Marion Sajdloski v. City of Bridgeport et al. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT # 118

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF FACTS

The defendants, the city of Bridgeport and animal control officer Jimmy Gonzalez (the defendants), move for summary judgment on the third count of the plaintiff, Marion Sajdloski's, complaint claiming that they were negligent in failing to inoculate a dog against rabies and in allowing the defendant Heather Swetz (Swetz) ¹ to adopt it despite knowing about its vicious tendencies.²  The plaintiff alleges that the dog bit her several days after Swetz adopted it, when she was entering Swetz's house.   She further alleges that the defendants were required to vaccinate the dog and that the defendants told Swetz that the dog had been vaccinated.

In moving for summary judgment, the defendants claim that governmental immunity protects them from liability pursuant to General Statutes § 52–557n.   They further claim that they cannot be liable for a dog bite because they were not the owners or keepers of the dog when it attacked the plaintiff.³  In response, the plaintiff argues that the defendants either had a ministerial duty to her or that the imminent harm exception to discretionary act immunity applies.   She also argues that while the defendants were not the owners or keepers of the dog, they can be held liable for negligence in transferring the dog to Swetz.   Both parties have submitted evidence in support of their positions.   The defendants have submitted an affidavit by Gonzalez, a variety of paperwork provided to Swetz when she adopted the dog, and the plaintiff's answers to their interrogatories and production requests.   The plaintiff has submitted her own affidavit.   The court took the matter on the papers on November 25, 2013.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 210, 9 A.3d 347 (2010).  “In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact ․ To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ․ Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue ․ It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue.   Mere assertions of fact ․ are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17–45].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10–11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).  “The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts ․ A motion for summary judgment is properly granted if it raises at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar the plaintiff's claim and involves no triable issue of fact.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Weiner v. Clinton, 106 Conn.App. 379, 383, 942 A.2d 469 (2008).

III. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

The defendants assert that they are protected from the plaintiff's negligence claim by the doctrine of governmental immunity.   The plaintiff counters that inoculating a dog, informing an individual adopting a dog that the dog was not inoculated, monitoring a dog in animal control's custody for violent propensities, and informing an individual adopting a dog that the dog has violent propensities are all ministerial duties to which immunity does not apply.   The threshold issue before the court, therefore, is whether the defendants had a ministerial or discretionary duty to perform the acts of which the plaintiff complained.

“[The Supreme Court] has previously stated that [a] municipality itself was generally immune from liability for its tortious acts at common law ․ [The Court] also recognized, however, that governmental immunity may be abrogated by statute ․ Thus, the general rule developed in our case law is that a municipality is immune from liability for [its tortious acts] unless the legislature has enacted a statute abrogating that immunity.”  Pane v. Danbury, 267 Conn. 669, 677, 841 A.2d 684 (2004).  General Statutes § 52–557n provides in relevant part:  “(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by:  (A) The negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties ․ (2) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by:  (A) Acts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct;  or (B) negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.”  “The issue of governmental immunity is simply a question of the existence of a duty of care, and this court has approved the practice of deciding the issue of governmental immunity as a matter of law ․” Coley v. Hartford, 140 Conn.App. 315, 321, 59 A.3d 811 (2013).

“Generally, a municipal employee is liable for the misperformance of ministerial acts, but has a qualified immunity in the performance of governmental acts ․ Governmental acts are performed wholly for the direct benefit of the public and are supervisory or discretionary in nature ․ In contrast, [m]inisterial refers to a duty which is to be performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judgment or discretion.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Spears v. Garcia, 263 Conn. 22, 36, 818 A.2d 37 (2003).  “This employee immunity for discretionary acts is identical to the municipality's immunity for its employees' discretionary acts under § 52–557n.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Kastancuk v. East Haven, 120 Conn.App. 282, 287, 991 A.2d 681 (2010).   Where “the plaintiffs also have failed to allege that there was any rule, policy, or directive that prescribed the manner in which [the challenged action was to be taken] ․ the complaint alleged conduct that was solely discretionary in nature, and, accordingly ․ qualified governmental immunity applied to [the defendant's] alleged acts and omissions.”  Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 324, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006).  “The hallmark of a discretionary act is that it requires the exercise of judgment.”  Lombard v. Edward J. Peters, Jr., P.C., 252 Conn. 623, 628, 749 A.2d 630 (2000).

The case of Wright v. Brown, 167 Conn. 464, 356 A.2d 176 (1975) provides an apt illustration of the ministerial-discretionary distinction.   In Wright, a dog warden quarantined a dog after the dog had bitten someone, then released it prior to the expiration of the quarantine period required by General Statutes § 22–358.  Id., 466.   The court allowed an action by the plaintiff, an individual who was bitten by the dog after its release, reasoning that the decision to quarantine the dog had been discretionary, but that the quarantine period was ministerial.  Id., 472.   In Thiverge v. Witham, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV–12–6007926–S (June 25, 2013, Morgan, J.), in contrast, the plaintiff, having been bitten by a dog, sued the animal control officer and the city for negligently failing to follow up after issuing a restraint order to the dog's owner.   The court found that there was no ministerial duty because the statute did not specify any requirement that the animal control officer monitor the owner's compliance with the order:  “the plaintiff does not allege that [the animal control officer] was required by any city charter provision, ordinance, regulation, rule, policy, or any other directive to enforce the restraint order in any prescribed manner.”  Id.

None of the many statutes the plaintiff cites provide for a duty to inoculate or monitor.  General Statutes § 22–332(a) states that upon impounding of a neglected, cruelly treated, ill, or roaming dog, a veterinarian may decide that the dog's injuries or disease warrants it being destroyed, and the animal control officer may have it destroyed.⁴  This statute does not discuss vaccination or dangerous propensities.   It discusses whether the dog has injuries or diseases, and affords both the veterinarian and the animal control officer discretion through the use of the words “may,” “decides,” and “warrants.”   The statute requires the veterinarian to determine whether, in his judgment, an animal is rabid, and if so, to put it down, but it does not require vaccination or analysis of viciousness.  General Statutes § 22–332(b) provides for sale or adoption of dogs or other animals.   This provision states that an animal control officer “upon finding such dog or other animal to be in satisfactory health, may ․ sell such dog or other animal to any person who satisfies such officer that he is purchasing it as a pet and that he can give it a good home and proper care.” ⁵  This statute illustrates the two concerns which permeate this section of the General Statutes:  promoting the health of animals and protecting animals from abuse.   It contains no directive that the animal control officer screen animals for vicious tendencies or administer vaccinations.

The plaintiff further cites to General Statutes §§ 22–322d, 22–328, 22–329, 22–329a, 22–330, 22–331, 22–332, and 53–247(a).   These statutes describe the hiring of animal control officers, the method of impounding animals, the definition of and remedies for cruelty to animals, and a variety of other facets of animal control law, none of which relate to inoculation of animals in animal control custody, assessment of their vicious propensities, or warning that an animal is not inoculated.   The defendants cite a single regulation, Conn. Agencies Regs. § 22–359–2, which exempts animals in municipal pounds from the vaccination requirements.⁶

While the plaintiff cites a bevy of statutes for its claim that the actions claimed of were ministerial, none of these statutes apply to the present case.   The defendants have provided the Gonzalez affidavit that no directives regarding mandatory inoculation or analysis for vicious tendencies exist, and have provided the adoption documents which place the impetus on the adopter to inoculate the dog and to take care in training the dog and in introducing the dog to new people.   The plaintiff's only evidence is her own affidavit, and she provides no authority for her claims of knowledge about animal control directives or procedures.   None of the statutes cited by the plaintiff suggest that the defendants had a duty to inoculate animals, to monitor them for signs of viciousness, to warn adopters of viciousness, or to warn adopters that the animals were not inoculated.   The regulation cited by the defendants suggests that there would either be no policy of vaccinating or that any policy would be discretionary, because animals in pounds are exempted from the vaccination requirements.   None of the evidence suggests that there are any other directives regarding vaccination or observation for dangerous propensities.

In addition, a directive that an animal control officer screen dogs for violent propensities would likely be discretionary, unless specific criteria defining propensity for violence were set out.   Some animals may be dangerous in some situations, but not others.   For example, a large rambunctious young dog with no training may be considered dangerous to young children, but might be the perfect companion for an active adult with no children.   While different breeds of dog may be categorized for general personality traits, this is but one of many factors, including any training, the history of how the dog has been treated, its reaction and adaptability to people and other circumstances specific to the animal.   The decision as to whether a dog may be dangerous should be borne by the adopter who is aware of these factors, not by the animal control officer.   Mandatory vaccination requirements would more likely be an example of a ministerial requirement, but the plaintiff has not presented any such requirements, and the regulation cited by the defendants suggests that there is no such requirement for animals held in animal control.   In addition, the adoption documentation provided by the defendants in support of their motion clearly states that the dog is not vaccinated, that the adopter is required by law to provide vaccines, and that care should be taken in introducing the dog to other people and animals.⁷  The defendants have therefore met their burden of demonstrating that all the evidence shows that any duty to monitor or vaccinate dogs held by animal control is a discretionary duty to which immunity applies, absent an applicable exception, and the plaintiffs have not met their burden of demonstrating that such evidence exists.

IV. IMMINENT HARM EXCEPTION

The remaining issue is whether there is an applicable exception to the defendants' immunity.   The plaintiff asserts, with little support, that the identifiable person-imminent harm exception applies, while the defendants counter that applying the exception would be a drastic expansion of the exception.

“The immunity from liability for the performance of discretionary acts by a municipal employee is subject to three exceptions or circumstances under which liability may attach even though the act was discretionary:  first, where the circumstances make it apparent to the public officer that his or her failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm ․” Evon v. Andrews, 211 Conn. 501, 505, 559 A.2d 1131 (1989).  “[T]he identifiable person, imminent harm common-law exception to municipal employees' qualified immunity also applies in an action brought directly against municipalities pursuant to § 52–557n(a)(1)(A) ․” Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324, 348, 984 A.2d 684 (2009).   The exception “applies when the circumstances make it apparent to the public officer that his or her failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm ․ By its own terms, this test requires three things:  (1) an imminent harm;  (2) an identifiable victim;  and (3) a public official to whom it is apparent that his or her conduct is likely to subject that victim to that harm.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 350.  “An individual may be ‘identifiable’ for purposes of the exception to qualified governmental immunity if the harm occurs within a limited temporal and geographical zone, involving a temporary condition ․ For the harm to be deemed imminent, the potential for harm must be sufficiently immediate.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cotto v. Board of Education, 294 Conn. 265, 275–76, 984 A.2d 58 (2009), citing Tryon v. North Branford, 58 Conn.App. 702, 710–11, 755 A.2d 317 (2000).  “[T]he criteria of ‘identifiable person’ and ‘imminent harm’ must be evaluated with reference to each other.   An allegedly identifiable person must be identifiable as a potential victim of a specific imminent harm.   Likewise, the alleged imminent harm must be imminent in terms of its impact on a specific identifiable person ․ For the purposes of the ‘imminent harm’ exception ․ it is impossible to be an identifiable person in the absence of any corresponding imminent harm.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Doe v. Peterson, 279 Conn. 607, 620–21, 903 A.2d 191 (2006).

In Tryon v. North Branford, supra, 58 Conn.App. 717, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims for negligent handling of a dog at a parade by a government employee, a firefighter.   The court found that the plaintiff, another firefighter in close proximity to the firefighter holding the dog's leash, was an identifiable person and that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that when the plaintiff approached the dog and grabbed its head she was in a position of imminent harm.  “The question is not whether a dog at a parade creates a condition of imminent harm per se, but whether the act or failure to act of [the defendant] in preventing his dog from being in close proximity to the plaintiff created a situation of imminent harm to the plaintiff.”  Id.

In Thiverge v. Witham, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV–12–6007926–S, where the plaintiff sued the animal control officer and the city for negligently failing to follow up after issuing a restraint order to the dog's owner, the court held that the imminent harm exception did not apply:  “the plaintiff's claims fall short of the limited circumstances under which imminent harm may be established.   The possibility that the plaintiff might be bitten by Witham's dog one day is not imminent as it is not a risk that is sufficiently immediate and limited in duration.   To the contrary, harm of this nature could occur at any time in the future, or not at all.   Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiff has not alleged a harm that comes within the ‘identifiable person/imminent harm’ exception to governmental immunity.”  Id. In contrast, in Kokinchak v. Ratnecht, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV–0119307–S (November 13, 2000, Hurley, J.T.R.), the plaintiff complained to the police department and dog warden about the viciousness of the dog that later attacked her.   Neither took any action.   The defendant city officials argued that the identifiable person, imminent harm exception did not apply because when the plaintiff called she was not in imminent harm.   The court held that there was an issue of fact as to whether the harm was imminent and denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment.  Id.

In the present case, the plaintiff was not the adopter of the dog, she was a social guest of the adopter.   Like the plaintiff in Thiverge, she was unknown to the defendants prior to the incident and was therefore not an identifiable person.   Unlike in Kokinchak, Gonzalez never had any contact with the plaintiff or any opportunity to see the dog interact with her.   He passed the dog along to a third party, Swetz, who then introduced the dog to the plaintiff.

Moreover, the danger was not imminent;  the bite occurred several days after the dog was adopted.   Gonzalez did not see a dangerous situation about to unfold before his eyes.   If the situation is as the plaintiff alleged, Gonzalez was aware that the dog had dangerous tendencies, transferred custody and control of the dog to Swetz and Swetz drove away with the dog.   However, plaintiff has not alleged any facts to support these allegations.   As stated earlier, Gonzalez had no way to know that danger was likely without knowing about Swetz's past history with dogs and her plans for keeping and training the dog.   Indeed, the adoption documents provided by the defendants state that dogs should be carefully monitored when they are first introduced into a household.

The animal control statutes further a recognized public policy by providing an efficient way for municipalities to collect unwanted, abused, and diseased animals and to deal with them in a humane fashion.   One way of dealing with them is to permit members of the public to adopt them.   The purpose of governmental immunity and qualified immunity is to permit state employees to perform their duties and to permit the state to provide services without constant fear of liability.   Subjecting the defendants to liability for harm done by an animal after it leaves their control would significantly hamper their efforts to provide homes for these dogs and other animals.   This is, therefore, not a situation where the imminent harm exception applies and the defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to the count against them.

V. COMMON–LAW LIABILITY

The court will also consider the defendants' alternate theory that of liability of non owners of animals under common-law claims dog bites as a second ground for summary judgment.   The defendants claim that only the owner or keeper of a dog may be held liable for negligence when the dog bites someone.   The plaintiff counters that she is not claiming that they were negligent in failing to control the dog, but rather that they were negligent in failing to inoculate the dog and in allowing Swetz to adopt the dog.

“[T]he issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care is an appropriate matter for summary judgment because the question is one of law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Mozeleski v. Thomas, 76 Conn.App. 287, 290, 818 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 904, 823 A.2d 1221 (2003).  “The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established:  duty;  breach of that duty;  causation;  and actual injury ․ Contained within the first element, duty, there are two distinct considerations ․ First, it is necessary to determine the existence of a duty, and then, if one is found, it is necessary to evaluate the scope of that duty ․ The existence of a duty is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular situation at hand ․ If a court determines, as a matter of law, that a defendant owes no duty to a plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot recover in negligence from the defendant ․ Duty is a legal conclusion about relationships between individuals, made after the fact, and imperative to a negligence cause of action.   The nature of the duty, and the specific persons to whom it is owed, are determined by the circumstances surrounding the conduct of the individual ․ Although it has been said that no universal test for [duty] ever has been formulated ․ our threshold inquiry has always been whether the specific harm alleged by the plaintiff was foreseeable to the defendant.   The ultimate test of the existence of the duty to use care is found in the foreseeability that harm may result if it is not exercised ․ By that is not meant that one charged with negligence must be found actually to have foreseen the probability of harm or that the particular injury which resulted was foreseeable ․ [T]he test for the existence of a legal duty entails (1) a determination of whether an ordinary person in the defendant's position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result, and (2) a determination, on the basis of a public policy analysis, of whether the defendant's responsibility for its negligent conduct should extend to the particular consequences or particular plaintiff in the case.”  (Citations omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  Sic v. Nunan, 307 Conn. 399, 406–08, 54 A.3d 553 (2012).

There has been some discussion recently in the Supreme Court of who, aside from the owner or possessor of a dog, has a duty to protect others from the dog.   In the recent Supreme Court case of Giacalone v. Housing Authority, 306 Conn. 399, 51 A.3d 352 (2012), the Court clarified that common-law negligence actions for dog bites are not restricted to owners and keepers in the same way that a strict liability claim under § 22–357 is.   In that case, the Court stated that a landowner who has knowledge of a dog with dangerous propensities on his property may possess a duty to protect others from the dog, given “the duty of a landlord to use reasonable care to keep in a reasonably safe condition the parts of the premises over which he reserves control.”   Id., 407.   In addition, the court stated that “a vicious dog may qualify as a dangerous condition under the traditional, common use of this term ․” Id., 408.   Reed v. Comen, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV–94–0311292–S (April 29, 1998, Mottolese, J.), involved a transfer of a dog followed by a dog bite, the specific situation at issue here.   In that case, the plaintiff bought a dog from a breeder, was bitten, and sued for fraudulent misrepresentation, strict liability under the dog bite statute, and negligence.   The plaintiff claimed that the breeder stated that the dog was “a very good dog, a desirable dog ․” Id. The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the negligence count, which stated that the defendant “was negligent in failing to warn him of the dog's dangerous propensities, history and aggressiveness.”  Id. The court stated that “[w]hile this defendant was neither the owner nor keeper of the dog for the reasons stated in the above discussion of the second count, there are genuine issues of material fact which arise out of the claimed representations which the defendant made, the notice of transfer provision in the sales agreement and the custom and practice in the sheep dog breeding industry.   The motion is denied as to this count.”  Id. Two similar cases have arisen regarding horses.   In Raudat v. Leary, Superior court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–02–20464724–S (July 22, 2003), and Platt v. Brown, 30 Conn. 336 (1862), the courts permitted fraud actions when two horses which the seller claimed were peaceful displayed violent tendencies.   In those cases, the plaintiffs had not asserted negligence causes of action.

The preceding analysis and authority demonstrate that it is possible for a cause of action to inure when one transfers a dog to another without giving them notice of violent propensities or lack of inoculation.   The Supreme Court has stated that a dangerous animal on a property is a dangerous condition the same as any other object which might cause danger.   By the same token, a dangerous animal which is being transferred from one individual to another is a dangerous condition or item, and the individual transferring it should inform the recipient of any hidden dangers of which he is aware.   See, e.g. Breen v. Synthes–Stratec, Inc., 108 Conn.App. 105, 111, 947 A.2d 383 (2008) (manufacturer's duty to warn of dangers of unavoidably unsafe products).   Upon transfer of a dog with dangerous propensities it would be clear that a dog bite was likely.   There therefore is an issue of material fact as to whether the defendants had a common-law duty to warn the plaintiff of any violent propensity.

It should be reiterated that the question before the court is whether, as a matter of law, the defendants could have owed the plaintiff a duty.   The court is not considering the weight of the evidence, or even whether the plaintiff could properly survive a motion for a directed verdict, given that the defendants did not move for summary judgment on those grounds.   The defendants have provided persuasive evidence, in the form of Gonzalez' affidavit and the printed adoption documentation, that they did in fact meet any duty they might have had to monitor the dog and to divulge that the dog had not been immunized.   The plaintiff's affidavit should be disregarded where it departs from her personal knowledge.   The plaintiff has not established that she had any personal knowledge of the situation at the animal control office or the circumstances of the adoption.   As a matter of law, however, the court cannot say that the defendants had no common-law duty to the plaintiff under the specific facts, where the alleged negligence was in the process of transferring the animal, rather than in control of the animal.

There are therefore issues of material fact as to whether the defendants had a duty to the defendants to immunize the dog, to determine that the dog was dangerous, or to warn that the dog was not immunized and was dangerous, which prevent the court from granting summary judgment on this additional ground.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above review and analysis of the law applicable to the facts of this case, the court grants the motion for summary judgment as to the count against the city and Gonzalez because governmental immunity shields the city from liability and qualified immunity shields Gonzalez.

SOMMER, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. There are discrepancies in the parties' submissions as to the spelling of Sajdloski/Sadjloski and Swetz/Svetz.   The plaintiff apparently prefers the former spelling and the defendant prefers the latter.   The court will use the former spelling, as it appears on the summons, even though Swetz's photographic identification, a copy of which the defendants submitted, lists her name as Svetz..  FN1. There are discrepancies in the parties' submissions as to the spelling of Sajdloski/Sadjloski and Swetz/Svetz.   The plaintiff apparently prefers the former spelling and the defendant prefers the latter.   The court will use the former spelling, as it appears on the summons, even though Swetz's photographic identification, a copy of which the defendants submitted, lists her name as Svetz.

FN2. Swetz does not join in this motion for summary judgment and has not filed an answer or otherwise contested the plaintiff's claims, therefore she is not included as a defendant for the purpose of this memorandum..  FN2. Swetz does not join in this motion for summary judgment and has not filed an answer or otherwise contested the plaintiff's claims, therefore she is not included as a defendant for the purpose of this memorandum.

FN3. At oral argument, the defendants also stated that there is no evidence in the record that the dog displayed any aggressive tendencies during the two months that it was in animal control's possession.   This ground was not listed in the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff was not given an opportunity to prepare a response, therefore the court will not consider it..  FN3. At oral argument, the defendants also stated that there is no evidence in the record that the dog displayed any aggressive tendencies during the two months that it was in animal control's possession.   This ground was not listed in the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff was not given an opportunity to prepare a response, therefore the court will not consider it.

FN4. “General Statutes § 22–332.   Impoundment and disposition of roaming, injured or mistreated animals.   Authority to spay or neuter unclaimed dog.   Liability for provision of veterinary care to injured, sick or diseased impounded animal.(a) The Chief Animal Control Officer, any animal control officer or any municipal animal control officer shall be responsible for the enforcement of this chapter and shall make diligent search and inquiry for any violation of any of its provisions.   Any such officer may take into custody (1) any dog found roaming in violation of the provisions of section 22–364, (2) any dog not having a tag or plate on a collar about its neck or on a harness on its body as provided by law or which is not confined or controlled in accordance with the provisions of any order or regulation relating to rabies issued by the commissioner in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, or (3) any dog found injured on any highway, neglected, abandoned or cruelly treated.   The officer shall impound such dog at the pound serving the town where the dog is taken unless, in the opinion of a licensed veterinarian, the dog is so injured or diseased that it should be destroyed immediately, in which case the municipal animal control officer of such town may cause the dog to be mercifully killed by a licensed veterinarian or disposed of as the State Veterinarian may direct.   The municipal animal control officer shall immediately notify the owner or keeper of any dog so taken, if known, of its impoundment.   Such officer shall immediately notify the owner or keeper of any other animal which is taken into custody, if such owner or keeper is known.   If the owner or keeper of any such dog or other animal is unknown, the officer shall immediately tag or employ such other suitable means of identification of the dog or other animal as may be approved by the Chief Animal Control Officer and shall promptly cause (A) a description of such dog or other animal to be published once in the lost and found column of a newspaper having a circulation in such town or that has a state-wide circulation, and (B) a photograph or description of such animal and the date on which such animal is no longer legally required to be impounded to be posted on a national pet adoption Internet web site or an Internet web site that is maintained or accessed by the animal control officer and that is accessible to the public through an Internet search, except such posting shall not be required if:  (I) The animal is held pending the resolution of civil or criminal litigation involving such animal, (ii) the officer has a good-faith belief that the animal would be adopted by or transferred to a public or private nonprofit rescue organization for the purpose of placing such animal in an adoptive home even in the absence of such posting, (iii) the animal's safety will be placed at risk, or (iv) such animal control officer determines that such animal is feral and not adoptable.   If any animal control officer does not have the technological resources to post such information on an Internet web site as required by subparagraph (B) of this subdivision, such officer may contact a public or private animal rescue organization and request that such organization post such information, at such organization's expense, on a web site that is accessible to the public through an Internet search.   To the extent practicable, any such posting by an animal control officer or a public or private animal rescue organization shall remain posted for the duration of such animal's impoundment in the municipal or regional dog pound.”.  FN4. “General Statutes § 22–332.   Impoundment and disposition of roaming, injured or mistreated animals.   Authority to spay or neuter unclaimed dog.   Liability for provision of veterinary care to injured, sick or diseased impounded animal.(a) The Chief Animal Control Officer, any animal control officer or any municipal animal control officer shall be responsible for the enforcement of this chapter and shall make diligent search and inquiry for any violation of any of its provisions.   Any such officer may take into custody (1) any dog found roaming in violation of the provisions of section 22–364, (2) any dog not having a tag or plate on a collar about its neck or on a harness on its body as provided by law or which is not confined or controlled in accordance with the provisions of any order or regulation relating to rabies issued by the commissioner in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, or (3) any dog found injured on any highway, neglected, abandoned or cruelly treated.   The officer shall impound such dog at the pound serving the town where the dog is taken unless, in the opinion of a licensed veterinarian, the dog is so injured or diseased that it should be destroyed immediately, in which case the municipal animal control officer of such town may cause the dog to be mercifully killed by a licensed veterinarian or disposed of as the State Veterinarian may direct.   The municipal animal control officer shall immediately notify the owner or keeper of any dog so taken, if known, of its impoundment.   Such officer shall immediately notify the owner or keeper of any other animal which is taken into custody, if such owner or keeper is known.   If the owner or keeper of any such dog or other animal is unknown, the officer shall immediately tag or employ such other suitable means of identification of the dog or other animal as may be approved by the Chief Animal Control Officer and shall promptly cause (A) a description of such dog or other animal to be published once in the lost and found column of a newspaper having a circulation in such town or that has a state-wide circulation, and (B) a photograph or description of such animal and the date on which such animal is no longer legally required to be impounded to be posted on a national pet adoption Internet web site or an Internet web site that is maintained or accessed by the animal control officer and that is accessible to the public through an Internet search, except such posting shall not be required if:  (I) The animal is held pending the resolution of civil or criminal litigation involving such animal, (ii) the officer has a good-faith belief that the animal would be adopted by or transferred to a public or private nonprofit rescue organization for the purpose of placing such animal in an adoptive home even in the absence of such posting, (iii) the animal's safety will be placed at risk, or (iv) such animal control officer determines that such animal is feral and not adoptable.   If any animal control officer does not have the technological resources to post such information on an Internet web site as required by subparagraph (B) of this subdivision, such officer may contact a public or private animal rescue organization and request that such organization post such information, at such organization's expense, on a web site that is accessible to the public through an Internet search.   To the extent practicable, any such posting by an animal control officer or a public or private animal rescue organization shall remain posted for the duration of such animal's impoundment in the municipal or regional dog pound.”

FN5. General Statutes § 22–332(b) states:  “If such dog or other animal is not claimed by and released to the owner within seven days after the date of publication, the municipal animal control officer, upon finding such dog or other animal to be in satisfactory health, may have a licensed veterinarian spay or neuter such dog and sell such dog or other animal to any person who satisfies such officer that he is purchasing it as a pet and that he can give it a good home and proper care.   The municipal animal control officer may retain possession of such dog or other animal for such additional period of time as he may deem advisable in order to place such dog or other animal as a pet and may have a licensed veterinarian spay or neuter such dog.   If, within such period, any dog or other animal is not claimed by and released to the owner or keeper or purchased as a pet, the officer shall cause such dog or other animal to be mercifully killed by a licensed veterinarian or disposed of as the State Veterinarian may direct.   Any veterinarian who so destroys a dog shall be paid from the dog fund account.   No person who so destroys a dog or other animal shall be held criminally or civilly liable therefor nor shall any licensed veterinarian who spays or neuters a dog pursuant to this section be held civilly liable, including, but not limited to, liability for reconstructive neutical implantation surgery.”.  FN5. General Statutes § 22–332(b) states:  “If such dog or other animal is not claimed by and released to the owner within seven days after the date of publication, the municipal animal control officer, upon finding such dog or other animal to be in satisfactory health, may have a licensed veterinarian spay or neuter such dog and sell such dog or other animal to any person who satisfies such officer that he is purchasing it as a pet and that he can give it a good home and proper care.   The municipal animal control officer may retain possession of such dog or other animal for such additional period of time as he may deem advisable in order to place such dog or other animal as a pet and may have a licensed veterinarian spay or neuter such dog.   If, within such period, any dog or other animal is not claimed by and released to the owner or keeper or purchased as a pet, the officer shall cause such dog or other animal to be mercifully killed by a licensed veterinarian or disposed of as the State Veterinarian may direct.   Any veterinarian who so destroys a dog shall be paid from the dog fund account.   No person who so destroys a dog or other animal shall be held criminally or civilly liable therefor nor shall any licensed veterinarian who spays or neuters a dog pursuant to this section be held civilly liable, including, but not limited to, liability for reconstructive neutical implantation surgery.”

FN6. Conn Agencies Regs. § 22–359–2 provides:  “Animals for which there is a licensed rabies vaccine.   Exceptions(1) No animal for which there is a licensed rabies vaccine may be in a public setting without being currently vaccinated for rabies.(2) Animals under the minimum age to be vaccinated, vaccinated animals offered for sale or adoption and animals residing in municipal pounds shall be exempt from the provisions of this section..  FN6. Conn Agencies Regs. § 22–359–2 provides:  “Animals for which there is a licensed rabies vaccine.   Exceptions(1) No animal for which there is a licensed rabies vaccine may be in a public setting without being currently vaccinated for rabies.(2) Animals under the minimum age to be vaccinated, vaccinated animals offered for sale or adoption and animals residing in municipal pounds shall be exempt from the provisions of this section.

FN7. The adoption agreement submitted by the defendants, signed by Swetz, states in pertinent part:Per section 22–339b—the dog you have adopted has not been vaccinated for rabies.   You must have this dog vaccinated for rabies by a licensed veterinarian as soon as possible.   If the dog is not vaccinated for rabies within 30 days, you may be issued a misdemeanor summons for failing to rabies-vaccinate your pet.* * * *Caution should be used when introducing this dog to other pets and family members.   It is advised to keep this dog on a leash during initial introductions.Because there is no past history on this dog, Bridgeport Animal Control cannot guarantee how this dog will react with children.   It is therefore, necessary for you to supervise this dog when it is with children until you are satisfied that both the dog and children are comfortable with each other.The dog you have adopted needs time to adjust to a new home.   It may take this dog a few weeks to adapt to its surroundings.   Patience and understanding should be used in the event of accidents and mischievous behavior.   As the adopter you should not immediately expect a perfectly behaved dog.   It is up to you, the new owner, to reinforce and train your dog's behavior over a period of time.* * * *I agree to assume full responsibility for any veterinary expense, including medication, and for any damage done by said dog while in my custody ․.  FN7. The adoption agreement submitted by the defendants, signed by Swetz, states in pertinent part:Per section 22–339b—the dog you have adopted has not been vaccinated for rabies.   You must have this dog vaccinated for rabies by a licensed veterinarian as soon as possible.   If the dog is not vaccinated for rabies within 30 days, you may be issued a misdemeanor summons for failing to rabies-vaccinate your pet.* * * *Caution should be used when introducing this dog to other pets and family members.   It is advised to keep this dog on a leash during initial introductions.Because there is no past history on this dog, Bridgeport Animal Control cannot guarantee how this dog will react with children.   It is therefore, necessary for you to supervise this dog when it is with children until you are satisfied that both the dog and children are comfortable with each other.The dog you have adopted needs time to adjust to a new home.   It may take this dog a few weeks to adapt to its surroundings.   Patience and understanding should be used in the event of accidents and mischievous behavior.   As the adopter you should not immediately expect a perfectly behaved dog.   It is up to you, the new owner, to reinforce and train your dog's behavior over a period of time.* * * *I agree to assume full responsibility for any veterinary expense, including medication, and for any damage done by said dog while in my custody ․

Sommer, Mary E., J.