Lisa G. Fresne v. David M. Fresne (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Before the court is Defendant's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement–Post–Judgment dated January 10, 2012.

The parties to this action were divorced in Poughkeepsie, New York on January 20, 2004.   The New York judgment, which incorporated by reference the parties' settlement agreement, was domesticated in the Litchfield Superior Court on June 27, 2011.   On August 9, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Contempt Post–Judgment, alleging that Defendant willfully violated court orders by failing to comply with several obligations set forth in the judgment.   The matter was scheduled for a hearing on December 16 and 17, 2011.

The evidence discloses that the parties, through counsel, agreed to and requested Judge Solomon to help settle the case.   It was for that reason, Judge Solomon came to the plaintiff's attorney's office on December 6, 2011.

The conference lasted approximately 5 1/2 hours.   The parties were not involved in the discussions with

On December 13, 2011 Attorney Louden wrote to Attorney Dranginis via e-mail, telling her that, after conferring with her client and reviewing the defendant's bank records and tax returns, she regretted that they would not be in a position to put a settlement on the record later in the week, but that she would forward a proposed stipulation to Attorney Dranginis by the following day.   This proposed stipulation would, in Attorney Louden's opinion, resolve matters “substantially along the lines recommended by Judge Solomon ․” Referring to a prior communication between them, Attorney Louden advised Attorney Dranginis that her client would not be available on December 23rd which was apparently the date that the matter was scheduled to go forward as an uncontested hearing.   Attorney Dranginis indicated in her e-mail that she believed that they had an agreement.

A document entitled Stipulation Of Parties, Post–Judgment was delivered electronically to Attorney Dranginis on December 16, 2011.   It sets out Plaintiff's wholesale modification of what Defendant and his attorney believed was the agreement the parties reached on December 6th (hereinafter, “recommended settlement agreement”).   The recommended settlement agreement regarding child support reached during negotiations was that “Defendant shall pay $500 per month for 5 1/2 years to Plaintiff for the support of the minor child.   Said payments shall continue following the child's reaching the age of majority.   Said payments are non-modifiable as to term and amount except that Defendant may pay off any remaining total balance due at any time at a 20% discount of the amount then due and owing.   The following penalty schedule shall apply if Defendant fails to make the payments due:  a 10% penalty if Defendant is one week overdue in making the payment;  a 20% penalty if defendant is two weeks overdue in making the payment;  a 30% penalty if Defendant is three weeks overdue in making the payment;  and a 50% penalty if he is four weeks or longer overdue in making the payment.”  (Defendant's Exhibit B.)

Attorney Louden proposed material changes to the aforesaid recommended settlement agreement by providing that child support would be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff in the amount of $36,000 by money order or bank check no later than March 31, 2012.  (Defendant's Exhibit A.) Her explanation for doing so was that she had reviewed Defendant's bank records and “did not believe that the court would give him some five years to pay off the lump sum amount, especially given Defendant's poor record in payments to Plaintiff for which he is not able to offer any security.”   Attorney Louden also commented that, although she believes that Defendant's arrearage would be closer to $100,000, she recommended to Plaintiff to settle for the lump sum amount, and the 90–day payment.   She emphasized that the 90–day payment is the basis upon which she can recommend settlement for one-third of what she believed the court would order Defendant to pay as a support arrearage.   She commented additionally that, when arriving at the 50% penalty, Judge Solomon clarified that Defendant also should be liable for any attorneys fees and costs of enforcement and, as a result, Attorney Louden included that language in the stipulation.   (Defendant's Exhibit A.) Attorney Dranginis commented:  “We reported this matter as settled, and we do not agree to any changes, especially the materially different changes suggested here ․ We discussed ‘going forward’ and settled this issue.   We did not contemplate a new version of the settlement which changed its terms.”  (Defendant's Exhibit B.)

Attorney Louden made other changes to the original recommended settlement agreement, most significantly by adding a provision for future support payments.   In doing so, she commented that she could not recommend to Plaintiff to settle for the provisions of this recommended settlement agreement and forego some $55,000 in support for each of the next 3 to 4 years through the Emancipation Events per New York law because “such would be too much of a windfall for [Defendant] and not fair to [Plaintiff] or the children.   We, therefore, need to address within the next three months whether there should be any modification to [Defendant's] future support payments and getting [Defendant] to resume such support payments to [Plaintiff].”  (Defendant's Exhibit A.) Attorney Dranginis responded:  “This settlement was predicated upon finality.   This is non-negotiable.   I do not want to have to file a Motion to Confirm Settlement, but will not in any way agree to another look.   That was very clear in our agreement with Judge Solomon.   We had a settlement of all issues and reported the same to him.”  (Defendant's Exhibit B.)

Regarding the second paragraph of Attorney Louden's Stipulation, Attorney Louden commented that Defendant is “not engendering confidence or trust ․ because he was to immediately address the issue [of payment to the minor child's private school] and he has not yet even contacted the school.”   Attorney Dranginis responded that Defendant would engage the school immediately “upon formalization of the settlement agreement we communicated to Judge Solomon and which we entered into with his help.”  (Defendant's Exhibit B.)

DISCUSSION

“A settlement agreement is a contract [between] the parties.  Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Welch Enterprises, Inc., 114 Conn.App. 290, 294, 970 A.2d 730 (2009).  “A trial court has the inherent power to enforce summarily a settlement agreement as a matter of law when the terms of the agreement are clear and unambiguous.”  Audubon Assoc.   Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, 225 Conn. 804, 811, 626 A.2d 729 (1993).  “Summary enforcement is not only essential to the efficient use of judicial resources, but also preserves the integrity of settlement as a meaningful way to resolve legal disputes.   When parties agree to settle a case, they are effectively contracting for the right to avoid a trial.   The asserted right not to go to trial can appropriately be based on a contract between the parties ․ Due regard for the proper use of judicial resources requires that a trial judge proceed with entry of a settlement judgment after affording the parties an opportunity to be heard as to the precise content and wording of the judgment ․ We hold that a trial court may summarily enforce a settlement agreement within the framework of the original lawsuit as a matter of law when the parties do not dispute the terms of the agreement.”  (Internal quotations omitted;  citations omitted.)  225 Conn. 812.

Before determining whether the terms of an agreement are clear and unambiguous, the court must first determine whether the parties have actually entered into an agreement.  “It is axiomatic that where no settlement agreement exists, there is no obligation on the court to enforce an agreement.”   Brycki v. Brycki, 91 Conn.App. 579, 587, 881 A.2d 1056 (2005).   Whether or not a settlement agreement exists depends upon the intention of the parties.   See Sloan v. Kubitsky, 48 Conn.App. 835, 848, 712 A.2d 966 (1998).  “In order for an enforceable contract to exist, the court must find that the parties' minds had truly met ․ If there has been a misunderstanding between the parties, or a misapprehension by one or both so that their minds have never met, no contract has been entered into by them and the court will not make for them a contract which they themselves did not make ․” Tsionis v. Martens, 16 Conn.App. 568, 577, 976 A.2d 53 (2009);  Aquarion Water Co. v. Beck Law Products, 98 Conn.App. 234, 339, 907 A.2d 1274 (2006).

Notwithstanding the fact that most of the participants at the settlement conference believed that an agreement had been reached, the court finds that Plaintiff offered credible evidence that she did not so believe.   She testified that, prior to December 6th, she had not had any opportunity to review defendant's financial papers.   She was told by her attorney that Defendant had gone as far as he was willing to go with negotiations, and that Judge Solomon needed to leave.   Her attorney did not discuss the details of the proposed settlement terms with her until after everyone had left.   Moreover, she had not authorized her attorney to settle the case.   She did not believe that they were finished negotiating.

Plaintiff's testimony is supported by evidence that her attorney did not receive responses to requests for production involving Defendant's finances until 5:30 PM on the day before the scheduled settlement conference, and that there is a history of acrimony and mistrust between the parties since their divorce.

Based on the evidence, the court finds that the parties did not enter into a settlement agreement on December 6, 2011 because there was no meeting of the minds.

BY THE COURT,

Gallagher, J.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.  

Gallagher, Elizabeth A., J.