Ryan Daddana v. Stephanie Wigglesworth (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE # 112

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF FACTS

On August 28, 2013, the plaintiff, Ryan Daddana, filed the one-count complaint in this action against the defendant, Stephanie Wigglesworth, in which he alleges the following facts.   On May 12, 2013, Daddana was operating a motor vehicle heading south on Main Street in Bridgeport, Connecticut.   At the same time, Wigglesworth was operating a motor vehicle heading east from the driveway of 4269 Main Street in order to turn onto Main Street.   As Wigglesworth was exiting the driveway, she collided with Daddana's vehicle, causing Daddana to suffer serious and permanent injuries.   The plaintiff alleges that the injuries and damages that he suffered were caused by the negligence and carelessness of Wigglesworth.

On November 6, 2013, Wigglesworth filed an apportionment complaint against Daddana's uninsured motorist coverage carrier, Victoria Fire and Casualty (hereinafter Victoria).   The apportionment complaint alleges that, as Wigglesworth was coming out of the parking lot immediately before the accident, she was waived on by another vehicle that had stopped to let her out.   Wigglesworth further alleges that, if Daddana was injured as alleged, that his injuries, damages, and the subject accident, were due to the carelessness and negligence of the unknown vehicle in that the unknown vehicle stopped to allow Wigglesworth to proceed when it was not safe to do so.   As a result, Victoria, via Daddana's uninsured motorist coverage, is responsible in whole or in part for Daddana's damages.

On November 27, 2013, Victoria filed a motion to strike the apportionment complaint on the ground that Wigglesworth may not seek an apportionment of liability against Daddana's uninsured motorist coverage carrier where Daddana, as the underlying plaintiff, did not name the uninsured motorist coverage carrier as a defendant.   Victoria has submitted a memorandum of law in support of its motion to strike.   Wigglesworth submitted a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to strike on December 12, 2013.   The matter was heard at the short calendar on December 23, 2013.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). “[l]t is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted ․ The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 116–17, 19 A.3d 640 (2011).

Victoria moves to strike the apportionment complaint on the ground that an apportionment plaintiff may not seek apportionment of liability against the underlying plaintiff's uninsured motorist coverage carrier on the basis that the insurer is the surrogate for an unidentified or uninsured motorist where the underlying plaintiff has not named the uninsured motorist coverage carrier as a defendant.   Wigglesworth argues in turn that the apportionment complaint is proper pursuant to our Supreme Court's decision in Collins v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 257 Conn. 718, 778 A.2d 899 (2001).

III. ANALYSIS

Although the state's appellate courts have yet to specifically weigh in on this issue, the state's trial courts have dealt with the question of apportionment under the subject circumstances on more than one occasion over the past few years.   The most notable and persuasive decision with respect to this issue is Santana v. Tom, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV–07–5002545–S (November 17, 2008, Rubinow, J.) (46 Conn. L. Rptr. 665).   In Santana, the court held that a defendant could not seek apportionment against a plaintiff's uninsured motorist coverage carrier following a multi-vehicle accident when the underlying plaintiff did not name the uninsured motorist coverage carrier or an uninsured motorist as a defendant in the underlying action.

The Santana court undertook an analysis of the afore-mentioned Collins case and the facts before it, which are almost identical to the facts in the present case.   In Santana, the named defendants brought an apportionment claim against the plaintiff's uninsured motorist coverage carrier, despite the carrier not being named in the underlying complaint.   The court reasoned that, “[t]he critical distinction between the present case and Collins is that the named plaintiff did not serve a complaint upon his uninsured motorist carrier, or seek to recover damages from an unidentified driver directly or through a surrogate by naming that unidentified driver as a defendant in his original or amended complaint.”  Id., 668.   The court continued, concluding that, “the defendants have no basis on which to apportion [the carrier]:  they lack privity of contract with [the carrier] and cannot require [the carrier] to stand in the shoes of an unidentified driver who was not named as a defendant by the plaintiff in his complaint.”  Id. The court distinguished the Supreme Court's use of the surrogate analogy in Collins on the basis that a tortfeasor was not identified by the plaintiff “for whom [the carrier] might be contractually liable.”  Id.

The Santana court concluded, “in such a case, where the plaintiff has not identified negligent conduct for which the uninsured motorist carrier may be contractually liable, § 52–572h(o) functions to preclude apportionment of liability on any basis other than negligence.   Without the surrogacy hook, the defendants' apportionment claim loses its tortious element and ‘hybrid’ nature, thus rendering it inappropriate for apportionment.”  Id., 669;  see also Massaro v. Craig, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–06–5007556–S (July 27, 2009, Wilson, J.) (48 Conn. L. Rptr. 314).   In the present case, Wigglesworth is in the same position as the original defendants and subsequent apportionment plaintiffs in Santana, lacking privity with Victoria because it was not named in the underlying complaint.   As a result, the Santana reasoning is fully applicable to this matter.   This court finds the Santana decision to be persuasive, and for the reasons summarized herein, grants Victoria's motion to strike the apportionment complaint.

It is important to note, however, that Wigglesworth is not without recourse.   The Santana court noted:  “Should [the] case come to trial, [the defendants] may be able to present evidence to the fact finder concerning the causation element of the accident—and thus their claims regarding the fourth driver allegedly involved in the accident which give rise to this action—if they tender a general denial of liability and assert that only the unidentified driver was responsible for the plaintiff's injuries.”  Santana v. Tom, supra, 46 Conn. L. Rptr. 669 (citing Archambault v. Soneco/Northeastern, Inc., 287 Conn. 20, 33, 946 A.2d 839 (2008)).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Victoria's motion to strike Wigglesworth's apportionment claim is granted.

SOMMER, J.

Sommer, Mary E., J.