IN RE: Violet B.1 (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PETITION FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families (DCF) seeks to terminate the parental rights of Nakara B., mother, and Sylvester G., father, to their daughter, Violet B., who was born on August 12, 2011.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE

Violet B. was taken into DCF's custody shortly after her birth due to mother's history of, and continuing difficulties with, substance abuse and mental health issues.   The ex parte order of temporary custody was issued on August 15, 2011 (Wollenberg, J.), and the order of temporary custody was sustained on August 19, 2011 (Keller, J.) Violet was adjudicated neglected on January 9, 2012, and custody was vested in DCF (Frazzini, J.).   DCF's petition to terminate parental rights was filed on May 30, 2012.

On November 1, 2012, father tendered to the court a signed, written consent to terminate his parental rights.   After canvassing father and making the finding that his consent was knowingly and voluntarily made, with a full understanding of all of the consequences, and with the effective assistance of counsel, the court accepted the consent of father to terminate his parental rights to Violet, and granted DCF's motion to amend the petition to reflect consent as the basis for termination of father's parental rights (Elgo, J.).

Trial on the termination of mother's rights as well as the best interests of the child proceeded on November 4 and 5, 2013.   All parties were represented by counsel at trial and participated fully therein.   Evidence consisted of the presentation of the testimony of five witnesses and production of thirteen documentary exhibits.

There are no other known pending proceedings affecting the custody of the child.   There are no claims of Indian tribal affiliation.   This court has jurisdiction in this matter.   The court has carefully considered all of the evidence and makes the following findings.

FACTUAL EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS

Mother is twenty-nine years of age.   Mother herself was adjudicated neglected and placed into DCF care when she was twelve years of age, and was never returned to her parents' care.   When she was sixteen years of age, mother gave birth to her first child, a son, in January 2001.   Mother was arrested two months later on the charge of Risk of Injury to a Child for failure to adequately supervise her then three-year-old niece.   Mother's son was placed in DCF care and two years later mother's parental rights to that child were terminated.   Mother gave birth to two other children, in 2004 and in 2008.   In 2010, DCF took these two children, then ages five and one, from mother's home because they had been left unattended and because of the deplorable living conditions in the home.   Mother admitted at that time to the continued use of crack cocaine.   Mother was referred and admitted to several different programs, through DCF and through jail diversion programs, but was unable to successfully complete any program.

Mother had been criminally charged with the felony of Risk of Injury to a Minor as a result of her neglect of her two middle children and mother was placed in a jail-diversion program for inpatient treatment of her substance abuse during her pregnancy with Violet.   Mother used crack cocaine during her pregnancy and had not had any prenatal care until mother's entry into this program, two months before Violet's birth.

Violet was taken into DCF's care immediately after the infant's birth due to mother's substance abuse and unaddressed mental health issues.   Violet was adjudicated neglected on January 9, 2012.   Mother's parental rights to two of her other children were terminated on January 26, 2012.

Mother was provided with comprehensive specific steps on the date of Violet's removal from her care and again on the hearing date for the ex parte removal (August 15 and 19, 2011).   At the time of the neglect adjudication, January 9, 2012, mother was again provided specific steps, and on May 13, 2013, mother was provided specific steps once again.   Each and every one of the specific step orders stresses mother's need to address her substance abuse and mental health issues and lists special programs for mother to attend.

After Violet's birth, mother continued to make no progress in addressing her substance abuse or mental health issues.   She became transient, could not be located at times, and lived with various individuals or at shelters.   In the spring of 2012, just before the DCF's filing of the petition to terminate mother's rights to Violet, mother began a turnaround.   Mother commenced procuring substance abuse and mental health services.   She became a regular attendee at weekly therapy sessions and complied with medication management directives and attended required meetings.   She has tested negative for drugs since May 2012.   Mother has been diagnosed as suffering from bipolar and post-traumatic stress disorders.   She regularly attends her psychiatric appointments and is compliant with her medication program.

Mother cooperated with the reunification efforts provided by DCF, including the parent education.   Mother has been consistent in attending visits with Violet and mother has demonstrated a great deal of progress in ability to appropriately parent her child.   Mother and Violet have a close and loving relationship.   DCF continues to have some concerns about mother's ability to safely parent Violet because of mother's apparent inability to comprehend the need to learn how and when to address Violet's asthma symptoms.   DCF is also concerned about mother's apparent lack of candor in revealing the identity of a gentleman visitor to her home.

A court-ordered psychological evaluation of mother took place on July 17, 2012.   As to the interactional aspect of the evaluation, Dr. Bruce Freedman noted a close relationship between mother and daughter and excellent interaction, as well as appropriate parenting skills.   Dr. Freedman reported that testing showed mother to be of borderline mental ability—at the fifth percentile in the adult population, explaining that individuals at this level have difficulty balancing different areas of adult responsibility, handling more advanced parenting tasks, and making sound judgments about events and other people.   Dr. Freedman recited mother's history in his report and concluded that mother had a very limited foundation in her life to build upon, “so that even basic challenges such as establishing work, a residence and routines for herself would be challenging.”  (Exhibit 10, page 8).   As of the time of his evaluation, Dr. Freedman did not believe that mother was yet ready to take care of her daughter but that she could become a good candidate for reunification.

Violet spent the first four months of her life in non-relative foster care and then was placed with her paternal aunt in December 2011.   She is a healthy and active child.   Violet demonstrates age-appropriative developmental skills, physically and cognitively.   She is bonded to her aunt and extended family, and she visits with her two maternal older sisters on a monthly basis.

ADJUDICATORY FINDINGS AND DISPOSITION as to PETITION TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS

Termination of parental rights is the complete severance of the legal relationship, with all of its rights and responsibilities, between a child and her parent, rendering the child free for adoption.  General Statutes § 17a–93(e).   Because of the natural rights of parents in their children, recognized in the law on a constitutional level, interference with the parent-child relationship cannot be legitimately invoked or acted upon under the law “absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.”  In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44 (1990), citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972);  See also In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. 42, 43 (2006).

In General Statutes § 17a–112, the Connecticut General Assembly has codified the limited circumstances in which there may be consideration by the superior court of a petition by DCF to terminate a parent's rights to a child, and the statute also sets forth strict guidelines for decision-making as to the serious and sensitive matter of terminating parental rights.   Unless a parent consents to termination of his or her parental rights, DCF is required to prove by the very highest civil standard, clear and convincing evidence, that DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent, where necessary, and to reunify the parent with the child.   Secondly, DCF must establish, by that same high standard, at least one of the bases of termination set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112.   Finally, as to both consenting and non-consenting parents, DCF must prove, again by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the parent's rights is in the best interests of the child.

The termination of parental rights statute has been construed to require that consideration of termination be separated into two phases.   In the initial adjudicatory phase the court must assess whether one or more grounds for termination exist, and, if that is decided in the affirmative, the court engages in the dispositional phase in which it determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child.  In re Lukas K., 120 Conn.App. 465, 486, confirmed on other grounds, 300 Conn. 463 (2011).

Reasonable Efforts

DCF has been working with mother since 2001 and has provided continued referrals, programs and assistance to mother after the birth of Violet.   The clear and convincing evidence reveals reasonable efforts to reunify on the part of DCF.

Termination Basis—Failure to Rehabilitate

In its termination petition, DCF has alleged that mother has failed to rehabilitate, invoking General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i) and (E), which provide in pertinent part:

[T]he child has been found by the Superior Court ․ to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ․ (and the parent) has failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child ․

and

the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected or uncared for, has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families;

As the Connecticut Supreme and Appellate Courts have frequently declared:

[P]ersonal rehabilitation ․ refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent [and] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent'sl rehabilitative status as it related to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ․ [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [his] ability to manage [his] own life, but rather whether [he] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Summer S., 124 Conn.App. 540, 545, 5 A.3d 972 (2010).

In re Zowie N., 135 Conn.App. 470, 503, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 916 (2012).

Parental rehabilitation refers to the restoration or development of a parent's ability to serve a constructive, responsible and useful role in the child's life as dictated by the needs of the child.  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706 (1999).   The concept encompasses not only whether a parent has developed the ability to manage his or her own life, but also whether the parent has developed, in a timely manner, the ability to adequately address the needs of the child.  In re Gianni C., 129 Conn.App. 227, 234 (2011).

DCF must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that mother had failed to rehabilitate as of the date of the filing of the termination petition, May 31, 2011, and the court is limited to consideration of events preceding the date of the filing of the termination petition, or the latest amendment thereof, in deciding whether the invoked statutory basis for termination exists.   Practice Book § 35a–7(a);  In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 357 (2001).   However, the court may rely upon post-petition events in evaluating whether a parent's degree of rehabilitation supports a finding that restoration is foreseeable within a reasonable time.  In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748 (2002);  In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 357 (2001);  In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230 (2000);  Practice Book § 35a–7

In this matter, as the factual findings above demonstrate, mother failed to rehabilitate after petitions to terminate her first three children were filed.   After Violet's birth and removal, mother once again showed no signs of ability to address her substance abuse and mental health problems.   As of the date of the petition, mother had not demonstrated a definitive turnaround and had only begun full-fledged efforts to rehabilitate.   However, mother persevered in those efforts, even to the point at which DCF was arranging overnight visits for the child with of mother—after the filing of the petition.   While this court may not be convinced that mother will be able to be a full-time caregiver for Violet, the termination bases set forth in the statute do not require that.   The statute speaks of “assuming a responsible position in the life of the child.”   There are numerous ways in which that could be accomplished and mother has demonstrated an ability to fulfill that responsibility.

DCF has not established by clear and convincing evidence that mother has failed to rehabilitate.   Indeed, the evidence reveals that, much to DCF's credit, as well as that of mother, mother has become a positive force in her daughter's life and has the potential to continue to serve in that capacity.

Best Interests of the Children

The best interests of children encompass sustained growth and development, well-being, continuity and stability of their environment.  In re Jaime S., 120 Conn.App. 712, 733–34 (2010), appeal dismissed, 300 Conn. 294 (2011);  In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 763–64 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 920 (2008).

As to father, whose consent to terminate has been accepted, this court finds that it is in Violet's best interests that his rights be terminated.   He has had nothing whatsoever to do with the child since her birth and has not provided any care or support.   There is no relationship at all, and it is in the child's best interests that his parental rights be terminated.

As to mother, while there may not be any requirement to discuss best interests in light of the denial of the petition to terminate her rights, the court would be remiss to not mention that it may very well be in this child's best interests for her mother's parental rights to remain intact so that there can be, at a very minimum, a continuing relationship, a nourishing one, between mother and her daughter.

CONCLUSION

This court has accepted father's consent to terminate his parental rights and has found, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in Violet's best interests to terminate his rights.   Therefore, DCF's petition to terminate the parental rights of father, Sylvester G., to Violet B. is granted.   DCF's petition to terminate the parental rights of mother Nakara B. is denied.

Judgment is entered accordingly.

BY THE COURT,

Constance L. Epstein, J.

Epstein, Constance L., J.