Curtis Bowman v. Warden, State Prison (2014)

DECISION

THE COURT:  The standard in this case is a high standard and our Supreme Court laid out that standard most recently in Faraday, F-a-r-a-d-a-y, versus Commissioner of Correction, which is at 288 Connecticut 326 in 2008, and in that opinion the court stated (as read), In order to establish an eighth amendment claim arising out of inadequate medical care, a prisoner must prove deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.

There are two parts that the prisoner must prove.   First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, sufficiently serious;  second, the government official must act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind and in official acts with the requisite deliberate indifference when that official knows of and disregards an excessive risk of inmate health or safety.

Thus, an official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, does not violate the eighth amendment.

That's at pages 338 and 339.

The court went on to say that it's more than an ordinary lack of due care that must be shown.   Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault and is equivalent to recklessness under the criminal law.   It must constitute an act or a failureto act by the prison doctor that evidences a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm.

In this case I understand Mr. Bowman's dissatisfaction with the outcome and that he doesn't have the full range of movement of his right fifth finger.   The problem with the claim, though, is there was not deliberate indifference to his condition.   There was considerable consideration given to it and he was given ․ he was sent to a specialist, which I'm not sure was required under the law, but nonetheless he was sent to a specialist.   The specialist evaluated alternatives and discussed those alternatives with Mr. Bowman and the agreement was made that a fusion should be done.

Even if Mr. Bowman had not agreed to the fusion, the doctor's conclusion that the fusion was the best solution was a medical judgment rendered by the doctor which certainly doesn't constitute deliberate indifference.   Even if it was a wrong decision, that would, at most, be negligence, which is not sufficient under Faraday to state a claim.

Furthermore, the petitioner hasn't proven that the issue is a sufficiently serious one to implicate the eighth amendment.

The injury is to the right fifth finger.   It does not impair his activities of daily life.   I understand it does cause some inconvenience in carrying trays or boxes.   It is an injury which the Court is familiar with.   I've had the injury to my right pinky a number of times from playing baseball and basketball.   I understand ․ I've never had surgery on it, but I've had it where for an extended period of time I was unable to use that finger.   I understand that it does create some inconvenience, but I do not view it as sufficiently serious to constitute an eighth amendment issue.

The surgery, the outcome of the surgery was what was anticipated and all of the evidence indicates that it was performed well.

Finally, based on Dr. Ruiz's testimony, Mr. Bowman, I don't think there is a possibility that we could do today what you want done anyway.   The fusion was done, the tendons were removed, the bones were fused together, so what you're really asking to have done is to undo the surgery that was done and go back to a state of your hand prior to that surgery and do the reconstructive surgery.   I have no evidence that that is even possible and when I asked the doctor that he said, no, it's not possible to do that now.

So even if I felt that there was deliberate indifference, which I don't think there was here, I think the relief that you're looking for would be impossible to get because I just don't think it is medically possible to undo what was done and to go back to where you were prior to May of 2013.

So, for all of those reasons—

THE PETITIONER:  I understand that.

THE COURT:  I'm sorry.   Go ahead, Mr. Bowman.

THE PETITIONER:  I understand if it's impossible for it to be done now, Your Honor, I understand that.   If they can't do it, then there's nothing else that they can do.

THE COURT:  They can do, right.

THE PETITIONER:  If that's the truth;  if that's the real diagnosis, medical opinion.   You understand what I'm saying?

THE COURT:  Yeah, I do, and that's what I asked Dr. Ruiz and that's what he said in response to that and he said the same thing to you.

So for all those reasons, I'm going to deny the petition.   I wish you the best in dealing with it, but, as he said, it was a ten-year-old injury and when something goes that long before it's corrected, it makes it more difficult.

So thank you for your demeanor today in how you presented your case.   I appreciate that, but the petition is denied.

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Bright, J.

Bright, William H., J.