IN RE: Anthony R.1 (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS

Anthony R., born on February 16, 2010, and his parents, Christine L. and Jose R., are parties to litigation initiated by the Commissioner of Children and Families (DCF or the department) on February 20, 2010.   Twice subject to emergency removals and twice committed to DCF, Anthony has been a DCF foster child for nearly his entire life.

The court now addresses the termination of parental rights (TPR) petition filed by DCF for Anthony on October 1, 2012, and subsequently amended.   The parties had due notice of the proceedings, which do not involve an “Indian child” as that term is used by Practice Book § 32a–3;  no claims affecting the child's custody have been shown to be pending elsewhere;  and the court has jurisdiction over the matter.   Each party has been represented by skilled and experienced counsel.

Finding all TPR issues in favor of the department, the court grants the TPR petition.

I

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case's attenuated procedural history is relevant to the TPR issues.²  See In re Paul O., 141 Conn.App. 477, 480, 62 A.3d 637, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 933, 64 A.3d 332 (2013).

On February 18, 2010, DCF imposed a ninety-six-hour hold upon two-day-old Anthony.   On February 22, 2010, the court (Wollenberg, J.) granted DCF's ex parte motion for an Order of Temporary Custody (OTC) for the child, and ordered specific steps for both parents.³  The department filed a neglect petition for Anthony on that date, including allegations that Christine L. had used Vicodin, Percocet, and amphetamines while she was pregnant;  that she had untreated substance abuse and mental health issues;  that her parental rights to three other children had been terminated;  and that a father has custody of her fourth child.   The department alleged, among other things, that Jose R. was not involved in Anthony's life.

On February 26, 2010, the court (Keller, J.) sustained the OTC and imposed amended specific steps for Christine L., requiring, among other things, that she make progress toward the goal of being able to provide Anthony with “safe + nurturing parenting.”  (Ex. 14.)

On April 6, 2010, the court (Dannehy, J.) found that Jose R. was Anthony's father.⁴

On April 14, 2010, after hearing, the court (Wollenberg, J.) sustained the OTC as to Christine L. and without prejudice to Jose R., who was absent.   Anthony was adjudicated neglected on that date, and the court ordered the OTC steps to remain in effect.   On November 2, 2010, the court (Wollenberg, J.) ordered a disposition of commitment for Anthony.   Present in court, Jose R. signed the specific steps imposed upon him, indicating his awareness of his obligation to, among other things, cooperate with parole services from the state of New York (N.Y.) and demonstrate parenting skills.  (Ex. 10.)   Christine L.'s new specific steps included obligations to undergo a psychiatric consultation, participate in individual therapy, and to make progress in treating her mental health, substance abuse, and domestic violence issues.  (Ex. 12.)

On March 24, 2011, the court (Bentivegna, J.) ordered specific steps which included Christine L.'s responsibility to:  consistently attend individual and family counseling, comply with medication management;  remain sober;  demonstrate the ability to meet Anthony's needs;  and develop a plan for obtaining legal income.   The steps for Jose R. required him, among other things, to:  make progress toward the treatment goal of developing stronger parenting skills;  financially support his child;  and resolve charges related to past arrests.  (Exs.9, 11.)

On August 2, 2011, the court (Dyer, J.) granted DCF's July 1, 2011 motion to modify Anthony's disposition to six months of protective supervision with Christine L. The court's amended steps included Christine L.'s duty to:  obey the law;  cooperate with service providers;  attend individual counseling with Dr. Bunk;  “[s]uccessfully address her mental health and domestic violence issues”;  maintain sobriety;  and continue medication management through “Dr. Shah-suboxone provider.”  (Ex. 13.)   Merely two and a half months later, DCF again moved to modify the disposition, seeking a second commitment for the child.   On December 20, 2011, after hearing, the court (Wollenberg, J.) granted DCF's October 17, 2011 motion and re-committed the child.

DCF filed the pending TPR petition on October 1, 2012.   As amended, the petition alleged that:  it was in Anthony's best interest to terminate parental rights;  the department had made reasonable efforts to locate the respondent-parents and to reunify Anthony with them and/or that they were unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts;  that reasonable efforts to reunify were made prior to the approval of a permanency plan of TPR and adoption, Jose R. had abandoned his son;  there was no ongoing father-son relationship;  the child had previously been found neglected and neither respondent had achieved statutory rehabilitation;  Anthony was under the age of seven, was neglected, and Christine L.'s parental rights had been terminated in response to previous DCF litigation.

On December 20, 2012, when Christine L. denied the TPR allegations, the court (Burgdorff, J.) noted that Jose R. was absent from the TPR plea hearing, despite due notice.   On February 26, 2013, again noting Jose R.'s absence from court proceedings, the court (Dannehy, J.) found the respondent-father in default as to the TPR allegations.   On July 15, 2013, at DCF's request, the court (Gleeson, J.), appointed TPR counsel for Jose R., who was incarcerated in NY.

The evidentiary portion of the TPR trial was held on September 11 and 12, 2013.   On September 26, 2013, the parties notified the court that they had waived closing arguments.

After hearing on November 20, 2013, this court granted DCF's and Jose R.'s joint motion to open the respondent-father's February 26, 2013 default nunc pro tunc to July 15, 2013.

II

APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

“A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition ․ In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights [in General Statutes § 17a–112(j) ] exists by clear and convincing evidence.   If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase.   In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child ․ In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 469–70, 816 A.2d 707 (2003).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Rafael S., 125 Conn.App. 605, 610–11, 9 A.3d 417 (2010).  “While there are two phases to a hearing on a termination of parental rights petition, adjudicatory and dispositional;  see In re Vincent D., 65 Conn.App. 658, 664, 783 A.2d 534 (2001);  the two phases may be combined in a single, nonbifurcated proceeding.   See In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 494, 816 A.2d 697, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 917, 821 A.2d 770 (2003);  In re Deana E., 61 Conn.App. 197, 205, 763 A.2d 45 (2000), [cert. denied, 255 Conn. 941, 768 A.2d 949 (2001) ].”  (Footnote omitted.)  In re Alison M., 127 Conn.App. 197, 226, 15 A.3d 194 (2011).   In such a nonbifurcated proceeding, “disposition may not be considered until the adjudicatory phase has concluded.”   Practice Book § 35a–7(b).⁵

General Statutes § 17a–112(j) sets forth the elements DCF must prove by clear and convincing to prevail in this TPR matter:  that “(1) the Department ․ has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a–111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required, (2) termination is in the best interest of the child, and (3)(A) the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child;  (B) the child (I) has been found by the Superior Court ․ to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ․ and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent ․ and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child;  ․ (D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child;  [and/or] (E) the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected or uncared for, has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by [DCF] ․” ⁶

Construing the “reasonable efforts ․ to reunify” element of § 17a–112(j)(1), our courts have stated that “[t]he word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof ․ [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible ․ In re Katia M., 124 Conn.App. 650, 668, 6 A.3d 86, [cert. denied, 299 Conn. 920, 10 A.3d 1051] (2010).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Chevol G., 125 Conn.App. 618, 621, 9 A.3d 413 (20 10).  “[T]he department must prove either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts.   Section 17a–112(j) clearly provides that the department is not required to prove both circumstances.   Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element.”  (Emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Alison M., supra, 127 Conn. 205, quoting In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 552–53, 979 A.2d 469 (2009).  “Although ․ incarceration alone is not a sufficient basis to terminate parental rights ․ incarceration nonetheless may prove an obstacle to reunification due, to the parent's unavailability ․” (Citation omitted.)  In re Katia M., supra, 124 Conn.App. 661.

Our courts have defined the best interests element of § 17a–112(j)(2) as follows:  “The best interests of the child include the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of [his or her] environment ․ In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent's parental rights is not in the best interest of the child ․ In re Sarah O., 128 Conn.App. 323, 340, 16 A.3d 1250 [cert. denied, 301 Conn. 298, 22 A.3d 1275] (2011).”  (Emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   In re Jason R., 129 Conn.App. 746, 766 n.15, 23 A.3d 18, (2011), aff'd, 306 Conn. 438, 51 A.3d 334 (2012).  “In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a–112(k) ] ․ The seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered ․ There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.  In re Alison M., [supra, 127 Conn.App. 211].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Etta H., 146 Conn.App. 751, 762, 78 A.3d 295 (2013).   See In re Jaime S., 120 Conn.App. 712, 734, 994 A.2d 233 (2010), appeal dismissed, 300 Conn. 294, 12 A.3d 566 (2011).  “The factors to be considered in deciding whether it would be in [a child's] best interest to permit further time for a relationship with [his parent] to develop include (1) the length of stay with [his] foster parents, (2) the nature of [his] relationship with [his] foster parents, (3) the degree of contact maintained with the natural parent and (4) the nature of [his] relationship to the natural parent ․ In addition, the genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999) (affirming judgment granting TPR on basis of lack of rehabilitation or ongoing parent-child relationship).

Statutory abandonment, as contemplated by § 17a–112(j)(3)(A),”focuses on the parent's conduct ․ A lack of interest in the child is not the sole criterion in determining abandonment ․ Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child ․ Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted;  citation omitted.)  In re Lukas K., 120 Conn.App. 465, 487, 992 A.2d 1142 (2010), aff'd, 300 Conn. 463, 14 A.3d 990 (2011).

Our courts have also defined the ground of statutory rehabilitation for TPR purposes.  “[P]ersonal rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(I) ] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ [This ground] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ․ It requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [the parent] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [the parent] can assume a responsible position in [the] child's life ․ In re Kaitlyn A., 118 Conn.App. 14, 26, 982 A.2d 253 (2009).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622.  “Rehabilitation does not require the parent to be able to assume full responsibility for a child without the use of available support programs ․ An inquiry regarding personal rehabilitation requires us to obtain a historical perspective of the respondent's child-caring and parenting abilities ․ In re Stanley D., [61 Conn.App. 224, 230–31, 763 A.2d 83 (2000) ].”  (Emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Tremaine C., 117 Conn.App. 521, 597, 980 A.2d 317, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 920, 984 A.2d 69 (2009).   In other words, “[i]n order for the court to make a determination as to the respondent's prospects for rehabilitation, the court [is] required to obtain a historical perspective of the respondent's child caring and parenting abilities.  In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 361, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995).   Because the parent-child relationship is at issue, all relevant facts and family history should be considered by the trial court when deciding whether to terminate the respondent's parental rights ․ The parent-child relationship presents an ongoing dynamic that cannot be frozen in time.   The entire picture of that relationship must be considered whenever the termination of parental rights is under consideration by a judicial authority.  In re Brianna F., 50 Conn.App. 805, 814, 719 A.2d 478 (1998).”  (Emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Anna Lee M., 104 Conn.App. 121, 128, 931 A.2d 949 (2007).

Accordingly, the court may properly examine a respondent's history in caring for other children “to gain perspective on the respondent's child caring and parenting abilities to determine if she had achieved rehabilitation.”   (Footnote omitted.)  In re Dylan C., 126 Conn.App. 71, 82, 10 A.3d 100 (2011).   In addition, the trier of fact may consider evidence of the respondent's arrests even though those arrests did not result in conviction;  that evidence is relevant to establish that whether the respondent's pattern of misconduct has or will deny his or her child the care, guidance or control necessary for the child's physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being.   See In re Helen B., 50 Conn.App. 818, 828–29, 719 A.2d 907 (1998) (no error in admitting evidence of respondent's arrests, which did not result in conviction);  In re Brianna F., supra, 50 Conn.App. 814 (all relevant facts and family history should be considered by trial court when deciding whether to terminate parental rights).

Insofar as statutory rehabilitation is concerned, “a parent's compliance with rehabilitative programs, while relevant, is not dispositive as to the rehabilitation finding.  In re Trevon G., 109 Conn.App. 782, 791, 952 A.2d 1280 (2008).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622.   Specific steps are an express element of § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(I);  upon execution, they become enforceable court orders.   See In re Jeffrey C., 261 Conn. 189, 194, 802 A.2d 772 (2002).  “The specific steps are also considered ‘fair warning’ of the potential termination of parental rights in subsequent proceedings pursuant to § 17a–112.”  In re Jeffrey C., 64 Conn.App. 55, 62, 779 A.2d 765 (2001), rev'd on other grounds, 261 Conn. 189, 802 A.2d 772 (2002).  “Indeed, the failure to comply with specific steps ordered by the court typically weighs heavily in a termination proceeding.”  In re Devon B., 264 Conn. 572, 584, 825 A.2d 127 (2003).

Our courts have also instructed that “[t]o establish the ground of no ongoing parent-child relationship pursuant to § 17a–112(j)(3)(D) it must be proven by clear and convincing evidence that the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child [is lacking] and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re S.D., 115 Conn.App. 111, 122–23, 972 A.2d 258 (2009).   This element “requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis.   First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop ․ In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance ․ The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent ․ Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only ․ In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Alexander C., 67 Conn.App. 417, 422, 787 A.2d 608 (2001), aff'd, 262 Conn. 308, 813 A.2d 87 (2003).   See also In re Jessica M., 217 Conn. 459, 468–70, 586 A.2d 597 (1991);  In re Lukas K., [supra, 120 Conn.App. 485–86];  In re Christian P., 98 Conn.App. 264, 269, 907 A.2d 1261 (2006);  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–6), 2 Conn.App. 705, 708–09, 483 A.2d 1101 (1984), cert. denied, 195 Conn. 801, 487 A.2d 564 (1985).   This standard applies to formerly custodial and noncustodial parents alike.   See In re Jessica M., supra, 470.   Where lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship is at issue, “[w]hen the child does have present memories or feelings, there must be a finding that ‘no positive emotional aspects of the relationship survive.’  “ In re Christian P., supra, 269.  “[T]he evidence regarding the quality of [a parent's] relationship with [a] child must be reviewed in the light of the [parent's] limited access to visitation at the time of the petition ․ In re Alexander C., [supra, 67 Conn.App. 425].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Christian P., supra, 269–70.

When considering both whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may assume, within a reasonable time, a useful role in the child's life, and when the issue relates to whether a parent-child relationship can be developed within a reasonable period of time, the court may rely on events occurring after the filing of the TPR petition.   See In re Gianni C., 129 Conn.App. 227, 234, 19 A.3d 227 (2011);  In re Luciano B., 129 Conn.App. 449, 469, 21 A.3d 858 (2011);  In re Keyashia C., 120 Conn.App. 452, 457 n.12, 991 A.2d 1113, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 909, 995 A.2d 637 (2010);  In re Sole S., 119 Conn.App. 187, 192 n.8, 986 A.2d 351 (2010);  In re Selena O., 104 Conn.App. 635, 646, 934 A.2d 860 (2007);  In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. 495;  In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230.

For TPR purposes, our courts have defined “the minimal parental obligations” in the conjunctive as follows:  “The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes:  (1) express love and affection for the child;  (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child;  (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care;  (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile;  and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance ․” (Emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Lukas K., supra, 120 Conn.App. 487–88 (identifying minimal parental obligations for abandonment).

III

FACTUAL FINDINGS

The court has considered the evidence as a whole, utilizing the applicable principles for assessing the credibility and weight attributable to exhibits and testimony.⁷  Trial testimony was provided through DCF social workers Sandra B. and Margaret C., the foster father, and Jose R.⁸ Exhibits included:  a TPR decision by Judge Olear;  court and DCF documents;  Department of Correction (DOC) records;  correspondence;  a cassette tape recording;  photographs;  and a report of the court-ordered evaluation conducted by Dr. Stephen Humphrey.⁹

Using the appropriate standards, the court finds the following facts to have been proved by clear and convincing evidence: ¹⁰

A

CHRISTINE L., THE MOTHER

Christine L. was born February 12, 1976.   She has five children:  Joshua L. was born March 26, 1996;  Alexander L. was born January 1, 2002;  Luis L. was born June 15, 2003;  Seyre L. was born July 25, 2007;  and, as noted, Anthony R. was born February 16, 2010.  (Exs.19, 20.)

Christine L. has extensive involvement with both DCF, substance abuse issues and the criminal justice system.¹¹  She has chronically expressed symptoms of anxiety and depression.   She began receiving anti-anxiety and antidepressant medication at age nine, and claims to suffer pain from a number of bodily injuries.  (Exs.18, 19.)   Christine L. was sexually assaulted as a child and was subject to physical and verbal violence by her step-father.  (Ex. 19;  see Ex. 18.)   Christine L. was also the victim of domestic violence by Wilbert L., whom she married in 2001, although he had burned and choked her, was unfaithful, and was abusive to her and her children.  (Exs.18, 19.)

A high school graduate, Christine L. has work experience.   She was employed as a dentist's secretary from 1997 to 2004, but lost that job for forging prescriptions.¹²  (Ex. 18;  see Exs. 2, 18, 19, 22A.) In 2006, Christine L. secured prescriptions for “Oxycontin, Percocet, Oxycodone, Soma, Xanax (Alprazolam), Metoclopram, Clonipin (sic) and others.”  (Ex. 19.)   Subsequently, she received prescribed morphine and also obtained morphine, Vicodin and Soma on the street, through March 2007.  (Ex. 19.)   In 2007, when she was still pregnant with Seyre, Christine L. took twenty-three Vicodin in a twenty-four-hour period, planning “to take the whole bottle at once.”  (Ex. 18.)

On March 16, 2007, DCF filed OTCs with neglect petitions for Joshua, Alexander and Luis, who were in Christine L.'s care.   The court (Wollenberg, J.) sustained those OTCs on March 23, 2007, placing Joshua with his father, and maintaining Alexander and Luis with the department.

In the spring of 2007, Derek Franklin, Psy.D., conducted the court-ordered evaluation of Christine L.¹³ At that time, Christine L.'s untreated mental health issues and her “pervasive” addiction to prescription medications negatively impacted her interpersonal relationships, her ability to meet the daily functions, and her capacity to provide safe care and supervision for her children.¹⁴  (Ex. 1;  see Ex. 18.)

In May 2007, DCF referred Christine L. to Interval House for domestic violence services, but she was discharged due to non-attendance and inconsistent reports concerning her relationship with Wilbert L. (Ex. 1.) Also, although DCF referred Christine L. to InterCommunity Mental Health, Inc. (ICMH) for counseling and medication management in May 2007, she did not attend all available treatment sessions.  (Ex. 1.) On June 4, 2007, when still pregnant with Seyre, Christine L. was arrested and charged with illegally obtaining prescription medication, in violation of General Statutes § 21a–108(1).  (Ex. 6.) On June 27, 2007, weeks later, she was arrested and charged with evading responsibility, in violation of General Statutes § 14–224(b).  (Ex. 6.)

On July 10, 2007, the court (Keller, J.) adjudicated Joshua, Alexander and Luis neglected.   Alexander and Luis were committed to DCF;  Joshua's father was made his sole guardian.¹⁵

When Seyre was born on July 25, 2007, Christine L. tested positive for PCP.¹⁶ (Ex. 1.) DCF imposed a ninety-six-hour hold, and filed an OTC and a neglect petition for the child.¹⁷

On August 16, 2007, Christine L. was convicted of illegally obtaining prescription medication, and was sentenced to one year suspended with eighteen months of probation.   On August 30, 2007, Christine L. was arrested and charged with obtaining a controlled substance by fraud or misrepresentation, in violation of General Statutes § 21a–266(a)(1).   On September 25, 2007, she was convicted of evading responsibility, and received a $100 fine.  (Ex. 6.)

In March 2008, Christine L. underwent a court-ordered psychiatric examination by David Krulee, M.D.¹⁸ (Exs.5, 18.)   Despite having “difficulty in obtaining accurate substance abuse information from Mother,” Krulee concluded that the respondent-mother presented with “multiple extant mental health issues.” ¹⁹  (Ex. 1;  see Ex. 18.)   At that time, Christine L. still needed medical care for her somatic pain, and to “engage in outpatient substance abuse treatment, receive psychotherapy to address codependency issues and engage in [relationship] counseling ․” (Ex. 5.)

On May 21, 2008, Christine L. was convicted of violating the probation imposed on her on August 16, 2007.  (Ex. 6.)

In August 2008, Christine L., at DCF's referral, was assessed at Family Matters to address her domestic violence with Wilbert L. She cancelled five times and failed to appear at two additional sessions, so Family Matters discharged Christine L. for non-attendance.  (Ex. 1.)

On August 6, 2008, at G.A. 12, Christine L. was convicted of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud or misrepresentation and was sentenced to two years suspended with two years of probation;  her previous probation was terminated.  (Ex. 6.)

Through August 2008, Christine L. had continued access to ICMH mental health services, although she continued to miss appointments and placed herself at risk of discharge.  (Ex. 1.)

In September 2008, Christine L. possessed Tramadol, a narcotic, without a prescription.  (Ex. 1.)

Commencing in September 2008, DCF provided My People's Clinical Services to supervise Christine L.'s visitation with Alexander, Luis and Seyre, who were in foster care with Lynn M., their maternal grandmother.   By December 2008, DCF allowed Lynn M. to supervise visits.  (Ex. 1.)

On September 17, 2008, Christine L. again engaged in the offenses of illegally obtaining prescription medication, and also engaged in criminal impersonation, in violation of General Statutes § 53a–130.   On October 3, 2008, she repeated the same two offenses.  (Ex. 6.)

In December 2008, a new ICMH therapist was assigned to Christine L. The respondent-mother attended only one appointment for counseling and medication services.  (Ex. 1.)

On December 26, 2008, Christine L. was charged yet again with illegally obtaining prescription medication;  she was also charged with forgery in the second degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a–139 and with violating her August 2008 orders of probation.  (Exs.2, 6.) Christine L. was held in lieu of bond from February 27, 2009 until March 2, 2009.  (Exs.2, 7.)

In the spring of 2009, Christine L. and Jose R. conceived Anthony.   On July 1, 2009, after trial, the court (Olear, J.) terminated Christine L.'s and Wilbert L.'s parental rights to Alexander, Luis and Seyre.²⁰  (Ex. 1.)

On October 23, 2009, while pregnant with Anthony, Christine L. tested positive for amphetamines, but denied using that drug.  (Exs.3, 4, 5.) Also on that date, Christine L. was convicted of one count each of forgery in the second degree, obtaining drugs without a prescription, and violating probation.   She was sentenced to an unconditional discharge on the drug count, and to five years, suspended, with three years of probation on the forgery count.  (Ex. 2, 6.)

On November 21, 2009, Christine was arrested and charged with the drug-related conduct in which she had engaged on September 17 and October 3, 2008.  (Ex. 6.)

As found in Part I, Anthony was born on February 16, 2010.   DCF executed a ninety-six-hour hold two days after his birth, placing the infant with Lynn M., where he remained when the OTC was sustained on February 26, 2010.  (Exs.15, 19.)

In March 2010, at DCF's referral, Christine L. attended a substance abuse evaluation at Community Health Resources (CHR).  CHR “diagnosed [her] with Opiate Dependence and suggested Phencyclidine [PCP] Abuse be ruled out [and] recommended [that she] attend the CHR Early Intervention/Relapse Prevention group.”  (Ex. 18.)   Christine L. refused to attend the individual therapy to which DCF referred her, “as she denied having any mental health issues.”  (Ex. 19.)

On March 16, 2010, Christine L. underwent a substance abuse evaluation at Genesis.   This provider also recommended a relapse prevention program.   As the respondent-mother was outside the Genesis catchment area, she was again assessed at ICMH on May 18, 2010.   This evaluating clinician recommended no further services, as Christine L. had “no evidence of a major mental illness ․” (Ex. 23.)   However, consistent with the respondent-mother's refusal to attend individual therapy, the ICMH clinician recommended “[c]ontinued random drug screens” and further found that Christine L. “may benefit from therapy for support, and to explore her past drug use and abusive relationship [but] does not feel the need for therapy at this time,” as she claimed to have achieved sobriety.  (Ex. 22A;  see also Exs. 1, 19, 22A, 23;  Tes. Sandra B.) Christine L. commenced Genesis's substance abuse relapse prevention program on March 22, 2010, but nonetheless used Xanax that was not prescribed for her use, in May 2010.  (Ex. 19.)

On May 19, 2010, Christine L. began addiction medication treatment with Hansa Shah, M.D. at the Rushford Center.   Dr. Shah provided a prescription for Suboxone, a controlled substance, with which Christine L. was already self-medicating.  (Ex. 18.)

On June 8, 2010, Christine L. was convicted of two counts of illegally obtaining prescription medication and two counts of criminal impersonation for incidents that had occurred on September 17 and October 3, 2008.  (Exs.2, 6.) She was sentenced to two years, suspended, with two years of probation consecutive to her existing probation.  (Ex. 2.)

Christine L. completed Genesis's relapse prevention group program on July 7, 2010.  (Ex. 18;  see Ex. 19;  Tes. Margaret C.)

On September 8, 2010, Stephen Humphrey, Ph.D. evaluated Christine L. At the time, the respondent-mother was bitter and resentful about past relationships, felt betrayed by those with whom she had once been close, and was preoccupied with fears of abandonment and rejection.²¹  (Ex. 18.)   Her psychological problems that adversely affected her functioning included:  “a history of opioid addiction and attendant antisocial behavior, as well as long-term involvement with an abusive partner despite the consequences to her children,” which resulted in their developing “a host of emotional and behavioral problems while in her care.”  (Ex. 18.)   Christine L.'s chronic substance abuse negatively impacted her ability to control her lifelong “difficulties with both authority and social convention” that were manifest in her “deceitfulness and antisocial tendencies ․” (Ex. 18.)   Christine L. required individual therapy to treat her depression, exposure to severe trauma, and her ongoing substance abuse.²²  (Ex. 18.)

On November 8, 2010, Christine L. began individual psychotherapy sessions with Barbara Bunk, Ph.D. (Ex. 16;  Tes. Sandra B.) Bunk's therapeutic “[c]oncerns centered on [the respondent-mother's] history of unaddressed trauma, including but not limited to a domestically violent marital relationship, substance abuse that endangered her young children, and generally inadequate personal coping skills for effectively negotiating her life.”  (Ex. 16.)

On November 10, 2010, Christine L. was referred for a second round with Genesis's relapse prevention group.   Although she was treated by Genesis, and by Dr. Shah and Dr. Bunk, in December 2010, Christine was still using Xanax for which she did not have a prescription.  (Ex. 19.)

On March 8, 2011, Dr. Bunk referred Christine L. for a medication evaluation with Steven Holzman, M.D. However, the respondent-mother did not attend.  (Ex. 19.)

By March 11, 2011, after Dr. Bunk reported that Christine L. was progressing in the development of parenting skills, and, on March 23, 2011, Christine L. finished her second round of Genesis treatment.  (Exs.16, 19.)   On March 25, 2011, DCF referred Christine L. to CHR's Reconnecting Families intensive family preservation (IFP);  however, as she had no housing, the respondent-mother was discharged from this program in May 2011.  (Ex. 19.)   On June 10, 2011, at DCF's referral, Christine L. began receiving IFP support through My People Clinical Services.  (Ex. 19.)   On August 1, 2011, DCF reunified Anthony with Christine M.;   both the respondent-mother and her son resided at the home of Lynn M. (Ex. 19.)   As found in Part I, at DCF's request, the court revoked Anthony's commitment on August 2, 2011, and Christine L. resumed legal guardianship of Anthony subject to protective supervision.

As also found in Part I, that reunification was short-lived, as Christine L. resumed or continued her substance abuse although she was charged with the care of her young son.²³  Lynn M. and Christine L.'s sister, Lena A., made several reports to DCF about this problem between August and October 2011.   In September 2011, a DCF social worker observed Christine L. under the influence at Lynn M.'s home, obviously unstable on her feet and slurring her words.²⁴  Christine L. admitted that when Anthony was in her custody, she had used Klonipin that she had obtained from her friends “a couple of times,” and that she had again used Xanax without a prescription.  (Tes. Sandra B.;   see Exs. 19, 20.)   Also in September 2011, Christine L. told Dr. Shah that her Suboxone addiction medication had been stolen;  Dr. Shah concluded that the respondent-mother was pill-seeking, and refused to write any more prescriptions for her.²⁵  (Ex. 19;  Tes. Sandra B.)

On October 11, 2011, Christine L. moved out of Lynn M.'s home, while Anthony remained there.   My People Clinical Services unsuccessfully discharged her from its reunification program.  (Ex. 19.)   Her relapse continued, as on October 17, 2011, Christine L. failed to attend the appointment Dr. Shah had made for her at the Hartford Dispensary.  (Ex. 19.)   On October 18, 2011, she admitted to her probation officer that she “was taking Klonopin and Xanax pills that she bought on the street.”  (Ex. 2;  see Ex. 19.)   On October 27, 2011, Dr. Shah formally discharged Christine L. from treatment in view of the respondent-mother's continuing use of Xanax.  (Ex. 19.)

Christine L. failed to attend the substance abuse evaluations that DCF had scheduled for her at Rushford Center on November 3, 7, 28 and December 4, 2011.  (Ex. 20;  Tes. Sandra B.)

On December 20, 2011, DCF regained custody and legal guardianship of Anthony through the court's second order of commitment, as found in Part I.

Christine L.'s relapse behavior and criminal conduct continued despite the services that had been provided.   By December 2011, her attendance at individual counseling sessions with Dr. Bunk “began to be sporadic ․” (Exs.19, 20.)   In December 2011, probation referred Christine L. to Manchester Hospital's ECHN STEPS program “for ․ substance abuse/mental health evaluation,” but the respondent mother failed to attend any of the appointments that were made for her.  (Ex. 2;  see Exs 19, 20.)

On December 20, 2011, while she was on probation, Christine L. made three separate telephone calls to her assigned DCF social worker using demeaning, insulting, derogatory, racially abusive, and harassing language.   Although her voice was tearful, somewhat hysterical and sometimes despondent during these telephone calls, Christine L. threatened the social worker's safety.  (Exs. 2, 17;  Tes. Sandra B.) On December 29, 2011, Christine L. and Lena M. had a fight;  both were arrested and charged with Breach of Peace in violation of General Statutes § 53a–181.  (Exs.2, 6, 19.)

On January 12, 2012, Christine L. was arrested and charged with three counts of harassment in the second degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a–183, three counts of threatening in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–62, and one count of racial ridicule in violation of General Statutes § 53–37, due to the December 20, 2011 incident.  (Exs.2, 6.) On February 7, 2012, a warrant was issued authorizing Christine L.'s arrest for Violation of Probation, General Statutes § 53a–32, based on her failure to attend meetings with her probation officer;  her failure to attend substance abuse evaluation and treatment;  and her failure to adhere to the laws of this state.  (Ex. 2.) On February 10, 2012, Christine L. was further charged with failure to appear in the second degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a–173.  (Ex. 6.)

On February 28, 2012, Christine L. was incarcerated at York Correctional Institute (York);  she remained under DOC supervision through the close of the TPR trial.²⁶  (Ex. 7.) The DOC administered “Wellbutrin and Paxil for depression.”  (Ex. 20.)   On April 8, 2012, Christine L. was found in possession of contraband at York, and was disciplined for this violation of prison rules by losing thirty days of commissary privileges.  (Ex. 7.)

As of June 26, 2012, Christine L. had engaged in the DOC's TARGET (Trauma Adaptive Recovery Group Education and Therapy) program at York, enabling her access to psycho-education with which to develop skills she could use “to deal with the internal distress that often affects women with trauma histories” and PTSD. (Ex. 20;  see Ex. 19.)   Through the DOC, Christine L. had access to parenting education.  (Tes. Margaret C.)

On July 31, 2012, after admitting to violating her probation, Christine L. was sentenced to two years of incarceration.   The December 2011 breach of peace, harassment, threatening and racial ridicule charges were nolled.   Christine L.'s “maximum release date is 2/14.”  (Exs.2, 6, 19.)

On September 25, 2012, after seven months at York and having completed the TARGET program, the DOC placed Christine L. at Neon House, a supervised residence, and recommended individual psychological services.  (Exs.7, 19.)   Christine L. finished attending a ten-week parenting education program sponsored by Elaine C. to which DCF had referred her.  (Tes. Margaret C.)

Although Christine L.'s parole officer referred her to Wellmore for counseling, the respondent-mother told DCF on January 8, 2013, that she “would prefer to go to MCCA [Midwest Connecticut Council on Alcohol,] as it was a newer place and had a better reputation.”  (Ex. 20.)   DCF complied with the respondent mother's request.   At Christine L.'s MCCA intake on January 22, 2013, consistent with the DOC's September 2012 recommendations, she “was referred for individual counseling and for a weekly relapse prevention group.”  (Ex. 20;  Tes. Margaret C.)

However, Christine L. did not attend the requested MCCA sessions, missing meetings scheduled for May 24;  June 7, 14, 28;  and on July 12, 2013.  (Ex. 20.)   She violated the law and Neon House rules by using cocaine during the spring of 2013.  (Ex. 20;  Tes. Margaret C.) Also, Christine L. claimed to have become “frustrated with the staff at the half-way house who were not doing their jobs ․” on June 27, 2013, in violation of her parole, she “bought Bacardi rum in a package store and ‘did a few shots.’  “ (Ex. 20.)   Thereafter, “all of her furloughs [from Neon House] were cancelled” and Christine L. unilaterally ended her MCCA involvement.  (Ex. 20.)

After Christine L. left Lynn M.'s home in 2011, and before she entered prison, twice weekly two-hour visits were available for Christine L. at the department's offices, supervised by My People Clinical Services.   DCF brought Anthony for monthly visits at York. Contact with Anthony was apparently not a priority for the respondent-mother at that time, as she did not attend visits on December 23, 2011;  on January 19 and 31 and February 14, 2012.²⁷  Since her admission to Neon House, DCF has provided twice monthly two-hour supervised visits.   Christine L.'s conduct is appropriate during visits, but maintaining contact with Anthony was still not a priority, as she missed visits on December 18, 2012;  and on May 22, June 19, and July 3, 2013.   Neon House sanctions precluded her July 17, 2013 visit.  (Ex. 20.)

B

JOSE R., THE FATHER

Born on April 7, 1977, Jose R. has completed the eleventh grade.  (Ex. 8.) In addition to Anthony, Jose has two children who are not in his custody.   (Exs.18, 19.)

Before 1999, Jose R. was twice charged with attempted sale of marijuana.²⁸  In November 1999, he was arrested for attempted sale of cocaine in NY;  convicted of this offense in December 2000, he received an indeterminate sentence of three to six years.²⁹  After approximately three years of imprisonment in NY, Jose R. was released on parole with the conditions that he maintain curfew and stay at his aunt's home in Brooklyn, NY. However, Jose R. almost immediately began a pattern of violating the N.Y. parole conditions.   After only five months of parole, he left N.Y. and went to Puerto Rico, then turned himself in and was reincarcerated.   Upon release, he again violated parole by going to Pennsylvania.   Jose also came to Connecticut, and was held at Hartford Correctional Center (HCC) from August 27, 2007 to October 11, 2007.   In 2008, after a stay in Connecticut, Jose R. again served time in N.Y. for violating parole.  (Ex. 8;  Tes Sandra B., and Jose R.)

Jose R. met Christine L. in Connecticut in 2009, while he was yet again evading N.Y. parole.  (Tes. Jose R.) On March 2, 2010, two weeks after Anthony's birth, Jose R. was reincarcerated at HCC. He was discharged on March 5, 2010;  readmitted to HCC on March 26, 2010;  and was extradited to N.Y. to serve eighteen months for his drug conviction.  (Exs. 8, 18, 19, 22A;  Tes. Sandra B.)

On October 1, 2010, N.Y. again released Jose R. to parole with the condition that he remain in “3/4 housing” in NY. (Ex. 19.)   On October 7, 2010, the respondent-father informed DCF that he was engaged in substance abuse treatment in NY, but he failed to complete that service.  (Ex. 19.)

On November 2, 2010, DCF secured Jose R.'s attendance at in court review for Anthony, who had been committed to DCF on April 14, 2010 when the respondent-father was absent.   The court (Wollenberg, J.) issued specific steps for Jose R., who signed them on that date memorializing, among other things, his obligations to visit Anthony as permitted by DCF, keep the department informed of his whereabouts, follow the law, and “demonstrate effective parenting skills.”  (Ex. 10.)

Jose R. visited Anthony on November 2 and November 23, 2010.  (Ex. 19.)

On November 19, 2010, Jose R. informed DCF that NY's parole had arranged for him to begin parenting classes on December 2, 2010.   However, he failed to attend this service.  (Ex. 19.)   Jose R. was present at permanency plan hearings in Hartford on January 4, and March 24, 2011.   However, by June 2011, he had “walked away from his 3/4 housing and the services” that were conditions of his N.Y. parole, and continued to elude N.Y. authorities.  (Ex. 19;  Tes. Margaret C., and Jose R.)

At some indiscernible date between November 23, 2010 and November 23, 2011, while still avoiding N.Y. authorities and without DCF's permission, although the child was committed, Jose R. had some contact with Anthony in Connecticut.  (Exs. 19, 20, A, B, C, D;  Tes. Jose R.) Jose R. admits that he has had no contact with DCF since December 2011, when Anthony was placed in his current foster home.  (Tes. Jose R.) Jose R. has neither communicated with nor seen Anthony since November 23, 2011, when the child was approximately twenty-one months old.³⁰  (Ex. 20.)

As of February 21, 2012, “there was an open warrant for father's arrest in NY” related to his drug conviction and persistent non-compliance with parole.  (Ex. 19.)   On June 27, 2012, still while defying N.Y. authorities, Jose R. telephoned DCF and explained that he often came to Connecticut and wanted to see his son.   The respondent-father stated that he would call back the next day, but failed to do so;  he “refused to provide his address or phone contact information.”  (Ex. 19;  see Ex. 20;  Tes. Margaret C.) Although Jose R. attended a hearing in Hartford on November 15, 2012, and claims to have been living in Manchester at the home of his fiancée, Carmen M., “mostly all the time,” he did not maintain contact with DCF as required by the steps.  (Exs. 19, 20;  Tes. Jose R.) As found in Part I, Jose R. was defaulted for failing to attend the December 20, 2012 TPR plea date.

On May 14, 2013, Jose R. was arrested in Connecticut and charged with threatening in the second degree, harassment in the second degree, and breach of peace in the second degree.  (Ex. 20.)   On May 23, 2013, when DCF contacted Jose R. at HCC, Jose R. admitted “that he was unable to visit with his son over the past two years” under DCF's supervision “because he was running from his warrants [and] that when he heard that Anthony was removed from mother's care, he went crazy and started using drugs.”  (Ex. 20;  Tes. Margaret C.) In July 2013, Jose R. informed DCF that he was being extradited to NY;  although extradition occurred on July 21, 2013, Jose R. still did not inform the department of his location.   DCF attempted unsuccessfully to make contact with him through his grandmother;  however, Carmen M. informed the department that he was incarcerated in Queensborough, NY. (Ex. 20;  Tes. Margaret C., and Jose R.)

Jose R.'s maximum release date was September 26, 2013.   He participated in the evidentiary portion of the trial by telephone connection, and was present in court on November 20, 2013, for the opening of the TPR default previously entered against him.  (Ex. 20;  Tes. Margaret C., and Jose R.)

C

ANTHONY, THE CHILD

Anthony will be four years old on February 16, 2014.   As found in Part I, he has had two placements but multiple caregivers during his early years:  Anthony was first taken into DCF custody and placed with Lynn M. on February 18, 2010;  remained with her through his April 2010 neglect adjudication and December 2010 DCF commitment and continued to reside in the maternal grandmother's home during his brief attempt at reunification with Christine L. after the August 2011 revocation.  “When reunification with the mother failed, the maternal grandmother asked that Anthony be removed.”  (Ex. 19.)   With his second commitment in December 2011, Anthony was placed in the non-relative foster home where he remains.   Anthony has lived in DCF foster care for all but approximately three months of his life.  (Exs. 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B., and Daniel S.)

While living with Lynn M., Anthony had regular contact with Christine L. After his December 2011 removal from that home, and, until Christine L.'s February 2012 incarceration, he saw his mother twice a week for two-hour supervised visits at DCF. When Christine L. was imprisoned, Anthony saw his mother once a month;  since her release to Neon House, Anthony has seen her twice a month, for two hours per visit, supervised by DCF. The child is happy to be in his mother's company, enjoys the gifts she brings to visits, looks forward to kisses at the end of their meetings, and calls her “mama.”  (Ex. 20;  Tes. Sandra B., and Margaret C.)

As found above, from his entry into DCF's care soon after his birth, through the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the TPR trial, Anthony has had almost no contact with Jose R. He was a baby when he saw his father on two occasions in November 2010, and was still a baby when they last had contact in Connecticut prior to November 23, 2011.³¹  Anthony has never received cards, letters, or holiday gifts from Jose R. (Exs. 19, 20, A, B, C, D;  Tes. Sandra B., Margaret C., and Jose R.)

Anthony is well-cared for by his present foster parents.   He has a healthy attachment to them and calls them “mommy” and “daddy.”   Anthony's December 2011 transition into this foster home was marked by tantrums, head banging, and aggression toward other children.   He received Birth–to–Three services twice per week;  attended a structured day care commencing in April 2012;  and entered the Headstart program in the 2013 school year.  (Ex. 19;  Tes. Daniel S., and Margaret C.) Anthony has been deemed ineligible for special education services despite his slow speech development, “low average personal-social skills, and a mild delay in cognitive skills.”  (Ex. 19;  see Ex. 20;  Tes. Margaret C.) He exhibited head-banging while being transported to the visits with Christine L. at York, although he appears to enjoy his twice weekly visits with her at the DCF offices.   Although his hitting and aggression have improved in this placement, by February 2013, Anthony still had a poor tolerance for disruption in routine.  (Exs. 19, 20;  Tes. Margaret C., and Daniel S.)

Anthony's foster parents are devoted to this child, have attended well to his impetigo condition, and meet his need for a highly structured environment to support healthy growth and development.   In this placement, Anthony is well-socialized;  while demanding a lot of direct attention from his caregivers, he has benefitted from the foster parents' consistent child care regimen.   Anthony's foster parents would like to adopt him.  (Tes. Daniel S.)

IV

LOCATION AND REUNIFICATION EFFORTS

DCF has fulfilled its § 17a–112(j)(1) “location” obligation as to Christine L., having maintained consistent contact with her, since Anthony's OTC. (Exs. 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B.)

DCF has also fulfilled its § 17a–112(j)(1) “location” obligation for Jose R., given the facts that he had not made himself known to DCF when the February 2010 OTC was implemented, and that although the November 2010 specific steps ordered him to do so, Jose R. failed to provide DCF with information that would facilitate contact with him thereafter.   DCF continued to make efforts to locate the respondent-father and to keep him engaged in Anthony's child protection case by engaging family members' assistance in finding him, and cooperating with DOC and N.Y. authorities.   After March 2011, Jose R. did not accept mail at the Brooklyn, N.Y. address he had provided to the department;  and despite claiming to live at an undisclosed address in Manchester, CT., he refused to provide contact information when he called DCF in June 27, 2012.   Jose R.'s decision to abscond from his parole housing in June 2012 rendered him whereabouts unknown until he was reincarcerated at HCC in 2013.   His intentional conduct deprived the department of a meaningful opportunity to locate him, despite its reasonable efforts.  (Exs. 9, 10, 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B.)

The court has measured the evidence of § 17a–112(j)(1) reunification efforts as of October 1, 2012, when the TPR petition was filed.   As found in Part I, the TPR petition was amended to reflect DCF's claim that it would meet its reunification efforts burden by relying upon a court determination that no such efforts were required.³²  As also found in Part I, such a determination was made on November 15, 2012, six weeks after the TPR petition was filed.   Given the procedural history of this case, DCF cannot reasonably meet its statutory reunification efforts burden by relying upon a § 17a–111b determination that was made after the adjudicatory date.³³

A

REUNIFICATION EFFORTS FOR CHRISTINE L.

Clear and convincing evidence establishes both that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify Christine L. with Anthony and that the respondent-mother was “unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1).³⁴  In re Chevol G., 125 Conn.App. 621;  In re Alison M., supra, 127 Conn. 205.   Accordingly, DCF has met its burden of proof on this TPR element.

DCF's reunification efforts for Christine L. included:  case management, foster care for Anthony, and administrative services;  visitation supervised by DCF, Lynn M., and My People Clinical Services;  transportation by bus and cab;  substance abuse and mental health assessment and treatment through Genesis, CHR, and ICMH;  substance abuse services through Rushford and the Hartford Dispensary;  toxicology screening through CHR and Rushford;  medication management through Dr. Holzman, Dr. Shah, and ICMH;  individual therapy and domestic violence treatment through Dr. Bunk;  parenting education through Elaine C.;   Reconnecting Families and My People Clinical Services IFP programs;  safety and domestic violence assessments and treatment through Interval House and Family Matters;  attempts to locate a safe residence;  and coordination of insurance benefits for supportive services after her release from the DOC.³⁵ Probation and the DOC provided coordinate reunification efforts for Christine L., including:  substance abuse, mental health assessment and treatment, and medication management through York, Neon House, ECHN, and Wellmore;  specialized trauma treatment through the TARGET program;  parent education;  and residential supervision at Neon House.³⁶  DCF evaluated maternal relatives as placement resources and obtained an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) study for an out-of-state non-relative placement.³⁷  Christine L.'s reunification efforts were guided by the psychological evaluations by Drs. Franklin, Krulee, and Humphrey that had been ordered upon DCF's motions.   In addition, Sandra B. attentively counseled Christine L. with regard to her need for substance abuse, and mental health treatment, and facilitated her access to Dr. Bunk's individual psychological counseling.  (Exs. 5, 19, 20;  Tes Sandra B., and Margaret C.)

However, Christine L. was unable or unwilling to benefit from any of the multi-modal reunification efforts reasonably provided to her.   As found in Part III, she was discharged from Interval House and Family Matters for non-attendance at the domestic violence counseling.   She did not attend all the sessions available to her at ICMH for counseling and medication management.   She did not satisfactorily cooperate with her psychological evaluations, failing to attend a portion of Dr. Franklin's assessment and failing to provide Dr. Krulee with an accurate substance abuse history.   She refused to attend the individual counseling recommended by CHR after her substance abuse evaluation at that agency, denying that she had any mental health issues.   She failed to attend the medication evaluation by Dr. Holzman to which she was referred by Dr. Bunk, failed to attend substance abuse evaluations scheduled at Rushford, and failed to attend the evaluation that Dr. Shah scheduled at the Hartford Dispensary.   She failed to attend the ECHN STEPS program to which she was referred by probation.   She continued to use Xanax and illegal drugs notwithstanding her Suboxone treatment by Dr. Shah, notwithstanding her multiple rounds of relapse prevention therapy, and notwithstanding her prolonged individual counseling with Dr. Bunk. After Anthony was returned to her care in the summer of 2011, Christine L.'s attendance at Dr. Bunk's psychological treatment sessions became inconsistent, and she displayed the drug-seeking behaviors that led Dr. Shah, to discharge her from care.   Christine L.'s involvement in domestic violence with her sister and her offensive, criminal behavior toward her social worker in December 2011, which lead to her arrest and incarceration in February 2012, impel the conclusion that her mental health and substance abuse issues, impulsiveness and irritability remained uncontrolled despite years of treatment.

Her inability or unwillingness to benefit from the panoply of reunification efforts was further manifest in Christine L.'s failure to abide by the rules of the DOC while she was confined at York, as she possessed contraband and received sanctions, and did not follow the regulations of the Neon House while in residence, using both cocaine and alcohol.   Christine L.'s recent failure to attend the MCCA treatment program that she had selected, in lieu of Wellmore to which the DOC had referred her, provides yet additional evidence that the respondent-mother has long remained unable or unwilling to benefit from reasonable efforts to render her an appropriate parenting resource for her son.   See In re Katia M., supra, 124 Conn. 666 (respondent's “failure to use the resources offered by the department of correction” supports conclusion of inability or unwillingness to benefit from services).

In addition, when she has been at liberty, Christine L.'s housing difficulties have been so severe that DCF's reasonable efforts to remediate that situation could have no positive effect.   On April 3, 2011, the respondent-mother became subject to her second eviction from state subsidized housing;  her history of failure to pay rent and exhaustion of legal remedies renders Christine L. ineligible for further supported housing, despite DCF's proffer of rent payment.  (Ex. 19.)   Accordingly, Christine L. was unable to benefit from this aspect of DCF's reasonable efforts.

Christine L. may argue that DCF did not make reasonable § 17a–112(j)(1) efforts because it did not timely refer her to a dual diagnosis and/or a residential treatment program.  (Tes. Margaret C.) Given the multiple levels of services Christine L. received from DCF, probation and the DOC from 2007 to the adjudicatory date, this argument carries no weight.   There is absolutely no evidence that this respondent is able or willing to benefit from alternate services.   York's TARGET program effectively mimics such a residential treatment program, with additional security.   During her lengthy stay at Neon House, Christine L. has had the regimentation, structure and surveillance that would have been available through residential treatment, including access to MCCA's support.   Dr. Bunk's November 2010 through February 2012 individual psychotherapy, coupled with Dr. Shah's long-term addiction medication treatment, provided Christine L. with intensive, appropriate treatment for her mental health and domestic violence issues, domestic violence, parenting deficiencies, and repeated criminal conduct.   Moreover, while some of Christine L.'s providers, including Genesis, her parent educators and Dr. Bunk, noted her ostensibly successful completion of the treatment in which she chose to engage, the respondent-mother regularly and predictably relapsed.  (Exs. 6, 7, 18, 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B., and Margaret C.) Significantly, no method of treatment or removal from the community has resulted in lasting correction of the issues that negatively impact Christine L.'s conduct.   Instead, she remains chronically unable or unwilling to achieve any reliably lasting improvement in her personal status, leaving her unable or unwilling to serve her son in a responsible parenting role.

B

REUNIFICATION EFFORTS FOR JOSE R.

Clear and convincing evidence establishes both that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify Jose R. with Anthony, and that the respondent-father “is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1).³⁸  In re Chevol G., 125 Conn.App. 621;  In re Alison M., supra, 127 Conn. 205.   Accordingly, DCF has met its burden of proof on this TPR element.

DCF's reunification efforts for Jose R. included:  case management, foster care for Anthony, and administrative services;  supervised visitation;  communication directly with the respondent-father, when he could be located, and with N.Y. authorities to enable the respondent-father's attendance at Anthony's Connecticut court proceedings;  and coordination with N.Y. authorities and the provision of bus tickets to enable him attend court dates and visits in Connecticut.   DCF made attempts to identify and make contact with paternal relatives and kin who might serve as placement resources.³⁹  Jose R. had access to parenting classes, substance abuse treatment, housing, and parole supervision through NY's correctional system.  (Exs. 10, 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B., and Jose R.)

Jose R.'s history with the N.Y. corrections system indicates his inability or unwillingness to benefit from reasonable efforts.   As found in Part III, he did not complete the substance abuse treatment or parenting education classes made available to him in NY. He absconded from the housing provided to him by N.Y. parole, failed to remain in that state as ordered, and instead maintained a lengthy pattern of eluding N.Y. authorities to avoid serving his sentence, further evincing his inability or unwillingness to benefit from reunification services available to him.  (Ex. 19;  Tes. Sandra B., Margaret C., and Jose R.) See In re Katia M., supra, 124 Conn. 666.

The respondent-father's failure to maintain consistent communication with DCF prior to the adjudicatory date, in violation of the specific steps, further establishes his inability or unwillingness to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts extended by the department.⁴⁰  (Ex. 19.)   In March 2010, DCF learned that Jose R. was incarcerated in NY, and that he was thus effectively unavailable to access DCF's reunification services.⁴¹  (Tes. Sandra B.) In October 2010, when N.Y. had released Jose R. on parole, DCF obtained authorization for him to attend Connecticut court proceedings, provided transportation, and arranged for the respondent-father to visit with Anthony.   These affirmative efforts had no impact upon Jose R.'s defiance of DCF. However, after attending a permanency plan hearing on March 24, 2011, Jose R. ceased communicating with the department, except to call in June 2012 and inquire about visiting.   But he did so but without inform DCF of his whereabouts and thus prevented DCF from providing him with any services, including visits.   In early 2013, DCF learned that renewed criminal contact had led to Jose R.'s reincarceration in Connecticut;  however, his reincarceration in N.Y. in the spring of 2013 “prove[d] an obstacle to reunification due to the parent's unavailability ․” In re Katia M., supra, 124 Conn.App. 661.   (Exs. 9, 10;  Tes. Sandra B.) Jose R. argues that DCF extended more reunification efforts to Christine L. than to him, that this disparate treatment was “not fair,” and that DCF did not “care” about his ability or willingness to care for Anthony.   However, that claim is overwhelmed by the credible evidence that the respondent-father persistently rendered himself unavailable to DCF. (Exs. 9, 10, 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B., Margaret C., and Jose R.) Jose R.'s claim ignores the fact that Christine L. was present and available to DCF throughout the adjudicatory period, while he failed to maintain contact with the department, turned to drug use after Anthony was removed from the mother's care in December 2011, was defaulted at the TPR plea date, and consistently evaded his N.Y. parole responsibilities until he was arrested in Connecticut in May 2013.   Thus, the reunification efforts qua the respondent father were reasonable given the circumstances of this case.

V

TPR GROUNDS AS TO CHRISTINE L.

DCF alleges that Christine L. has failed to achieve personal rehabilitation, as that term is used in § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(I) and § 17a–112(j)(3)(E), and/or that she is unable or unwilling to achieve the rehabilitation contemplated by § 17a–112(j)(3)(E).   Using the applicable legal principles and the facts set forth above, the court finds that DCF has met its burden of proving both statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence.⁴²

As to the § 17a–112(j)(3)(E) factors that are not based upon rehabilitation, as previously found;  Anthony was born on February 16, 2010, and is under the age of seven;  the court adjudicated him neglected on April 14, 2010;  and Judge Olear terminated Christine L.'s parental rights to Alexander, Luis and Seyre on July 1, 2009, granting petitions filed by DCF for the reasons stated in Exhibit 1.

Sadly, Christine L.'s parenting history has repeated itself.   While her youngest son has spent many years in foster care, and Christine L. has had abundant time and opportunities, she has failed to achieved such degree of personal rehabilitation with regard to her mental health, domestic violence, substance abuse and parenting issues as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, she could develop and implement the ability to assume a safe, predictable, reliable or a responsible position in the life of the child.  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(I).   Moreover, the respondent-mother “is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child” she could fulfill such a role in Anthony's life.  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(E).   Any level of rehabilitation Christina L. may have achieved “falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date she can assume a responsible position in her child's life.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622.   Accordingly, the department has met its burden of proof on these TPR grounds.⁴³

Numerous features of the evidence establish both that the respondent-mother has not yet achieved personal rehabilitation and that she is unable or unwilling to reach this status within the time constraints of § 17a–112(j)(B)(I) and/or § 17a–112(j)(E).   As found in part III, Anthony is a pre-school child whose developmental needs require a consistent, attentive, and highly structured regimen of attentive care from a stable parent figure in order to help him maintain healthy behaviors.   At a minimum, before the respondent-mother could fulfill Anthony's needs for a stable, child-focused caregiver, she would have to achieve and maintain absolute sobriety and control over her mental health issues for a period of at least one year.   When she has been subject to services in the community or under the supervision of the DOC, Christine L. has never reached this goal.   Instead, as found in Parts III and IV, she has chronically relapsed, using drugs or alcohol to deal with the stressors in her life, both when Anthony was in her care and when he was not, and whether she was placed in the community or living in a half-way house.   (Tes. Margaret C.) As a whole, the evidence establishes that Christine L. has not resolved the continued, unameliorated issues that previously had an adverse impact upon her parenting abilities.   Christine L. has not been able in the past and will not be able in the foreseeable future, to benefit even from intensive personal rehabilitation services, such as medication therapy from Dr. Shah or psychological counseling from Dr. Bunk, or from other mental health and/or substance abuse programs.   She has not, and remains unable or unwilling to acquire, the minimum attributes of parental stability that are necessary to allow her to assume the role of a responsible parent for Anthony, as required by § 17a–112(j)(B)(I) and § 17a–112(j)(E).

As fully discussed in Parts III and IV, despite being provided with repeated opportunities to work with appropriate service providers, Christine L. relapsed in 2011, shortly after Anthony had been returned to her care under protective supervision.   Her rehabilitative issues included her continuing substance abuse, unstable mental health, repeated criminal activity, domestic violence and lack of the self-control that is an implicit element of minimal parenting skills.   This lead to her altercation with her sister and the racially-charged, harassing telephone calls she made to DCF, and to her possession of contraband after entering York. Even following her entry into Neon House under DOC surveillance and while the TPR was pending, Christine L. relapsed again and again, using cocaine in the spring of 2013, and alcohol as a means of coping with stress in June 2013, self-inducing the consequential negative effect of losing the chance for visits with her son.  (Exs. 1, 2, 6, 7, 15, 17, 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B., and Margaret C.) As the issues related to Christine L.'s substance abuse, unregulated mental health, unlawful conduct, and difficulties with interpersonal relationships remain extant, they still adversely impacted her ability and/or willingness to effectively parent Anthony.   Given the years she has spent without succeeding in rehabilitation, the court is constrained to conclude that this respondent-mother cannot assume a responsible position in the life of her son within a reasonable time, considering Anthony's age, repeated removals and commitments, and specialized needs.

Christine L.'s lack of rehabilitation is psychologically apparent in the fact that she is still unable and/or unwilling to put Anthony's needs ahead of her own, despite years of appropriate and intensive services.   Dr. Humphrey opined in September 2010 that he found “troubling [the respondent-mother's] unconvincing claims about the length of her sobriety and the role deceptive and antisocial behaviors played in sustaining past substance abuse.   To put it briefly, I am concerned the factors that adversely affected [Christine L.'s] older children (domestic violence, substance abuse, inadequate parental response) may not have changed to the extent that immediate reunification is in Anthony's best interests.”  (Ex. 18.)   Dr. Humphrey's September 2010 concerns about the instability of Christine L.'s sobriety and her unresolved mental health issues proved accurate, despite affirmative efforts at remediation from DCF, probation, and DOC services.   Christine L.'s completion of Genesis group treatment, and her involvement with Dr. Shah and Dr. Bunk apparently led DCF to perceive that the respondent-mother had made actual progress in her personal rehabilitation by the summer of 2011, a conclusion not supported by the TPR trial evidence.⁴⁴  As found in Parts III and IV, Christine L. relapsed and reinstituted her pattern of chronic drug use and unlawful behavior within a brief time after her reunification with Anthony, notwithstanding the fact that she was unemployed, had housing available at her mother's home, and was thus available to devote all of her time and attention to the rehabilitation process and to her then one and one-half-year-old child.   The respondent-mother's continuing drug use, depression, anxiety, deceptive and antisocial behaviors were refractory to treatment, as is evident in:  her attempt to abuse Dr. Shah's suboxone therapy and her plan to obtain street drugs after Dr. Shah refused to provide her with lawful access to addiction medicine;  her failure to consistently attend Dr. Bunk's therapy sessions;  her refusal to attend medication evaluations with Dr. Holzman or at the Hartford Dispensary;  her refusal to attend the substance abuse evaluations at Rushford or to attend the substance abuse and mental health evaluations at ECHN's STEPS program;  her unlawful use of Xanax and Klonopin impeding her function and ability to care for Anthony during the fall of 2011, despite her ostensible completion and re-completion of Genesis's relapse prevention program;  her loss of the My People Clinical Services IFP, due to her departure from Lynn M.'s home in the fall of 2011;  and her domestic violence with her sister and the inflammatory, unregulated conduct evident in her December 2011 telephone calls to her DCF social worker.   After her incarceration in February 2012, Christine L.'s possession of contraband at York, her use of cocaine in the spring of 2013, her use of alcohol during the summer of 2013, her rejection of Wellmore's services, and her failure to adequately participate in the MCCA services she had selected all further indicate an absolute lack of positive response to the myriad rehabilitation services that had been provided to her, including the multi-faceted TARGET program she attended at York and the 10–week parent-education program she had attended.  (Exs. 1, 2, 18, 19, 20, 22A;  Tes. Sandra B., and Margaret C.)

With the exception of attending visits with Anthony, Christine L. has demonstrated little, if any, personal progress since the child's February 2010 entry into the foster care system;  even her visits have not always been a priority to her, as found in Part IV. Anthony is a child whose behavioral, developmental and social needs can be well-managed in a structured home setting in which he receives consistent, reliable parental attention, without disruption or exposure to substance abuse or uncontrolled mental health issues on the part of his caretaker.   There is no basis for concluding that the future will lead to anything other than a repeat of Christine L.'s prior drug-related behaviors and unmitigated mental health issues, which are inimical to the effective parenting Anthony requires given his age, stage of development, and designated special needs for a predictable, regimented home environment.   Thus, the department has met its burden of proving that the respondent-mother remains without the attributes of rehabilitation that would enable the court to foresee reunification within § 17a–112(j)(B)(i)'s or § 17a–112(j)(E)'s time frame.

The respondent-mother's failure to achieve rehabilitation is further evident in the fact that she still lacks insight into the depth of her substance abuse issues;  she maintains her long pattern of, at best, minimizing or denying her use of drugs that have not been prescribed for her.   This was apparent during her substance March 2010 self-report-based abuse evaluation at CHR when, in addition to denying using alcohol or illicit substances, she “expressed confusion about a positive screen for PCP in October 2009, stating that she did not take PCP and did not know what it was.”  (Ex. 18.)   Similarly, she denied using amphetamines in October 2009, when she was pregnant with Anthony, although her prenatal care provider found that she had ingested this controlled substance.⁴⁵  In May 2010, Christine L. self-reported to the ICMH evaluator that she had abstained from using opiates for three years;  she admitted that she used drugs during her recent pregnancy with Anthony, as she had when she was pregnant with Seyre in 2007, but she rationalized this drug use as being somehow insignificant because she had avoided her preferred prescription narcotics.  (Exs. 3, 4, 5;  Tes. Margaret C.) Christine L.'s pattern of deceiving and misleading health care providers, noted by Dr. Humphrey in 2010, has been discussed above.   However, the respondent-mother has never obtained a valid benefit from her individual mental health therapy, and thus has never developed the insight she needs to understand, and to control, her drug use and impulsive conduct.   Her lack of insight into and failure to even acknowledge her rehabilitative needs, consistent with her repeated relapses, is apparent in the fact that she takes no responsibility for the traumatic events that any of her children, including Anthony, have suffered as the result of DCF's necessary involvement with her family.   In July 2012, despite her incarceration, Christine L. blamed the fact that Anthony was not in her care upon Lynn M.'s refusal to keep him at her house.   Christine L. blamed her stay at York not upon the sentence that had been previously suspended but imposed in July 2012, but upon Sandra B., the DCF social worker who was the victim of the respondent-mother's offensive telephone calls, and upon Margaret C., the department's next assigned social worker.  (Tes. Margaret C.) The respondent-mother's persistent lack of insight impels the conclusion that she has not yet, and will not within the reasonable future, achieve rehabilitation by way of developing the personal attributes minimally necessary to provide consistent, reliable, safe, and effective parenting for Anthony.   See In re Lukas K., supra, 120 Conn.App. 487–88.

Christine L.'s failure to cooperate with or benefit from criminal court-based services or supervision further establishes her failure to achieve rehabilitation.   In addition to violating the conditions of her probation by continuing to engage in criminal conduct and failing to attend the ECHN STEPS program as described in Parts III and IV, Christine L. did not even attend a number of meetings with her probation officer scheduled from November 3, 2010 through January 17, 2012.   Christine's failure to adhere to the conditions of probation led to the imposition of a two-year sentence on July 31, 2012.  (Ex. 2.) Christine L.'s maximum release date is in February 2014, four years after Anthony was removed from her care through the February 2010 OTC. (Exs.19, 20.)   The effect of the respondent-mother's intentional conduct with regard to criminal court-based services, coordinate with her continued mental health and substance abuse relapses, has been to render her functionally unavailable to function in a parental role for far too long a time, given Anthony's need for permanency.   See In re Katia M., supra, 124 Conn.App. 661;  In re Tremaine C., supra, 117 Conn.App. 597.

Additional evidence of Christine L.'s failure to achieve rehabilitation, as found in Parts III and IV, is apparent in her failure to comply with significant aspects of the specific steps despite the many years Anthony has been in foster care.⁴⁶  Having been warned of the implications of nonadherance, Christine L.'s failure to comply with the specific steps has “weigh[ed] heavily in [this] termination proceeding.” ⁴⁷  In re Devon B., supra, 264 Conn. 584;  In re Cheila R., 112 Conn.App. 582, 591, 963 A.2d 1014 (2009);  In re Jeffrey C., supra, 64 Conn.App. 62.   As found above, throughout 2010, 2011, and 2013, Christine L. continued to violate the steps' prohibition from using illegal drugs or abusing alcohol or medicine.   She failed to complete the treatment provided to her by Dr. Bunk and Dr. Shah, and terminated her MCCA treatment in June 2013 without success.   She refused to undergo drug testing at DCF's discretion, as required by the steps:  she failed to appear for drug tests on May 20, August 10 and 13, October 26, November 8 and 30, and December 30, 2010, and on January 27, February 10, and on July 11 and 15, 2011.   Christine L. failed to adhere to the steps' obligation to undergo substance abuse evaluations and recommended treatment, in that she missed:  Dr. Holzman's March 2011 medication assessment;  the October 2011 appointment at the Hartford Dispensary;  the early December 2011 ECHN STEPS intake session;  the evaluations scheduled for her at the Rushford Center twice in November and once in early December 2011.   Christine L. failed to timely fulfill the specific steps' requirement that she “[g]et and/or maintain adequate housing and a legal income,” as she remained transient or lived with friends and family, and secured stable work as a telemarketer only before the start of the TPR trial.   She failed to comply with the steps' requirement that she avoid unlawful conduct, as evident in her repeated arrests, all further establishing her failure to achieve personal rehabilitation.⁴⁸  (Exs. 2, 6, 11, 12, 14,19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B., and Margaret C.)

In addition, despite attending parent education, such as the “Parenting from a Distance” and “Mother's Support Group” programs at York and classes with Elaine C., Christine L. has still not acquired the ability or willingness to put her child's needs first, an inherent feature of effective parenting, and critical to meeting Anthony's specialized needs.  (Ex. 14;  see Exs. 11, 19.)   Prior to her February 2012 arrest, the respondent-mother's “attendance at visits was sporadic.”  (Ex. 20;  see Exs. 2, 6, 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B., Margaret C.) As found in Part IV, even maintaining contact with Anthony is still not a top priority, as she missed visits on December 18, 2012;  and on May 22, June 19, and July 3 and July 17, 2013.  (Ex. 20).

Any progress Christine L. may have made in managing her personal affairs is minimal, at best;  her progress in achieving rehabilitation sufficient to provide a safe, consistent, reliable environment for Anthony is nonexistent.   Christine L.'s personal submissions regarding her rehabilitation carry little weight, as they must be viewed in the light of her psychological “deceitfulness,” which was recognized by Dr. Humphrey in September 2010;  her multiple convictions for crimes related to fraud and misrepresentation;  and her admission to Dr. Krulee that “she misled hospital staff” when, coincident to giving birth to Anthony, she told Manchester Hospital personnel that she had four children living with her.” ⁴⁹  (Ex. 1;  see Ex. 18.)   These statements are unfortunately consistent with Christine L.'s pattern of denial or deception, her failure to take responsibility for positive drug tests, instead attributing the results to taking over-the-counter medication, and her claim that she continuing to use Xanax unlawfully, while she was receiving Suboxone treatment from Dr. Shah, and while Anthony was in her custody, because she had suddenly learned Anthony would not be returned to her care.  (Exs. 18, 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B., and Margaret C.) Christine L.'s opportunity to achieve rehabilitation is impeded by her persistent failure to acknowledge her own limitations insofar as her readiness to care for young Anthony are concerned.

In concluding that Christine L. has failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation, there is no reliable evidence from which the court could reasonably find that the respondent-mother understands or has even inquired about Anthony's specific developmental or behavioral health needs;  that she has ever supplied or will in a reasonable time be able to supply the domicile, food, clothing, social and religious guidance, and/or access to medical care the child requires.   See In re Lukas K., supra,.  120 Conn.App. 487–88.   Since Anthony's entry into DCF custody in February 2010, Christine L. has failed to acquire minimal parental attributes, and she has failed to achieve the rehabilitation contemplated by § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i) or (E).   Even if she should now be able or willing to actively engage rehabilitative services, any improvement in her parenting skills would be “too little and too late” for Anthony, who requires permanency now, not at some unforeseeable date in the future, and who should not have to wait any longer for his mother to attempt to improve her ability to fulfill a responsible role in his life.   See, e.g., In re Kamora W., 132 Conn.App. 179, 187, 31 A.3d 398 (2011);  In re Dylan C., supra, 126 Conn.App. 81–82.

VI

TPR GROUNDS AS TO JOSE R.

As grounds for terminating Jose R.'s parental rights to Anthony, DCF has alleged:  that he abandoned his child, as contemplated by § 17a–112(j)(3)(A);  that he failed to achieve § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i) personal rehabilitation;  and that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship within the meaning of § 17a–112(j)(3)(D).  DCF has met its burden of proving each allegation by clear and convincing evidence.⁵⁰

A

ABANDONMENT

Focusing upon Jose R.'s conduct prior to the filing October 1, 2012, when the TPR petition was filed, DCF has met its burden of proving that the respondent-father abandoned Anthony, within the meaning of § 17a–112(j)(3)(A).  In re Lukas K., supra, 120 Conn.App. 487.

Other than contesting the TPR and now proposing to assume custody of Anthony, Jose R. has not demonstrated an actual interest in or affection for the child, critical to the subject of statutory abandonment.   The respondent-father's actual lack of interest in the child is clearly and convincingly evident from the paucity of attention he paid to Anthony after his birth in February 2010.   As found in Parts III and IV, the respondent-father was in Connecticut in March 2010 despite the parole conditions requiring him to remain in NY;  he engaged in criminal conduct and was arrested here, but Jose R. did not even visit his newborn son.  (Tes. Jose R.) After his extradition and release on N.Y. parole in October 2010, Jose R. only contacted DCF on only two occasions, informing DCF that he would attend parenting and substance abuse classes in NY. He visited baby Anthony twice in November 2010, but then made no efforts to contact the child or his caretakers for many months.   Although Jose R. did not contact the department at any time from March 2011 through December 2012, Jose R. did visit on at least one occasion when Anthony was a toddler.   Even if he saw Anthony when the child resided at Lynn M.'s home, there is no credible evidence from which the court could reasonably conclude that Jose R. was physically in the child's presence at any time following November 23, 2011.⁵¹  Despite his telephone call to DCF in July 2012, ostensibly seeking visits but providing no information about his location, Jose R.'s minimal contact with his son prior to the October 1, 2012 adjudicatory date supports the conclusion that DCF has proved his abandonment of this child.  (Exs. 19, 20, 22A, A, B, C, D;  Tes. Sandra B., Jose R.)

Jose R.'s consistent evasion of N.Y. authorities, violating parole and intentionally disregarding his sentence, establishes that his self-centeredness superseded the requisite degree of parental interest, concern or responsibility as to Anthony's welfare contemplated by § 17a–112(j)(3)(D).  Jose R. relegated all aspects of his son's care to DCF for many years, without effectively even presenting himself as a valid parental resource.   Had he timely met his N.Y. penal obligations Jose R. could have been available to engage in remedial services and lawful visits, and demonstrated an actual intention to maintain connected to his son.   Instead, by voluntarily remaining whereabouts unknown for a prolonged time, the respondent effectively abandoned Anthony within the meaning of the statute.⁵²  (Exs. 10, 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B., and Jose R.)

Jose R.'s lack of valid interest in Anthony, as defined by the statute, is further evident in his lack of concern about the impact reunification would have upon the child, with whom he has had no contact since November 23, 2011, and who can have no memory of him due to his young age.   Jose R. has not been a measurable presence in Anthony's life either before or after the adjudicatory date.   He has not commemorated the child's birthday or holidays in any way;  he has not sent Anthony gifts or cards;  and has not even attempted to maintain contact with his son by telephone, written, or electronic communication.   Other than incidentals, Jose R. did not provide physical, emotional, moral, religious, or financial support for the child;  he did not supply the food, clothing, domicile and medical care Anthony needed to survive.   He has not demonstrated statutory interest in or concern about the child's well being, health or educational status by seeking information about the child, avoiding even the administrative case planning sessions conducted by the department.   He had very rarely displayed love or affection for the child.  “The father's sporadic visits and telephone calls do not constitute the type of interest, concern or responsibility expected of a father who has maintained a reasonable degree of interest and concern in his child.”  In re Jaime S., supra, 120 Conn.App. 733;  see In re Lukas K., supra, 120 Conn.App. 487–88.

Jose R. claims that he is currently able to provide Anthony with adequate housing through residence with Carmen M. (Tes. Jose R.) Even if there is insufficient basis for crediting this proposition, a conclusion the court does not reach, the respondent-father did not provide his son with an adequate domicile within the adjudicatory period.   Rather, prior to filing the TPR petition, and thereafter as described therein, Jose R. has had scant personal interaction with Anthony, and did not demonstrate a valid concern for the child's welfare.   Thus, DCF has met its burden of proving abandonment pursuant to § 17a–112(j)(3)(A).   See In re Lukas K., supra, 120 Conn.App. 487.

B

FAILURE TO REHABILITATE

As found above, Anthony was adjudicated neglected on April 14, 2010, and has been in foster care since he was two days old.   Jose R. has had more than enough time to assume a responsible parenting role for his son, but he has not made himself available to DCF, and has never achieved the ability to serve as a safe, predictable or reliable parenting resource.   Instead, Jose R. has failed “to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of [Anthony, this] parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.”  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i).   If Jose R. has achieved some level of rehabilitation, it “falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he] can assume a responsible position in [Anthony's] life.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622.   Accordingly, the department has met its burden of proof on this TPR element, as well.⁵³

Many features of the evidence establish that the respondent-father has not achieved personal rehabilitation and that he will meet this standard within § 17a–112(j)(B)(i)'s time constraints.

Jose R. intentionally defied the orders of N.Y. parole and made his protracted efforts to flee from the N.Y. during the first three years of Anthony's life, as found in Parts III, IV and VI.A. The fact that the respondent-father was unwilling to complete his N.Y. sentence, requiring repeated his extradition, along with his failure to cooperate with the post-incarceration substance abuse treatment, parenting education, housing support, and the geographical limitations imposed upon him by NY, in and of themselves, clearly and convincingly establish both the respondent-father's failure to timely achieve statutory rehabilitation, and that he will not do so within the time frame established by the statute.

Jose R.'s failure to comply with significant aspects of the specific steps further establishes that he has not met his obligation to effectively engage in services so as to make progress toward improving his personal status, a condition of rehabilitation.⁵⁴  Salient features of Jose R.'s specific steps required him to:  demonstrate effective parenting skills;  visit with Anthony as often as DCF permitted;  keep the department advised of his whereabouts;  timely resolve all legal charges related to past arrests;  avoid involvement with the criminal justice system and adhere to the conditions of his probation or parole.  (Exs.9, 10.)   Jose R. failed to adhere to any of these steps, although he was warned of the consequences of noncompliance, including the filing of a TPR petition.   His failure to adequately meet the specific steps thus “weigh[ed] heavily in [this] termination proceeding.” ⁵⁵  In re Devon B., supra, 264 Conn. 584.

The court has fully discussed, in Parts III, IV and VI.A., Jose R.'s intentional failure to comply with the steps's obligation to adhere to the law and to keep DCF informed of his location at all times.   These violations led to further noncompliance with the steps, evident in the respondent-father's failures to:  be available for all visits as permitted by DCF;  keep appointments with DCF;  allow home visits;  and/or accept the department's reunification or rehabilitation services.   Jose R. further violated the steps by failing to execute the required releases, by unreasonably delaying in identifying Carmen M. as a part of his household, and by never obtaining the legal income required by the steps.⁵⁶  Despite the steps' obligation that he do so, he failed to complete the substance abuse treatment or the parenting class proffered to him through the N.Y. parole.   His failure to meet the steps' requirement that he develop stronger parenting skills is apparent in his failure to maintain any type of contact with Anthony, his caretakers or his legal guardian, and in his fundamental lack of consideration as to the impact reunification, after so long an absence, would have upon the child.  (Exs. 8, 9, 10, 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B., Margaret C.;   and Jose R.)

Jose R.'s failure to achieve statutory rehabilitation is further clearly and convincingly evident in that although he proclaims a desire to function as Anthony's parent, and although he may have provided diapers and clothing to the child prior to December 2011, Jose R. did not make himself available to function in this role in a reasonably timely manner, given the child's age and developmental status.⁵⁷  The respondent-father's prolonged evasion of his obligation to complete his N.Y. sentence and his continuing inability or unwillingness to learn anything about the child's social or behavioral concerns make it clear that he remains unprepared to put aside his own needs in order to meet the needs of his child, a fundamental criteria of responsible parenting.   While Jose R. may dream of having Anthony, he has made no measurable efforts to establish a recognizable presence in the child's life, never extending meaningful emotional or financial support for the child.   Since Anthony's entry into DCF custody in February 2010, Jose R. has failed to acquire minimal parental attributes, and he has failed to achieve the rehabilitation contemplated by § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i).  (Exs. 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B., Margaret C.;   and Jose R.) See In re Lukas K., supra, 120 Conn.App. 487–88.   Even if he should now be able or willing to actively engage rehabilitative services, any improvement in Jose R.'s parenting skills would be “too little and too late” for Anthony, who requires permanency at the present, not at some unforeseeable date in the future.   This child, who lingered in foster care for years while Jose R. avoided facing his criminal penalties, should not have to wait any longer for his father to even attempt to improve his ability to fulfill a responsible, parental role.   See, e.g., In re Kamora W., supra, 132 Conn.App. 187;  In re Dylan C., supra, 126 Conn.App. 81–82.

Jose R. may argue that he has already achieved a sufficient degree of rehabilitation as he has plans for work and for housing.   He claims to be a good father;  that he has always taken care of his children;  that he has been there for Anthony;  that DCF failed to provide him with appropriate services;  and that he has achieved rehabilitation because he has “not caught a case since 2000.”  (Tes. Jose R.) These arguments bear no weight, and reflect both the respondent-father's lack of insight into his self-limited role in the rehabilitation process, and the adverse impact that his prolonged paternal dysfunction, continued criminal conduct, and self-admitted evasion of New York parole has had upon the child.  (Tes. Jose R.;   see Exs. 8, 19, 20.)   Jose R.'s past and recent history of violating the law and evading authorities, which continued while the TPR petition was pending, establishes that he has failed to achieve the degree of stability necessary to manage his personal life in a reliably lawful manner.   Even if he has housing available for Anthony, and even if he has some potential, untested income source available, Jose R. has not yet achieved the degree of personal rehabilitation necessary to provide the moral guidance, stability, consistency, and structure necessary to care for this child's specialized needs.   The evidence throughout clearly and convincingly establishes the absence of any basis for encouraging the belief that Jose R. could assume a responsible position in this child's life within the period contemplated by § 17a–112(j)(B)(i).   Accordingly, the department has met its burden of proof on the failure to rehabilitate ground.

C

NO ONGOING PARENT–CHILD RELATIONSHIP

Clear and convincing evidence also establishes that Jose R. and Anthony have “no ongoing parent-child relationship” within the meaning of § 17a–112(j)(3)(D).  Jose R. has never “met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to [Anthony's] best interest of the child ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D).  Thus, DCF has met its burden of proving this element of its TPR petition.  In re Lukas K., supra, 120 Conn.App. 485–86;  In re Christian P., supra, 98 Conn.App. 269.

As to the first prong of the statutory analysis, even if a statutory parent-child relationship once existed, a conclusion that is not supported by the evidence, it is no longer extant.   Jose R. has never been a custodial parent for his son;  he has never fulfilled Anthony's daily needs for love or affection, housing and food, medical attention, educational support, critical behavioral health services, religious or moral guidance.   Instead, as found in Parts III, IV, VI.A. and B., due to his repeated criminal conduct and repeated evasion of N.Y. authorities, Jose R. kept himself functionally unavailable to serve in any actual and/or consistent parenting role since Anthony was born.   Even when N.Y. authorities made parenting and substance abuse treatment available to Jose R. to assist him in developing his parenting skills, which are predicate to forming a parent-child relationship, Jose R. failed to engage in these services.   His defiance of N.Y. parole and his voluntary failure to maintain contact with DCF self-limited his lawful visits with his son, as discussed throughout, and served as a self-induced impediment to the development of any father-son relationship.  (Exs. 8, 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B., and Margaret C.) In re Christian P., supra, 98 Conn.App. 269–70;  In re Alexander C., supra, 67 Conn.App. 425.

Further establishing the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship, Anthony has no present or positive memories of Jose R. Even if the pre-schooler knows that he has a biological father, Anthony does not ask about him;  he has never lived with Jose R.;   has had no contact whatsoever with Jose R. since November 2011, before his second birthday;  and cannot reasonably view this respondent in a parental role.⁵⁸  (Exs. 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B., Margaret C., and Jose R.) Under these circumstances, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the child retains any present, positive remembrance of this “natural parent” whatsoever.   See In re Jessica M., supra, 217 Conn. 468, 470;  In re Lukas K., supra, 120 Conn.App. 485–86;  In re Christian P., supra, 98 Conn.App. 269.

As to the second § 17–112(j)(3)(D) prong, the evidence provides no reasonable basis for finding that the allowance of any additional time would result in any improvement of Jose R.'s ability or willingness to serve as an appropriate parenting resource for Anthony.   Instead, as found throughout, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that the respondent-father has, since Anthony's birth, refused to cooperate with criminal authorities or juvenile court orders.   Even if the court did credit Jose R.'s claims that now has stable housing and employment, and/or that he had regular contact with Anthony while the child lived with Lynn M., any such contact could only have occurred when the child was a baby.   Thus, the development of a father-son bond, if possible, would require a protracted period of time, all to Anthony's detriment.   Also, Jose R. has admitted many aspects of his unlawful or oppositional behavior, which render his plans for future care and support of Anthony unreliable, at best, and likely an illusion.   The entrenched degree of the respondent-father's oppositional, anti-authoritarian behavior is evident through his multiple violations of criminal and juvenile court orders, as discussed above.   Given Jose R.'s functional parenting deficits, which have remained uncorrected for so many years, Anthony's best interests cannot be served by enlarging the opportunity for a § 17a–112(j)(3)(D) relationship to be established.

Additional evidence establishes that it would be detrimental to Anthony to allow further time for him to develop a relationship with Jose R. Anthony's specialized behavioral needs are met by his present foster parents, with whom he has lived since December 20, 2011, and to whom he is healthily bonded.  (Ex. 19.)   In contrast to these foster parents, the respondent-father's functional disinterest in the child's well-being is fully apparent;  see Part VI.A.;   and as Jose R. has not yet become able or willing to fulfill even minimal parental attributes, there is no basis for concluding that he will, within a reasonable period of time from Anthony's perspective, become able or willing to provide the structured but nurturing environment warranted by his son's age and specialized needs.   See Part VI.B. Even if a bond could be created, this would result in additional months of impermanent foster care for Anthony, who would remain committed to the DCF;  this young boy, who has already suffered far too much disruption in his life, should not be forced to shoulder the burden of waiting any longer for an opportunity to achieve the permanency that will enhance his sense of security and well-being during his remaining childhood years.

As the clear and convincing evidence establishes that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists and that it would be detrimental to Anthony's best interests to force him to endure any more delay in permanency in the hope, never before fulfilled, that the respondent-father could set aside his self-interests and his inconstant behaviors and develop the capacity to provide the emotional and practical stability Anthony deserves, DCF has met its burden of proving the § 17a–112(j)(3)(D) ground as alleged.   See In re Christian P., supra, 98 Conn.App. 269–70.

VII

BEST INTERESTS

As the department has met its burden of proof on the TPR grounds, the court next turns to Anthony's “best interests.” ⁵⁹  DCF again prevails, as clear and convincing establishes that continuing either respondent's parental rights is not in this child's best interests;  to the contrary, Anthony's best interests will be served by granting the TPR petition, so that the child may, at last, have stable access to sustained healthy growth, personal development, well-being, and continuity in his environment.⁶⁰  In re Rafael S., supra, 125 Conn.App. 611;  In re Jaime S., supra, 120 Conn.App. 733–34.

A

SEVEN STATUTORY FINDINGS

The § 17a–112(k) findings are based on the totality of the evidence presented in this matter.   See Parts III, IV, V and VII.

(1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.

As found above, DCF and/or the respondent-parents' relevant probation or parole supervisors proffered a variety of timely and appropriate services in an effort to facilitate Anthony's reunion with both Christine L. and/or Anthony R.

(2) Whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family in compliance with federal law.

As found above, DCF made such efforts to reunite the family, in compliance with federal law, as were appropriate under the circumstances of this case.

(3) The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order.

Both respondents have been found in violation of multiple orders of probation and/or parole issued by courts of criminal jurisdiction.   They have failed to comply with many aspects of the specific steps, which are court orders upon execution.   See In re Jeffrey C., supra, 261 Conn. 194.

(4) The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.

Anthony is very emotionally bonded to the foster parents with whom he has been placed since his second removal from Christine L.'s care in December 2011.   He looks to them for affection, care, guidance, and support.   While he has enjoyed visits with his mother in the past, there is insufficient evidence to indicate that any measurable emotional bond exists.   Anthony has no emotional ties to with Jose R., although he may know him to be his biological father.

(5) The age of the child.

Anthony was born on February 16, 2010.   He is approaching his fourth birthday.

(6) The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future.

Neither parent has made adjustments in his or her circumstances, conduct, or conditions so as to make it in Anthony's best interest to allow the child to be placed in either parent's care.   Even if they have attended some treatment programs, any benefit they may have gotten therefrom is overwhelmed by the respondent-mother's recurrent relapses and failure to comply with the conditions of her halfway house, and by respondent-father's long pattern of flight from criminal authorities.   Although Christine L. has visited her son and communicated with DCF, Jose R. has had only insignificant contact with Anthony or the department.

(7) The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child.

Neither unreasonable acts of any other person or economic circumstances, but instead, the respondent-parents' own misconduct, precluded each from maintaining a meaningful relationship with Anthony.

B

BEST INTEREST ANALYSIS

In deciding the best interest element and concluding that Anthony's best interests will be met by granting the TPR petition, the court has considered:  this child's general need for sustained growth, healthy development, well-being, stability and continuity of his environment;  his specialized need for consistent, structured care in the home of responsible, reliable and knowledgeable parent figures;  and his biological relationship to the respondents.  (Ex. 20.)   See In re Rafael S., supra, 125 Conn.App. 611;  In re Jaime S., supra, 120 Conn.App. 733–34;  In re Savanna M., supra, 55 Conn.App. 816.   Given the many years Anthony has already spent in foster care, while his biological father evaded N.Y. law enforcement authorities and continued his criminal conduct, and while his biological mother continued to violate the law and could not overcome her mental health and substance abuse issues, to require the child to wait for Jose R. or Christine L. to acquire the ability to function even in a minimal parental role would necessitate putting this child's best interests on hold without any reasonable basis.   TPR will serve the child's best interests, most promptly enabling Anthony to find placement in a safe, dependable “forever home” ⁶¹ in which he is cared for by those who are willing and able not only to love him, but to reliably care for his specialized needs, support him emotionally and guide him in the future.⁶²  In re Jaime S., supra, 120 Conn.App. 744.

The court has also balanced Anthony's need for permanency against any benefit that might be achieved through denying TPR. Given this child's unfortunate placement and removal history, and given the circumstances as found herein, Anthony's due opportunity for healthy maturation would be unduly impaired if he were to continue his legal relationship with either Christine L. or Jose R. Only termination of parental rights will enable this child to achieve the secure, stable and consistent home life that he is entitled to experience without disruption.   See In re Davonta V., 285 Conn. 483, 494–95, 940 A.2d 733 (2008);  In re Alison M., supra, 127 Conn.App. 216 and n.12.

VIII

ORDERS

The parental rights of Christine L. and Jose R. to Anthony R. are hereby terminated.

The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed the statutory parent for the child, and within thirty days of this judgment, DCF shall present the court with a case plan, which shall include measurable objectives and time schedules.  General Statutes § 17a–112(o).

The Clerk of the Probate Court or the Clerk of the Superior Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of this child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford of the date when said adoption is finalized.

Judgment is entered accordingly this 15th day of January 2014.

BY THE COURT,

N. Rubinow, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN2. On September 11, 2013, the parties stipulated that the court could take judicial notice of the child protection files for Anthony and his siblings..  FN2. On September 11, 2013, the parties stipulated that the court could take judicial notice of the child protection files for Anthony and his siblings.

FN3. Originally identified as Anthony's father, Wilbert L. is no longer a party in this case..  FN3. Originally identified as Anthony's father, Wilbert L. is no longer a party in this case.

FN4. The court (Bentivegna, J.) confirmed this finding on March 24, 2011..  FN4. The court (Bentivegna, J.) confirmed this finding on March 24, 2011.

FN5. “When making its reasonable efforts determination during the adjudicatory phase, the court is limited to considering only those facts preceding the filing of the termination petition or the most recent amendment to the petition ․ See Practice Book § 35a–7(a) ․;  In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 148–49, 962 A.2d 81 (2009) (reasonable efforts finding is distinct from analysis of whether there exist grounds for termination of parental rights);  In re Shaiesha O., [93 Conn.App. 42, 48–49, 49 n.5, 887 A.2d 415 (2006) (in determining whether the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and a child ․ the court is required in the phase to make its assessment on the basis of events preceding the date on which the termination petition was filed).”  (Emphasis added;  internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)  In re Paul O., 141 Conn.App. 477, 483–84, 62 A.3d 637, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 933, 64 A.3d 332 (2013)..  FN5. “When making its reasonable efforts determination during the adjudicatory phase, the court is limited to considering only those facts preceding the filing of the termination petition or the most recent amendment to the petition ․ See Practice Book § 35a–7(a) ․;  In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 148–49, 962 A.2d 81 (2009) (reasonable efforts finding is distinct from analysis of whether there exist grounds for termination of parental rights);  In re Shaiesha O., [93 Conn.App. 42, 48–49, 49 n.5, 887 A.2d 415 (2006) (in determining whether the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and a child ․ the court is required in the phase to make its assessment on the basis of events preceding the date on which the termination petition was filed).”  (Emphasis added;  internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)  In re Paul O., 141 Conn.App. 477, 483–84, 62 A.3d 637, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 933, 64 A.3d 332 (2013).

FN6. Each of the grounds for termination set out in § 17a–112(j)(3) is “an independent ground for termination.”  In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 293, 618 A.2d 1 (1992).   To prevail with regard to a respondent-parent, DCF is required “to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that one of the specified statutory bases for termination has been established.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id..  FN6. Each of the grounds for termination set out in § 17a–112(j)(3) is “an independent ground for termination.”  In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 293, 618 A.2d 1 (1992).   To prevail with regard to a respondent-parent, DCF is required “to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that one of the specified statutory bases for termination has been established.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id.

FN7. “ ‘It is well established that [i]n a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony ․ The credibility and the weight of expert testimony is judged by the same standard, and the trial court is privileged to adopt whatever testimony [it] reasonably believes to be credible ․ It is the quintessential function of the factfinder to reject or accept certain evidence, and to believe or disbelieve any ․ testimony ․ The trier may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of an expert offered by one party or the other.’  ․ In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 781–82, 740 A.2d 896 (1999).”  In re Rafael S., supra, 125 Conn.App. 611–12.  “ ‘Furthermore, [c]ourts are entitled to give great weight to professionals in parental termination cases.’  ․ In re Tabitha P., [supra, 39 Conn.App. 364–65 n.8].” In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 161.  “As the finder of fact and the arbiter of credibility, the court [is] free to believe all, some or none of [a witness's] testimony.”  In re Katia M., supra, 124 Conn.App. 666.  “The factfinding function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Musolino v. Musolino, 121 Conn.App. 469, 476, 997 A.2d 599 (2010).   Moreover, “ ‘[i]t is the right and the duty of the [trier of fact] to draw reasonable and logical inferences from the evidence.’  ․ Russell v. Russell, 91 Conn.App. 619, 642, 882 A.2d 98, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 924, 925, 888 A.2d 92 (2005).  ‘In considering the evidence introduced in a case, [triers of fact] are not required to leave common sense at the courtroom door ․’ In re Kristy A., 83 Conn.App. 298, 316, 848 A.2d 1276, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 921, 859 A.2d 579 (2004).”  Welsch v. Groat, 95 Conn.App. 658, 666–67, 897 A.2d 710 (2006)..  FN7. “ ‘It is well established that [i]n a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony ․ The credibility and the weight of expert testimony is judged by the same standard, and the trial court is privileged to adopt whatever testimony [it] reasonably believes to be credible ․ It is the quintessential function of the factfinder to reject or accept certain evidence, and to believe or disbelieve any ․ testimony ․ The trier may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of an expert offered by one party or the other.’  ․ In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 781–82, 740 A.2d 896 (1999).”  In re Rafael S., supra, 125 Conn.App. 611–12.  “ ‘Furthermore, [c]ourts are entitled to give great weight to professionals in parental termination cases.’  ․ In re Tabitha P., [supra, 39 Conn.App. 364–65 n.8].” In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 161.  “As the finder of fact and the arbiter of credibility, the court [is] free to believe all, some or none of [a witness's] testimony.”  In re Katia M., supra, 124 Conn.App. 666.  “The factfinding function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Musolino v. Musolino, 121 Conn.App. 469, 476, 997 A.2d 599 (2010).   Moreover, “ ‘[i]t is the right and the duty of the [trier of fact] to draw reasonable and logical inferences from the evidence.’  ․ Russell v. Russell, 91 Conn.App. 619, 642, 882 A.2d 98, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 924, 925, 888 A.2d 92 (2005).  ‘In considering the evidence introduced in a case, [triers of fact] are not required to leave common sense at the courtroom door ․’ In re Kristy A., 83 Conn.App. 298, 316, 848 A.2d 1276, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 921, 859 A.2d 579 (2004).”  Welsch v. Groat, 95 Conn.App. 658, 666–67, 897 A.2d 710 (2006).

FN8. On September 10, 2013, DCF filed a notice “that [it] would request the court to draw an adverse inference” if either respondent elected not to testify at the TPR trial.   Christine L. did not testify at trial.   In the face of evidence reflecting her history as a whole, including her convictions for crimes involving forgery, illegal procurement of prescription drugs by fraudulent misconduct, impersonation of another, and violation of probation orders, the absence of the respondent mother's testimony has little impact upon the TPR issues.   Accordingly, the court did not draw the requested adverse inference.   If an adverse inference were to be drawn, it would further support the conclusion that all of Christine L.'s pending TPR allegations were proved by clear and convincing evidence..  FN8. On September 10, 2013, DCF filed a notice “that [it] would request the court to draw an adverse inference” if either respondent elected not to testify at the TPR trial.   Christine L. did not testify at trial.   In the face of evidence reflecting her history as a whole, including her convictions for crimes involving forgery, illegal procurement of prescription drugs by fraudulent misconduct, impersonation of another, and violation of probation orders, the absence of the respondent mother's testimony has little impact upon the TPR issues.   Accordingly, the court did not draw the requested adverse inference.   If an adverse inference were to be drawn, it would further support the conclusion that all of Christine L.'s pending TPR allegations were proved by clear and convincing evidence.

FN9. The court fully credits the opinions provided through the evaluating psychologist's written report as they relate to the TPR issues, including the references to the opinions and conclusions of professionals who had performed prior evaluations.   Although not tested by cross examination and somewhat remote in time, the court finds Dr. Humphrey's written opinions to be well-founded, detailed, thorough, and consistent with other trial evidence.   See In re Jason B., supra, 129 Conn.App. 772–73;  see also In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 161..  FN9. The court fully credits the opinions provided through the evaluating psychologist's written report as they relate to the TPR issues, including the references to the opinions and conclusions of professionals who had performed prior evaluations.   Although not tested by cross examination and somewhat remote in time, the court finds Dr. Humphrey's written opinions to be well-founded, detailed, thorough, and consistent with other trial evidence.   See In re Jason B., supra, 129 Conn.App. 772–73;  see also In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 161.

FN10. Additional facts will be found as required..  FN10. Additional facts will be found as required.

FN11. Throughout, the court has considered the respondents' arrests not to discredit them or to establish their community reputation, but to enable a valid assessment of their abilities and/or willingness to fulfill their parental responsibilities and to provide Anthony with a safe, secure home in the context of the TPR allegations, as contemplated by In re Helen B., supra, 50 Conn.App. 830..  FN11. Throughout, the court has considered the respondents' arrests not to discredit them or to establish their community reputation, but to enable a valid assessment of their abilities and/or willingness to fulfill their parental responsibilities and to provide Anthony with a safe, secure home in the context of the TPR allegations, as contemplated by In re Helen B., supra, 50 Conn.App. 830.

FN12. During that period of employment, Christine L. underwent a root canal procedure, and “began using opiate medications ․” for which she “wrote out prescriptions to herself or her husband.”  (Ex. 18.).  FN12. During that period of employment, Christine L. underwent a root canal procedure, and “began using opiate medications ․” for which she “wrote out prescriptions to herself or her husband.”  (Ex. 18.)

FN13. Dr. Franklin was unable to complete the ordered evaluation, as Christine L. failed to attend her scheduled intellectual assessment.  (Ex. 1.).  FN13. Dr. Franklin was unable to complete the ordered evaluation, as Christine L. failed to attend her scheduled intellectual assessment.  (Ex. 1.)

FN14. Dr. Franklin's diagnoses included:  Generalized Anxiety Disorder, NOS;  Rule out Poly substance Dependence;  Substance-induced Mood Disorder;  Opioid Abuse;  Anxiolytic Dependence;  and Borderline Personality Disorder.  (Ex. 18.).  FN14. Dr. Franklin's diagnoses included:  Generalized Anxiety Disorder, NOS;  Rule out Poly substance Dependence;  Substance-induced Mood Disorder;  Opioid Abuse;  Anxiolytic Dependence;  and Borderline Personality Disorder.  (Ex. 18.)

FN15. Joshua remained in his father's custody under protective supervision, which the court (Dannehy, J.) terminated on January 3, 2008.   Joshua has never returned to his mother's care..  FN15. Joshua remained in his father's custody under protective supervision, which the court (Dannehy, J.) terminated on January 3, 2008.   Joshua has never returned to his mother's care.

FN16. “PCP” is an illegal hallucinogenic drug formally known as phencyclidine.   See State v. Barnes, 112 Conn.App. 711, 716, 963 A.2d 1087 (2009);  In re Jocquyce C., 124 Conn.App. 619, 622, 5 A.3d 575 (2010)..  FN16. “PCP” is an illegal hallucinogenic drug formally known as phencyclidine.   See State v. Barnes, 112 Conn.App. 711, 716, 963 A.2d 1087 (2009);  In re Jocquyce C., 124 Conn.App. 619, 622, 5 A.3d 575 (2010).

FN17. Seyre was adjudicated neglected (Wollenberg, J.) and committed to the department on December 21, 2007..  FN17. Seyre was adjudicated neglected (Wollenberg, J.) and committed to the department on December 21, 2007.

FN18. Dr. Krulee's psychiatric diagnoses included:  Major Depression;  Panic Disorder without Agoraphobia;  Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Mild;  Opiate Dependence;  and Personality Disorder NOS with Codependent features.  (Ex. 18.)   Dr. Krulee was not called as a witness at this TPR trial;  his report was admitted in evidence 2009 TPR trial before Judge Olear, and was referenced by Dr. Humphrey.  (Exs.1, 18.).  FN18. Dr. Krulee's psychiatric diagnoses included:  Major Depression;  Panic Disorder without Agoraphobia;  Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Mild;  Opiate Dependence;  and Personality Disorder NOS with Codependent features.  (Ex. 18.)   Dr. Krulee was not called as a witness at this TPR trial;  his report was admitted in evidence 2009 TPR trial before Judge Olear, and was referenced by Dr. Humphrey.  (Exs.1, 18.)

FN19. Dr. Krulee found less than reliable Christine L.'s self-serving statements that she had “stopped using opiate prescription medication” and that she had changed her circle of friends, or that she “really did a complete turnaround” with regard to her drug use and lifestyle.  (Ex. 18.)  “Regarding [the respondent-mother's] comments concerning her use of pain medications, Dr. Krulee wrote, ‘[Christine L.] ․ had a way of rationalizing and defending episodic use of opiates.   For example, she claimed that she had been opiate free since August 2007, but then later indicated that in February 2008 someone had given her two Percocets because her back was really hurting.   Then she indicated that she had not told her current mental health treatment team that she is taking Ultram and Soma, Ultram being a synthetic opiate derivative, and both Ultram and Soma being abusable substances.   It also seemed strange that many of the doctors she has gone to see are out of business or retired and that she has no primary care doctor.’  “ (Emphasis added.)  (Ex. 18.).  FN19. Dr. Krulee found less than reliable Christine L.'s self-serving statements that she had “stopped using opiate prescription medication” and that she had changed her circle of friends, or that she “really did a complete turnaround” with regard to her drug use and lifestyle.  (Ex. 18.)  “Regarding [the respondent-mother's] comments concerning her use of pain medications, Dr. Krulee wrote, ‘[Christine L.] ․ had a way of rationalizing and defending episodic use of opiates.   For example, she claimed that she had been opiate free since August 2007, but then later indicated that in February 2008 someone had given her two Percocets because her back was really hurting.   Then she indicated that she had not told her current mental health treatment team that she is taking Ultram and Soma, Ultram being a synthetic opiate derivative, and both Ultram and Soma being abusable substances.   It also seemed strange that many of the doctors she has gone to see are out of business or retired and that she has no primary care doctor.’  “ (Emphasis added.)  (Ex. 18.)

FN20. Lynn M. adopted these children on May 4, 2010.  (Exs. 1, 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B.).  FN20. Lynn M. adopted these children on May 4, 2010.  (Exs. 1, 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B.)

FN21. Christine L. described her relationship with DCF at the time, as follows:  “These people really piss me off!   They change their words!   They don't keep their words in order!”   She further stated that:  “she went to a ‘Suboxone doctor’ to see if she could get DCF to ‘shut up.’   She continued, ‘Sure enough they did.’   She said she felt she did not need any medication, adding, ‘But that's what shut them the hell up on the substance abuse issue.   But those people really make me sick.”  (Emphasis added.)   (Ex. 18.).  FN21. Christine L. described her relationship with DCF at the time, as follows:  “These people really piss me off!   They change their words!   They don't keep their words in order!”   She further stated that:  “she went to a ‘Suboxone doctor’ to see if she could get DCF to ‘shut up.’   She continued, ‘Sure enough they did.’   She said she felt she did not need any medication, adding, ‘But that's what shut them the hell up on the substance abuse issue.   But those people really make me sick.”  (Emphasis added.)   (Ex. 18.)

FN22. In September 2010, Dr. Humphrey diagnosed Christine L. with Opioid Dependence (apparent Sustained Partial Remission);  concerns about the existence of Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Substance–Induced Mood Disorder, and/or Posttraumatic Stress Disorder;  and Personality Disorder, NOS with Borderline and Antisocial Features.   On November 19, 2012, after the TPR petition had been filed but prior to trial, DCF moved for an updated psychological evaluation of Christine L. The court (Dannehy, J.) denied that motion on December 4, 2012..  FN22. In September 2010, Dr. Humphrey diagnosed Christine L. with Opioid Dependence (apparent Sustained Partial Remission);  concerns about the existence of Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Substance–Induced Mood Disorder, and/or Posttraumatic Stress Disorder;  and Personality Disorder, NOS with Borderline and Antisocial Features.   On November 19, 2012, after the TPR petition had been filed but prior to trial, DCF moved for an updated psychological evaluation of Christine L. The court (Dannehy, J.) denied that motion on December 4, 2012.

FN23. The court acknowledges the evidence establishing that, from time to time, Christine L. has undergone hair testing and urinalysis that yielded negative results.   For instance, a urine screen performed on February 14, 2011 was negative for opiates, although no testing was apparently done for drugs, such as benzodiazapines, or for alcohol.   The court finds other evidence of the respondent-mother's relapses, including her own admissions and her conduct on December 20, 2011 and during the summer of 2012, described below, to be far more credible, supporting the conclusion that her unstable mental health and substance abuse continues unabated.  (Exs. 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B.).  FN23. The court acknowledges the evidence establishing that, from time to time, Christine L. has undergone hair testing and urinalysis that yielded negative results.   For instance, a urine screen performed on February 14, 2011 was negative for opiates, although no testing was apparently done for drugs, such as benzodiazapines, or for alcohol.   The court finds other evidence of the respondent-mother's relapses, including her own admissions and her conduct on December 20, 2011 and during the summer of 2012, described below, to be far more credible, supporting the conclusion that her unstable mental health and substance abuse continues unabated.  (Exs. 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B.)

FN24. Under those circumstances, Christine L. could not function as a safe caregiver for her eighteen-month-old child.  “Because ‘[t]he condition of intoxication and its common accompaniments are a matter of general knowledge’ ․ our Supreme Court has held that laymen may testify as to their opinion of whether a person is intoxicated.”  (Citations omitted.)   State v. Lamme, 19 Conn.App. 594, 606, 563 A.2d 1372 (1989), aff'd, 216 Conn. 172, 579 A.2d 484 (1990)..  FN24. Under those circumstances, Christine L. could not function as a safe caregiver for her eighteen-month-old child.  “Because ‘[t]he condition of intoxication and its common accompaniments are a matter of general knowledge’ ․ our Supreme Court has held that laymen may testify as to their opinion of whether a person is intoxicated.”  (Citations omitted.)   State v. Lamme, 19 Conn.App. 594, 606, 563 A.2d 1372 (1989), aff'd, 216 Conn. 172, 579 A.2d 484 (1990).

FN25. When Dr. Shah declined to write any further prescriptions for the respondent mother, Christine L. declared that she would obtain her medication on the street.  (Tes. Sandra B.).  FN25. When Dr. Shah declined to write any further prescriptions for the respondent mother, Christine L. declared that she would obtain her medication on the street.  (Tes. Sandra B.)

FN26. Christine L.'s counseling sessions with Dr. Bunk terminated on that date.  (Ex. 19.).  FN26. Christine L.'s counseling sessions with Dr. Bunk terminated on that date.  (Ex. 19.)

FN27. “On 2/14/12, mother called the person who supervised her visits with Anthony and told her that she was cancelling her visit because there was a warrant out for her arrest and she did not want to be arrested at DCF ․” (Ex. 20.).  FN27. “On 2/14/12, mother called the person who supervised her visits with Anthony and told her that she was cancelling her visit because there was a warrant out for her arrest and she did not want to be arrested at DCF ․” (Ex. 20.)

FN28. See footnote 11..  FN28. See footnote 11.

FN29. Christine L. described the cause of Jose R.'s N.Y. conviction as follows:  “He got caught with drugs on him and he told the police he was a drug user.   He was a drug dealer.”  (Ex. 18.).  FN29. Christine L. described the cause of Jose R.'s N.Y. conviction as follows:  “He got caught with drugs on him and he told the police he was a drug user.   He was a drug dealer.”  (Ex. 18.)

FN30. The court does not credit Jose R.'s testimony that while he was evading NY's parole services, he visited Anthony regularly in Connecticut with Lynn M.'s permission.   It is clear, however, that after the child's removal from Lynn M.'s care, there has been no contact between Jose R. and Anthony, physically, verbally or emotionally.  (Exs. 19, 20, A, B, C, D;  Tes. Jose R.).  FN30. The court does not credit Jose R.'s testimony that while he was evading NY's parole services, he visited Anthony regularly in Connecticut with Lynn M.'s permission.   It is clear, however, that after the child's removal from Lynn M.'s care, there has been no contact between Jose R. and Anthony, physically, verbally or emotionally.  (Exs. 19, 20, A, B, C, D;  Tes. Jose R.)

FN31. As discussed above, the court does not credit Jose R.'s claims that he saw and/or visited Anthony regularly while the child was in the care of Lynn M. (Tes. Jose R.;   see Exs. 19, 20, A, B, C, D;  Tes. Sandra B., and Margaret C.) Even if that contact occurred, it was prior to the child's second DCF commitment to, which took place when Anthony was less than two years old..  FN31. As discussed above, the court does not credit Jose R.'s claims that he saw and/or visited Anthony regularly while the child was in the care of Lynn M. (Tes. Jose R.;   see Exs. 19, 20, A, B, C, D;  Tes. Sandra B., and Margaret C.) Even if that contact occurred, it was prior to the child's second DCF commitment to, which took place when Anthony was less than two years old.

FN32. See footnote 5. DCF has not claimed that the adjudicatory date should be based upon any amendments to the October 1, 2012 TPR petition..  FN32. See footnote 5. DCF has not claimed that the adjudicatory date should be based upon any amendments to the October 1, 2012 TPR petition.

FN33. Although the court allowed DCF to brief the legal basis of its claim that the court should rely upon the § 17a–111b ruling for reasonable efforts purposes in this TPR case, given the disparate burdens of proof applicable to proceedings under § 17a–112(j)(1) and § 17a–111b, no memorandum was submitted..  FN33. Although the court allowed DCF to brief the legal basis of its claim that the court should rely upon the § 17a–111b ruling for reasonable efforts purposes in this TPR case, given the disparate burdens of proof applicable to proceedings under § 17a–112(j)(1) and § 17a–111b, no memorandum was submitted.

FN34. In addition to DCF-proffered services, Christine L. had access to the services of probation and DOC supervision and referrals, as found above.  (Exs. 5, 19, 20;  Tes Sandra B., and Margaret C.) There is no basis, in law or reason, establishing that DCF is obligated to duplicate services being provided to a parent through a coordinate program such as probation or parole.   See generally In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 56–57, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998)..  FN34. In addition to DCF-proffered services, Christine L. had access to the services of probation and DOC supervision and referrals, as found above.  (Exs. 5, 19, 20;  Tes Sandra B., and Margaret C.) There is no basis, in law or reason, establishing that DCF is obligated to duplicate services being provided to a parent through a coordinate program such as probation or parole.   See generally In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 56–57, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998).

FN35. Christine L.'s MCCA treatment, discussed in Part III, occurred after adjudicatory date..  FN35. Christine L.'s MCCA treatment, discussed in Part III, occurred after adjudicatory date.

FN36. DCF could not provide Christine L. with services while she was imprisoned at York. See In re Kamal R., 142 Conn.App. 66, 71, 62 A.3d 1177 (2013), and cases cited therein..  FN36. DCF could not provide Christine L. with services while she was imprisoned at York. See In re Kamal R., 142 Conn.App. 66, 71, 62 A.3d 1177 (2013), and cases cited therein.

FN37. As previously found, Anthony's maternal grandmother, Lynn M., refused to care for him after December 2011.   Although DCF made reasonable efforts to engage them in the foster care process:  the maternal grandfather John A. did not respond;  and maternal great aunts Mary Lou A., Robin M. and Elaine M. declined to serve as placement resources for the child.   The ICPC “was completed [by DCF] on an identified kinship option presented by the maternal family.”  (Ex. 19.)   While his maternal family friend, Sandra J., was willing to adopt Anthony, the ICPC “report took nine months to process and in that time Anthony had continued to [grow] close to his foster parents ․” which reasonably prompted DCF to forgo out-of-state non-relative placement.  (Ex. 19.).  FN37. As previously found, Anthony's maternal grandmother, Lynn M., refused to care for him after December 2011.   Although DCF made reasonable efforts to engage them in the foster care process:  the maternal grandfather John A. did not respond;  and maternal great aunts Mary Lou A., Robin M. and Elaine M. declined to serve as placement resources for the child.   The ICPC “was completed [by DCF] on an identified kinship option presented by the maternal family.”  (Ex. 19.)   While his maternal family friend, Sandra J., was willing to adopt Anthony, the ICPC “report took nine months to process and in that time Anthony had continued to [grow] close to his foster parents ․” which reasonably prompted DCF to forgo out-of-state non-relative placement.  (Ex. 19.)

FN38. In addition to services from DCF, Jose R. had access to the services of NY's correctional system.  (Exs. 19, 20;  Tes Sandra B., and Margaret C.) See footnote 34..  FN38. In addition to services from DCF, Jose R. had access to the services of NY's correctional system.  (Exs. 19, 20;  Tes Sandra B., and Margaret C.) See footnote 34.

FN39. While Jose R. may argue that DCF failed to consider family and kin placement resources for Anthony, contrary evidence renders this claim of little merit.   Although DCF made affirmative, reasonable identify paternally-related caregivers, none were available.   Although DCF made reasonable efforts to engage them in the foster care process, paternal cousins Rosa R. and Yolanda M., declined to serve as a placement resources for Anthony;  paternal grandmother Carmen R. was ill with asthma, did not respond to the department's certified letter of inquiry, and otherwise indicated that she is available only as a visiting resource for the child.  (Ex. 19;  Tes. Margaret C.) Jose R. did not present Carmen M. as a potential placement resource until August 2013, nearly a year after the adjudicatory date, just prior to commencement of the TPR trial, and long after Anthony had bonded with his current foster parents.   See Part III. (Tes. Margaret C., and Jose R.).  FN39. While Jose R. may argue that DCF failed to consider family and kin placement resources for Anthony, contrary evidence renders this claim of little merit.   Although DCF made affirmative, reasonable identify paternally-related caregivers, none were available.   Although DCF made reasonable efforts to engage them in the foster care process, paternal cousins Rosa R. and Yolanda M., declined to serve as a placement resources for Anthony;  paternal grandmother Carmen R. was ill with asthma, did not respond to the department's certified letter of inquiry, and otherwise indicated that she is available only as a visiting resource for the child.  (Ex. 19;  Tes. Margaret C.) Jose R. did not present Carmen M. as a potential placement resource until August 2013, nearly a year after the adjudicatory date, just prior to commencement of the TPR trial, and long after Anthony had bonded with his current foster parents.   See Part III. (Tes. Margaret C., and Jose R.)

FN40. Where specific steps have ordered a parent to keep DCF informed of his whereabouts, “[t]he department surely cannot be faulted for failing to make reasonable efforts when the respondent essentially has vanished from [his child's] life.”  In re Kamal R., supra, 142 Conn.App. 71–72..  FN40. Where specific steps have ordered a parent to keep DCF informed of his whereabouts, “[t]he department surely cannot be faulted for failing to make reasonable efforts when the respondent essentially has vanished from [his child's] life.”  In re Kamal R., supra, 142 Conn.App. 71–72.

FN41. DCF could not provide Jose R. with services while he was incarcerated at HCC or in NY. See In re Kamal R., supra, 142 Conn.App. 71..  FN41. DCF could not provide Jose R. with services while he was incarcerated at HCC or in NY. See In re Kamal R., supra, 142 Conn.App. 71.

FN42. In determining that DCF has met its burden of proof on the TPR issues, including Anthony's best interests, the court has remained respectful of the life-challenges each respondent-parents has faced.   Such circumstances do not alter the court's conclusion that the department has proved each element of each ground the TPR petition as to each respondent..  FN42. In determining that DCF has met its burden of proof on the TPR issues, including Anthony's best interests, the court has remained respectful of the life-challenges each respondent-parents has faced.   Such circumstances do not alter the court's conclusion that the department has proved each element of each ground the TPR petition as to each respondent.

FN43. In reaching these conclusions, the court has analyzed Christine L.'s:  rehabilitative status as it relates to Anthony;  parenting history;  pattern of oppositional and criminal conduct;  failure to benefit from services provided either by DCF, probation or parole;  and degree of contact with the child.   The court has also considered Christine L.'s persistent drug-related behaviors;  trauma history;  and the loss of custody of her oldest son;  and the termination of her parental rights to three of her other children.   See In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622–23;  In re Katia M., supra, 124 Conn.App. 664–65;  In re Tremaine C., supra, 117 Conn.App. 597..  FN43. In reaching these conclusions, the court has analyzed Christine L.'s:  rehabilitative status as it relates to Anthony;  parenting history;  pattern of oppositional and criminal conduct;  failure to benefit from services provided either by DCF, probation or parole;  and degree of contact with the child.   The court has also considered Christine L.'s persistent drug-related behaviors;  trauma history;  and the loss of custody of her oldest son;  and the termination of her parental rights to three of her other children.   See In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622–23;  In re Katia M., supra, 124 Conn.App. 664–65;  In re Tremaine C., supra, 117 Conn.App. 597.

FN44. Even if Christine L. had made progress in controlling her depression, anxiety, and substance abuse by the summer of 2011, any remission was extremely short-lived, and any cooperation Christine L. appeared to have demonstrated to Dr. Bunk, Dr. Shah and/or to her probation officer was either unfounded, or too insecure to establish any significant improvement in her ability to control her personal life, let alone the life of a young child.  (See Exs. 19, 20, 23.).  FN44. Even if Christine L. had made progress in controlling her depression, anxiety, and substance abuse by the summer of 2011, any remission was extremely short-lived, and any cooperation Christine L. appeared to have demonstrated to Dr. Bunk, Dr. Shah and/or to her probation officer was either unfounded, or too insecure to establish any significant improvement in her ability to control her personal life, let alone the life of a young child.  (See Exs. 19, 20, 23.)

FN45. In reaching its conclusion on Christine L.'s failure to rehabilitate, the court acknowledges that DCF did not substantiate neglect for Anthony's in utero exposure to amphetamines.  (Ex. 5.).  FN45. In reaching its conclusion on Christine L.'s failure to rehabilitate, the court acknowledges that DCF did not substantiate neglect for Anthony's in utero exposure to amphetamines.  (Ex. 5.)

FN46. Commencing with the OTC, Christine L.'s steps consistently identified her need to improve the status of her issues related to her parenting deficits, mental health, substance abuse and domestic violence;  her involvement with the criminal justice system;  her need for psychiatric supervision and medication management;  and her obligation to visit the child as often as DCF permitted.   See Specific Steps ordered February 22, 2010;  February 26, 2010;  November 2, 2010;  March 24, 2011;  and August 2, 2011..  FN46. Commencing with the OTC, Christine L.'s steps consistently identified her need to improve the status of her issues related to her parenting deficits, mental health, substance abuse and domestic violence;  her involvement with the criminal justice system;  her need for psychiatric supervision and medication management;  and her obligation to visit the child as often as DCF permitted.   See Specific Steps ordered February 22, 2010;  February 26, 2010;  November 2, 2010;  March 24, 2011;  and August 2, 2011.

FN47. In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledges that Christine L. did comply with some of the steps, but she did so without achieving rehabilitation.   See In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622..  FN47. In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledges that Christine L. did comply with some of the steps, but she did so without achieving rehabilitation.   See In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622.

FN48. On each occasion on which Christine L. used medication without a prescription, whether Xanax or Klonopin or cocaine, she violated this step.   She further violated this step by failing to meet the conditions of her probation;  failing to appear in criminal court as ordered;  engaging in three separate episodes of harassment, threatening in the second degree, and racial ridicule in December 20, 2011;  engaging in domestic violence with her sister on December 29, 2011;  and possessing contraband in 2012, while incarcerated at York. (Ex. 2, 6, 7, 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B., and Margaret C.).  FN48. On each occasion on which Christine L. used medication without a prescription, whether Xanax or Klonopin or cocaine, she violated this step.   She further violated this step by failing to meet the conditions of her probation;  failing to appear in criminal court as ordered;  engaging in three separate episodes of harassment, threatening in the second degree, and racial ridicule in December 20, 2011;  engaging in domestic violence with her sister on December 29, 2011;  and possessing contraband in 2012, while incarcerated at York. (Ex. 2, 6, 7, 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B., and Margaret C.)

FN49. She “acknowledged she was attempting to skirt DCF by having Anthony at Manchester Hospital, [saying] ‘(DCF) lied to me, so why should I be honest with them?’  “ (Ex. 18.).  FN49. She “acknowledged she was attempting to skirt DCF by having Anthony at Manchester Hospital, [saying] ‘(DCF) lied to me, so why should I be honest with them?’  “ (Ex. 18.)

FN50. See footnotes 42 and 43..  FN50. See footnotes 42 and 43.

FN51. See footnote 31..  FN51. See footnote 31.

FN52. Jose R.'s intentional avoidance of DCF precluded the department's opportunity to provide supervised visitation that had been ordered with the November 2, 2010 specific steps.   Although he knew how to contact the child's DCF social worker, Jose R.'s July 2012 call to inquire about visits was self-interested, and not focused upon Anthony's well-being.   Jose R. did not then ask, for instance, whether his son was adjusting well to his new foster placement, or whether the child needed any assistance.   Further establishing his abandonment of the child, Jose R. did not call DCF back, as he had promised, and, even on that occasion, he refused to provide the department with information about how he could be reached.  (Exs. 10, 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B.).  FN52. Jose R.'s intentional avoidance of DCF precluded the department's opportunity to provide supervised visitation that had been ordered with the November 2, 2010 specific steps.   Although he knew how to contact the child's DCF social worker, Jose R.'s July 2012 call to inquire about visits was self-interested, and not focused upon Anthony's well-being.   Jose R. did not then ask, for instance, whether his son was adjusting well to his new foster placement, or whether the child needed any assistance.   Further establishing his abandonment of the child, Jose R. did not call DCF back, as he had promised, and, even on that occasion, he refused to provide the department with information about how he could be reached.  (Exs. 10, 19, 20;  Tes. Sandra B.)

FN53. In reaching these conclusions, the court has analyzed Jose R.'s:  rehabilitative status as it relates to Anthony;  parenting history;  pattern of oppositional and criminal conduct, including the full implications of his lengthy pattern of criminal conduct, failure to cooperate with authorities in N.Y. and this state;  failure to benefit from services provided either by DCF or NY;  and his almost non-existent degree of contact with the child.   See In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622;  In re Katia M., supra, 124 Conn.App. 664–65;  In re Tremaine C., supra, 117 Conn.App. 597..  FN53. In reaching these conclusions, the court has analyzed Jose R.'s:  rehabilitative status as it relates to Anthony;  parenting history;  pattern of oppositional and criminal conduct, including the full implications of his lengthy pattern of criminal conduct, failure to cooperate with authorities in N.Y. and this state;  failure to benefit from services provided either by DCF or NY;  and his almost non-existent degree of contact with the child.   See In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622;  In re Katia M., supra, 124 Conn.App. 664–65;  In re Tremaine C., supra, 117 Conn.App. 597.

FN54. Even if Jose R. informally visited with his son while Anthony was in the care of Lynn M., a conclusion unsupported by credible evidence, this father-son contact took place without DCF's permission, and did not comply with the steps.  (Exs. 9, 10;  Tes. Jose R.).  FN54. Even if Jose R. informally visited with his son while Anthony was in the care of Lynn M., a conclusion unsupported by credible evidence, this father-son contact took place without DCF's permission, and did not comply with the steps.  (Exs. 9, 10;  Tes. Jose R.)

FN55. In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledges Jose R.'s minimal compliance with some of the steps, as by visiting Anthony twice in November 2010.   See In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622..  FN55. In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledges Jose R.'s minimal compliance with some of the steps, as by visiting Anthony twice in November 2010.   See In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622.

FN56. Jose R. claims that he has worked “under the table.”  (Tes. Margaret C.) The court declines to credit this aspect of the evidence, but even if it is accurate, such work establishes only an employment that is inconsistent with the specific steps which consistently require that he obtain “legal income.”.  FN56. Jose R. claims that he has worked “under the table.”  (Tes. Margaret C.) The court declines to credit this aspect of the evidence, but even if it is accurate, such work establishes only an employment that is inconsistent with the specific steps which consistently require that he obtain “legal income.”

FN57. Poignantly, Jose R. has attempted to prove his ability and willingness to serve as a safe, effective placement resource for his nearly four-year-old son by providing the court with photographs showing him with Anthony when the boy was a baby.  (Exs. A, B, C, D;  Tes. Jose R.).  FN57. Poignantly, Jose R. has attempted to prove his ability and willingness to serve as a safe, effective placement resource for his nearly four-year-old son by providing the court with photographs showing him with Anthony when the boy was a baby.  (Exs. A, B, C, D;  Tes. Jose R.)

FN58. Even if, as the respondent-father claims, Anthony saw and/or visited with Jose R. regularly prior to the child's December 2011 recommitment to DCF, Anthony would have been too young to have retained actual remembrances of any interaction with this respondent.  (Exs. A, B, C, D;  Tes. Jose R.;   and Margaret C.).  FN58. Even if, as the respondent-father claims, Anthony saw and/or visited with Jose R. regularly prior to the child's December 2011 recommitment to DCF, Anthony would have been too young to have retained actual remembrances of any interaction with this respondent.  (Exs. A, B, C, D;  Tes. Jose R.;   and Margaret C.)

FN59. “After determining whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights under ․ § 17a–112(j) exists by clear and convincing evidence, a judge is required to evaluate whether severing the legal tie between parent and child is in the child's best interest.   That task is among the most sensitive and difficult with which a judge is charged ․ In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 42, 43, 907 A.2d 126 (2006), aff'd, 285 Conn. 483, 940 A.2d 733 (2008).”  In re Alison M., supra, 127 Conn.App. 210 n.9..  FN59. “After determining whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights under ․ § 17a–112(j) exists by clear and convincing evidence, a judge is required to evaluate whether severing the legal tie between parent and child is in the child's best interest.   That task is among the most sensitive and difficult with which a judge is charged ․ In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 42, 43, 907 A.2d 126 (2006), aff'd, 285 Conn. 483, 940 A.2d 733 (2008).”  In re Alison M., supra, 127 Conn.App. 210 n.9.

FN60. In concluding that TPR will serve Anthony's best interests, the court has fully considered the question of whether there is any less restrictive means of achieving a “permanency plan for the child that would not terminate [either respondent's] paternal rights ․” In re Juliana B., supra, 141 Conn.App. 167–68.   As found in Parts III and IV, this case does not allow for the identification of any lesser alternative, as no other maternal, paternal, or kinship custodial resources could be found for the child and no designated person is available to fill the role of a General Statutes § 46b–129(k) permanent legal guardian.  (Exs.19, 20.).  FN60. In concluding that TPR will serve Anthony's best interests, the court has fully considered the question of whether there is any less restrictive means of achieving a “permanency plan for the child that would not terminate [either respondent's] paternal rights ․” In re Juliana B., supra, 141 Conn.App. 167–68.   As found in Parts III and IV, this case does not allow for the identification of any lesser alternative, as no other maternal, paternal, or kinship custodial resources could be found for the child and no designated person is available to fill the role of a General Statutes § 46b–129(k) permanent legal guardian.  (Exs.19, 20.)

FN61. In re Heather L., 49 Conn.Sup. 287, 313, 877 A.2d 27 (2004), aff'd, 274 Conn. 174, 874 A.2d 796 (2005)..  FN61. In re Heather L., 49 Conn.Sup. 287, 313, 877 A.2d 27 (2004), aff'd, 274 Conn. 174, 874 A.2d 796 (2005).

FN62. The court has not based its decision to grant the TPR petition “in order to substitute another, more suitable parent.”  In re Baby Girl B., supra, 224 Conn. 280;  see also In re Zion R., 116 Conn.App. 723, 738, 977 A.2d 247 (2009).   However, “once a ground for termination has been shown to exist,” the court may properly consider the “suitability and circumstances of [proposed] adoptive parents.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Vincent D., supra, 65 Conn.App. 666..  FN62. The court has not based its decision to grant the TPR petition “in order to substitute another, more suitable parent.”  In re Baby Girl B., supra, 224 Conn. 280;  see also In re Zion R., 116 Conn.App. 723, 738, 977 A.2d 247 (2009).   However, “once a ground for termination has been shown to exist,” the court may properly consider the “suitability and circumstances of [proposed] adoptive parents.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Vincent D., supra, 65 Conn.App. 666.

Rubinow, Nicola E., J.