekly expenses of $2,008, which includes $580 for alimony (representing the reduced amount that defendant has paid the plaintiff since February 2013).   Annualizing these amounts, it appears that the defendant spent $104,416 in 2013.

The defendant maintains accounts at three banks:  Alpha Bank, Banca Popolare di Novara, and Deutsche Bank. The plaintiff offered an analysis of the defendant's bank statements which showed that the defendant spent an average of 27,698 ($38,164) each month for the months of July, August, and September 2013.   The plaintiff argued that, on an annual basis, the defendant is spending 332,376 ($457,968) a year.   The defendant disputed this conclusion and explained that the amount he spent during July, August and September 2013 was unusually high because he was setting up a new household in Greece.   Upon the court's review of the defendant's banking transactions between January 1 and September 30, 2013, the defendant apparently spent 211,476 ($291,384) during that nine-month period, or an average of 23,497 ($32,375) a month.   Annualizing this amount, it appears that the defendant spent 281,968 ($388,139) in 2013.

The defendant testified that when he had the money, he had given the plaintiff more than the alimony that he was required to pay her.   He said that he had paid a total of $180,000 in excess of the alimony that was due to the plaintiff between 2006 and 2012.   He explained that he considered this amount to be a credit on his account—i.e., that he had prepaid his alimony obligation and did not owe any more to the plaintiff until the credit had been applied.   The defendant acknowledged that the plaintiff did not agree to this arrangement.

In addition to claiming that he was entitled to a credit for overpaying alimony to the plaintiff, the defendant testified that the extra money was intended for Michele.   He continued paying $2,500 a month after Michele's twenty-first birthday in March 2006, despite having no legal obligation to do so, until November 2012.

The plaintiff is sixty-five years old.   She has been partially paralyzed since 1998 as a result of an undiagnosed immune system disease that affected her ability to walk.   She is not employed, and she has not worked since Michele's birth in 1985.   She has no source of income other than the alimony paid by the defendant.

In addition to alimony and support for Michele, the plaintiff received nearly $1.8 million in cash and assets in the November 2003 dissolution judgment.   According to the plaintiff's current financial affidavit, the plaintiff has assets totaling $177,623, and liabilities of $82,000.   She has no income other than alimony, and she does not own any real property.   She has total weekly expenses of $2,085, including rent in the amount of $988 and $200 for special help for Michele.

The parties' son Michele resides with the plaintiff.   Michele turned twenty-one on March 4, 2006.   Although the defendant's support obligation for Michele terminated at that time, the defendant continued to send the plaintiff the same amount—$2,500 a month—in addition to the monthly alimony payment of $7,500, until November 2012.   Michele receives $670 a month in Social Security disability benefits.

The plaintiff testified that the defendant did not make an alimony payment in November 2012.   According to the plaintiff, the defendant paid $7,500 in alimony in December 2012, $7,700 in January 2013, and $2,548 in February 2013.¹²  From March through September 2013, the defendant reduced his monthly alimony payment to $2,500.   As of the hearing date, the defendant had not paid alimony for October 2013, and the accrued arrearage—including the October 2013 alimony payment—was $52,500.

III

At the October 22, 2013 hearing, the defendant sought an order reducing his alimony obligation to $1,000 per month—or at most to $2,500 per month—due to a substantial change in his circumstances.   The defendant also proposed to stop paying alimony temporarily and apply the $180,000 credit that he claimed had accrued for amounts that he had regularly paid in excess of the alimony award between 2006 and 2012.   The plaintiff objected to any modification in the defendant's alimony obligation, either by reducing the monthly payment or by giving the defendant a credit for the additional sums that he had paid prior to November 2012.

General Statutes § 46b–86(a) provides in pertinent part that, “[u]nless and to the extent that the decree precludes modification, any final order for the periodic payment of permanent alimony or support ․ may, at any time thereafter, be continued, set aside, altered or modified by the court upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party ․” General Statutes § 46b–86(a).  “To obtain a modification, the moving party must demonstrate that circumstances have changed since the last court order such that it would be unjust or inequitable to hold either party to it.”   Borkowski v. Borkowski, 228 Conn. 729, 737–38, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994).  “[I]n determining the threshold inquiry of a substantial change in circumstances, the trial court is limited to considering events arising after the dissolution decree or the most recent modification thereof.”  Olson v. Mohammadu, 310 Conn. 665, 675, 81 A.3d 215 (2013).

The court's inquiry on a motion for modification proceeds in two steps:  first, after confirming that modification is not precluded by the decree, the court must determine whether a substantial change in the circumstances of one or both of the parties has occurred;  then, if the court finds that such circumstances have substantially changed, the court must consider the motion in light of the criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b–82.¹³  As a threshold matter, the court has confirmed that the November 2003 dissolution judgment expressly permits modification of the alimony award.   The court turns next to the question of whether there has been a substantial change in either or both of the parties' circumstances.   The burden is on the defendant, as the moving party, to show that a substantial change in his circumstances has occurred since the parties' divorce in November 2003 so as to warrant a modification of the alimony award.  Borkowski, supra, 228 Conn. at 734.

The defendant testified at length regarding the decline in the value of his assets during the decade following the dissolution of the parties' marriage.   Comparing the defendant's current financial affidavit to his June 2003 financial affidavit, it appears that the defendant's net worth has dropped to about thirty-five percent of the amount that was represented to be the value of his assets in June 2003.   Judge Novack did not, however, base the alimony award on the defendant's assets.   Indeed, Judge Novack said that he was “unable to speculate as to the defendant's net worth ․” ¹⁴ A modification of alimony cannot be predicated on a post-dissolution decrease in the value of the defendant's assets when the court in the dissolution proceeding expressly declined to make a finding with respect to the value of those assets, because there is no basis for comparison.

Judge Novack found in the dissolution proceeding that the defendant's June 2003 financial affidavit reflected weekly expenses of $5,620.   Annualizing this amount, Judge Novack determined that the defendant was spending $292,000 per year.¹⁵  Although the defendant reported no earned income, Judge Novack imputed income to the defendant based upon his spending and then awarded alimony to the plaintiff accordingly.

A defendant's “[l]ifestyle and personal expenses may serve as the basis for imputing income where conventional methods for determining income are inadequate.”  (Citation omitted;  quotation marks omitted.)  Carasso v. Carasso, 80 Conn.App. 299, 304, 834 A.2d 793 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 913, 840 A.2d 1174 (2004).   In Carasso, as here, the court in the dissolution proceeding did not find the defendant entirely credible regarding his financial status.   In particular, the defendant claimed that he did not draw a salary from his various businesses.   With no information available as to the defendant's earned income, the court used the defendant's spending to impute income to him in order to determine an appropriate alimony award.   See Brown v. Brown, 130 Conn.App. 522, 528–29, 24 A.3d 1261 (2011) (rejecting defendant's argument that deterioration in value of business investments deprived him of ability to pay alimony;  although defendant disclosed “$0.00” in net monthly income, parties' lifestyle and expenditures supported alimony award).

The defendant's current financial affidavit reflects net weekly income of $2,014 ¹⁶ and weekly expenses of $2,008.   On its face, the current financial affidavit shows that the defendant is barely meeting his expenses each week.   Annualizing these numbers, both the defendant's 2013 net income ($104,728) and spending ($104,416) would appear to be significantly lower than the income imputed to him in the November 2003 dissolution judgment ($292,000).

The defendant's 2013 bank statements tell a different story.   As discussed above, the defendant's bank statements show that the defendant spent a total of $291,384 in the first nine months of 2013.   Annualizing this amount, it appears that the defendant spent $388,139 in 2013 —an amount that is substantially greater than the annual spending upon which Judge Novack based the original alimony award, and more than three times the amount that the defendant reports on his current financial affidavit.

In view of the discrepancy between the defendant's current financial affidavit and his 2013 bank statements, the court declines to credit the defendant's testimony and the income and expenses shown on his current financial affidavit.   See Brown, supra, 130 Conn.App. at 525 (trial court found defendant's testimony regarding limited income and declining net worth to be “self-serving” and his reported debts to be “grossly exaggerated”).   The court will impute income to the defendant in the amount of $388,000 annually, based on his spending during the period January through September 2013, as reflected on his 2013 bank statements.   See Carasso, supra, 80 Conn.App. at 304.

In addition, not only has the defendant's spending increased since the November 2003 dissolution judgment, but the defendant's alimony and support obligations have decreased by twenty-five percent since the November 2003 dissolution judgment.   Beginning in April 2006, the defendant was no longer obligated to pay $2,500 monthly for Michele's support (although he voluntarily chose to do so until November 2012).   The defendant has sufficient resources to pay the alimony awarded to the plaintiff in the November 2003 dissolution judgment.

In light of the foregoing, the defendant has not sustained his burden of demonstrating that a substantial change in his circumstances has occurred since the parties' divorce in November 2003 so as to warrant a downward modification of the alimony award.   Accordingly, the court declines to issue an order modifying the defendant's alimony obligation.

IV

In addition to seeking a downward modification of the alimony award, the defendant argues that he is entitled to a credit of $180,000—the amount by which he claims to have overpaid alimony between 2006 and 2012—or a refund from the plaintiff.   In fact, it appears that the defendant has already presumed to have such a credit, since he has unilaterally reduced his monthly alimony payment to the plaintiff from $7,500 to $2,500 since February 2013, and he failed to make the November 2012 alimony payment entirely.

“[T]he question of whether to grant a credit for a voluntary overpayment is based on equitable principles.”   Kosak v. Boucher, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. LLI–FA950067665–S (July 1, 2010;  Danaher, J.) [50 Conn. L. Rptr. 215].   In the child support context, “[s]ome courts have recognized that a parent is not entitled as a matter of law to credit for such voluntary expenditures made in a manner other than that specified by the divorce decree ․ Other courts hold that situations may arise in which equitable considerations would permit a parent to credit, against past due support payments, voluntary expenditures made on behalf of the child ․ No universal or general principle has been articulated by the latter courts.   Rather, the circumstances of each individual case are considered in determining whether credit can be allowed ․ In all such cases, however, courts have recognized that the decision to allow or disallow credit lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.”  (Citations omitted.)  Goold v. Goold, 11 Conn.App. 268, 277, 527 A.2d 696, cert. denied, 204 Conn. 810, 528 A.2d 1156 (1987).

In Lawrence v. Lawrence, 92 Conn.App. 212, 883 A.2d 1260 (2005), the defendant claimed that his voluntary overpayment of weekly child support entitled him to a credit, thus justifying his unilateral decision to stop paying child support.   The defendant argued that the court abused its discretion and improperly found him in contempt for nonpayment of child support, in view of his overpayment.   The Appellate Court disagreed, finding that “[t]here is nothing in the record to indicate that the defendant informed the plaintiff, or the court, that he would be using these overpayments as credit against his future support obligation.   The defendant, if he intended to make advance payments, could have attempted to reach an agreement with the plaintiff or to seek a modification from the court.   Instead, the defendant chose to disregard a key component of the order ․” Id. at 216.   The court concluded that “[t]he mere fact that the defendant in the present case believed that he was entitled to such a credit does not excuse his nonpayment of support, nor does it constitute an abuse of the court's discretion to hold him in contempt.”  Id. at 217.

Here, as in Lawrence, there is no evidence that the defendant ever indicated to the plaintiff prior to November 2012 that he would seek to use his overpayment as a credit against alimony due in the future, or that the defendant and the plaintiff had an agreement that he could do so.   In fact, it does not appear that these additional payments were intended to be supplemental alimony at all.   The plaintiff considered them to be the defendant's voluntary continuation of support for Michele beyond their son's twenty-first birthday.   The defendant also acknowledged that the payments were for Michele's benefit.

Even if the defendant were entitled to a credit for his overpayment, he had no right to engage in self-help and reduce his monthly alimony payment to the plaintiff without the court's approval.  Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 529–30, 710 A.2d 757 (1998).   The defendant did not seek a court order modifying his alimony obligation until May 9, 2013, several months after he began to pay the plaintiff $5,000 less than the monthly alimony that he was required to pay her under the November 2003 dissolution judgment.

For the reasons set forth above, the defendant is not entitled to an alimony credit or a refund in any amount for the additional payments that he made to the plaintiff between 2006 and 2012.   The defendant sent those funds voluntarily for the benefit of the parties' son, Michele, and not as an agreed-upon prepayment of alimony.

V

The plaintiff moved for contempt, postjudgment, due to the defendant's failure to pay monthly alimony in full to her since November 2012.   The plaintiff testified that the defendant paid no alimony in November 2012.   From February 2013 through September 2013, he paid only $2,500 in alimony each month, rather than the $7,500 that was awarded in the November 2003 dissolution judgment.   As of the date of the hearing, the defendant had not paid alimony for October 2013.

“Contempt is a disobedience to the rules and orders of a court which has power to punish for such an offense.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Wilson v. Cohen, 222 Conn. 591, 596 n.5, 610 A.2d 1177 (1992).   “Civil contempt is committed when a person violates an order of court which requires that person in specific and definite language to do or refrain from doing an act or series of acts ․ Whether an order is sufficiently clear and unambiguous is a necessary prerequisite for a finding of contempt ․” (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Leah S., 284 Conn. 685, 695, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007).   If a court order is found to be sufficiently clear and unambiguous, the court must then determine whether a violation of the court order was willful or excused by a good faith dispute or misunderstanding.   See Eldridge, supra, 244 Conn. at 526–27 & 529.

The alimony award to the plaintiff was entered pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–82 and set forth in the November 2003 dissolution judgment.   The alimony award was clear and unambiguous in ordering that the defendant was to pay periodic alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $7,500 per month, tax-free.   The alimony payments were to commence on December 1, 2003 and continue until the death of either party or the plaintiff's remarriage, whichever first occurred.   The defendant complied with the alimony order until November 2012, when he decided to stop paying alimony as required by the November 2003 decree.

The defendant did not pay alimony to the plaintiff for the month of November 2012, and he has paid alimony in the amount of only $2,500 per month since February 2013, despite having sufficient income to meet his alimony obligation in full.   The defendant intentionally failed to comply with the alimony award set forth in the dissolution judgment, deciding instead that he was entitled to a credit or a refund of $180,000 for the amount that he claimed to have overpaid between 2006 and 2012.   Even if the defendant had a good faith belief that he was due a credit or a refund, he was required to file a motion for modification and obtain court approval before unilaterally withholding alimony from the plaintiff.  Eldridge, supra, 244 Conn. at 529–30.   The defendant's noncompliance with the alimony order was and continues to be willful.¹⁷

Accordingly, the court finds the defendant in contempt for his failure to pay alimony to the plaintiff as required by the November 2003 dissolution judgment.   As of the hearing date, the alimony arrearage was $52,500.   That amount is due and owing to the plaintiff.

General Statutes § 46b–87 provides in pertinent part that “[w]hen any person is found in contempt of an order of the Superior Court entered under section 46b–60 to 46b–62, inclusive, 46b–81 to 46b–83, inclusive, or 46b–86, the court may award to the petitioner a reasonable attorneys fee and the fees of the officer serving the contempt citation, such sums to be paid by the person found in contempt ․” General Statutes § 46b–87.  “Once a contempt has been found, § 46b–87 establishes a trial court's power to sanction a noncomplying party through the award of attorneys fees ․ Pursuant to § 46b–87, that sanction may be imposed without balancing the parties' respective financial abilities.”  Dobozy v. Dobozy, 241 Conn. 490, 499, 697 A.2d 1117 (Conn.1997).

An order requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff's attorneys fees and costs is appropriate here.   The court also finds that the attorneys fees and costs sought by the plaintiff, in the amounts of $19,330 and $400, respectively, are reasonable.   Pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–87, the court awards attorneys fees and costs to the plaintiff in the amount of $19,730.

VI

The court has fully considered the applicable statutes, including General Statutes §§ 46b–86 and 46b–87, together with the factors enumerated in General Statutes § 46b–82, well as the evidence, the relevant case law, the demeanor and the credibility of the witnesses, and the arguments of counsel, in making the following findings and in reaching the decisions reflected in the orders that issue below.

With respect to the defendant's motion for modification, postjudgment, and related relief, the court finds that:

1. The judgment of dissolution, dated November 7, 2003, required the defendant to pay periodic alimony to the plaintiff at the rate of $7,500 per month, tax-free.

2. The decree did not preclude modification of the alimony award.

3. Since the date of the dissolution judgment, a substantial change in the circumstances of either or both of the parties has not occurred.

4. Between April 2006 and November 2012, the defendant voluntarily paid a total of $180,000 to the plaintiff in addition to the monthly alimony awarded to her.

5. The defendant made the additional payments for the benefit of the parties' son, Michele, who suffers from Down syndrome.

6. The defendant is not entitled to a credit against his alimony obligation and the accrued arrearage for the additional payments that he made to the plaintiff for the benefit of the parties' son, Michele.

5. The defendant is not entitled to a refund from the plaintiff of the additional payments that he made for the benefit of the parties' son, Michele.

With respect to the plaintiff's motion for contempt, postjudgment, the court finds that:

1. The defendant had notice of the alimony award to the plaintiff set forth in the November 7, 2003 dissolution judgment.

2. The alimony award was clear and unambiguous in its direction that the defendant was to pay periodic alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $7,500 per month, tax-free, commencing on December 1, 2003 and continuing until the death of either party or the plaintiff's remarriage, whichever first occurred.

3. The defendant has failed to comply with the alimony award in that he has paid alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of only $2,500 per month since February 2013, and he failed to pay alimony to her for the month of November 2012.

4. The defendant's noncompliance was and continues to be willful.

5. As of the hearing date, the alimony arrearage was $52,500.

6. The attorneys fees and costs sought by the plaintiff in the amounts of $19,330 and $400, respectively, are reasonable.

Accordingly, the defendant's motion for modification, postjudgment, and related relief is DENIED, and the plaintiff's motion for contempt, postjudgment is GRANTED.   It is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the alimony arrearage as of the October 22, 2013 hearing, in the amount of $52,500, plus the attorneys fees and costs awarded to the plaintiff, in the amount of $19,730, in four equal monthly installments of $18,057.50, commencing on March 1, 2014.

2. Any alimony arrearage that accrued after the hearing date shall be paid in full on or before March 1, 2014.

BY THE COURT:

HELLER, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiff is now known as Marina Cassini.   Her maiden name was restored in the November 7, 2003 dissolution judgment.   Memorandum of Decision, dated November 7, 2003, at 8 (# 232.10) [36 Conn. L. Rptr. 10]..  FN1. The plaintiff is now known as Marina Cassini.   Her maiden name was restored in the November 7, 2003 dissolution judgment.   Memorandum of Decision, dated November 7, 2003, at 8 (# 232.10) [36 Conn. L. Rptr. 10].

FN2. Although the defendant never filed a pleading to contest the plaintiff's allegation concerning the date and place of the parties' marriage, he challenged the validity of the marriage during the 2003 dissolution trial.   He claimed that the parties' marriage was void because the plaintiff's prior marriage was not validly dissolved in a Dominican Republic proceeding.   The court (Novack, J.) did not permit a collateral attack on the divorce decree obtained in the Dominican Republic.  Id. at 4..  FN2. Although the defendant never filed a pleading to contest the plaintiff's allegation concerning the date and place of the parties' marriage, he challenged the validity of the marriage during the 2003 dissolution trial.   He claimed that the parties' marriage was void because the plaintiff's prior marriage was not validly dissolved in a Dominican Republic proceeding.   The court (Novack, J.) did not permit a collateral attack on the divorce decree obtained in the Dominican Republic.  Id. at 4.

FN3. From 1991 to 1998, however, the defendant earned $1 million annually.  Id. at 7..  FN3. From 1991 to 1998, however, the defendant earned $1 million annually.  Id. at 7.

FN4. Id..  FN4. Id.

FN5. Id..  FN5. Id.

FN6. Id at 5..  FN6. Id at 5.

FN7. Id. at 7..  FN7. Id. at 7.

FN8. Id..  FN8. Id.

FN9. Id. at 8..  FN9. Id. at 8.

FN10. The euros were converted to U.S. dollars by applying the historic exchange rate of 1.3779, which was in effect on October 22, 2013, the hearing date..  FN10. The euros were converted to U.S. dollars by applying the historic exchange rate of 1.3779, which was in effect on October 22, 2013, the hearing date.

FN11. The defendant testified that Manzoni 43 was the original Sofinel.   The name was changed to Manzoni 43 in 1996, and it went into liquidation.   A new Sofinel was formed thereafter..  FN11. The defendant testified that Manzoni 43 was the original Sofinel.   The name was changed to Manzoni 43 in 1996, and it went into liquidation.   A new Sofinel was formed thereafter.

FN12. In his motion to modify, the defendant stated that he had paid alimony in the amount of $5,000 in January 2013 and $2,500 in February 2013.   He testified at the hearing that he had paid $7,700 in January 2013 and $2,500 in February 2013..  FN12. In his motion to modify, the defendant stated that he had paid alimony in the amount of $5,000 in January 2013 and $2,500 in February 2013.   He testified at the hearing that he had paid $7,700 in January 2013 and $2,500 in February 2013.

FN13. General Statutes § 46b–82(a) provides in relevant part that “[i]n determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall consider the evidence presented by each party and shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties ․” General Statutes § 46b–82(a)..  FN13. General Statutes § 46b–82(a) provides in relevant part that “[i]n determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall consider the evidence presented by each party and shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties ․” General Statutes § 46b–82(a).

FN14. Memorandum of Decision at 5..  FN14. Memorandum of Decision at 5.

FN15. Id. at 7..  FN15. Id. at 7.

FN16. As noted above, the defendant's net weekly income does not reflect any earnings from employment..  FN16. As noted above, the defendant's net weekly income does not reflect any earnings from employment.

FN17. Like the plaintiff in Eldridge, the defendant is a college graduate.   He is an intelligent person who has had a successful career.   He knew, or certainly should have known, that he was not entitled to exercise self-help and disregard the alimony award.   See Eldridge, supra, 244 Conn. at 530..  FN17. Like the plaintiff in Eldridge, the defendant is a college graduate.   He is an intelligent person who has had a successful career.   He knew, or certainly should have known, that he was not entitled to exercise self-help and disregard the alimony award.   See Eldridge, supra, 244 Conn. at 530.

Heller, Donna Nelson, J.