Kathleen Notis v. David J. Caldwell et al. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT

This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident on I–91 southbound in Wethersfield, Connecticut, which occurred on November 3, 2010.   The trial to a jury took place over the course of four days commencing on September 17, 2013 and concluded with a verdict in favor of the defendants delivered on September 20, 2013.   Pending before the court is the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict.

“The verdict will be set aside and judgment directed only if we find that the jury could not reasonably and legally have reached [its] conclusion ․” Sutcliffe v. FleetBoston Financial Corp., 108 Conn.App. 799, 811, 950 A.2d 544 (2008).  “[I]t is not the function of this court to sit as the seventh juror when we review the sufficiency of the evidence ․ rather, we must determine, in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, whether the totality of the evidence, including reasonable inferences therefrom, supports the [trier's] verdict ․ In making this determination, [t]he evidence must be given the most favorable construction in support of the verdict of which it is reasonably capable ․ In other words, [i]f the [trier] could reasonably have reached its conclusion, the verdict must stand, even if this court disagrees with it.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  O'Connor v. Larocque, 302 Conn. 562, 612, 31 A.3d 1 (2011).   Most recently, our Supreme Court held that “[the trial court] should not set aside a verdict [when] it is apparent that there was some evidence [on] which the jury might reasonably reach [its] conclusion, and should not refuse to set it aside [when] the manifest injustice of the verdict is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was made by the jury in the application of legal principles ․” Rawls v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 310 Conn. 768, 775–76 (2014).  “As a general rule, [t]he decision to set aside a verdict entails the exercise of a broad legal discretion ․ that, in the absence of clear abuse, we shall not disturb.”  Id., 776.  “In making the determination [as to whether to set aside a verdict,] [t]he evidence must be given the most favorable construction in support of the verdict of which it is reasonably capable.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gaudio v. Griffin Health Services Corp., 249 Conn. 523, 534, 733 A.2d 197 (1999).

The accident in question occurred when the defendant, David J. Caldwell, attempted to change from the center travel lane to the passing lane occupied by the plaintiff.   In order to avoid a collision, the plaintiff swerved her motor vehicle to the left and hit the jersey barrier that divides the northbound and southbound lanes of the highway.   The impact caused the plaintiff's car to careen over the three travel lanes until came to rest on the far right lane.   Significantly, the two motor vehicles did not come into contact.   Caldwell testified that he did not stop because he did not believe that he was involved in an accident.

In the answer to the complaint, the defendants denied negligence and asserted by way of special defense that the plaintiff was herself negligent and it was her own negligence that was a proximate cause of any damages suffered by her.   In accordance with the complaint, answer, special defense and requests to charge, the court charged the jury on comparative negligence.   There were two independent eyewitnesses to the accident who testified at trial.   The testimony of each eyewitness supported the plaintiff's claim that Caldwell swerved into her lane forcing her into the jersey barrier.   On the other hand, there was no contact between the vehicles and the ambulance report included a statement that the plaintiff may have overcorrected when she saw Caldwell coming into her lane.

The plaintiff claims that she was only required to prove one of her claims of negligence and that all the evidence pointed to the defendant's negligence.   Thus, she clearly sustained her burden of proof and that the jury verdict was based on mistake, confusion or bias.   The defendants counter that Caldwell's consistent testimony, both in court and to the investigating police officer, and the lack of contact between the vehicles, support the jury's conclusion.   The defendant also asserts that because the plaintiff admittedly swerved, the jury could well have found that she was negligent.

Based on all the evidence, the court cannot find that it was unreasonable for the jury to find either that the defendant was not negligent, or more likely, that the plaintiff's own negligence was greater than any negligence of the defendant.   Because neither party requested special interrogatories, the general verdict rules applies.  “The general verdict rule provides that if a jury renders a general verdict for one party, and no party requests interrogatories, an appellate court will presume that the jury found every issue in favor of the prevailing party ․ [I]n a case in which the general verdict rule operates, if any ground for the verdict is proper, the verdict must stand;  only if every ground is improper does the verdict fall.”   Malaguit v. Ski Sundown, Inc., 136 Conn.App. 381, 385–86, 44 A.3d 901, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 902, 53 A.3d 218 (2012).   Because the court finds that based on the evidence presented, the jury could have reasonably found as it did, the verdict must be sustained.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, the motion to set aside the verdict is hereby denied.

Peck, J.

Peck, A. Susan, J.