Commissioner of Labor v. LLC (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO STRIKE SPECIAL DEFENSES # 113

This is a revised two-count complaint alleging unpaid wages.   Plaintiff has moved to strike the last three of the defendants' four Special Defenses on the grounds that sufficient facts have not been pleaded to sustain Special Defense two, statute of limitations, and Special Defense three, exception from the wage statutes by virtue of the claimant's bona-fide administrative position.   Plaintiff claims that the fourth special Defense is improper because the defendants fail to plead that there is a mutual debt between the plaintiff and the defendants as required for set off pursuant to General Statutes § 52–139.

-I-

The plaintiff alleges the following facts.   The defendant Northeast Diesel was an employer in Connecticut during the relevant time period alleged.   The defendant employed Louisa Valley (the claimant), from July 2, 2008 to January 18, 2010.   The claimant filed a statement alleging unpaid wages with the plaintiff on or about May 14, 2010.   Upon investigation of the claim, the plaintiff determined that the defendants owed wages to the claimant in the amount of $19,201.89 from January 2009 through December 2009, in violation of General Statutes §§ 31–71b and 31–76b.   Despite demand, the defendants failed to tender payment of the wages, conduct which the plaintiff argues is intentional, egregious, arbitrary, unreasonable and in bad faith.   The plaintiff seeks to recover double the amount of unpaid wages due by its authority under General Statutes § 31–72.

On February 6, 2013, the defendants filed an answer to the amended complaint wherein they raised four Special Defenses.   On March 15, 2013, the plaintiff filed this motion to strike special defenses two through four.

-II-

The defendants' second special defense states that the claimant's wage claim is barred by the relevant statute of limitations, codified in General Statutes § 52–596.   The second Special Defense is insufficient as a matter of law because the defendants have not pleaded any facts with respect to the date on which the plaintiff's action accrued or the date on which the statute of limitations tolled.   The defendants state only that “Louisa Valley's wage claims are barred in whole or in part by the applicable statute of limitations” and argue that they have pleaded sufficient facts to sustain their special defense of a statute of limitations violation.  General Statutes § 52–596.   Herasimovich v. Wallingford, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–04–0481797–S (August 8, 2013, Thompson, J.) concerned a motion to strike a statute of limitations defense.   The court noted that the special defense, which alleged only that “the plaintiff's action is barred by the fifteen-year statute of limitations period set forth in Connecticut General Statutes § 13a–138a,” was devoid of any facts and any explanation of the legal theories on which it is relying to support its contentions.   The defendant simply states that the plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

In this action, which is procedurally identical to Herasimovich, not only is no legal theory set forth, but the defendants have not provided a date on which they argue the statute of limitations begins tolling, a material fact that is essential to a statute of limitations defense.   As a result, the plaintiffs' motion to strike the second Special Defense is granted.

The defendants argue for their third Special Defense that the claimant qualifies as exempt from the wage requirements of General Statutes § 31–71b by virtue of her status as office manager.   The plaintiff argues that this defense is legally insufficient as it fails to allege any facts consistent with the plaintiff's complaint that the claimant was employed in a bona-fide executive, administrative or professional capacity.

“Employee” is defined by statute as “any individual employed or permitted to work by an employer but shall not include ․ an individual employed in a bona fide executive, administrative or professional capacity as defined in the regulations of the Labor Commissioner.”  “[I]t is essential that exemptions or exclusions [from the wage laws] be strictly and narrowly construed.”  Shell Oil Co. v. Ricciuti, 147 Conn. 277, 283, 160 A.2d 257 (1960).   The primary factor in the determination of whether a person is employed in a bona fide administrative capacity is the nature of his or her duties.  Butler v. Hartford Technical Institute, Inc., 243 Conn. 454, 467, 704 A.2d 222, 229 (1997).

In the present case, the only fact alleged in the third Special Defense is that “[w]hile employed by Northeast in the position of office manager, Louisa Valley qualified as exempt from the wage requirements of Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31–60.”   There are no additional facts pleaded beyond the claimant's title that would support the defendants' claim that the claimant was employed in one of the three exempt capacities.   The defendants claim that “the very title of Office Manager implies Valley's position falls within the exempt category pertaining to individuals in a bona fide administrative capacity as defined in § 31–60–15 of the regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.”   This assertion ignores Ricciuti and Butler, above, which hold that the question of whether a person is employed in a bona fide administrative capacity must be determined on the facts of the particular case in a strict and narrowly construed manner.   At least some accompanying facts must be pleaded alluding to the nature of the claimant's job, as required by Butler, rather than simply the job title and nothing more.

-III-

In their fourth Special Defense, demand for set off, the defendants plead that because the claimant occasionally worked less than complete forty-hour weeks, to the extent the claimant is found not exempt from wage requirements, any monies owed to the plaintiff must be set off against the money owed by the claimant to the defendants for overpaying her for weeks in which she did not work forty hours.   The plaintiff responds that General Statutes § 52–139(a) provides that in order for set off to be applicable, there must be a debt between the plaintiff and the defendants, and as the plaintiff in this action is the Commissioner and there is no such debt between the parties, the special defense must fail.   The defendants also argue that they are also entitled to recovery under General Statutes § 52–140, which controls set off of an assigned claim, or alternatively, under common-law equitable set off.   The plaintiff's answer that no statutory set off provision is applicable to the present case because the plaintiff is not an assignee such that § 52–140 applies, and the same applies to a claim of equitable set off.

Setoff allows parties that owe each other money to apply their mutual debts against each other.  Shapero v. Mercede, 77 Conn.App. 497, 509, 823 A.2d 1263 (2003).  “A condition precedent to the application of the set off statute ․ is that the defendant's claim arises from a debt due from the plaintiff.”  Lind–Larsen v. Fleet National Bank of Connecticut, 84 Conn.App. 1, 22, 852 A.2d 799, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 940, 861 A.2d 514 (2004).  “The debt must be a mutual one.”  General Consolidated, Ltd. v. Rudnick & Sons, Inc., 4 Conn.Cir.Ct. 581, 586, 237 A.2d 386 (1967).

One Superior Court decision has held that an action by the Commissioner of Labor on behalf of a claimant to collect unpaid wages does not also necessitate the acquisition by the Commissioner of any debts the claimant may have to his or her employer.   Commissioner of Labor v. Bednaz Excavating, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV–06–4020338 (October 24, 2006, Wiese, J.).   In the present case, the plaintiff is the Commissioner of Labor, not the employee whom the defendants allegedly overpaid.   There is no debt between the Commissioner and the defendants.   Likewise, any claim that there has been a valid assignment from the employee to the Commissioner under Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., 265 Conn. 210, 828 A.2d 64 (2003).   Any assignment language contained in complaints made with the Commissioner only assigns the right to collect wages, not a total assignment, and therefore an action under § 52–140 is not proper.   See Id., 230.

The defendants in this case have not as a part of their pleadings alleged facts suggesting that justice cannot be obtained in separate action against the claimant and have not met their burden of adequately alleging their claims.   See Bassett v. City Bank & Trust Co., 115 Conn 1, 9, 160 A.2d 60 (1932).

For the above reasons, that the motion to strike the defendants' three special defenses is granted.

Wagner, J.T.R.

Wagner, Jerry, J.T.R.