Francisco Rodriguez v. Corona's Auto Parts, Inc. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Plaintiff was hired by Corona's Auto Parts, Inc. (hereinafter “Coronas”) in 2006 to set up and work a body shop at Coronas which dealt with used cars, sale of used auto parts, towing, motor vehicle repairs, auto-body work and scrap metal recycling.   James Corona (hereinafter “Corona”) is the vice president.   Plaintiff was required to and did supply his own tools to do the body work.

In May 2007, the plaintiff was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and later convicted of conspiracy to sell 10,000 bags of heroin.   He was sentenced to federal prison and was not released until September 2009.   In the meantime, the tools owned by the plaintiff were subject to a loan from Snap–On, a franchise which was owned and operated by Eugene Halstead (hereinafter also “Halstead”).   Coronas maintained possession of the plaintiff's tools and utilized them at least while the plaintiff was in prison.   When the plaintiff returned from prison, he was rebuffed by Coronas in his attempt to retrieve his tools.

Plaintiff has brought this matter in three counts.   Count one is for conversation, Count two is for fraud, and Count three is for collection of wages.   The plaintiff is also seeking punitive damages based upon the conversion count and punitive damages for the withholding of wages.

Trial was held before this Court on December 5 & 6, 2013.   The parties have filed briefs, and a hearing was held on the request for attorneys fees on January 23, 2014.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The plaintiff in a civil case (and a defendant in Special Defenses and Counterclaim) sustain their burden of proof as to any essential element in their cause of action if the evidence, considered fairly and impartially, induces in the mind of the trier, a reasonable belief that it is more probable than otherwise that the facts involved in that element are true.”  Busker v. United Illuminating Co., 156 Conn. 456, 458 (1968).   This is also known as proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

In addition, this Court evaluates the credibility of the witnesses upon their appearance and demeanor on the witness stand, the consistency or inconsistency of their testimony, their memory or lack thereof of certain events, whether they were candid and forthright or evasive and incomplete, their manner in responding to questions and their interest or lack of interest in the case as well as the exhibits in the case.

Also, the Court evaluates general credibility on the basis of other testimony in the case, as well as documents in evidence as to their consistency or inconsistency with other evidence.

The burden is on the plaintiff to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.

ISSUES AND FINDINGS

1. The defendants have filed a Special Defense of Statute of Limitations.   However, no evidence was produced as to that Special Defense and it was not part of the defendants' brief.   Therefore, the Court deems that defense abandoned.

2. The Court does not find James Corona a proper defendant because there is no evidence that he was acting other than as vice president/owner, etc., of the corporation Corona's Auto Parts, Inc., and there has been no pleading claiming piercing of the corporate veil.

3. CREDIBILITY

A. Although the plaintiff was not convicted of crimes such as larceny, forgery, fraud, or other crimes that usually go to the honesty of the individual, the Court cannot help but take into consideration the fact that he was convicted of a conspiracy to sell 10,000 bags of heroin, a federal felony for which he served time in prison for a little bit over two years.   This does affect his credibility.

In addition, during the trial, the plaintiff, needed the use of an interpreter.   When he was not testifying, he stared at the Court, which the Court found to be somewhat weird.   Whether he was trying to influence the Court or show the Court that he was paying attention, that is only speculation, but it was unnerving.   This also negatively affected his credibility.

B. James Corona was not credible either.   Attorney Peter Hull, who represented the plaintiff on the criminal matter, testified that Corona told him that the subject tools were gone but in fact they were still in the possession of Coronas, and this was more than a week after the Coronas “purchased” the tools.   In addition, Holstead testified that contrary to what James Corona said, he never told James Corona that he owned the tools or was going to repossess them.   James Corona did on behalf of his corporation, pay the sum of $3,023 to Snap–On being the balance due on the loan for the tools.   No evidence was introduced showing a bill of sale or anything like it from Snap–On to Coronas.

Moreover, James Corona's testimony did not ring true.

The Court finds it hard to believe that Mr. Corona acted as if he were searching his memory or wasn't sure regarding a number of items or answers to questions as if this were the first time that he heard such questions.   The Court believes that he knew very well what the issues were and what the claims were, and they came as no surprise to him.   His leaning back and pondering the questions as if he were trying to remember something that this Court believes of which he was well aware was just not credible.   Mr. Corona is an intelligent man and an experienced businessman, and the Court cannot believe that he struggled to remember certain facts as if he was unaware until his testimony of the issues in this case.   It was a performance and not much else.

The Court believes that what happened here is that James Corona was justly angry at the plaintiff for being convicted of conspiracy to sell 10,000 bags of heroin and the facts underlying same.   He, Corona, then, believing that the plaintiff would be “away” for a long period of time decided to utilize the tools for his company.   He had no use for the plaintiff and acted accordingly.

Credibility aside, the fact remains that Corona's Auto Parts, Inc., did convert the plaintif's tools for its own use.

4. Is Coronas liable for conversion of the plaintiff's tools?

The short answer is yes.

The parties in their briefs agree with the definition of conversion as set forth in Miller v. Guimaraes, 78 Conn.App. 760, 778 (2003), which is quoted as follows:  “Generally, conversion is an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods belonging to another, to the exclusion of the owner's rights ․ To establish a prima facie case of conversion, the plaintiffs had to establish that (1)[p]roperty belonged to the plaintiffs (2) the defendant deprived the plaintiffs of their [p]roperty for an indefinite period of time (3) the defendant's conduct was unauthorized and (4) the defendant's conduct harmed the plaintiffs.”

There is no question that the tools belonged to the plaintiff (testimony of the plaintiff and Halstead);  the defendant, Coronas, deprived the plaintiff of his property for at least two years and still deprives the plaintiff of his property.   This is true because possession of the goods was wrongful from the outset because the plaintiff was told to bring his own tools to work, and they were, therefore, in his ownership at all times even though in the facility owned by Coronas, or if it was originally in the possession of Coronas as counsel for Coronas claims, on page 7 of his brief, it was quickly converted as soon as Coronas paid the $3,023 balance and assumed ownership of it and utilized the tools for Coronas own use.

The defendant, Coronas, did deprive the plaintiff of his property for an indefinite period of time;  not only when he was in prison but still continues to rebuff the plaintiff's efforts to retrieve his tools.

The defendant, Coronas' conduct was unauthorized because the plaintiff always owned these tools, there was no repossession (see Halstead testimony) and although it was subject to the loan, the ownership was that of the plaintiff, and there is no evidence that he authorized Coronas to take possession of or utilize the tools.

The defendant, Coronas,' conduct in depriving the plaintiff of his tools and converting them harmed the plaintiff.   He has not only lost the value of the tools, but he has also lost the ability to use the tools to obtain other employment.

Accordingly, this Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant, Coronas, did convert to its own use the plaintiff's tools as aforesaid.

5. Is the defendant, Coronas, liable for fraud on Count two.

The short answer is no.

No additional evidence was presented by the plaintiff on this count.   The fraud has to be committed against the plaintiff.   Mr. Corona may have deceived Attorney Hull, but he never spoke to the plaintiff.   Moreover, fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence at least as to the first three elements, and the Court does not find fraud by clear and convincing evidence.

6. Is the defendant Coronas liable on failure to pay wages under CGS Sec. 31–72, Count three?

The short answer is yes.

The Court finds that the plaintiff was never paid until the date of trial which is a span of six years from the date he last worked for Coronas, and he was owed $41.56.   Since he has already been paid the $41.56, and the statute provides for double damages being twice the amount of such wages, Coronas is liable for $41.56.   In addition to the Court hereby awarding $41.56 to the plaintiff on this issue, it awards $500 in attorneys fees based upon the provision of the aforementioned statute, for a total of $541.56 due from Coronas to the plaintiff.

DAMAGES

The Court will now set forth the damages to be paid by Coronas to the plaintiff for the conversion of the tools:

1. It is well settled law in Connecticut that the owner of the property, including personal property or business property, can testify as to his value of the said property.¹  Moreover, “[I]n the case of goods having a special and peculiar value to the owner, full compensation requires that the rightful owner recover the value to him based on his actual money lost, all the circumstances and conditions considered, resulting from his being deprived of the property.”  Waterbury Petroleum Products v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co, 193 Conn. 208, 222, 223 (1984).   The Court may consider consequential damages as well as the value of the property.

The total purchase price of the tools from Snap–On was $10,313.21, for the 2006–2007 tools.   The plaintiff testified that the current replacement value of Snap–On tools that he had purchased between 2006–2007 was $13,840.23.   The Court finds that he is entitled to the value that it would cost to replace these tools in the amount of $13,840.23.   The Court does not find sufficient evidence to conclude that he is entitled to the $9,274.29 for the 2001–2002 tools.   There is not sufficient evidence that those tools were present at Coronas and subsequently converted.

In addition the plaintiff is entitled to be reimbursed for the loss of a power washer at $1,500 and a Dell computer at $2,000.   The Court is not convinced that the compressor on the premises belonged to the plaintiff.

Therefore, the total damages for the conversion of the specific tools is as follows:

2006–2007 Snap–On tools $13,840.23

Power Washer $1,500.00

Dell Computer $2,000.00

TOTAL TOOLS/EQUIPMENT:  $17,340.23

2. Consequential damages

It was stated, over and over again, by all of the witnesses that someone who works in automobile body repairs must have his own tools.   Since he was deprived of his tools for at least a year following his release from prison, he should be compensated for such lost wages.   He was earning $18/hr. and working a 40–hour week and for 52 weeks that totals $37,440, as consequential damages.   It is true that he had a felony conviction for the conspiracy to sell drugs, but the most important part of his inability to work in his chosen occupation is that he did not have the tools of which he was deprived.   The Court believes that in this type of an occupation (auto body repair), a felony conviction does not result in unemployment such as in the banking or insurance industry, etc.   The Court, therefore, is willing to accept as consequential damages $37,440.   Defendant, Coronas, in its brief states that the plaintiff admitted that he earned $9,000 in the year after he was released from prison.   However, the Court finds nothing in its notes as to that testimony.   If the defendant can provide a transcript of the testimony of the plaintiff to that effect, the Court will consider reducing this award by that amount of money.

3. Punitive Damages:  Under Label Systems Corporation v. Aghamohammadi, 270 Conn. 291 (2004), punitive damages in a case of conversion are awardable if the evidence shows wanton or wilful malicious misconduct.   The evidence does show that the conduct of the defendant, Coronas, was an intentional effort to dispossess plaintiff of his property and that plaintiff's efforts to recover his property were rebuffed.   However, as stated above, Mr. Corona on behalf of Coronas was angry at the plaintiff for conspiracy to sell heroin and knowing that he was going to be in prison for a long period of time, decided that he was going to take possession of the plaintiff's tools.   He knew that Snap–On did not own the property, that it still belonged to the plaintiff, and he purposely with wanton and wilful malicious misconduct converted the plaintiff's property to the use of his company.   As stated above, the Court did not find Mr. Corona's testimony nor actions credible.

The punitive damages are in the form of attorneys fee, and in this case, the legal arrangement between the plaintiff and his attorney was for payment of legal fees on a contingency fee basis, in this case, at 45%.²  The Court finds 45% of $55,321.79, results in attorneys fees of $24,854.86 plus court costs of $641.55 ($300 filing fee;  $52.80 marshal's fee, interpreters fee, $288.75).

CONCLUSION

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Coronas is liable for conversion of the plaintiff's property and awards as follows:

1. $17,340.23 cost of tools;

2. Wages withheld, $541.56;

3. Consequential damages, $37,440.00;

4. Punitive damages and Court costs, $25,536.35.

Judgment is hereby entered against Coronas Auto Parts, Inc., in the amount of $80,618.14 on Counts one and three.   Judgment is entered for the defendants on Count two and no judgment is entered against James as an individual.

Rittenband, JTR

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Tait's Handbook of Connecticut Evidence Section 7.2.2..  FN1. Tait's Handbook of Connecticut Evidence Section 7.2.2.

FN2. The Court is well aware of CGS Sec. 52–251c which limits an attorney on a contingency fee basis, which was the situation here, to one-third of the first $300,000.   However, the Court finds that the reference to the words “damage to property” does not refer to conversion of property.   Conversion is taking away the entire property whereas damage in the context of the statute refers to property damage resulting from some sort of negligent acts.   The Court has reviewed the legislative history of that statute and finds that it refers primarily to medical malpractice and other types of negligence.   In addition, the plaintiff's attorney presented the Court with a proper waiver..  FN2. The Court is well aware of CGS Sec. 52–251c which limits an attorney on a contingency fee basis, which was the situation here, to one-third of the first $300,000.   However, the Court finds that the reference to the words “damage to property” does not refer to conversion of property.   Conversion is taking away the entire property whereas damage in the context of the statute refers to property damage resulting from some sort of negligent acts.   The Court has reviewed the legislative history of that statute and finds that it refers primarily to medical malpractice and other types of negligence.   In addition, the plaintiff's attorney presented the Court with a proper waiver.

Rittenband, Richard M., J.T.R.