Jane Doe v. Radoja Krsmanovic (2014)

RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SEAL FILE AND COURTROOM (# 113)

The plaintiff has moved pursuant to Practice Book §§ 11–20A(c) and 11–20B to “close the Courtroom for a hearing in damages ․ and to seal the Court file, seal the hearing testimony, and seal the Trial Exhibits, which will be introduced at the time of the Hearing in Damages.”   The plaintiff has previously received permission to proceed using a pseudonym.   The defendant has been defaulted for failure to appear.   For the reasons that follow, the plaintiff's motion is denied.

Practice Book § 11–20 deals with the closure of a courtroom in a civil matter.  Section 11–20(a) provides that “there shall be a presumption that courtroom proceedings shall be open to the public.”   Further, “[t]his tradition of open trials made its way to colonial America and evolved into a presumption of public access to court proceedings and records that remains a fundamental part of our judicial system today.”  Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 34, 970 A.2d 656 (2009).  “This presumption is not absolute and applies only to ‘judicial documents' because such documents serve as a proxy for public monitoring of court proceedings when the public cannot be present.”  Id., 42.  “Connecticut follows the broader approach under which any document filed that a court reasonably may rely on in support of its adjudicatory function is a judicial document ․ The vindication of this interest supports public access, not only to the proceedings themselves, but to any materials upon which a court may rely in reaching a decision.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id., 46–47.

Under Practice Book § 11–20(c), the public may be excluded from the courtroom “only if the judicial authority concludes that such order is necessary to preserve an interest which is determined to override the public's interest in attending such proceeding.”   Given the presumption that courtroom proceedings shall be open to the public, the movant bears the burden of proof on this issue.   See Vargas v. Doe, 96 Conn.App. 399, 412, 900 A.2d 525, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 923, 908 A.2d 546 (2006).   The plaintiff has not carried her burden of proof on the issue of closure.   Moreover, the mere fact that the plaintiff's complaint involves allegations of sexual assault, standing alone, does not convince the court that closure is necessary in the case at bar.  Id. Given the strong presumption in favor of openness, the court cannot conclude that an order of closure “is necessary to preserve an interest which is determined to override the public's interest in attending such proceeding.”  Practice Book § 11–20(c).

With regard to the exhibits and reports that the plaintiff is seeking to seal under Practice Book § 11–20A, it is clear that these are “judicial documents” under Rosado, for which there is a strong presumption of public access.  Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, 290 Conn. 46–47;  Practice Book § 11–20A(a).   Again, the plaintiff has made not made a sufficient showing that these documents should be sealed.   To the extent that these documents contain information that the plaintiff regards as “private,” she is free to redact any portion she wishes, and introduce the redacted reports.   Any claim of privilege, to the extent not waived by the complaint, may, of course, be claimed by the plaintiff.   In short, the plaintiff, particularly since this case is proceeding as a hearing in damages against a non-appearing defendant, is the master of what evidence she wishes to introduce.   Claims of privilege and confidentiality can be addressed by the trial judge.   With regard to “personal identification information,” the plaintiff may petition the trial judge to have such information removed pursuant to Practice Book § 11–20B.

Frechette, J.

Frechette, Matthew E., J.