John Eudy et al. v. Richard Sartori (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR LIMITED STAY (# 102)

FACTS

On October 9, 2013, the plaintiffs, John Eudy and Geri Eudy, filed a two-count complaint against Richard Sartori in his capacities as the administrator of the decedent's estate and the guardian of Jonathan Sartori and Daniel Sartori.¹  On November 1, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging the following facts.   The decedent, Barbara A. Sartori, died on August 31, 2013.   Subsequently, John Eudy filed an application to appoint himself and Geri Eudy as the administrator of the decedent's estate.   The application was contested by the defendant, who is divorced from the decedent.   A hearing, via telephone, was held by the Probate Court for the district of Wallingford on October 1, 2013.   On the same date, the Probate Court, Wright J., issued a decree appointing the defendant as the administrator of the estate.

The defendant is currently the administrator, acting with full authority and without any bond, restriction, or other security posted benefitting the estate, its heirs, and creditors.   The plaintiffs claim that the Probate Court violated public policy and disregarded the decedent's clear wishes by appointing her former spouse as the administrator of the estate.   Moreover, the plaintiffs assert that the Probate Court did not provide the plaintiffs with a fair and proper opportunity to present their case.   Count one of the complaint seeks to appeal the Probate Court's decree and challenges the appointment of the defendant as the administrator of the estate.   Count two seeks a reimbursement of funeral expenses that the defendant denied as the estate's administrator.

On November 4, 2013, the plaintiffs filed the present motion for limited stay seeking to prevent the defendant from obtaining certain information and prosecuting any wrongful death claim.   In response, the defendant filed an objection to the motion on November 5, 2013.   The matter was heard at short calendar on December 16, 2013.

DISCUSSION

In their motion to stay the decree pending this appeal, the plaintiffs state that irreparable harm will result because, inter alia, the defendant “is provided with sole authority to access the decedent's house, personal effects, phone records, medical records, a personal computer and emails, which is a grave violation of any standard of human decency, given that this is the very man from whom [the] decedent obtained a divorce and entirely severed her life ․” Additionally, the plaintiffs claim that the defendant “could learn personal information about [the] decedent with which he could then jeopardize their children's memory of her ․” Based on these concerns, the plaintiffs are seeking a limited stay to prevent the defendant from (1) obtaining access to the decedent's home, personal effects, phone records, computer, and emails, (2) obtaining access to the decedent's medical records, and (3) investigating and prosecuting any wrongful death claim.

General Statutes § 45a–186(a) provides in relevant part that “any person aggrieved by any order, denial or decree of a Probate Court in any matter, unless otherwise specially provided by law, may ․ appeal therefrom to the Superior Court.”  “[A] stay of enforcement of the probate court's order or decree from which an appeal is taken is not automatic ․” Sullivan v. Ganim, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV–09–4030012–S (December 10, 2009, Arnold, J.).   Nevertheless, a motion for a stay may be made to the Probate Court or the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 45a–186(g).  Specifically, § 45a–186(g) provides in relevant part:  “The filing of an appeal under this section shall not, of itself, stay enforcement of the order, denial or decree from which the appeal is taken.   A motion for a stay may be made to the Court of Probate or the Superior Court.   The filing of a motion with the Court of Probate shall not preclude action by the Superior Court.”

The court is guided by the principles set forth in Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals, 196 Conn. 451, 493 A.2d 229 (1985), on the issue of whether to stay the Probate Court's decree.   These include “(1) the likelihood that the appellant will prevail;  (2) the irreparability of the injury to be suffered from immediate implementation of the [probate court's] order;  (3) the effect of a stay upon other parties to the proceeding;  and (4) the public interest involved.”  Id., 456.   The decision to grant a stay requires a “balancing of the equities,” taking into account these four factors.  Id., 458–59.  “An application for a stay ․ during the pendency of an appeal calls upon an exercise of the trial court's general equitable powers.”  Park City Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 210 Conn. 697, 700–01, 556 A.2d 602 (1989);  see also In re Zukovs, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV–10–6006598–S (January 11, 2010, Peck, J.) (49 Conn. L. Rptr. 170, 172).

In assessing the likelihood of success on the merits of this appeal, it is important to first consider the standard of review available to the court in an appeal of a probate matter.  “In an appeal taken under section 45a–186 from a matter heard on the record in the Court of Probate, the Superior Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the Court of Probate as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.   The Superior Court shall affirm the decision of the Court of Probate unless the Superior Court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:  (1) In violation of the federal or state constitution or the general statutes;  (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the Court of Probate, (3) made on unlawful procedure, (4) affected by other error of law, (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record, or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.   If the Superior Court finds such prejudice, the Superior Court shall sustain the appeal and, if appropriate, may render a judgment that modifies the Court of Probate's order, denial or decree or remand the case to the Court of Probate for further proceedings.”   General Statutes § 45a–186b.

In considering the first prong of the test set out in Griffin Hospital, the court must assess the likelihood that the appellant will prevail.   In the present case, the Probate Court's decree is based solely on the court's finding that the decedent died on August 31, 2013, and that the defendant, as the fiduciary, has accepted the position as administrator of the estate.   Pl.'s Ex. A. The decree does not provide any specific reason for appointing the defendant as the administrator of the decedent's estate.   Based on these findings, it is unclear whether the Probate Court was even aware of the fact that the defendant was the ex-husband of the decedent.   Therefore, the plaintiffs are likely to prevail on appeal because, pursuant to § 45a–186b, their rights have likely been prejudiced by the seemingly arbitrary and capricious decree of the Probate Court.²

In assessing the second and third prongs, the plaintiffs have alleged that irreparable harm will result without the limited stay because the defendant has the authority to access the decedent's house, personal effects, phone records, medical records, a personal computer, emails, and medical records.   Additionally, the plaintiffs claim that the defendant “could learn personal information about [the] decedent with which he could then jeopardize their children's memory of her ․” Based on these arguments, the court agrees with the plaintiffs that they will suffer irreparable harm if the defendant is allowed to act as the decedent's administrator.   Without a limited stay, the defendant may inappropriately have access to his ex-spouse's information, including her medical records, and settle the decedent's estate.   In comparison, the effect of granting this limited stay on the defendant would merely delay his ability to settle the decedent's estate.

Finally, in examining the fourth prong, which entails public policy concerns, the court is guided by other principles of probate law.   For example, it is well established that wills may be revoked by a subsequent divorce.   See Kulmacz v. Kulmacz, 177 Conn. 410, 410, 418 A.2d 76 (1979).   The Connecticut General Assembly has adopted a revocation-by-divorce statute, which provides that divorce results in the revocation of any disposition to the ex-spouse made by a will.   See General Statutes § 45a–257c.³  In other words, “[i]n a situation of dissolution, divorce or annulment, the former spouse will be considered to have failed to have survived the testator with respect to passing of property and/or powers or office.”   K. McEvoy, 20 Connecticut Practice Series:  Connecticut Elder Law (2013–2014 Ed.) § 4:8, p. 194.  “The policy underlying the revocation statutes is presumed testamentary intent.   The statute assumes that most testators would prefer that a former spouse not receive property under a will executed before the spouses divorced.”   S. Gary, “Applying Revocation–on–Divorce Statutes to Will Substitutions,” 18 Quinnipiac Prob. L.J. 83, 84 (2004).   Likewise, it follows, a fortiori, that an ex-spouse would not want a former spouse to be involved with the disposition of her estate.   Regardless of the precise reason for their divorce,⁴ the divorce demonstrates an intent between the parties to live separate and distinct lives.   See Casale v. Casale, 138 Conn. 490, 493, 86 A.2d 568 (1952).   Therefore, allowing the defendant to administer his ex-wife's estate would be contrary to the decedent's presumed intent when the divorced was finalized.

In the present case, the Probate Court appointed the defendant, the decedent's ex-spouse, to be the administrator of the estate and provided no explanation for doing so.   As a result, the defendant is currently in charge of administering the decedent's estate and has access to his ex-spouse's home, personal effects, phone records, computer, emails, and medical records.   In balancing of the equities and considering the four principles set forth in Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals, supra, 196 Conn. 456, all four factors persuades the court to exercise its discretion in favor of granting the plaintiffs' motion for limited stay.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs' motion for limited stay is granted.

Wilson, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. For the sake of clarity, hereafter, Richard Sartori will be referred to as the defendant in this memorandum..  FN1. For the sake of clarity, hereafter, Richard Sartori will be referred to as the defendant in this memorandum.

FN2. For the purposes of the instant motion for a limited stay, the court is required to decide whether the plaintiffs are likely to succeed in their appeal, not whether they will actually succeed in the appeal..  FN2. For the purposes of the instant motion for a limited stay, the court is required to decide whether the plaintiffs are likely to succeed in their appeal, not whether they will actually succeed in the appeal.

FN3. Specifically, § 45a–257c provides in relevant part:  “If, after executing a will, the testator's marriage is terminated by dissolution, divorce or annulment, the dissolution, divorce or annulment shall revoke any disposition or appointment of property made by the will to the former spouse, any provision conferring a general or special power of appointment on the former spouse, and any nomination of the former spouse as executor, trustee, conservator, guardian or other fiduciary, unless the will expressly provides otherwise.”.  FN3. Specifically, § 45a–257c provides in relevant part:  “If, after executing a will, the testator's marriage is terminated by dissolution, divorce or annulment, the dissolution, divorce or annulment shall revoke any disposition or appointment of property made by the will to the former spouse, any provision conferring a general or special power of appointment on the former spouse, and any nomination of the former spouse as executor, trustee, conservator, guardian or other fiduciary, unless the will expressly provides otherwise.”

FN4. In Connecticut, “[a] decree of dissolution of a marriage or a decree of legal separation shall be granted upon a finding that one of the following causes has occurred:  (1) The marriage has broken down irretrievably;  (2) the parties have lived apart by reason of incompatibility for a continuous period of at least the eighteen months immediately prior to the service of the complaint and that there is no reasonable prospect that they will be reconciled;  (3) adultery;  (4) fraudulent contract;  (5) wilful desertion for one year with total neglect of duty;  (6) seven years' absence, during all of which period the absent party has not been heard from;  (7) habitual intemperance;  (8) intolerable cruelty;  (9) sentence to imprisonment for life or the commission of any infamous crime involving a violation of conjugal duty and punishable by imprisonment for a period in excess of one year;  (10) legal confinement in a hospital or hospitals or other similar institution or institutions, because of mental illness, for at least an accumulated period totaling five years within the period of six years next preceding the date of the complaint.”  General Statutes § 46b–40(c)..  FN4. In Connecticut, “[a] decree of dissolution of a marriage or a decree of legal separation shall be granted upon a finding that one of the following causes has occurred:  (1) The marriage has broken down irretrievably;  (2) the parties have lived apart by reason of incompatibility for a continuous period of at least the eighteen months immediately prior to the service of the complaint and that there is no reasonable prospect that they will be reconciled;  (3) adultery;  (4) fraudulent contract;  (5) wilful desertion for one year with total neglect of duty;  (6) seven years' absence, during all of which period the absent party has not been heard from;  (7) habitual intemperance;  (8) intolerable cruelty;  (9) sentence to imprisonment for life or the commission of any infamous crime involving a violation of conjugal duty and punishable by imprisonment for a period in excess of one year;  (10) legal confinement in a hospital or hospitals or other similar institution or institutions, because of mental illness, for at least an accumulated period totaling five years within the period of six years next preceding the date of the complaint.”  General Statutes § 46b–40(c).

Wilson, Robin L., J.