Robert A. Martin v. Maryann C. Martin (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Plaintiff filed a dissolution action with the court on October 20, 2012.   Defendant timely appeared through counsel, answered and cross-complained on November 3, 2012.   The parties entered into several temporary stipulations during the pendency of the action:  # 117 (12/3/12)—regarding custody of and access with the parties' minor daughter;  exclusive use of the marital premises;  an allocation of debts and a withdrawal of funds from a retirement account. # 122 (1/14/13)—agreeing to a right of first refusal, returning some personal items to plaintiff and setting the timing for an exchange of discovery. # 152 (9/13/13)—giving defendant her entire 401K account so that she would have funds to relocate from the marital premises and outlining a partial division of personal property.

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Modify child support and alimony on September 25, 2013 (# 153).   On November 4, 2013 Judge Devine deferred action on this motion to the time of trial.   He also re-appointed Attorney Lori Hellum as Guardian ad Litem for the parties' minor daughter.   With her guidance the parties attempted to institute a parenting plan.   Each, however, proposed differing plans for the court to consider.

The court tried the case to conclusion on November 21, 2013.   The court orders the parties' Financial Affidavits to be unsealed.

FACTUAL FINDINGS

The court makes all its findings by a preponderance of the evidence, having observed the attitude and demeanor of the various witnesses and assessed their credibility.   The court considered the exhibits and assigned all due weight.   The court took into account the arguments and proposed orders of counsel.   The court takes judicial notice of the entire court file.   All statutory stays have expired.   The court has jurisdiction.

From the credible, sworn testimony the court finds that both parties lived continuously in Connecticut at least 12 months prior to the filing of the Complaint.   Defendant's birth name was “Coleda.”   They married on June 28, 1997 in Montville, Connecticut.   They have a daughter, Rhiannon, born February 12, 2004.   The child currently receives HUSKY A insurance benefits.   Defendant is not now pregnant.   Defendant received cash assistance from the state most recently in April 2013.¹  Based on the evidence, there is no realistic hope that the parties will reconcile.   The court concludes that the marriage has broken down irretrievably, and it is dissolved.   The parties are declared to be single and unmarried.

The Parties and their Child.

Plaintiff (also referred to as “husband” or “father”) is 45 years old and appears to be in reasonably good health from the court's observation.   He is a high school graduate with specialized electrical training.   He has no military background.   He has worked predominantly in the cable/communication industry, first with MetroCast and currently with Comcast.   He recently left a job in Rhode Island with Yardney Technical Products, Inc. because he observed layoffs and other negative changes that he felt limited his future.²  He now is a “lead installer” for Comcast at a lower pay than at his previous job,³ but he hopes to eventually earn more, perhaps as a manager.   He works Sundays through Thursdays from 7:30 a.m. to 4 p.m. He will qualify for health benefits for himself and his child after three months.   He could not afford such benefits at his last job.

Defendant (also referred to as “wife” or “mother”) is 43 years old.   She, too, appeared to be in reasonably good health.   Defendant has a BA degree and began work on a Master's degree.   She last worked full-time in 2010.   She used to teach at Thames Valley Council for Community Action, Inc. (TVCCA) and Three Rivers Community College.   Plaintiff claims she left this work due to stress and “never went back.”   Defendant counters that he “encouraged” her to be a stay-at-home-mom and that she also did some substitute teaching.   She worked at a day care facility for seven months in 2013, earning $11.50 an hour for up to 40 hours.   Those hours were not guaranteed.   She received a $1,200.00 severance when laid off in July 2013.   See, Defendant's Exhibit B. She currently works for EASTCONN, an educational non-profit organization.   Her contract runs through the current school year until June 2014.   There is no overtime.   It will take her approximately eighteen months to earn a certificate to teach grades K–6th. She began this process about a year ago but never took the necessary test.   Plaintiff paid $470.00 for this test,⁴ and now he wants this money back.   He also asserts that her earning capacity should be determined as if she has a Master's Degree.

The parties have one child, a daughter, Rhiannon.   She turns ten years old in about a month.   The girl is said to be “bright” and “articulate,” earning As and Bs as a 4th grader in Griswold's elementary school.   Plaintiff testified that the ride to school from his current home is about 15 to 20 minutes and that that same commute is considerably more from mother's current home.   Rhiannon is involved in a number of extracurricular activities like cheerleading, clarinet, basketball and Girl Scouts.   She has attended day camp 3–4 times per week in the summer.

Neither party disputes that defendant has been the girl's primary caretaker;  that she enjoys time with her father and loves his family.   Defendant's parents live nearby.   She and Rhiannon see them on holidays.

Plaintiff moved from the marital residence over a year ago.   He currently lives with a woman and her 22–year–old son in Voluntown.   Rhiannon does not currently spend any school nights in her father's household.   His Proposed Orders dated November 21, 2013 outline a parenting plan sharing joint legal and physical custody of the child with defendant, although he concedes that primary residence would be with the mother.   He seeks access each Tuesday from 5 to 7 p.m. and Thursdays overnight every other week to Sunday after dinner.⁵  This schedule takes into account that he does not work for his new employer on Friday and Saturday.   He further seeks two weeks of “exclusive” time in the summer and an alternation of holidays.

Defendant agrees to share joint legal custody of Rhiannon and that the child will reside primarily with her.   Defendant wants no shared physical custody.   She proposes that plaintiff's access will be alternating weekends from Friday at 5 p.m. to Sunday at 8 p.m. with plaintiff providing the bulk of the transportation.   She offers a different holiday schedule and only one “exclusive” week in the summer for each parent.   She seeks to restrict who cares for the child when plaintiff is unavailable during his access, and she seeks a right of “first refusal” in these instances.   She asks that neither party consume alcohol or illicit drugs or smoke cigarettes in the child's presence nor allow others to do so.

Both parties ask the court to retain jurisdiction over Rhiannon's post-secondary education costs.   On this basis and the parties' sworn, credible testimony, the court finds that had this family remained intact, it is more likely than not that each would have found a way to contribute to their daughter's post-secondary educational expenses.  C.G.S. § 46b–56c(c).

The “Hut.”

Both parties complain about the other's lifestyle and the effect on their child.   Plaintiff terms the condition of defendant's home as “appalling” and labels her a “hoarder.”   He asserts that the child is embarrassed to have guests and play-dates in her mother's home.   He claims that his current home is “clutter-free,” but the court concludes from the credible evidence only that neither party is a perfect homemaker.

Defendant expresses concern over plaintiff's use of alcohol and drugs.   She asserts that the condition of the marital household was as much plaintiff's fault as hers.   Plaintiff testified that he last smoked “weed” “years ago” and that he recently passed Comcast's drug-test to qualify for his current employment.

There is a structure on the premises of the former marital home both parties called the “hut.” ⁶  Defendant points to the many beer and alcohol containers in and around the hut as evidence of plaintiff's excessive drinking.   Plaintiff claims that he collected most of these for the 5–cent deposit.   The court credits neither of these assertions.

Both parties described the hut as a “man-camp,” a place where plaintiff would congregate with friends, prepare for hunting or fishing trips, prepare venison and clean fish.   Plaintiff does not deny that he drank alcohol with others there and that Rhiannon was sometimes present.

One of plaintiff's friends, Tom Anderson, testified credibly that he was often present in the hut, but he never observed drinking to excess, especially with Rhiannon present.   He testified that Rhiannon has a “normal” relationship with her father and a “good” one with his family.   He thinks defendant is a “good” mother.

The Marital Estate—Land and House.

Plaintiff purchased land for the marital premises in 1995, prior to the parties' marriage.⁷  He paid $37,000.00, putting $7,000.00 cash down and borrowing the rest.   Plaintiff claims that defendant did not participate in these finances and that he should be credited in full for his provision of the down payment.⁸  The court finds this claim to be attenuated by the passage of over sixteen years of marriage and declines to assign him such credit.   He also claims a credit of $250.00 from defendant for his payment of a septic pumping bill in August 2013.⁹  This service facilitated the sale of the marital premises.   The court finds both parties equally liable for the bill.

When the parties decided to build, they refinanced the land mortgage with one for construction.   They purchased a kit home, and both helped to build it along with friends, family and some hired contractors.

The parties stipulated on December 3, 2012 that plaintiff would be responsible for payment of the first mortgage on the marital premises.   Defendant was to pay the home equity line, and she did.   Plaintiff, however, failed to pay the full amount due on the first mortgage.   They later agreed on July 30, 2013 that neither would pay either mortgage on the home, but defendant reserved “her right to argue for a credit at the time of trial re:  the $8,000.00+ arrearage.”   She now asserts this claim.   The court calculates the first mortgage arrearage to be $6,626.00.¹⁰  The house recently sold.   Plaintiff's counsel currently holds $13,666.00 of the remaining proceeds;  defendant's counsel, $14,996.00.   Had plaintiff made the first mortgage payments as ordered by the court there would have been $6,626.00 more proceeds to divide between the parties.

The Marital Estate—401Ks

Plaintiff accumulated a substantial 401K during his employment with MetroCast.   He does not dispute that defendant is entitled to share in the marital portion of this asset.   As of September 30, 2013, the balance in this account was $59,488.49.¹¹  The amount may have fluctuated since that date due to market conditions.   The court finds that each party benefited equally from withdrawals taken from this account in November 2012.¹²

Defendant also had a 401K. The parties agreed that defendant would retain all of these funds, approximately $10,000.00, so that she could move from the marital premises in advance of its sale.¹³

The Marital Estate—Personal Property.

The parties also determined a partial division of personal property in their September 2013 Agreement.   Their sworn Financial Affidavits dated November 21, 2013 (plaintiff) and November 19, 2013 (defendant) list other personal property that may not yet have been distributed.   All their bank accounts have been separated or divided to their mutual satisfaction.

The Marital Estate—Bills, Debts and Other Obligations.

Plaintiff lists family loans and his attorney's fees as liabilities as well as federal taxes of $908.00 and state taxes of $3,055.00.   The court finds plaintiff solely responsible for his family loans and attorneys fees.   The tax obligations from 2012 are found to be jointly owed.   Defendant lists a Sunoco and an AT & T credit card.   She assumes responsibility for the Sunoco debt.   She credibly testified that the AT & T card debt is the result of years of “rolling over” and combining other credit card debt onto one lower-rate card.   She proposes to share this obligation equally with plaintiff by paying the AT & T card and the 2012 tax bills “off the top” of the remaining house proceeds.   Plaintiff claims that the AT & T debt is solely defendant's, but he concedes that some of the charges “may have been” used for the benefit of the child.

APPLICABLE LAW, DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS

To reach its decisions, the court considered and applied all applicable Connecticut General Statutes particularly Sections 46b–56, 62, 81, 82 & 84.

Child Custody and Access.

If both parties agree to it, joint custody is presumed to be in the best interests of the child.  General Statutes § 46b–56a(b).  These parents have agreed to share joint legal custody of their daughter and that the child would reside primarily with defendant mother.   The parents disagree only on plaintiff father's access schedule.

A dispute over access “is not one primarily to determine the rights of the respective parties but rather a determination of the best interests of the child or children.”  Raymond v. Raymond, 165 Conn. 735, 741 (1974).   The court finds from the credible evidence presented that Rhiannon is a bright, happy, well adjusted child.   Her mother has been her primary caretaker, but she loves her father and enjoys her time with him and his family.

Defendant seeks to make plaintiff solely responsible for Rhiannon's care during his access, but she offered no credible evidence of any problem having occurred when someone other than plaintiff cared for the child.¹⁴  Defendant also seeks a right of “first refusal” when and if father is unavailable to care for the child.   In the court's experience, however, such a right requires a high level of dispassionate communication between parents.   Sadly, the court finds that this necessary level of communication does not currently exist between these parents.

Plaintiff's current work week for Comcast begins early Sunday morning and ends at 4 p.m. Thursday afternoon.   His two-day break on Friday and Saturday is his “weekend.”   Having Rhiannon spend a reasonable amount of time with her father when he does not have to work is in her best interests because the child is entitled to experience life in both her parents' households.   Naturally, both parents are tasked with helping the child fulfill her school and social obligations, and the court does not expect the parties' individual households to function exactly the same way.   In fact, Rhiannon may learn and grow by observing the differences in her parents' methods.   A bright, well-adjusted, happy child will be able to smoothly transition from one parent's home to the other if her parents shield her from their adult issues and disputes.

Personal Property and Liabilities.

The court finds the parties' Agreement dividing their personal property to be fair, reasonable and equitable.   The court adopts this agreement without change and makes it a final order, but the court's orders may reiterate some of the major items in the Agreement in order to be clear.

Fault.

The court credits defendant's testimony that plaintiff has been involved in a sexual relationship with another woman since Memorial Day 2012.   He did not take adequate precautions during this affair, and he continued to have unprotected relations with his wife.   He testified that his marriage changed for the worse after Rhiannon's birth as early as 2005;  that his wife centered her attention on the baby and that their intimacy ceased.   The court has observed this same pattern of deterioration in far too many relationships that have come before it.   However, plaintiff took no effective action to resolve the issue or dissolve the marriage until late 2012 when defendant confronted him about his affair.

The court finds plaintiff more at fault for the breakdown of the marriage than defendant.

Alimony and Plaintiff's Motion to Modify (# 153).

Alimony is the obligation of support that spouses assume toward each other by virtue of their marriage.   Alimony is always represented by money and is damages to compensate for the loss of marital support and maintenance.   Weigand v. Weigand, 129 Conn.App. 526 (2011).

On July 30, 2013 the parties agreed and the court ordered plaintiff to pay defendant $150.00 per week alimony.   Defendant had no other income at this time except $150.00 per week child support.

Plaintiff sought a modification of alimony on September 25, 2013 when he learned that defendant had become employed.   She now earns $371.54 gross per week, a net of $284.54, according to her sworn Financial Affidavit.   Plaintiff gave defendant proper notice of his motion on September 25, 2013.   On November 4, 2013 Judge Devine deferred action on the modification to the time of trial, but that court found an alimony arrearage of $1,050.00 and $280.00 of child support due defendant.   Judge Devine ordered $1,330.00 to be taken from plaintiff's escrowed house sale proceeds and paid to defendant at once.   The $1,330.00 was to be considered a debt to the escrow account owed by plaintiff.

A modification of alimony required a two-pronged inquiry.   First, the court must determine whether there has been a substantial change in the circumstances of either party since the latter of the date of the dissolution judgment or last modification.  Hardisty v. Hardisty, 183 Conn. 253, 259 (1981).   The party seeking the modification bears the burden of showing the existence of a substantial change in circumstances.  Mundell v. Mundell, 110 Conn.App. 466 (2008).   If the court determines that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred, the statutory factors set forth in Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46b–82 are applied to determine what modification, if any, should occur.

The last order for alimony in this case entered on July 30, 2013 at $150.00 per week.   Since that time there have been two changes in the parties' financial circumstances:  plaintiff earns somewhat less in his new job, and defendant is now employed.   The court finds this combination of changed circumstances to be substantial.

The court has weighed the applicable criteria of C.G.S. § 46b–82 in light of the modification and for the final judgment, particularly the parties' educational levels, the amount and sources of each party's current income, their vocational skills and employability, the cause for the breakdown of the marriage (as to the final order, only) and the desirability of this mother securing employment.   To her credit, defendant has become employed.   She needs at least 18 months to complete the requirements for her teaching certificate.   Given her child care responsibilities now as a working mother, the court deems an 18–month schedule to be ambitious and finds that defendant will require more time and support to achieve her employment goal.

The court grants plaintiff's modification and finds that plaintiff should pay $100.00 per week alimony to defendant from the week of September 25, 2013 forward to the date of the Judgment.   From the Judgment forward, the court awards defendant three years of alimony at $100.00 per week.¹⁵

Child Support and Plaintiff's Motion to Modify (# 153).

The analysis for a modification of child support is similar to that of alimony.  C.G.S. § 46b–86.   The starting point for this analysis is the last award of child support on July 30, 2013:  $150.00 per week and 75% of unreimbursed health care and work-related day care expenses.   According to his sworn Financial Affidavit dated July 30, 2013, plaintiff grossed $741.00 weekly and netted $581.00 at that time.

Plaintiff now earns $610.00 gross per week ¹⁶ and nets $492.00 per week.   Defendant's current earnings are noted, above.   The court prepared a Guidelines Worksheet based on these numbers.   The court finds that the presumptive amount of child support due from plaintiff to defendant is $117.00.¹⁷  With $100 weekly alimony factored in, the presumptive split of unreimbursed health-related expenses and work-related day care expenses is 36.7% to plaintiff and 63.3% to defendant.

The court concludes that plaintiff's lesser earnings, defendant's new income and the difference between the July 30th child support award and the current presumptive amount are substantial changes I=in the parties' financial circumstances, requiring a modification of the child support award.   Applying C.G.S. § 46b–84 and especially the guiding criteria of subsection (d), the court finds that plaintiff should pay defendant $100.00 per week child support plus 35% of unreimbursed health-related expenses and work-related day care expenses.   The court does not find these awards to be a substantial deviation from the presumptive amounts found.

ORDERS

1. CHILD CUSTODY AND ACCESS

The parties shall share joint legal custody of their minor daughter.   She shall reside primarily with her mother.

The parties shall share transportation of their daughter as they may reasonably agree, but if they cannot agree, then plaintiff shall be solely responsible for transportation of his daughter on Tuesdays;  he shall pick up the child at the beginning of his Friday/Saturday access, and defendant shall pick up the minor child at the beginning of her access.   Either party may designate another responsible party, known to and familiar with the child, to assist them with parental responsibility or transportation if they are not available.

The parties may reasonably agree on plaintiff's access schedule, but if they cannot agree:

Father shall have access with and parental responsibility for his daughter:

each Tuesday from after work (approximately 4:30 pm) until 7:30 p.m., and

first week:  Thursdays after work until Saturday at 7:30 p.m., and

second week:  Thursdays after work until Friday until return to school or 9 a.m. if school is not in session.

Each party shall provide the other with a minimum of 60 days advance written notice of any intention to relocate outside New London County.   No one shall relocate until the 60 days has elapsed barring written agreement of the parties or court order.

Holidays and Summers

The holiday and summer schedule shall supersede the regular one.   When the holiday or summer scheduled time ends, the regular schedule begins again.

The parties shall share their child's access on the following holidays as follows:

Christmas Eve—with father from 12 noon or dismissal from school until 12 noon Christmas Day in even years;  with mother in odd years.

Christmas Day—with mother from 12 noon to 12 noon the following day in even years;  with father in odd years.

New Year's Eve—with father from 12 noon until 12 noon New Year's Day in odd years;  mother in even years.

New Year's Day—with mother from 12 noon to 12 noon the following day in odd years;  father in even years.

Easter—With mother until 2:00 p.m. in even years;  father in odd years.

Easter—With mother from 2:00 p.m. until 7:30 p.m. in odd years;  father in even years.

Thanksgiving—With mother the Wednesday before Thanksgiving from school dismissal until the Friday after Thanksgiving at 7:30 p.m. in even years;  father in odd years.

Additionally, the child shall spend every Father's Day and Father's Birthday with father and Mother's Day and Mother's Birthday with mother.   The parties shall alternate the child's Birthday and Halloween each year on an odd/even basis.   Each party shall be entitled to one week vacation with the child every summer.   Notice to the other party as to the week selected shall be provided no later than May 1 of each year.   If the parties cannot agree, then mother's choice prevails in even-numbered years;  father's in odd years.

Neither party shall consume alcohol to excess, engage in any drug use or smoke cigarettes when the child is with him/her.   Neither party shall allow other individuals to engage in any of these activities in the child's presence.

2. CHILD SUPPORT

The husband shall pay child support to the wife in the amount of $100.00 per week.   This amount is substantially compliant with the Child Support Guidelines.   Additionally, the husband shall pay 35% of work-related day care and unreimbursed health care expenses for the minor child.   The husband's child support obligation shall be paid by an immediate wage withholding.   The parties shall cooperate to implement the wage withholding.   The parties shall exchange W–2s and 1099s every year by February 15 so long as there is a child support or alimony obligation between them.

3. POST–MAJORITY EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT

The court retains jurisdiction over Rhiannon's post-majority educational costs pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–56c.

4. TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHILD

Defendant shall claim Rhiannon as an exemption/dependent on her federal and state income tax returns for Tax Year 2014, all even-numbered years thereafter and any year in which plaintiff does not qualify.

Plaintiff shall claim Rhiannon as an exemption/dependent on his federal and state income tax returns for Tax Year 2013 and all odd-numbered years thereafter so long as he is in substantial compliance with all aspects of his child support obligation by December 31st each year.

5. HEALTH INSURANCE (MEDICAL AND DENTAL) FOR CHILD

Each party shall maintain health insurance (medical and dental) for the minor child so long as it is available at reasonable cost through his/her employment (currently defined as 7–1/2% of net income).

Unreimbursed health care expenses for the minor child include but are not limited to medical, dental, orthodontic, optometric, ophthalmologic, psychiatric and psychological expenses.   The party who has incurred the expense shall notify the other of the cost and provide documentary evidence thereof.   Reimbursement by the other party shall be paid no later than 30 days of said notification.

6. ALIMONY

The husband shall pay periodic alimony to the wife in the amount of $100.00 per week for a period of three years from the date of the parties' dissolution of marriage.   The alimony obligation terminates upon the wife's death, the husband's death, the wife's re-marriage, and shall be subject to modification, suspension, or termination upon the wife's cohabitation/living with another person pursuant to applicable state law.   Alimony shall be non-modifiable as to term.   Alimony shall be modifiable as to amount, however, based upon a substantial change in circumstances of either party.

The above-referenced alimony obligation shall constitute income to the wife and shall be deductible by the husband for income tax purposes.   Under no circumstance shall the husband be responsible to pay alimony to the Wife after three years from the date of the parties' dissolution of marriage.

7. HEALTH INSURANCE (MEDICAL AND DENTAL) AND EXPENSES FOR PARTIES

The husband and wife shall hereafter each be solely responsible for maintaining and paying for their own respective health insurance and unreimbursed/uncovered health care expenses.   Should either be eligible for COBRA benefits, such benefits shall be at their own election and expense.

8. PROPERTY DIVISION AND DISTRIBUTION

Real Property

The escrowed funds currently held by counsel shall be distributed as follows:

$3,313.00 to defendant as her share of the equity that should have been available had plaintiff followed the court's orders to the letter;

$1,330.00 to defendant to repay the “loan” taken by plaintiff as decided by Judge Devine;

$125.00 to plaintiff to compensate him for one-half of the septic pumping at the marital premises prior to sale;

$470.00 to plaintiff for the test defendant failed to take;

$908.00 to the federal government to pay the parties' back federal taxes;

$3,055.00 to the State Department of Revenue Services to pay the parties' back state taxes;

$1,000.00 toward the payment of the AT & T credit card.  (Any balance after this payment is the sole responsibility of defendant.)

Any remaining escrowed funds shall be shared equally.

Personal Property

The parties have designated a division of their personal property to their mutual satisfaction.   The husband and wife shall each be entitled to the exclusive ownership and possession of those items in their possession, free of any right, claim or interest of the other.

Bank Accounts

The wife shall be entitled to retain as her sole and separate property such cash as she may possess and all bank accounts standing in her name, which are identified in her financial affidavit filed with the court In connection with the final hearing of the parties' dissolution of marriage action.

The husband shall be entitled to retain as his sole and separate property such cash as he may possess and all bank accounts standing in his name, which are identified in his financial affidavit filed with the court in connection with the final hearing of the parties' dissolution of marriage action.

Motor Vehicles

The wife shall retain her 2007 Subaru Forester automobile free of any claim of right, title or interest by the husband.   The wife shall be solely responsible for all loans, debt, taxes, insurance and maintenance costs associated with said automobile and shall indemnify and hold the husband harmless with regard to same.   The husband shall sign all documents necessary to transfer the title and registration of said vehicle to the Wife.

The husband shall retain his 1997 Chevrolet Silverado automobile, the 2001 Volkswagen Jetta, the 1975 John Deere tractor and any interest he may have in the “stake-body” and “plow” truck free of any claim of right, title or interest by the wife.   The husband shall be solely responsible for all loans, debt, taxes, insurance and maintenance costs associated with said automobile and shall indemnify and hold the wife harmless with regard to same.   The wife shall sign all documents necessary to transfer the title and registration of said vehicle to the husband.

9. STOCKS, 401k's, CD's, IRA's, ANNUITIES, PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT PLANS

Defendant's Stocks, 401k's, CD's, IRA's, Annuities, Pensions and Retirement Plans

Defendant shall retain 100% of her IRA. The Northeast Investors Stock, the Adelphia Stock, and the Ultra Strip Systems Stock shall be divided equally between the parties or sold and the net proceeds divided equally between the parties.

Plaintiff's Harron Communications, L.P. 401k Plan

Plaintiff shall transfer to defendant 55% of the gross value of his Harron Communications, L.P. 401k Plan valued as of the date of divorce, plus or minus gains or losses on her share by Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO).   Plaintiff shall take no action whatsoever in regards to said account unless and until this transfer has been accomplished.   Additionally, plaintiff shall continue to name defendant as the sole surviving beneficiary on this account until this transfer has occurred.   The court retains jurisdiction over the effectuation of this provision.   The parties shall split equally the cost associated with preparation of the QDRO. Each party shall pay his/her one-half share of this cost within 30 days of this decision.   Plaintiff shall retain as his sole and separate property the remainder of his 401k Plan.

10. LIFE INSURANCE

Each party shall obtain and maintain life insurance coverage on his/her life with a total death benefit of $100,000.00 dollars with the child named as the sole, irrevocable beneficiary until the child reaches the age of 23, so long as such policy is available at a premium cost not to exceed $500.00 per year.   Each party shall authorize the other to obtain direct information from the insurance carrier(s) regarding the existence of the policy(ies) and confirmation regarding each party's compliance with the provisions of this order.   Each party shall, upon reasonable demand, execute and deliver to the other party, without charge, whatever instruments, documents, or authorizations which may be necessary and desirable in order that the other party may document each party's compliance with this order.

Each party shall request the insurance carrier to provide notice to the other party in the event of any default in premium payment by the other party.   If so notified, the other party may cure the defect by making the outstanding payment to the insurance carrier and the other party shall immediately reimburse the other party for the same.

Each party shall, at any and all times upon reasonable request by the other party or their legal representatives, make, execute and deliver any and all such other and further instruments as may be necessary or desirable for the purpose of giving full force and effect to this order without charge therefore.   No party shall pledge, hypothecate or encumber their policy.

Each party shall pay or cause to be paid all premiums, dues and/or assessments which may become due and owing on said insurance policy on or before the due date.

11. LIABILITIES

Debts on Financial Affidavits

Except as previously ordered in this decision, each party shall be responsible to pay those debts which they have listed on their financial affidavits filed with the Court at the time of the final hearing for dissolution of their marriage.   Each party shall indemnify and hold the other harmless.   Wife shall be solely responsible for the following debt:  Sunoco ($260.50), and she shall indemnify and hold the husband harmless.   Additionally, each party shall be responsible to pay those debts incurred by them separately, and/or those debts which are in their separate names, whether or not listed on their respective financial affidavits, and each party shall indemnify and hold the other harmless.

The assumption of all such debts by the respective parties as set forth above shall be in the nature of family support and shall therefore be non-dischargeable in any bankruptcy proceeding.

Termination of Joint Accounts

Each party shall forthwith return to the other any and all charge accounts, credit cards or any other indicia of credit in the name of the other party.   Each party shall also return any credit cards or charge cards on accounts which are in the other party's name, but on which they have been granted their own card or right of use.

12. RESTORATION OF WIFE'S MAIDEN NAME

The wife's maiden name of Coleda is restored to her.

13. ATTORNEYS FEES

Each party shall pay their own separate costs of counsel.

So ordered.

Carbonneau, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The court does not intend to prejudice any rights accruing to the State of Connecticut because of this assistance to defendant..  FN1. The court does not intend to prejudice any rights accruing to the State of Connecticut because of this assistance to defendant.

FN2. See, Plaintiff's Exhibit 4..  FN2. See, Plaintiff's Exhibit 4.

FN3. See, Plaintiff's Exhibit 6. Plaintiff credibly testified and the cited Exhibit clearly showed that on and after December 9, 2013 plaintiff would earn $15.25 per hour and work 40 hours per week at Comcast..  FN3. See, Plaintiff's Exhibit 6. Plaintiff credibly testified and the cited Exhibit clearly showed that on and after December 9, 2013 plaintiff would earn $15.25 per hour and work 40 hours per week at Comcast.

FN4. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 8..  FN4. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 8.

FN5. The court notes that since December 9, 2013 when he started his new job with Comcast, plaintiff now works on Sundays.   See, Plaintiff's Exhibit 6..  FN5. The court notes that since December 9, 2013 when he started his new job with Comcast, plaintiff now works on Sundays.   See, Plaintiff's Exhibit 6.

FN6. See, Defendant's Exhibit O..  FN6. See, Defendant's Exhibit O.

FN7. See, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1..  FN7. See, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.

FN8. See, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2..  FN8. See, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.

FN9. See, Plaintiff's Exhibit 3..  FN9. See, Plaintiff's Exhibit 3.

FN10. See, Agreement of the Parties dated July 30, 2013 (# 146) and Defendant's Exhibits A & D. Defendant's Exhibit A is a Dime Savings Bank record of the parties' first mortgage payments.   Their monthly payment was $1,726.00 per month.   Plaintiff made a lump sum payment on November 14, 2012 to bring the account current.   The parties agreed that they would no longer pay the mortgage from the date of their July 30, 2013 Agreement forward.   Eight months passed since Plaintiff's lump sum payment, so to July 30, he should have paid $13,808.00 on the first mortgage ($1,726.00 times 8 months = $13,808.00).   He actually paid nothing in December 2012, $1,726.00 in January 2013, nothing in February, five payments in March—$1,700.00, $430.00, $1,300.00, $404.00 and $22.00, a total of $3,856.00, nothing in April or May and $800.00 in both June and July 2013.   The sum of these numbers is $7,182.00.   The difference between the amount due on the mortgage—$13,808.00—and the amount plaintiff actually paid—$7,182.00—is $6,626.00..  FN10. See, Agreement of the Parties dated July 30, 2013 (# 146) and Defendant's Exhibits A & D. Defendant's Exhibit A is a Dime Savings Bank record of the parties' first mortgage payments.   Their monthly payment was $1,726.00 per month.   Plaintiff made a lump sum payment on November 14, 2012 to bring the account current.   The parties agreed that they would no longer pay the mortgage from the date of their July 30, 2013 Agreement forward.   Eight months passed since Plaintiff's lump sum payment, so to July 30, he should have paid $13,808.00 on the first mortgage ($1,726.00 times 8 months = $13,808.00).   He actually paid nothing in December 2012, $1,726.00 in January 2013, nothing in February, five payments in March—$1,700.00, $430.00, $1,300.00, $404.00 and $22.00, a total of $3,856.00, nothing in April or May and $800.00 in both June and July 2013.   The sum of these numbers is $7,182.00.   The difference between the amount due on the mortgage—$13,808.00—and the amount plaintiff actually paid—$7,182.00—is $6,626.00.

FN11. See, Plaintiff's Exhibit 5..  FN11. See, Plaintiff's Exhibit 5.

FN12. See, Agreement of the Parties, Pendente Lite filed December 3, 2012 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 9..  FN12. See, Agreement of the Parties, Pendente Lite filed December 3, 2012 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 9.

FN13. See, Agreement of the Parties, filed September 3, 2013 (# 152)..  FN13. See, Agreement of the Parties, filed September 3, 2013 (# 152).

FN14. Defendant implied that the 22–year–old son of plaintiff's current girlfriend drank irresponsibly and was therefore a bad influence on Rhiannon.   See, Defendant's Exhibit O. The court assigns no weight to these implications..  FN14. Defendant implied that the 22–year–old son of plaintiff's current girlfriend drank irresponsibly and was therefore a bad influence on Rhiannon.   See, Defendant's Exhibit O. The court assigns no weight to these implications.

FN15. The court acknowledges that plaintiff did not start his new job with the lesser earning until December 9, 2013.   However, defendant's new job and greater earnings began well before plaintiff's Motion for Modification.   The court considered these factors when deciding its awards..  FN15. The court acknowledges that plaintiff did not start his new job with the lesser earning until December 9, 2013.   However, defendant's new job and greater earnings began well before plaintiff's Motion for Modification.   The court considered these factors when deciding its awards.

FN16. $15.25 per hour times 40 hours per week = $610.00..  FN16. $15.25 per hour times 40 hours per week = $610.00.

FN17. The court notes that this amount is more than 15% different from the prior child support order, a substantial deviation.  C.G.S. § 46b–86(a)..  FN17. The court notes that this amount is more than 15% different from the prior child support order, a substantial deviation.  C.G.S. § 46b–86(a).

Carbonneau, John L., J.