Mitchell Vazquez v. Maria Loza–Vega (2014)

Memorandum of Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment (No. 139)

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Mitchell Vazquez, filed the three-count complaint in this action on April 10, 2012, alleging claims for publicly placing another in a false light (count one), intentional infliction of emotional distress (count two), and tortious interference with parental/custodial relations (count three).   The second amended complaint, filed August 19, 2013 (henceforth the complaint) alleges the following facts.

During the plaintiff's divorce proceedings in 2006, the plaintiff's ex-wife, Kari Nettles,¹ obtained a court order requiring the plaintiff to retain the defendant, Maria Loza–Vega, also referred to as Maru, who had been the nanny for the plaintiff's and Nettles' children since 2002, during their marriage.   The defendant then served as nanny in the plaintiff's house from early 2009 through January 2012.²  During this time, the plaintiff alleges that he and the defendant became romantically involved and that he eventually rejected her.   In October of 2011, the defendant provided photographs of the plaintiff's bedroom, which she was forbidden from entering, to Ms. Nettles' attorneys.   These pictures showed various items strewn across a dresser, including a white substance, a straw, a wire cooking whip, and a cooking sifter.   The defendant never called the police, the department of children and families, or the plaintiff to report the supposed drug paraphernalia.   In January of 2012, Ms. Nettles brought a post-dissolution of marriage child custody modification lawsuit against the plaintiff.³  The plaintiff contends that the photographs were staged in order to suggest that the plaintiff was doing drugs and endangering the welfare of his children by leaving drugs out in the open and that the provision of the pictures in the child custody case interfered with the plaintiff's parental, custodial relationship with his children.   In addition, the plaintiff alleges that around the same time the defendant provoked and antagonized the plaintiff's fiancée and recorded the confrontation.   The defendant then provided the recording to Ms. Nettles' divorce attorneys as well.

On May 22, 2013, the court, Mintz, J., entered an order requiring all dispositive motions be argued before August 19, 2013, and a certificate of closed pleadings filed by December 12, 2013.   The defendant then filed a motion for permission to file a motion for summary judgment on August 19, 2013, along with a motion for summary judgment, supporting memorandum, and several photographs.   The motion for permission was granted.   The plaintiff filed an objection with supporting memorandum and exhibits consisting of uncertified deposition testimony of the plaintiff, Ms. Nettles, and the defendant, on September 25, 2013.   The defendant filed a reply memorandum on September 26, 2013, including exhibits consisting of the uncertified deposition testimony of the plaintiff and the defendant.   The motion was heard at short calendar on September 30, 2013.

In the motion for summary judgment, the defendant argues that each count of the complaint fails to state a claim as a matter of law.   The arguments are as follows.   The false light invasion of privacy claim fails to allege that the photographs were publicized to the general public.   The intentional infliction of emotional distress claim fails to allege sufficiently extreme and outrageous conduct.   Finally, the interference with custodial relations claim fails to allege that the defendant aided in placing the children in unlawful custody.

The plaintiff objects first that the party moving for summary judgment must provide evidence, rather than simply challenging the sufficiency of the pleadings on their face.   He then asserts that his allegations are sufficient to support the causes of action he claims.   He contends that disseminating the photograph to approximately six people, with no guarantee that they would not be disseminated further, is sufficient publicity for a false light claim.   He claims that the defendant having a relationship with him, staging photographs depicting drug use, providing those photographs to attorneys for use in a child custody matter, starting and videotaping a fight with the plaintiff's fiancée, then providing that recording to the attorneys is sufficiently outrageous for intentional infliction of emotional distress.   Finally, he claims that the defendant engaged in an elaborate scheme to remove his custody rights, and Connecticut courts should adopt a broad interpretation of tortious interference with custody in order to dissuade similar schemes.   In addition, at oral argument the plaintiff stated that if necessary he could replead any counts which the court finds to be inadequate.

DISCUSSION

“Practice Book [§ 17–49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ․ In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  Patel v. Flexo Converters U.S.A., Inc., 309 Conn. 52, 56–57, 68 A.3d 1162 (2013).  “[T]he ‘genuine issue’ aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred ․ A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002).

“In contrast, [a] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court ․ We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint ․ and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ․ [I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied ․ Thus, we assume the truth of both the specific factual allegations and any facts fairly provable thereunder.   In doing so, moreover, we read the allegations broadly, rather than narrowly.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 400, 876 A.2d 522 (2005).

“[T]he use of a motion for summary judgment to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint is appropriate when the complaint fails to set forth a cause of action and the defendant can establish that the defect could not be cured by repleading ․ If it is clear on the face of the complaint that it is legally insufficient and that an opportunity to amend it would not help the plaintiff, we can perceive no reason why the defendant should be prohibited from claiming that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and from invoking the only available procedure for raising such a claim after the pleadings are closed.”   (Citation omitted.)  Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 401–02, 876 A.2d 522 (2005).

“The rule that we set forth in Larobina does not bar a litigant from pursuing arguments in the alternative.   In other words, a party does not waive its right to replead by arguing that the pleading is legally sufficient, but offering, if the court were to conclude otherwise, to amend the pleading.   Therefore, the defendants' conduct did not indicate that they were waiving the right to replead if the legal issue is decided against them.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  American Progressive Life & Health Insurance.   Co. v. Better Benefits, LLC, 292 Conn. 111, 124, 971 A.2d 17 (2009).   “Moreover, the plaintiff, as the moving party, did not demonstrate ․ that, if the defendants had been permitted to replead ․ the legal deficiency underlying the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment would not have been cured.”  Id., 125.

In contrast, in Wilton Meadows Ltd. Partnership v. Coratolo, 299 Conn. 819, 832–33, 14 A.3d 982 (2011), the Supreme Court concluded that a claim could not be cured through repleading because the claim was wholly statutory in nature and the expenses claimed were clearly exempted under the statute.   Likewise in Carrasquillo v. Carlson, 90 Conn.App. 705, 714, 880 A.2d 904 (2005), “even if the plaintiff were permitted to replead, he would be unable to cure the legal defects in his complaint.   As his dialogue with the court makes clear, he has no additional facts to allege that would put into issue any negligent act or acts of the dog owner.   Accordingly, the court properly granted the dog owner's motion for summary judgment.”  (Footnote omitted.)

In the present case, the defendant asserts that the plaintiff's claims lack legal sufficiency.   The court's inquiry is therefore twofold.   First, is each claim legally sufficient?   If not, the court will consider whether the defect could be cured through repleading.   If it could, then the court will strike the count, but permit repleading.   If it cannot, then the court will grant summary judgment as to that count.

A

False Light

The first count asserts that the defendant invaded the plaintiff's privacy and publicly placed him in a false light.   The defendant claims that this claim is invalid because it does not allege that the defendant publicized the photographs.   The plaintiff counters that there is no specific number of people that must see photographs for them to be publicized.

“[T]he law of privacy has not developed as a single tort, but as a complex of four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff to be let alone ․ The four categories of invasion of privacy are set forth in 3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 652A [1977] as follows:  (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another;  (b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness;  (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life;  or (d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Foncello v. Amorossi, 284 Conn. 225, 234, 931 A.2d 924 (2007).

“A number of state and federal courts have applied the Restatement rule that false light invasion of privacy occurs if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.   3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 652E ․ The essence of a false light privacy claim is that the matter published concerning the plaintiff (1) is not true;  id.;   and (2) is such a ‘major misrepresentation of his character, history, activities or beliefs that serious offense may reasonably be expected to be taken by a reasonable man in his position.’  Id., comment c.” Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican–American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 131, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982).

“ ‘Publicity’ as it is used in this [Restatement] Section differs from ‘publication,’ as that term is used ․ in connection with liability for defamation.  ‘Publication,’ in that sense, is a word of art, which includes any communication by the defendant to a third person.  ‘Publicity,’ on the other hand, means that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge ․” Apicella v. Driver Logistic Services, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–01–0450101–S (August 19, 2002, Arnold, J.).  “Thus it is not an invasion of the right to privacy, within the rule stated in this Section, to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff's private life to a single person or even to a small group of persons.   On the other hand, any publication in a newspaper or magazine, even of small circulation, or in a handbill distributed to a large number of persons, or any broadcast over the radio, or statement made in an address to a large audience, is sufficient to give publicity within the meaning of the term as it is used in this Section.”   3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 652D, comment (a), p. 384–85, 1977.

In Orsini v. Zimmer, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–07–5013711–S (December 24, 2009, Corradino, J.), the court did not find publicity where “[b]esides being sent to Mark Camp I, the grandfather, Mr. Orsini, in paragraph 18 of his affidavit lists court employees, state employees the judge and two lawyers who became privy to the contents of the letter.   The record is said by Mr. Orsini to have been made part of the Probate Court file.   A total of nine people received the information contained in the letter.”   Other courts have likewise granted motions to strike where the plaintiff only alleged that the defendant communicated to a small group of people.   See Bonito Manufacturing, Inc. v. Criscuolo, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X10–10–6010297–S (August 27, 2012, Dubay, J.)(communication to two people);  Morse v. Connecticut Community for Addiction Recovery, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV–09–5005371–S (September 15, 2010, Riley, J.) (Disclosure to members and visitors at an addiction center—described as “a smallish group of individuals”);  Negron v. Rexam Cosmetic Packaging, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV–04–4000333–S (January 11, 2006, Trombley, J.) (Offensive annotated photograph posted on bulletin boards for about two hours—exposed to approximately 200 people).   In short, “[t]o allow the cause of action to be premised on any conduct of the defendant which could foreseeably result in media publicity putting the plaintiff in a bad light, would expand the concept of invasion of privacy beyond manageable limits.”   Winters v. Concentra Health Services, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–07–5012082–S (March 5, 2008, Thompson, J.).

The plaintiff cites several cases from the employment context, in which the rules for publicity are somewhat stricter.   See Beveridge v. Briston Spring Manufacturing Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV–98–0491953–S (February 7, 2000, Graham, J.);   Decampos v. Kennedy Center, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV–89–260290–S (November 23, 1990, Licari, J.) [3 Conn. L. Rptr. 549].   These cases are inapposite here because this case does not concern employment.   There is a strong rationale for applying the false light invasion of privacy tort more broadly in the employment context, to include when false images are shown or false statements are made to a prospective employer.   When false images or statements are presented to the court, as in this case, there are other safeguards in place in the court system, most notably that the party against whom the images or statements are used will have an opportunity to rebut them.   Outside of the employment context, publicity requires that the false images or statements be published to the public or to so many people that they are substantially likely to be disseminated to the public.

In the present case, the complaint does not allege that the pictures were shown publicly.   It merely alleges that they were shown to the defendant's attorneys and to the plaintiff's attorneys, and in general to third parties.   In his memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff also states that they were shown to Ms. Nettles and the defendant's sister.   He also states that the defendant did not know whether they would be made public by one of the people who she showed them to, or whether the defendant had copied them.   None of these allegations suggests that the images were made public, or that the defendant intended the images to become public.   If permitted to replead, it is likely that the plaintiff could plead that the additional people he mentions in his opposition saw the photographs and obtained copies.   More than this would likely be required, but the defendant has not conclusively demonstrated that the plaintiff could not allege further dissemination of the images to the point where they were public knowledge.

Count one is therefore stricken and the plaintiff be permitted to replead.

B

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The plaintiff also alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress, stemming from the alleged physical relationship, the allegedly staged photographs, and the taped argument with the plaintiff's financée.   The defendant argues that it is clear as a matter of law that the allegations are not sufficiently outrageous to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.   The plaintiff responds that they are sufficient.

“In order for the plaintiff to prevail in a case for liability under ․ [intentional infliction of emotional distress], four elements must be established.   It must be shown:  (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct;  (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous;  (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress;  and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe ․ Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society ․ Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.   Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous!  ․ Conduct on the part of the defendant that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or results in hurt feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action based upon intentional infliction of emotional distress.”  (Citations omitted, footnote omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 442–43, 815 A.2d 119 (2003).  “[I]n assessing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court performs a gatekeeping function.   In this capacity, the role of the court is to determine whether the allegations of a complaint ․ set forth behaviors that a reasonable factfinder could find to be extreme or outrageous.   In exercising this responsibility, the court is not fact finding, but rather it is making an assessment whether, as a matter of law, the alleged behavior fits the criteria required to establish a claim premised on intentional infliction of emotional distress.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gagnon v. Housatonic Valley Tourism District Commission, 92 Conn.App. 835, 847, 888 A.2d 104 (2006).

The defendant cites a number of cases wherein accusations of drug use were made, but the accused was not arrested and did not suffer other serious consequences of the accusations.   In these cases, courts granted motions to strike intentional infliction of emotional distress claims by the accused.   See Bremmer–McLain v. New London, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV–11–5014142–S (June 1, 2012, Devine, J.);   Hauer v. Eastern Connecticut Health Network, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV–09–4046119–S (October 29, 2010, Hale, J.T.R.);   DiBenedetto v. Gianatti, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV–11–5015354 (December 23, 2011, Swienton, J.).   Where the plaintiff was actually arrested, however, courts have denied the motion to strike.   See Kelly v. McIntosh, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV–07–5004381–S (January 18, 2008, Upson, J.);   Deblasi v. Duclos, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–05–4011860–S (February 16, 2006, Thompson, J.);   Barbiero v. Chiocca, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–05–40139295–S (January 31, 2006, Corradino, J.) (40 Conn. L. Rptr. 694, 697);  Jezierny v. Brown, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia–Milford at Milford, Docket No. CV–04–084755–S (August 24, 2005, Moran, J.T.R.).   In Gilman v. Gilman, 46 Conn.Sup. 21, 23 (1999), on the other hand, the court held that false accusations by the plaintiff's ex-wife that the plaintiff was smoking marijuana which brought the police to the plaintiff's house were sufficient to deny the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, even though after questioning the plaintiff the police determined that the accusations were baseless.   Likewise, in Watts v. Chittenden, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–05–4014425–S (January 25, 2008, Hadden, J.T.R.), aff'd, 301 Conn. 575, 22 A.3d 1214 (2011), the trial court found that the defendant's false accusations that the plaintiff sexually abused his children were sufficiently outrageous for a judgment of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Regarding whether the recording of the argument with the plaintiff's financée was extreme and outrageous, the plaintiff referenced a United States district court case which applied Connecticut law, Caro v. Weintraub, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:09–CV–1353 (PCD) (D.Conn. Nov. 2, 2010), in which “[t]he Court cannot find as a matter of law that the conduct alleged in the complaint was not so outrageous and extreme as to go beyond all bounds of decency.   Recording an intimate family conversation about a dying relative's wishes and altering the recordings to mislead a probate court about the deceased relative's intentions could meet the standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress.   The inquiry is fact-intensive and thus cannot be resolved at the pleadings stage.”   The plaintiff also referenced Zamstein v. Marvasti, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford at New Britain, Docket No. CV–93–0457182–S (November 29, 1994, Handy, J.) [13 Conn. L. Rptr. 159], aff'd, 240 Conn. 549, 692 A.2d 781 (1997), in which the court stated that “the question of outrageous and/or extreme conduct is for the jury to decide, if such conduct is alleged, it is not properly the subject of a motion to strike.”   This concept of the role of the judge runs counter to the gate-keeping role described in Gagnon v. Housatonic Valley Tourism District Commission, supra, 92 Conn.App. 847.   The defendant also contends that because the plaintiff has tested positive for cocaine use in the past, the pictures suggesting cocaine use were not as damaging as they otherwise would have been.   The defendant has not presented evidence of this past cocaine use, however, and therefore the court will disregard this contention.

The present case is distinguishable from many of the cases involving false statements regarding drug use because of the ongoing child custody case.   The child custody case makes the present case analogous to a case where the accused was actually arrested, rather than one where he was not arrested.   Evidence that a parent leaves drugs lying around the house would certainly damage that parent's case in the child custody proceedings.   Having a trusted member of the household create false evidence and then provide it to attorneys who would likely use it in the custody case does appear to be outrageous behavior.   In addition if, as the plaintiff contends, the defendant staged a second incident, the fight with the plaintiff's financée, that would further increase the emotional distress caused.   Finally, the alleged relationship could heighten the sense of betrayal felt by the plaintiff.

For the above reasons the motion for summary judgment is denied as to count two, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, because the complaint sufficiently states a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

C

Interference with Custodial Relations

Finally, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant tortiously interfered with the custody of his children.   In moving for summary judgment, the defendant asserts that the tort of interference with custodial relations requires that the defendant have unlawful custody of the children.   The plaintiff counters that the tort should be applied broadly in order to dissuade actions such as the one alleged.

In Marshak v. Marshak, 226 Conn. 652, 666, 628 A.2d 964 (1993), the Supreme Court first considered an action for tortious interference with custodial relations.   Although it did not find tortious interference because the alleged interference was by a parent with joint custody rights, the court stated that “[a] factual predicate for any tort related to child abduction ․ is the unlawful custody of the child.”   In Zamstein v. Marvasti, 240 Conn. 549, 566, 692 A.2d 781 (1997), the court reiterated the statement from Marshak that unlawful custody was necessary and stated that “[t]he defendant's acts were the alleged influencing of a judicial decision regarding custody, and were not some extralegal taking of custody as required for the tort of intentional interference of custodial rights.”   In State v. Vakilzaden, 251 Conn. 656, 664, 742 A.2d 767 (1999), the court overruled its decision in Marshak by broadening custodial interference to include interference by a joint custodian.   The case in Vakilzaden concerned abduction of a child by one parent, so the court did not consider whether unlawful custody was necessary and did not consider Zamstein.  Id. Subsequent courts have held that the Zamstein and Marshak requirement of an extralegal taking still applies.   See Bouchard v. Sundberg, 80 Conn.App. 180, 201, 834 A.2d 744 (2003);  Elbert v. Connecticut Yankee Council, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–01–0456879–S (July 16, 2004, Arnold, J.).   Cases where a custodial interference claim has been allowed involved extralegal takings.   See Golodner v. Women's Center of Southeastern Connecticut, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 4002933 (August 15, 2006, Hurley, J.T.R.) (41 Conn. L. Rptr. 822, 823);  Streeter v. Rifton Management, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket at Waterbury, Docket No. X01–CV–02–179481–S (December 27, 2004, Sheedy, J.) (38 Conn. L. Rptr. 493, 499–500) (applying both Massachusetts and Connecticut law).

The defendant cites several cases from other jurisdictions stating that an extralegal taking should not be required for tortious interference with custodial relations.   The law in Connecticut, however, appears to the court to be clear that an extralegal taking is required.

The motion for summary judgment as to the third count for tortious interference with custodial relations is therefore granted without the right to replead because the plaintiff has not suggested in his memorandum or at oral argument that he could plead that the children were abducted or otherwise subject to an extralegal taking.

CONCLUSION

Count one, alleging false light invasion of privacy, is stricken because the allegations do not allege that the defendant publicized the photos, but the plaintiff may be able to allege that they were made available to the general public.   Summary judgment is denied as to count two, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, because the actions claimed of, a nanny creating false evidence of drug use and starting a fight with the plaintiff's financée in order to aid the plaintiff's ex-wife in her child custody action, are sufficiently outrageous to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.   Finally, summary is granted as to count three alleging tortious interference with custodial relations, without the right to replead, because an extralegal taking is required for that tort and the plaintiff has not claimed he could allege that his children were abducted or that plaintiff's custodial relations were otherwise illegally interfered with.

So Ordered,

Alfred J. Jennings, Jr.

Judge Trial Referee

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiff's ex-wife is referred to as Mrs. Vazquez in the complaint, but as Ms. Nettles in both parties' memoranda.   The court will refer to her as Ms. Nettles in this memorandum..  FN1. The plaintiff's ex-wife is referred to as Mrs. Vazquez in the complaint, but as Ms. Nettles in both parties' memoranda.   The court will refer to her as Ms. Nettles in this memorandum.

FN2. The complaint does not state whether the defendant worked in the household from 2006 to 2009..  FN2. The complaint does not state whether the defendant worked in the household from 2006 to 2009.

FN3. The complaint erroneously refers to the lawsuit as being against “the defendant,” rather than the plaintiff in this action, who is the defendant in the child custody action..  FN3. The complaint erroneously refers to the lawsuit as being against “the defendant,” rather than the plaintiff in this action, who is the defendant in the child custody action.

Jennings, Alfred J., J.T.R.