IN RE: Alessandra Z.1 (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On March 14, 2013, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, hereafter “DCF,” filed a petition for the termination of the parental rights of Olivia L. and Pablo Z. to their child, Alessandra Z. Alessandra Z. was removed from the care of her mother twice by an order of temporary custody, the last on May 12, 2012 due to her mother's neglect of her and drug abuse.   At that time her father had not seen or cared for the child for many months.   Alessandra was first adjudicated neglected on December 11, 2011.   Subsequently the disposition was modified to protective supervision, which ended with the second order of temporary custody.   Disposition was again modified to commitment to DCF on September 18, 2012.   Alessandra has remained to the care and custody of DCF since that time.

The termination petition alleges that both parents have failed to rehabilitate so that they could parent Alessandra Z. See Connecticut General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B).  It further alleges that Pablo Z. has both abandoned his child and that he has no ongoing parent-child relationship with her, see Connecticut General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(A) and § 17a–112(j)(3)(D) respectively.   Trial on the termination petition took place on January 14 and 15, 2014.   Pablo Z. did not attend the trial, despite having been duly served and represented by counsel in these proceedings.   He was defaulted for failure to so attend.   Olivia attended the first day of trial and through her counsel vigorously contested the proceedings.

The court finds from the record that there are no other custody proceedings affecting Alessandra and that it has jurisdiction.   After duly considering all the evidence and for the reasons set forth in detail below, the court grants the petition and finds that it is in the best interests of Alessandra Z. to terminate her biological parents' rights to her.   From the evidence presented, the court finds the following facts:

A. FACTS

1. Procedural Background

Alessandra was first removed from her mother on May 27, 2011 due to an order of temporary custody filed with the court.   Shortly prior to that time, the police had been called to the apartment where she was caring for Alessandra, due to a report that she was using heroin.   She admitted that she had been using illegal substances to the police officer on the scene.   On December 12, 2011, Alessandra was adjudicated neglected and committed to DCF.

Subsequent to Alessandra's removal, the plan was for Olivia to have inpatient substance abuse treatment, as her level of drug abuse was significant.   She was assessed for such placement, but did not enter such treatment.   She did have outpatient treatment services with a local provider for methadone treatment.   In August 2011 she was hospitalized at the Blue Hills detox program.   She did thereafter receive inpatient treatment briefly until she was discharged for failure to follow the course of treatment set out for her.   Fortunately for Olivia, she was able in October of that year to enter a residential substance abuse treatment program for women with children.   At the end of December, DCF reunified Alessandra with her mother at that facility and in April 2012, the commitment was modified to protective supervision for a period of six months.

As would be her pattern for future referrals and placement into drug treatment programs, initially Olivia was excited about the program, compliant with all conditions, and sober.   But after a period of time, she became much more irritable, unwilling to follow the rules of the residence, failed to take her medication and continue as required on her methadone maintenance treatment.   Her social worker reported meeting with her at the residential home, pointing out to her the need to keep her room clean and to take her psychotropic medications.   Nonetheless, Olivia continued to decompensate and ultimately she was discharged from the program with her daughter and was homeless.   DCF was unable to contact her for a short period of time.   Nonetheless the program permitted her to return.

At that time, she had begun a relationship with an individual who was also in treatment at the program, Stephen L., the father of her youngest child.   DCF learned that Olivia and Stephen planned to reside together.   Due to his drug use and information that he had harmed a prior girlfriend's small child, DCF was not supportive of Olivia's relationship with him.   And to protect Alessandra, DCF entered into a safety plan and contract with Olivia.²

Despite that plan, Olivia went to work and, violating the safety plan, nonetheless left Alessandra in Stephen's care.   She, too, was abused by him.   On May 8, 2012, DCF received a referral from Alessandra's dentist concerning bruises the child had sustained, the causes of which varied from the reports given by Olivia to the child's paternal grandmother.   Because of Olivia's behavior, her failure to protect her daughter and lack of compliance with her treatment programs, another order of temporary custody was sought and granted by the court in May 2012.   Alessandra was again placed in foster care, originally with non-relatives, but shortly thereafter in the care of her paternal grandparents.   Subsequently she came into the care of paternal cousins, where she remains and thrives at the present time.

2. Olivia L., Alessandra Z.'s mother.

Olivia L. is now twenty-three (23) years old.   She is the mother of three children, none of whom are in her care.   Alessandra is her middle child and has been in foster care for some time.   Her oldest child from a different relationship is now in the guardianship of a paternal relative.   Her youngest is also in foster care, but in a different home from Alessandra.   Pablo Z. also has a child from an earlier relationship still in the care of that child's mother.   Olivia's relationship with Alessandra's father began in 2011, but they only intermittently resided together and their relationship ended in 2012 when Pablo Z. moved out of state.

Olivia's life history is a sad tale of drug addiction without more than sporadic periods of sobriety.   She is an individual with serious and unsuccessfully treated mental health difficulties and a significant drug addiction of long standing.   She began to abuse alcohol and marijuana while only twelve years old.   In the years since then, she has become addicted to heroin.   She has been involved for some years in a methadone maintenance program.   As have many others before her, she is able to manage only brief periods of sobriety and compliance with her treatment recommendations.   Her relapses involve continued alcohol and substance abuse.   She has never managed to accomplish the serious internal changes necessary to free herself from her drug addiction or secure successful treatment for her mental health difficulties.   During the times she is actively using, her children have been neglected and, at least on one occasion, abused by others.

The number of substance abuse treatment programs, particular residential programs for treatment of women and children, to which Olivia has been admitted, is nothing short of astounding.   She presents to the program directors as sincere in her desire to reform and therefore secures admission without difficulty.   Unfortunately, despite her initial successes, she is never able to make anything other than meager progress.   After Alessandra was removed from her care for the last time, she was still in a sober house treatment program but then DCF lost contact with her briefly in June 2012.   She remained involved with her methadone maintenance provider and received community services.   By the fall of 2012, she became more consistent in attendance at her required appointments.

Olivia then went to stay with her father for a period for three months.   After that did not prove a permanent solution, she self-referred to yet another inpatient substance abuse program for women and children.   She was accepted into the program in January 2013 and again, did well for a short period of time, then she began to have disputes with other patients in the program and with the staff, she did not follow the rules, failed to take her medication and was subsequently discharged from the program.

After a lapse of about two weeks, she again self-referred to another such program, The Hallie House, where she again received housing and supportive services in the community for drug and mental health treatment.   At that time she was pregnant with her third child.   The same pattern of behavior as previously demonstrated also occurred at this program.   Ultimately, after her third child was born with drugs in his system and removed by DCF from the hospital in which she gave birth, she was again unsuccessfully discharged from the treatment program.   Her case manager testified to her decompensating over time, her guardedness and defensiveness, including her inability to accept and internalize any criticism.   Again, she was angry, fought with and threatened her fellow program participants, and did not abide by the house rules.

In the summer of 2013, Olivia was discharged from Hallie House and stayed for a short period of time at a local shelter and then was incarcerated briefly for larceny.³  Through the criminal court she was referred to yet another outpatient treatment program, where she has only been partially complaint, has not completed her parenting program and has not followed up with her psychiatric treatment.

Olivia continues to have supervised visitation with Alessandra and the two interact well.   Alessandra lately has taken to mainly interacting with her baby brother and calls her mother “Mommy Olivia.”   Her mother has been inconsistent with visitation but does attend fairly regularly.   She wishes to have all three of her children in her care.

The daily difficulties Olivia faces were also evident at trial.   She was unable to sit and concentrate for any length of time, to accept any negative statements about herself without emotional responses or leaving the court hearing, which she did a number of times during the course of the first day of trial.   She clearly is extraordinarily defensive and uncooperative with those in authority.   She did not appear at all on the second day of trial.   Her conduct at trial bore out all the detailed reports of her service providers in each of the numerous programs she attended.

2. Pablo Z., Alessandra Z.'s father.

Pablo Z. is now twenty-eight years old.   He is a convicted felon.   While specific steps for improvement were issued to him by the court, he has not complied with any and his whereabouts were unknown for much of the time this case has been pending.   He has now been located and lives out of state.   He apparently had a happy childhood but had behavioral problems and graduated with a high school equivalency diploma.   He began using heroin, cocaine and marijuana in his teenage years.   He has received treatment but has not made any significant progress.   He has not visited with his daughter since December of 2011, although she resides with his relatives.   He has never sent cards or gifts or attempted to have a relationship with her.

3. The child, Alessandra Z.

Alessandra Z. is now three years and three months old.   She has been in relative foster care since May 2012.   She is an extremely intelligent and inquisitive child.   Her foster parents are delighted to have her in their care and have altered their lifestyle to accommodate this young child.   Alessandra has done very well in their care.

B. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

The legal issue before the court is whether DCF has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of the respondent parents should be terminated.  “In order to terminate a parent's parental rights under [Connecticut General Statutes] § 17a–112, the petitioner is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that:  (1) the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify the family;  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1);  (2) termination is in the best interest of the child;  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(2);  and (3) there exists any one of the seven grounds for termination delineated in § 17a–112(j)(3).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 148–49, 962 A.2d 81 (2009).

“The legal framework for deciding termination petitions is well established.   [A] hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases:  the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase.   During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the ․ grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in § 17a–112[ (j)(3) ] exists by clear and convincing evidence ․ If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then it proceeds to the dispositional phase.   During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child ․ The best interest determination also must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 163.  “Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding” the seven statutorily enumerated criteria.   See Connecticut General Statutes § 17a–112(k).

1. Reasonable Efforts

In order to terminate parental rights, DCF must initially show by clear and convincing evidence that it “has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and reunify the child with the parent ․ unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such a finding is not necessary if the court has determined at a hearing ․ that such efforts are not required ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1).   The court has reviewed the services provided to these parents and the repeated attempts to permit them to demonstrate that they had learned a sufficient amount to be able to care for their daughter.   The court finds, from the clear and convincing evidence, that more than reasonable reunification efforts were made for these parents.   Neither Olivia L. nor Pablo Z. have benefited from the services provided to them nor are they are sufficiently rehabilitated to be able to care for Alessandra in the reasonably foreseeable future, given her age and needs.

2. Olivia L.

Alleged against Olivia is that she has failed to rehabilitate so that she could parent her child.  Connecticut General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B).  Alessandra was adjudicated neglected and last committed to the care and custody of DCF on September 18, 2012.   The court further finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that as of the filing of the termination petition and since that time, Olivia had not achieved such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of her child, she could assume a responsible position in her life.   Connecticut General Statutes §§ 17a–112(j)(3)(B).

Olivia has not shown that she is capable of being a safe, nurturing and responsible parent for her child.   Her mental difficulties and ongoing persistent substance abuse make her rehabilitation unlikely, given the many and significant services that she has received.   Alessandra has already waited for a secure home a good deal of her young life She cannot delay her need for permanency any longer, as “long-term stability is critical to a child's future health and development ․” (Citations omitted.)  In re Eden F., 250 Conn 674, 709, 741 A.2d 873, re-argument denied, 251 Conn. 924, 742 A.2d 634 (1999).   Furthermore, the court notes that “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence” when resolving issues related to permanent or temporary care of neglected children.  In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 934 (1991), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1992).

The court's primary concern is Alessandra's stability and permanence as well as her sense of time.   See In re Katia M., 124 Conn. 650, 666–67, 6 A.3d 86, cert. denied 299 Conn. 930, 10 A.3d 1051 (2010).   She has done very well in her foster home where there are individuals who can meet her needs for nurturance, care and permanency.

3. Pablo Z.

The same ground is alleged against the child's father.   As to his failure to rehabilitate so that he could care for the child, the court finds from the clear and convincing evidence that Pablo has not rehabilitated.   He has not completed all necessary services;  he has not engaged in counseling nor has he been able to comply with his methadone maintenance program.   He has now been absent from his daughter's life for a considerable period of time and has not visited her for many months.   The court finds that this adjudicatory ground for termination of his parental rights to Alessandra has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.

The second ground alleged is abandonment.   Abandonment focuses on the conduct of the parent.  In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17, 632 A.2d 1112, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993).  General Statutes § 45as–717(g) defines “abandonment” as “the fail[ure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of a child ․ “ The statute “does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child.   A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child.   Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern ․” In re Ashley E., 62 Conn App. 307, 314–15, 771 A.2d 160, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 910, 772 A.2d 601 (2001).  “Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child ․” Id.

Without question, Pablo's conduct toward his daughter over the short years of her life demonstrates his abandonment of her and the court so concludes.   He has not visited;  he has not sent cards, letters or gifts.   He has not provided any financial or other support.   He has not even taken minimal steps to maintain some contact.   He has done nothing to indicate an interest in re-establishing a connection to his daughter.   The court concludes from the clear and convincing evidence that this ground for termination of parental rights has been established.

The petition further alleges that he has no ongoing parent-child relationship with his daughter.  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D).  As previously noted, to grant a petition for termination of parental rights under this section, the court must make two findings:  “[f]irst, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop ․” In re Christian P., 98 Conn.App. 264, 269, 907 A.2d 1261 (2006).

Given that there has been no visitation between Alessandra and her father since 2011, and no contact either by phone or letters or gifts since that time, the court concludes that there is no longer any ongoing parent-child relationship between the two, if there ever was one.   Almost two years have elapsed without contact.   This is a significant length of time for a young child.   In addition, as noted Alessandra has flourished with her foster family.   It would be detrimental to Alessandra's best interests to permit more time to go by to see if a better contact could be established.   The court concludes that this ground for termination of Pablo's parental rights to his daughter have been established by clear and convincing evidence.

C. DISPOSITION

1. The Seven Statutory Criteria

The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that the necessary statutory grounds alleged by DCF for the termination of Olivia L. and Pablo Z.'s parental rights have been proven.  “ ․ [B]efore making a decision whether or not to terminate parental rights, “the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in Connecticut General Statutes § 17a–112(k).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Devon W., 124 Conn.App. 631, 648, 6 A.3d 100 (2010);  In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn.App. 819, 835, 863 A.2d 72, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 403 (2005);  In re Vanna A., 83 Conn.App. 17, 26, 847 A.2d 1073 (2004).

(1) “The timeliness, nature, and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.”

As set forth above, the court finds that DCF offered timely, appropriate and reasonable services to both parents.

(2) “Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.”

As noted above, DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify both of the parents with their daughter, in her mother's case many services over a considerable period of time.

(3) “The terms of any court orders entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which the parties have fulfilled their expectations.”

The court finds that specific steps were ordered for both parents through which DCF offered them timely, appropriate and reasonable services.   Although Olivia was somewhat cooperative with the steps, it is not in Alessandra's best interest to be returned to her mother's care.   As to her father, he has not complied even minimally with the steps issued for him nor has he evidenced any interest in her.

(4) “The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the parents, any guardians of his person and any person who has exercised physical care custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.”

Alessandra considers her relative foster parents her parents.   She has done well there, has become their child and a member of their family.

(5) “The Age of the Child.”

Alessandra is three years and three months old.

(6) “The effort of the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return to his home in the foreseeable future including but not limited (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact with the guardian or other custodian of the child.”

As set forth above, Olivia L. has made some efforts, but her efforts have been inadequate to rehabilitate her as a parent.   Pablo Z. has made no such efforts.

(7) “The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”

There has not been any such conduct that has prevented the maintenance of a meaningful relationship between either parent and the child, nor have economic circumstances stood in the way of development of a meaningful relationship.

2. Best Interests of the Child

The court must now address the issue of whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.   See In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 511, 613 A.2d 748 (1992) (“Our statutes and case law make it crystal clear that the determination of the child's best interest comes into play only after statutory grounds for termination of parental rights have been established by clear and convincing evidence”).

In every termination case, the state has an interest in safeguarding the welfare of children which must be weighed against the constitutionally protected right of parents to maintain their connection and relationship to their children.  “The desire and right of a parent to maintain a familial relationship with a child cannot be separated from the desire and best interest of a child either to maintain or to abandon that relationship, or the interest of the state in safeguarding the welfare of children.   These legitimate interests of parent and child require a balancing of the factors involved in those interests.   In every case involving parental rights, a struggle exists between parents and the state to determine what is in the child's best interest, the child being the focus of the struggle.”  (Internal quotations marks omitted.)  In re Shaquanna M., 61 Conn.App. 598–99, 767 A.2d 155 (2001).   In this case, Alessandra's interests in a safe and stable environment outweigh her parents' right to her society.

In considering whether it is in Alessandra's best interest to terminate her parents' rights, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of her environment;  her length of stay in foster care;  the nature of her relationship with her biological parents;  the degree and quality of contact maintained with her biological parents;  and her genetic bond to his extended family, in whose care she remains.

The court has also balanced this child's crucial need for safety, emotional stability, validation, consistency and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with her biological parents.   See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).   After such scrutiny, and after considering the child's age, and the totality of circumstances, the court concludes from the clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parents' rights to her is in her best interests.

From all of the evidence, court finds that termination is in Alessandra's best interest.   It is time she has permanency and a secure and safe placement so that she can grow and mature to become a productive child and adult.

ORDERS

It is HEREBY ORDERED that the parental rights of Olivia L. and Pablo Z. to Alessandra Z. are terminated.   The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for the child.   The Commissioner will file, within 30 days hereof, a report as to the status of this child as required by statute and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.   Judgment may enter accordingly.

BY THE COURT

Barbara M. Quinn, Judge Trial Referee

FOOTNOTES

FN2. Petitioner's Exhibit 12..  FN2. Petitioner's Exhibit 12.

FN3. She has a criminal record of convictions for misdemeanor offenses, primarily shoplifting..  FN3. She has a criminal record of convictions for misdemeanor offenses, primarily shoplifting.

Quinn, Barbara M., J.