Marie LeVasseur v. Town of Bethany (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The defendant, the Town of Bethany has moved for summary judgment based upon the exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Act as set forth in General Statutes §§ 31–275(10) and 31–284.   The court grants the defendant's motion.

The parties agree that the plaintiff, Marie LeVasseur, was a school teacher and was employed by the Board of Education of the Town of Bethany on the date she was injured.   The plaintiff alleges that on January 19, 2010, while in the course of her employment, she suffered injuries when she fell in a parking lot owned and controlled by the Town of Bethany.   The plaintiff filed a claim for workers' compensation with the Bethany Board of Education, and a voluntary agreement was approved accepting the workers' compensation claim.

As stated by the court in Velardi v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 178 Conn. 371, 376, 423 A.2d 77 (1979);  “[I]f the defendant [is] the plaintiff's employer, the plaintiff [is] relegated to the remedies afforded by the [Workers' Compensation Act].” Mase v. Meriden, 164 Conn. 65, 316 A.2d 754 (1972), is instructive in the case at bar.   In Mase, as in the case at bar, the Board of Education of the City of Meriden and the plaintiff entered into a written agreement for workers' compensation coverage for the plaintiff.   The plaintiff then brought a claim against the City of Meriden to recover damages for the personal injuries that he claimed to have sustained as a result of a fall on a public sidewalk within the city limits.   The court rejected this claim, concluding that it was barred by § 31–284, and stated:  “In Wallingford v. Board of Education, 152 Conn. 568, 573–74, 210 A.2d 446 (1965), we specifically held that although town boards of education are agencies of the state in charge of education in the towns, members of the board of education are, nevertheless, also officers of the town and that persons employed by the board in the performance of its statutory functions are employees of the town and are thus subject to the provisions of the town charter relating to civil service.   Our holding in the Wallingford case that persons employed by the board of education was not limited only to situations where there was a requirement that the board select its nonprofessional employees under those civil service requirements.”  (Emphasis added.)  Mase v. Meriden, supra, 164 Conn. 67.

The court in Rettig v. Woodbridge, 304 Conn. 462, 475, 41 A.3d 267 (2012), later added that:  “It was ‘of no moment’ that the Meriden board of education ‘may have purchased workers' compensation coverage for persons hired by it ․ The premium was obviously paid with money supplied by the [c]ity ․’ “ So too in the case at bar, it is of no moment that the voluntary agreement was signed by the Town of Bethany Board of Education.

The case cited by the plaintiff, Sansone v. Bechtel, 180 Conn. 96, 429 A.2d 820 (1980), does not help the plaintiff.   It actually cites Wallingford v. Board of Education, supra, 152 Conn. 573 (1965), for the proposition that the defendant teacher is not employed by the state (and therefore entitled to immunity), but rather is employed by the local board of education.  Sansone does not purport to change the law as set forth in Wallingford, Mase and Rettig with regard to the application of the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act to workers employed by the town boards of education.

The law is clear that “for purposes of applying the exclusivity provision of the [Workers' Compensation Act], an employee of a local board of education [is] an employee of the town served by the board.”  Rettig v. Woodbridge, supra, 304 Conn. 470.   The law makes no distinction concerning the professional or nonprofessional status of that employee.

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's claim in this action is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. The defendant's motion for summary judgment is, therefore, granted.

Frechette, J.

Frechette, Matthew E., J.