Michael Grunberg v. First Horizon Home Loans et al. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS (104.00)

I. FACTS

On January 20, 2012, the plaintiff, Michael Grunberg, commenced this action to quiet title by service of process on the defendant, First Horizon Home Loans, a Division of First Tennessee Bank National Association (First Horizon).   The action concerns title over a portion of property at 3 Juniper Hill Road in Greenwich, Connecticut.   In a one-count complaint filed against the defendants, First Horizon and Donald Orlando, the plaintiff alleges the following facts.   On May 16, 1995, he acquired the real property at 1 Juniper Hill Road in Greenwich, Connecticut.   Since that time, the plaintiff has “openly, notoriously, visibly, exclusively, and continuously maintained and controlled” the portion of property at 3 Juniper Hill Road adverse to each of its successive owners in excess of fifteen years.   The maintenance and control included the following acts performed by the plaintiff, his family, or third parties at his request:  erection of fencing;  maintenance of the pond;  repair and maintenance of the foot bridge;  periodic removal of weeds and underbrush;  removal of dead and fallen trees;  planting of trees;  periodic maintenance of culvert pipe;  and use as a play area for children.   These actions resulted in the plaintiff acquiring title of the property by adverse possession.

The complaint also alleges that First Horizon claims to have acquired title to the property at issue by way of foreclosure.   Moreover, Orlando may also claim to own the property or an interest in it.   The plaintiff requests the court to “render judgment quieting and settling title” to the property at 3 Juniper Hill Road after hearing all claims from the parties.

On January 24, 2012, Louis Zazzarino purchased the property at 3 Juniper Hill Road from First Horizon.   After filing a motion to be made a party defendant, Zazzarino was permitted by the court on February 8, 2012 to intervene in the case as a co-defendant.   On March 28, 2012, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint repeating the allegations found in the original complaint and adding a statement of Zazzarino's present claim of title to the property.

On April 5, 2012, First Horizon filed a motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiff's claims are currently moot and non-justiciable as to First Horizon which no longer holds title to the claimed property.   It filed a memorandum of law and other documentation in support.   On April 12, 2012, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion.   For reasons not apparent on the record, the motion to dismiss was not heard at short calendar until December 2, 2013.

II. DISCUSSION

“A motion to dismiss ․ properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court ․ [It] admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ferreira v. Pringle, 255 Conn. 330, 346, 766 A.2d 400 (2001).  “A motion to dismiss is the appropriate vehicle for challenging the jurisdiction of the court ․ The grounds which may be asserted in this motion are:  (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;  (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person;  (3) improper venue;  (4) insufficiency of process;  and (5) insufficiency of service of process.”  (Citation omitted.)   Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 687, 490 A.2d 509 (1985).  “Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be determined as a threshold matter because it implicates [the] court's subject matter jurisdiction.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Holder, 147 Conn.App. 505, 507–08 (2014).  “Mootness ․ imposes a duty on the court to dismiss a case if the court can no longer grant practical relief to the parties ․ Mootness presents a circumstance wherein the issue before the court has been resolved or had lost its significance because of a change in the condition of affairs between the parties.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Begley, 122 Conn.App. 546, 550–51, 2 A.3d 1 (2010).

In its memorandum of law in support of the motion to dismiss, First Horizon argues that, because of its conveyance of the property to Zazzarino after the lawsuit was initiated, “the court cannot make a determination of this controversy [between the plaintiff and First Horizon] which will result in practical relief to the plaintiff.”   Accordingly, First Horizon maintains that since there is no existing controversy and the matter is moot, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over their dispute.   In response, the plaintiff counters that the court can afford him practical relief by finding that he maintained legal title to the property in question prior to when First Horizon purportedly conveyed the property to Zazzarino.   Such a judgment is justiciable, the plaintiff argues, because it awards him legal title to the property and “determines the rights and future actions of all parties involved.”   The plaintiff further argues that First Horizon should remain a party to the case as an indispensable party to the controversy due to its central role in many of the case's determinative facts.   These facts would appear to include whether the allegations made by the plaintiff to support a claim of adverse possession are supported by evidence.   Moreover, the motion should be denied, the plaintiff contends, in order to further judicial efficiency as First Horizon's inclusion in the suit is necessary for the court to resolve all present and continuing controversies between all parties to the case.

In the present case, the plaintiff filed an action to quiet the title to the disputed property against First Horizon in accordance with General Statutes § 47–31.   The statute provides in relevant part:  “(a) An action may be brought by any person claiming ․ any interest in ․ real or personal property ․ against any person who may claim ․ to have any interest in the property ․ adverse to the plaintiff ․ for the purpose of determining such adverse ․ interest or claim, and to clear up all doubts and disputes and to quiet ․ the title to the property ․ (f) The court shall ․ determine the rights of the parties ․ and render judgment determining the questions and disputes and quieting ․ the title to the property.”

“An action to quiet title is one quasi in rem, and it lies against those who, at the time it is instituted, are the present claimants to the land ․” Lake Garda Improvement Assn. v. Battistoni, 155 Conn. 287, 294, 231 A.2d 276 (1967).  “The action [can] be maintained against one in whom the land records disclose any interest, lien, claim or title conflicting with the plaintiff's claim, title or interest.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Id., 293.

First Horizon concedes it was a claimant of title to the property pursuant to a judgment of foreclosure on January 20, 2012, the day the action commenced.   The plaintiff was therefore justified in making First Horizon a party to the original action to quiet title.   Because, however, the plaintiff conveyed its title to the property to Zazzarino on January 24, 2012, and Zazzarino later intervened in the action as a co-defendant and was included in the plaintiff's amended complaint, the issue arises as to whether an ongoing state of justiciability exists in the controversy between the plaintiff and First Horizon.

“Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable.   Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute ․ (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse ․ (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power ․ and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant ․ In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in any way.”  (Emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 555–56, 979 A.2d 469 (2009).  “[A] dispute has not actually disappeared if one of the parties still suffers injury, even if the impairment is merely collateral to the main disagreement.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Housing Authority v. Lamothe, 225 Conn. 757, 765, 627 A.2d 367 (1993).

In the present controversy between the plaintiff and First Horizon, even after First Horizon's conveyance of the property to Zazzarino, there still exists an actual dispute between the two parties as to which had legal title at the time the action commenced.   Each party's interests in having maintained legal title is in direct adversity to the opposing party as both assert conflicting claims of ownership to the property at that time.   Moreover, the rights of the parties, including title to the property, can be determined by a court in accordance with the judicial authority granted by § 47–31 to quiet title to a disputed property.   Thus, the case meets the first three elements of justiciability.   The fourth element, that a ruling on the controversy will yield a practical benefit for one of the parties, is therefore dispositive.   To this end, the plaintiff currently continues to suffer injury as his claim to title in the property remains clouded despite First Horizon's relinquishment of its ownership rights through its purported sale of the property to Zazzarino.   A determination that First Horizon did not maintain legal title to the property at the time the action was filed on account of the plaintiff's acquisition of ownership through adverse possession will render its subsequent sale to Zazzarino null and unsuccessful in transferring any legal interest in the property.   Accordingly, judgment by the court that the plaintiff had properly attained legal title to the property from its previous owners, including First Horizon, would afford the plaintiff practical relief in the form of a settled title to the property as to all defendants in the case, and would, potentially, adversely affect First Horizon.

At minimum, the law requires only “a collateral consequence [to the main dispute] ․ to defeat the plaintiff's claim of mootness.”  Housing Authority of Stamford v. Lamothe, supra, 225 Conn. 765–66.   In the present case, because a judgment of the title dispute between the plaintiff and First Horizon will provide the plaintiff with direct practical relief, the case is therefore justiciable and not moot.

Support for continued justiciability in situations of claimed and disclaimed ownership is found in dicta from Lake Garda Improvement Assn. v. Battistoni, supra, 155 Conn. 293–95.   The case involves two defendants who “[b]oth claimed to be the owners of the disputed ․ property, and both claimed that they had conveyed their interests seriatim to [another] company.”  Id., 295.   The court ultimately reversed the trial court's findings because the company recipient to the property “was, according to the land records, in the position of one who might [at the time the action commenced] claim an interest adverse to the plaintiff”;  id., 294;  and the plaintiff was therefore required to name it as a party defendant.  Id., 293.

The decision, however, stated unequivocally that an action to quiet title “lies against those who, at the time it is instituted, are the present claimants to the land.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id., 294.   It further noted in passing that § 47–31 even “permits the court to render judgment in favor of any defendant who disclaims all interest in ․ the property.”  Id., 295.   So long as the plaintiff fulfills the required essentials of the complaint, maintains the action against a party with a conflicting claim to the land at the time of the suit's initiation, and claims a full determination of the parties' rights to the land in a dispute justifying litigation, Lake Garda Improvement Assn. sanctions the cause of action in accordance with § 47–31.   See id., 293–94.

In the present case, unlike Lake Garda Improvement Assn., the present adverse claimant to the property has been added to the case as a party defendant.   With all present claimants to the property joined to the case, First Horizon remains a properly named defendant as it was a claimant to the property at the time the action was instituted.   Because the plaintiff's suit fulfills the other essentials for a quiet title claim in its complaint, and requests a full determination of the parties' rights in the land, the court may therefore issue a judgment as to both defendants.   In its memorandum of law, First Horizon cites this court's decision in Stones Trail, LLC v. Weston, Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford–Norwalk, Docket No. CV–05–4007138–S (December 16, 2011, Adams, J.T.R.) as support for the proposition that, in an action requiring a judgment over land, a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a party who no longer maintains ownership over the property in dispute because the court cannot possibly make a determination against them that will result in practical relief to the plaintiff.   The factual circumstances of the case, however, differ in relevant part from those of the present case.   In contrast to the present case, Stones Trail involved a situation in which the plaintiff, not the defendant, sold its claimed interest in the disputed property.   In light of those circumstances, this court ruled that “[t]he plaintiff's claims for relief have definitely been mooted by its loss of ownership.”  Id.

In support of its holding, this court in Stones Trail reasoned that, because the plaintiff no longer owned the property in question, “[t]here [was] simply no meaningful or practical relief that [could] be granted by the court [under the] circumstances.”  Id. The decision is clear that its holding was intended to be limited to situations where the plaintiff conveyed title to the disputed property and therefore could no longer be afforded any practical relief in the form of a declaratory judgment regarding the property's use.   See id.   See also Gemmel v. Lee, 42 Conn.App. 682, 686 n.5, 680 A.2d 346 (1996) (actions for a declaratory judgment, like actions to quiet title, may involve a determination of property rights).   In cases such as the present, because the plaintiff maintains his claim of title to the property and could benefit from a judgment to settle title to the property, Stones Trail's holding is not applicable.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the defendant's motion to dismiss.¹

TAGGART D. ADAMS

JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE

FOOTNOTES

FN1. As the motion to dismiss is denied on the ground that the controversy is justiciable and not moot, the court does not need to reach a decision on the alternative arguments raised by the plaintiff involving more subjective determinations.   These include First Horizon's standing as an indispensable party and the probability that a dismissal of First Horizon will harm judicial efficiency..  FN1. As the motion to dismiss is denied on the ground that the controversy is justiciable and not moot, the court does not need to reach a decision on the alternative arguments raised by the plaintiff involving more subjective determinations.   These include First Horizon's standing as an indispensable party and the probability that a dismissal of First Horizon will harm judicial efficiency.

Adams, Taggart D., J.T.R.