Stephen Joseph v. Heidi Joseph (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

I. Procedural History

This case comes before the court on the defendant's post-judgment Motion for Contempt (# 131) filed August 20, 2013.   In her motion, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff is in contempt for his failure to pay 50% of all uncovered, unreimbursed medical expenses of their minor children, as well as other expenses of the children, and other sums due the defendant under the judgment.   The defendant alleges that the total due to her from the plaintiff is $32,106.70.   A hearing on the motion was held on January 7, 2014.   Both parties were self-represented.¹

II. Facts

Based upon a careful consideration of all of the evidence, and a review of the record, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence the following facts:  the plaintiff brought this dissolution of marriage action on April 18, 2005.   The parties filed a Marital Dissolution Agreement on November 10, 2005, and judgment entered (Purtill, JTR) on that date.   The agreement of the parties was incorporated by reference into the judgment.   Consistent with the agreement of the parties, the court ordered that the parties share joint legal and physical custody of their three minor children, and that the parties share medical costs and other costs associated with the children.²  The court also entered orders regarding certain real and personal property.³

In addition to owing past unreimbursed medical expenses in the amount of $1,085.56 (50% to be paid by the defendant), the defendant claims that the plaintiff is obligated to pay her 50% of each of the following:  a recent X–Ray bill in the amount of $710.93, $1,849.83 in unreimbursed dental expenses, $1,577.45 in extracurricular expenses, and $5,860.00 in orthodontist expenses.⁴  The defendant also alleges that the plaintiff owes her $9,806.70 for a lien paid by the defendant on the marital home;  $12,000.00 from the sale of a camper;  $300.00 for payments made by the defendant's mother towards the debt on the Harley Davidson motorcycle;  and $7,500.00 attorneys fees related to the release of the lis pendens on the marital home which was related to a lien arising from the defendant's business.⁵  Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is a collection of documents submitted by the defendant at the hearing in support of the monies she claims is owed by the plaintiff for unreimbursed medical and dental bills, orthodontic bills and extracurricular expenses.⁶  The document was proffered by the defendant at the hearing on the Motion for Contempt, however, it was inadvertently marked as an exhibit of the plaintiff.⁷

As discussed below, the plaintiff admits that he has failed to pay some of the expenses for which he was obligated, but claims that he has been financially unable to pay.   As to other expenses alleged by the defendant, the plaintiff essentially claims that he is not obligated to pay because the defendant failed to secure his approval prior to incurring the expenses, and/or that the expenses were not contemplated by the orders of the court.   The court will set forth below further factual findings relevant to its analysis.

III. Discussion

“The court's authority to impose civil contempt penalties arises not from statutory provisions but from the common law ․ The penalties which may be imposed, therefore, arise from the inherent power of the court to coerce compliance with its orders.   In Connecticut, the court has the authority in civil contempt to impose on the contemnor either incarceration or a fine or both.”  (Citations and internal quotations omitted.)  Gil v. Gil, 94 Conn.App. 306, 310–11, 892 A.2d 318 (2006), citing Papa v. New Haven Federation of Teachers, 186 Conn. 725, 737–38, 444 A.2d 196 (1982).   In order for the court to conclude that a party is in contempt, the court must find that there existed a sufficiently clear and unambiguous order for which the party had notice, that the party did not comply with the order, and that the non-compliance was wilful.  Brody v. Brody, 145 Conn.App. 654, 77 A.3d 156 (2013);  Pace v. Pace, 134 Conn.App. 212, 215–16, 39 A.3d 756 (2012);  Celini v. Celini, 115 Conn.App. 371, 380–81, 973 A.2d 664 (2009), citing In re Leah, 284 Conn. 685, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007).

“To constitute contempt, a party's conduct must be wilful ․ Noncompliance alone will not support a judgment of contempt ․ Scott v. Scott, 90 Conn.App. 883, 889, 879 A.2d 540 (2005).   The inability of a party to obey an order of the court, without fault on his part, is a good defense to the charge of contempt ․ The contemnor must establish that he cannot comply, or was unable to do so.”  (Internal quotations omitted;  citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Brody v. Brody, supra at 662, citing Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 532, 710 A.2d 757 (1998).  “It is undisputed that a judgment of civil contempt is improper if the contemnor, through no fault of his own, was unable to obey the court's order ․ It is, however, equally undisputed that, if a finding of wilful misconduct is based on a court's determination of the credibility of relevant testimony at trial, we will overturn it only if the record demonstrates a manifest abuse of discretion.   [T]he trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony and, therefore, is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony offered by either party.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Pace v. Pace, supra at 216, citing LaBossiere v. Jones, 117 Conn.App. 211, 224, 979 A.2d 522 (2009).  “[It] is within the sound discretion of the court to deny a claim for contempt when there is an adequate factual basis to explain the failure to honor the court's order.”  (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)   Giordano v. Giordano, 127 Conn.App. 498, 506, 14 A.3d 1058 (2011), citing Sablosky v. Sablosky, 72 Conn.App. 408, 423–24, 805 A.2d 745 (2002).

The court shall consider separately each of the alleged orders for which the defendant claims the plaintiff is in contempt.

A. Camper

The defendant claims that she is due $12,000.00 from the sale of the camper.   The court's order, incorporating the agreement of the parties, specified only that if the plaintiff chose to purchase the defendant's share of the camper, the plaintiff shall pay the defendant $12,000.00.   See footnote 2. There is no evidence that the plaintiff purchased the defendant's interest in the camper for himself;  rather, the plaintiff sold the camper to a third party.⁸  The court finds that at some point after the dissolution,⁹ the plaintiff sold the camper for $6,000.00, and that he did not give any portion of the proceeds to the defendant.   The parties' agreement specifically stated:  “[t]he proceeds from any arm's length sale to a third party shall be divided equally between the parties.”

The plaintiff testified that he did not pay the defendant her share of the proceeds because he could not afford to do so.   However, he also testified that he owns a new home in which there exists $4,500.00 in equity.   He further testified that the financial situation of both parties has slightly improved since the date of the judgment.   The court reasonably infers that the plaintiff chose to spend his money on new property, rather than comply with his court-ordered obligations to the defendant.

The court finds that the order of the court was clear and unambiguous, that the plaintiff was obligated to pay to the defendant one-half of the proceeds from the camper, or $3,000.00.   The court finds that the plaintiff failed to comply with this order.   The court also finds, based upon all of the evidence, that the plaintiff's failure to comply was wilful.   Therefore, the court finds that the plaintiff is in contempt for failure to pay the defendant $3,000.00 as proceeds from the sale of the camper.

B. Lien in the amount of $9,806.70

The defendant argues that the plaintiff is in contempt for his failure to pay a lien on the property.   Neither the dissolution agreement, nor the judgment of the court, mention the lien or order the plaintiff to do anything with regard to a lien.   Both the agreement and the judgment required the plaintiff to quitclaim his interest in the marital property in exchange for the defendant paying the sum of $38,750.00 to the plaintiff.   On January 30, 2006, in response to a contempt motion filed by the defendant, and pursuant to a signed stipulation of the parties, the court ordered the plaintiff to “cooperate to release the lis pendens from the real estate filed by Lyons & Billard/Atty.   Reisner.  Both parties preserve their rights to claim that the lis pendens is invalid.”

The court finds that there is not a clear and unambiguous order requiring the plaintiff to pay off the lien.   The court ordered that the plaintiff cooperate to release the lis pendens;  he was not ordered to pay off the lien.   Alternatively, the court finds that had the court intended—and the parties were so notified—that cooperation meant paying off the lien, the court finds nonetheless that the plaintiff is not in contempt.   The plaintiff did quit claim his interest in the property, but the defendant never paid the $38,750.00.   The testimony at the hearing was uncertain regarding the benefit to the plaintiff which caused the release of the $38,750.00.   The court credits the plaintiff's testimony that the $9,806.70 lien was paid to the defendant as part of the release of any interest in the marital property.   Therefore, the court finds that the plaintiff did not fail to satisfy the lien, and is not in contempt with regard to this claim.

C. Payments on Harley Davidson Motorcycle

The motorcycle was ordered to be retained by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was to pay the debt on the motorcycle.   The plaintiff admits that he owes $300.00 to the defendant's mother for two payments made on the motorcycle loan by the defendant's mother.   The defendant's mother is not a party to the action.   The court infers from the evidence that the defendant's mother willingly made the payments on behalf of the plaintiff.   Although the defendant admits that he owes the plaintiff's mother $300.00, his failure to repay money to the plaintiff's mother is not a violation of the court's order.   Therefore, the court finds that the plaintiff is not in contempt with regard to this claim.

D. Attorneys Fees in the amount of $7,500.00

The defendant claims that the plaintiff owes her $7,500.00 for attorneys fees related to prosecution of a motion for contempt, and the release of the lis pendens related to the marital home.   The operative order is that entered on January 30, 2006 by the court (Gordon, J.), which order incorporated a signed stipulation of the parties.   The stipulation and order involved proceeds from a refinance on the marital home.   In relevant part, the court ordered that the plaintiff allow his share of the proceeds from the refinance to be used to pay the defendant's attorneys fees and costs due the defendant “for the necessity of filing process re this contempt and the lis pendens filed by Raisner.” ¹⁰  The stipulation and the court's order are silent as to the amount of the attorneys fees.¹¹

The plaintiff does not contest the amount of the attorneys fees.   He claims that the attorneys fees were previously paid as part of the consideration for the release he signed, releasing the defendant from any obligations she owed him under the dissolution and modifications related to any lien or claims of the plaintiff.   The defendant claims the release did not cover the attorneys fees.   The release, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, is silent as to attorneys fees.   In it, the plaintiff certified that all obligations in the dissolution and subsequent modifications have been fully satisfied, and that the marital property is released from any lien or claims by the plaintiff as against the defendant.   The court finds that the release did not apply to the attorneys fees, and the plaintiff is still obligated to pay the defendant's attorneys fees pursuant to the court order.

Although the defendant claims $7,500.00 in attorneys fees, she offered no evidence at the hearing to establish the reasonableness, nature and extent of the claimed fees.  “[T]here is an ‘undisputed requirement that the reasonableness of attorneys fees and costs must be proven by an appropriate evidentiary showing.’  “ Smith v. Snyder, 267 Conn. 456, 471–72, 839 A.2d 589 (2004), citing Hartford Electric Light Co. v. Tucker, 183 Conn. 85, 91, 438 A.2d 828, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 837, 102 S.Ct. 143, 70 L.Ed.2d 118 (1981).  “Even though a court may employ its own general knowledge in assessing the reasonableness of a claim for attorneys fees, we also have emphasized that ‘no award for an attorneys fee may be made when the evidence is insufficient.’  “ (Internal citations omitted.)  Id. There is insufficient evidence for this court to determine the reasonableness of the fees, therefore, further proceedings are required.

Because the evidence is insufficient for the court to evaluate the reasonableness of the amount of the attorneys fees, the court reserves decision on the portion of the defendant's Motion for Contempt regarding attorneys fees.   The court orders the matter be scheduled for an additional hearing.   At the hearing, each party may present evidence on the issue of the reasonableness, extent and nature of the attorneys fees.

E. Medical Expenses in the amount of $1,796.49 and Dental Expenses in the amount of $1,849.33

The medical expenses ($1,085.56 plus new X–Ray bill of $710.93) and dental expenses ($1,849.83) total $3,646.32.   The plaintiff admits that he is responsible for one-half of the total medicals and dentals, $1,823.16, and that he has failed to pay pursuant to the court order.   He argues that he has not wilfully violated the court's order, but that he has been financially unable to pay.   The court does not credit the plaintiff's claim that he has been financially unable to pay.   As articulated above, the plaintiff is in a better financial position than he was at the time of the dissolution, he presently owns a home with equity, and has chosen to expend money in ways other than to meet his court obligations.

The court finds that the order of the court that the plaintiff pay one-half of all unreimbursed medical and dental expenses of the children is a clear and unambiguous court order.   The court finds that the defendant violated the court order by his failure to pay his share of these expenses.   The court further finds, based upon all of the evidence, that the defendant's failure to pay is wilful.   Therefore, the court finds the defendant is in contempt for his failure to pay 50% of the unreimbursed medical and dental expenses, which share totals $1,823.16.

F. Extracurricular Expenses

The court ordered that the parties pay 50% of the following expenses:  “school lunches, school expenses for field trips, school fees, extracurricular activities, sports equipment, athlete fees, high school expenses such as driver's education, yearbook, class due etc., camps, day care and clothing.”   The court credits the evidence that the defendant has expended a total of $1,577.45 for the children's extracurricular and other activities, including sports and other types of expenses covered by the dissolution agreement and judgment.   The plaintiff's share of these expenses is $788.72.   The plaintiff does not dispute that he is responsible for certain expenses pursuant to the judgment, but takes issue with some of the amounts of the expenses, such as a prom dress for his daughter, which cost $89.00.   The court finds that the extracurricular and other expenses were reasonable.

The court finds that the order was clear and unambiguous, requiring the plaintiff to pay 50% of the extracurricular and other expenses.   The court finds that the plaintiff has failed to pay his share of these costs, and that his failure to comply with the court order was wilful.   Again, the plaintiff is in a better financial position than he was at the time of the dissolution, he presently owns a home with equity, and has chosen to expend money in ways other than to meet his court obligations.   Therefore, the court finds that the defendant is in contempt for his failure to pay $788.72, his share of the extracurricular and other expenses.

G. Orthodontic Expenses in the amount of $5,860.00

The defendant seeks 50% reimbursement of the total orthodontic expenses, claiming the court ordered the plaintiff to pay one-half of these expenses in the dissolution.   The plaintiff claims that the expenses were not necessary, and testified that he would like to speak with the orthodontist regarding the question of necessity prior to being obligated for this expense.   The court notes the following relevant language from the parties' dissolution agreement, incorporated into the judgment:  “[n]either parent shall engage any new medical or mental health providers without first consulting with the other parent and reaching a mutual agreement ․ ‘Medical expenses' shall be defined in its broadest sense and shall include, but not be limited to medical, dental, [orthodontic], optometrist, [ophthalmology], psychiatric, therapeutic, and psychological.”   The plaintiff testified that he told the defendant he could not afford orthodontic expenses;  the defendant testified that the plaintiff told her that he could not afford the expense for two of the children at the same time.

The court finds that the order of the court was clear and unambiguous.   The court finds further, based upon the evidence, that the parties did consult, but that they did not reach a mutual agreement prior to the orthodontic expenses being incurred, and that no mutual agreement was reached as required by the dissolution agreement.   Because no mutual agreement was reached before the defendant incurred the orthodontic expenses, the plaintiff is not obligated to pay for these expenses.   The court finds that the plaintiff's failure to pay did not violate an order of the court, therefore, the plaintiff is not in contempt as to this claim.

IV. Conclusion

Based upon a careful review of all of the evidence and the record, the court finds that the plaintiff is in contempt for his wilful failure to comply with clear and unambiguous court orders, to wit:  the plaintiff wilfully failed to pay the defendant $3,000.00 for her share of the sale of the camper;  the plaintiff wilfully failed to pay to the defendant $1,823.16, the plaintiff's 50% share of unreimbursed medical and dental expenses;  and the plaintiff wilfully failed to pay the defendant $788.72, the plaintiff's 50% share of the extracurricular expenses.   Currently, the plaintiff owes to the defendant a total amount of $5,611.88.

The court orders the plaintiff to pay the defendant the lump sum of $3,000.00 on or before February 28, 2014.   Additionally, the court orders the plaintiff to pay the defendant periodic weekly payments in the amount of $250.00 per week, which payments shall commence on March 1, 2014, and be paid every week thereafter, until the balance of $2,611.88 is paid in full.

The court orders this matter be scheduled for a hearing for additional evidence regarding the defendant's Motion for Contempt as it relates to attorneys fees;  specifically, as to the question of the reasonableness, nature and extent of the attorneys fees.   At the hearing, the parties will also report on the status of the plaintiff's compliance with the court orders.

BY THE COURT,

Goodrow, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. At the hearing, the defendant (Heidi Joseph) was inadvertently referred to as the plaintiff;  the plaintiff (Stephen Joseph) was inadvertently referred to as the defendant.   The defendant testified that the plaintiff owed her $2,000.00 from a prior debt, which $2,000.00 the defendant calculated as part of the alleged total due of $32,106.70.   However, the defendant is not seeking payment of the prior debt due to the fact that the judgment did not include same..  FN1. At the hearing, the defendant (Heidi Joseph) was inadvertently referred to as the plaintiff;  the plaintiff (Stephen Joseph) was inadvertently referred to as the defendant.   The defendant testified that the plaintiff owed her $2,000.00 from a prior debt, which $2,000.00 the defendant calculated as part of the alleged total due of $32,106.70.   However, the defendant is not seeking payment of the prior debt due to the fact that the judgment did not include same.

FN2. The agreement, in relevant part, states:  “[n]either parent shall engage any new medical or mental health providers without first consulting with the other parent and reaching a mutual agreement ․ neither party shall pay child support to the other.   However, the parties shall each pay 50% of the following expenses:  [s]chool lunches, school expenses for field trips, school fees, extracurricular activities, sports equipment, athletic fees, high school expenses such as driver's education, yearbook, class dues etc., day care and clothing ․ [a]ll uncovered, unreimbursed medical expenses shall be divided 50% by father and 50% by mother ․ ‘Medical expenses' shall be defined in its broadest sense and shall include, but not be limited to medical, dental, [orthodontic], optometrist, [ophthalmology], psychiatric, therapeutic, and psychological.   A CGS § 46b–84d order shall enter ․ Both parties agree that the court shall retain jurisdiction over the issue of an educational support order entering and either party may return to court in the future seeking such an order.”.  FN2. The agreement, in relevant part, states:  “[n]either parent shall engage any new medical or mental health providers without first consulting with the other parent and reaching a mutual agreement ․ neither party shall pay child support to the other.   However, the parties shall each pay 50% of the following expenses:  [s]chool lunches, school expenses for field trips, school fees, extracurricular activities, sports equipment, athletic fees, high school expenses such as driver's education, yearbook, class dues etc., day care and clothing ․ [a]ll uncovered, unreimbursed medical expenses shall be divided 50% by father and 50% by mother ․ ‘Medical expenses' shall be defined in its broadest sense and shall include, but not be limited to medical, dental, [orthodontic], optometrist, [ophthalmology], psychiatric, therapeutic, and psychological.   A CGS § 46b–84d order shall enter ․ Both parties agree that the court shall retain jurisdiction over the issue of an educational support order entering and either party may return to court in the future seeking such an order.”

FN3. The agreement also states that within ninety days of the judgment, the husband shall quitclaim his right, title and interest in the marital residence to the wife, and in exchange, the wife shall pay the husband $38,750.00.   The parties agree that the defendant did not pay the plaintiff $38,750.00, even though the plaintiff had quitclaimed his interest in the property to the defendant.   The record is unclear as to why the defendant did not pay the amount, or the consideration received by the husband which led to the non-payment.   Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 is a document entitled “Release and Satisfaction of Judgment” in which the plaintiff certified that all obligations of the defendant in the dissolution judgment, including subsequent modifications, had been satisfied by the defendant, and that the plaintiff released the defendant from any claims against the property.   The document was proffered by the defendant, however, it was mismarked as an exhibit of the plaintiff.   In the judgment, the court also ordered that the plaintiff sell a jointly owned camper, and that if the plaintiff purchased the wife's interest in the camper from the wife, he shall pay the wife $12,000.00;  if the camper was sold to a third party, the parties would split the proceeds equally..  FN3. The agreement also states that within ninety days of the judgment, the husband shall quitclaim his right, title and interest in the marital residence to the wife, and in exchange, the wife shall pay the husband $38,750.00.   The parties agree that the defendant did not pay the plaintiff $38,750.00, even though the plaintiff had quitclaimed his interest in the property to the defendant.   The record is unclear as to why the defendant did not pay the amount, or the consideration received by the husband which led to the non-payment.   Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 is a document entitled “Release and Satisfaction of Judgment” in which the plaintiff certified that all obligations of the defendant in the dissolution judgment, including subsequent modifications, had been satisfied by the defendant, and that the plaintiff released the defendant from any claims against the property.   The document was proffered by the defendant, however, it was mismarked as an exhibit of the plaintiff.   In the judgment, the court also ordered that the plaintiff sell a jointly owned camper, and that if the plaintiff purchased the wife's interest in the camper from the wife, he shall pay the wife $12,000.00;  if the camper was sold to a third party, the parties would split the proceeds equally.

FN4. The defendant testified to conflicting amounts due for orthodontist expenses:  $7,500.06 total (1/2 to be paid by the plaintiff), $5,860.00 (1/2 to be paid by the plaintiff), and $4,967.50 (plaintiff's share)..  FN4. The defendant testified to conflicting amounts due for orthodontist expenses:  $7,500.06 total (1/2 to be paid by the plaintiff), $5,860.00 (1/2 to be paid by the plaintiff), and $4,967.50 (plaintiff's share).

FN5. The defendant claims that the parties entered an agreement whereby the plaintiff agreed to pay $200.00 per month towards attorneys fees in the amount of $7,500.00.   The record reflects that the parties entered into a written stipulation on January 30, 2006, which states, in relevant part that the plaintiff shall pay attorneys fees to the defendant for effectuating the release of the lis pendens, and to pursue the Motion for Contempt..  FN5. The defendant claims that the parties entered an agreement whereby the plaintiff agreed to pay $200.00 per month towards attorneys fees in the amount of $7,500.00.   The record reflects that the parties entered into a written stipulation on January 30, 2006, which states, in relevant part that the plaintiff shall pay attorneys fees to the defendant for effectuating the release of the lis pendens, and to pursue the Motion for Contempt.

FN6. The defendant's testimony was not consistent with regard to the specific amounts she alleges are due under the court's orders.   This court makes factual findings regarding specific amounts based upon the testimony it credited, in light of all of the evidence from the hearing..  FN6. The defendant's testimony was not consistent with regard to the specific amounts she alleges are due under the court's orders.   This court makes factual findings regarding specific amounts based upon the testimony it credited, in light of all of the evidence from the hearing.

FN7. The parties agree that, generally, when the defendant incurred an expense for one of the children, she would submit the bill or information to the plaintiff, who would then either pay his share directly to the provider, or reimburse the defendant 50% of the cost if the defendant had paid the expense in full.   The plaintiff testified that he would sometime pay for expenses for the children in cash, and that he did not always seek 50% of the expense from the defendant.   The plaintiff did not keep records of the payments that he made for which he did not receive reimbursement from the defendant, however, based upon his testimony, the court finds that such payments were nominal in comparison to the expenses paid by the defendant..  FN7. The parties agree that, generally, when the defendant incurred an expense for one of the children, she would submit the bill or information to the plaintiff, who would then either pay his share directly to the provider, or reimburse the defendant 50% of the cost if the defendant had paid the expense in full.   The plaintiff testified that he would sometime pay for expenses for the children in cash, and that he did not always seek 50% of the expense from the defendant.   The plaintiff did not keep records of the payments that he made for which he did not receive reimbursement from the defendant, however, based upon his testimony, the court finds that such payments were nominal in comparison to the expenses paid by the defendant.

FN8. The court finds that although the defendant asserts that the plaintiff took ownership of the camper, the evidence is contrary.   At the hearing, the court articulated the fact that pursuant to the defendant's position, the plaintiff would owe the defendant $12,000.00.   However, the evidence supports the fact that the plaintiff sold the camper to a third party;  therefore, pursuant to the judgment, the defendant would only be entitled to 50% of the proceeds from the sale..  FN8. The court finds that although the defendant asserts that the plaintiff took ownership of the camper, the evidence is contrary.   At the hearing, the court articulated the fact that pursuant to the defendant's position, the plaintiff would owe the defendant $12,000.00.   However, the evidence supports the fact that the plaintiff sold the camper to a third party;  therefore, pursuant to the judgment, the defendant would only be entitled to 50% of the proceeds from the sale.

FN9. The plaintiff could not recall when he sold the camper, but testified that sale may have occurred in 2006 or 2007..  FN9. The plaintiff could not recall when he sold the camper, but testified that sale may have occurred in 2006 or 2007.

FN10. The defendant testified that she had an agreement with the plaintiff that he would pay $200.00 per week towards the attorneys fees.   The plaintiff did not deny this claim, but asserted that he was no longer obligated to pay due to the release..  FN10. The defendant testified that she had an agreement with the plaintiff that he would pay $200.00 per week towards the attorneys fees.   The plaintiff did not deny this claim, but asserted that he was no longer obligated to pay due to the release.

FN11. The stipulation contains a separate clause whereby plaintiff's proceeds would also be used toward his attorneys fees not to exceed $3,000.00..  FN11. The stipulation contains a separate clause whereby plaintiff's proceeds would also be used toward his attorneys fees not to exceed $3,000.00.

Goodrow, Karen, J.