John J. Calderoni et al. v. John A. Senese (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR JURY TRIAL

In this action for the dissolution of a family partnership, the defendant has moved to strike the case from the jury list, asserting that General Statutes § 52–215 requires the case to be tried to the court.   The plaintiff objects and argues that the action is primarily legal rather than equitable, and, in the alternative, asks that the court exercise its discretion under General Statutes § 52–218 to submit the issues of fact to a jury.   For the reasons stated below, the motion to strike the case from the jury list is granted.

The second revised complaint is the operative complaint and contains three counts.   The first count seeks the dissolution of the partnership;  the second asserts a claim of breach of fiduciary duty;  and the third asserts a claim for conversion of the partnership's assets.   The relief sought includes an accounting, a dissolution of the partnership, the appointment of a receiver, money damages and treble damages under General Statutes § 52–564.

The claims for an accounting, for dissolution of the partnership, and for appointment of a receiver are clearly equitable, and there is no right to a trial by jury for those claims.   See Bennett v. United Lumber & Supply Co., 110 Conn. 536, 538, 148 A. 369 (1930) (“No action for an accounting, or one of this character, should be tried to a jury”);  Maruca v. Phillips, 139 Conn. 79, 82 (1952);  90 A.2d 159 (1952) (“The settlement of partnership affairs comes properly within the equity jurisdiction of the court,” where the settlement of partnership affairs included as relief dissolution of the partnership, an accounting, and appointment of a receiver).   The claims for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion are claims cognizable at law.   See Northeast Savings, F.A. v. Plymouth Commons Realty Corp., 229 Conn. 634, 642, 642 A.2d 1194 (1994) (“breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence [are] indisputably legal in nature”).   The court recognizes that where there is a right to a jury trial, that “right shall remain inviolate.”   Connecticut Constitution, Article First, § 19.   The question presented here is whether there is a right to a jury trial based on the pleadings before the court.

“When legal and equitable issues are combined in a single action, whether the right to a jury trial attaches depends upon the relative importance of the two types of claim.”  United States Trust Co. v. Bohart, 197 Conn. 34, 45, 495 A.2d 1034 (1985).   In Bohart, the Supreme Court observed that claims apparently sounding in tort could be equitable in nature.   It held that counts alleging negligence, gross negligence and intentional wrongdoing in management of a trust were essentially equitable because their effect was to challenge the proposed trust account for having understated the amount available for distribution to the beneficiaries.  Id. at 46.

In Williams v. Williams, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. TTDCV–06–50009855, 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 806 (February 1, 2008, Sferrazza, J.), a case very similar to this one, the court granted a motion to strike the jury claim.   The complaint in Williams alleged conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of the Uniform Partnership Act. The remedies sought included an accounting, imposition of a constructive trust, injunctive relief, the enforcement of partnership rights, and monetary damages.   A counterclaim also sought an accounting, appointment of a receiver, dissolution of the partnership, and imposition of a constructive trust.   In striking the jury claim, the court relied on General Statutes § 52–215, which provides in relevant part, that “[a]ll cases ․ in which an account is demanded and judgment rendered that the defendant shall account ․ shall, with all issues of law and issues of fact ․ which may be joined in actions entered on the docket as jury cases, be disposed of as court cases.”   The court in Williams construed § 52–215 to require a court trial when legal claims were joined with a claim for an accounting and the accounting would have a bearing on any judgment rendered on the other claims.   The court here finds the reasoning in Williams to be consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court cited above and to be persuasive in this similar case.

In this case, the essential allegations of the first count are that the defendant, as managing partner, has taken unauthorized management fees disguised as commissions, has refused to allow other partners access to the partnership books, and has converted partnership assets to his own account.   The plaintiffs seek dissolution of the partnership, removal of the defendant as general partner, and appointment of a receiver to wind up the partnership.   The second count incorporates the allegations of the first count and, based on the allegations of self-dealing, asserts a claim of breach of fiduciary duty.   It claims harm to the partnership.   The third count similarly incorporates the allegations of the first count and alleges that those facts constitute conversion of the partnership assets in violation of General Statutes § 52–264.   The parties have informed the court that a motion to dismiss the second and third counts is outstanding.   For the purposes of this motion, the court considers the claims in the second and third counts in relation to the pleadings as a whole.

It is apparent from a review of the pleadings as a whole that this case is primarily equitable in character.   Whether the partnership should be dissolved, and whether the defendant is liable for breach of a fiduciary duty or for conversion of partnership assets, are closely related to the claim for an accounting, and the accounting, if granted, is likely to bear on all the remaining counts.   The accounting is likely to determine whether partnership assets were misused or converted.   Accordingly, because the equitable claims predominate, there is no right to a jury trial in this case.

The court has discretion, pursuant to General Statutes § 52–218, to submit the issues of fact in an equitable action to the jury.   Such discretion should be “sparingly exercised” because of the practical challenges of differentiating between the claims.  Lombardi v. Laudati, 124 Conn. 569, 571, 200 A. 1019 (1938).   The court declines to exercise its discretion to submit the issues of fact in this case to a jury because of such practical difficulties.

The motion to strike the case from the jury list is granted.

BY THE COURT,

Sheila A. Huddleston, Judge

Huddleston, Sheila A., J.