Ed Heflin v. IKEA LLC (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINHFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE SPECIAL DEFENSES & MOTION FOR DEFAULT, NO. 149.00

I. Procedural Background and Facts of Case

Plaintiff Ed Heflin commenced this action as a small claims matter in August of 2011 to recover monetary damages from defendant IKEA U.S. East, LLC (“IKEA”), Helmsman Management Services, LLC (“Helmsman”) and Diversified Maintenance Systems, LLC (“Diversified”).   The plaintiff alleges in his 38–page revised complaint ¹ that on or about September 6, 2009, he purchased several items of furniture from defendant IKEA, including one large pre-assembled armoire.   The plaintiff further alleges that on this date he sustained serious and lasting personal injuries while loading the armoire into his vehicle.   The plaintiff alleges that he sustained these injuries due to the negligence of one or more of the defendants.   The plaintiff has separated his revised complaint into twelve “claims,” but all of them except the twelfth claim sound in negligence and/or premises liability against one or more of the defendants.   Defendants IKEA and Helmsman have filed an Answer and eight Special Defenses dated September 6, 2013, which the plaintiff now challenges.   Specifically, the plaintiff moves to strike all eight special defenses interposed by defendant on the grounds that “each enumerated Special Defense is improper, unsubstantiated or speculative in formulation or conclusion and therefore without any legal basis,” and are therefore insufficient as a matter of law in accordance with Practice Book § 10–39.

II. Analysis

A. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Special Defenses of Defendants IKEA and Helmsman

“Whenever a party wishes to contest ․ (5) the legal sufficiency of any answer to any complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any part of that answer including any special defense contained therein, that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof.”  Practice Book § 10–39.  “The proper procedural vehicle to challenge legal sufficiency of a proposed pleading is a motion to strike ․” Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, 280 Conn. 225, 256, 905 A.2d 1165 (2006).   A motion to strike for failure to state a claim under Practice Book Section 10–39 will be granted unless the “facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action.”  Waters v. Autori, 236 Conn. 820, 826, 676 A.2d 357 (1996).  “In ruling on a motion to strike the court must assume that all well-stated allegations of fact, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, are true.”   Parker v. Colgate–Palmolive Co., 2003 Conn.Super. LEXIS 2487 at 2 (Conn.Super.Ct. Aug. 8, 2003).  “A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded;  it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.”  Faulkner v. United Techs.   Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).  “Although we are mindful that our jurisprudence requires us to interpret pleadings broadly, we must construe them reasonably to contain all that they mean but not in such a way as to ‘strain the bounds of rational comprehension.’  “ Nazami v. Patrons Mut. Ins. Co., 280 Conn. 619, 629, 910 A.2d 209 (2006).  “The allegations of the pleading involved are entitled to the same favorable construction a trier would be required to give in admitting evidence under them and if the facts provable under its allegations would support a defense or a cause of action, the motion to strike must fail.”   Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108–09, 491 A.2d. 368 (1985).

The Rules of Practice require that certain defenses be specially pleaded.   Practice Book § 10–50 states “[n]o facts may be proved under either a general or special denial except such as show that the plaintiff's statements of fact are untrue.   Facts which are consistent with such statements but show, notwithstanding, that the plaintiff has no cause of action, must be specially alleged.”

The question therefore as to the legal sufficiency of the defendant's special defenses is whether the allegations contained therein are (1) consistent with the allegations of the complaint but (2) nevertheless would, if proven, defeat the plaintiff's cause of action.   If the facts and legal ground stated therein would not defeat the plaintiff's cause of action, then they should not be affirmatively pleaded and should be stricken as special defenses.  “The fundamental purpose of a special defense, like other pleadings, is to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, so that basic issues are not concealed until the trial is underway ․ Whether facts must be specially pleaded depends on the nature of those facts in relation to the contested issues ․ In Pawlinski, we clarified this distinction by explaining that the denial of a material fact places in dispute the existence of that fact.   Even under a denial, a party generally may introduce affirmative evidence tending to establish a set of facts inconsistent with the existence of the disputed fact ․ If, however, a party seeks admission of evidence which is consistent with a prima facie case, but nevertheless would tend to destroy the cause of action, the ‘new matter’ must be affirmatively pleaded as a special defense.”  (Internal citations omitted.)  (Emphasis in the original.)   Coughlin v. Anderson, 270 Conn. 487, 501–02, 853 A.2d 460 (2004).

To begin, the plaintiff argues that the first six of the defendants' eight special defenses are insufficient as a matter of law because none “provide any recitation of Plaintiff's statement, witness testimony,” or “evidence of discovery.”  Practice Book § 10–1 states that “[e]ach pleading shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies, but not of the evidence by which they are to be proved, such statement to be divided into paragraphs numbered consecutively, each containing as nearly as may be a separate allegation.”  (Emphasis added.)   Thus, plaintiff incorrectly argues that the first six special defenses should be stricken for failure to set forth with particularity the evidence upon which the defendants will rely to prove their special defenses.

In the present case, defendants IKEA and Helmsman assert as their first and second special defenses contributory negligence and comparative responsibility by the plaintiff in the incident.   Connecticut law recognizes defenses of contributory negligence and comparative responsibility in negligence actions, and General Statues § 52–114 requires that “[i]f contributory negligence is relied upon as a defense, it shall be affirmatively pleaded by the defendant or defendants, and the burden of proving such contributory negligence shall rest upon the defendant or defendants.”   Also, contributory negligence is a defense to a claim of nuisance, to the extent claimed by the plaintiff, Noebel v. Housing Authority, 146 Conn. 197, 203, 148 A.2d 766 (1959).   The court is not completely certain of the plaintiff's argument regarding “pure” contributory negligence, but if he argues that contributory negligence cannot act as a bar to his recovery if the trier of fact finds that his negligence exceeds that of the parties against whom his recovery is sought, he incorrectly states Connecticut law as set forth in subsection (b) of General Statutes § 52–572h.   The defendants have set forth sufficient facts upon which to prove their claims of contributory negligence and comparative responsibility.   The court therefore finds these two special defenses sufficient as a matter of law.

The court finds defendants' Third Special Defense to be closer to a general denial of the negligence allegations of plaintiff's revised complaint, which the defendants have already specifically denied in their Answer, than a proper special defense.   However, when read together with the defendants' Answer repeatedly denying that any of their employees assisted the plaintiff during the incident, and viewed in the light most favorable to the defendants, the court finds that the Third Special Defense states a legally sufficient special defense.   Read together, the Answer and Third Special Defense set forth facts consistent with the allegations of plaintiff's complaint which show notwithstanding that the plaintiff does not have a cause of action.   Therefore, plaintiff's motion to strike the Third Special Defense is denied as well.

The Fourth Special Defense properly sets forth the defendants' rights to reductions in economic damages due to recovery of collateral source payments provided by General Statutes §§ 52–225a et seq.   The court finds the Fourth Special Defense sufficient as a matter of law.

The court finds that the defendants' Fifth and Sixth Special Defense again properly set forth sufficient facts which are consistent with plaintiff's claims, that would, if proven, nevertheless show that plaintiff has no cause of action.   Viewed in the light most favorable to the defendants, the court views the Fifth and Sixth Special Defenses as additional claims of contributory negligence, which are properly pleaded as a special defense.

The court notes that the Seventh and Eighth Special Defenses properly set forth the relevant statutes of limitation upon which the defendants rely and are sufficient as a matter of law.  Practice Book § 10–39 requires statutes of limitations to be specially pleaded, as the defendants have done.

B. Plaintiff's Motion for Default for Non–Pleading

Defendant Diversified Maintenance filed its Answer and Special Defenses in response to plaintiff's Revised Complaint on August 15, 2013.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above the plaintiff's Motion to Strike the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Special Defenses of defendants IKEA and Helmsman is denied.

Plaintiff's Motion for Default for Non–Pleading as to defendant Diversified is denied.

It is so ordered.

By the Court,

Anthony D. Truglia, Jr., J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiff entitles his revised complaint dated February 5, 2012 his “Answer to Requested Revision,” but for clarification purposes, the court refers to it as plaintiff's revised complaint..  FN1. The plaintiff entitles his revised complaint dated February 5, 2012 his “Answer to Requested Revision,” but for clarification purposes, the court refers to it as plaintiff's revised complaint.

Truglia, Anthony D., J.