IN RE: Rashawnna D. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PETITION TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS

In accordance with General Statute § 46b–124 and Practice Book § 32a–7, the names of the parties involved in this case are not to be disclosed, and the records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and only upon order of the Superior Court.

Before this court is the termination of parental rights petition filed by the petitioner, the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) in the interest of Rashawnna D. (birth date:  March 9, 2008).   The termination of parental rights petition was filed on July 19, 2013.   The respondents are Amie D. (“mother”) and the putative fathers are Kharon H. and John Doe. Mother was served by way of certified mail;  Father Kharon H. was served by way of publication.   Father John Doe was served by way of publication.   Mother was advised and appointed counsel.   Father Kharon H. was defaulted for his failure to appear on August 15, 2013.   Father John Doe was defaulted for his failure to appear on October 24, 2013.   The child was appointed an attorney.   As neither parent claims Native American Heritage, the Indian Child Welfare Act is not applicable.   The court finds that it has proper jurisdiction and there are no pending actions affecting the custody of the minor child.

This matter was tried to the court on December 9, 2013.   Mother failed to appear for the trial and she was defaulted for her failure to appear.   Mother's attorney was present for and participated in the trial.   DCF was represented at the trial by an assistant attorney general.   The child was represented by counsel who was present at trial.   The court heard testimony from a clinician from The Village for Children and Families, the foster mother and the DCF social worker assigned to the case.   Nine exhibits, including one exhibit which consisted of 18 photographs, were entered into evidence as full exhibits by agreement of the parties.   The court takes judicial notice of the entire record of the prior non-delinquency proceedings including pleadings, petitions, social studies, status reports, evaluations, court memoranda and specific steps as well as the dates and contents of the court's findings, orders, rulings and judgments.¹  All counsel participated in the examination of the witnesses.

By way of the procedural history of this matter, DCF invoked a 96–hour hold on Rashawnna on June 27, 2012.   Motions for Orders of Temporary Custody and a Petition of Neglect were filed by DCF on June 29, 2012.   The Motion for Order of Temporary Custody was sustained on July 6, 2012.   On October 10, 2012, Rashawnna was adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of the Commissioner of DCF. A permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption was filed by DCF on April 2, 2013 and approved by the court on May 14, 2013.   Final specific steps were ordered as to father on February 28, 2012.   Final specific steps were ordered as to mother and father Kharon H. on October 10, 2012.

The statutory grounds stated in the termination of parental rights petition against the respondent mother and the respondent fathers allege that the child has been abandoned by mother and fathers in the sense that they have failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child (General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(A));  the child has been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for, and that mother and fathers have failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child (General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(I) and;  that there is no on-going parent child relationship with mother or fathers that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child (General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D).  The petition also alleges that reasonable efforts were made to locate the respondent parents, that reasonable efforts were made to reunify the child with mother and fathers, and that mother and fathers are unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.   In addition, it alleges reasonable efforts to reunify are not required for mother and fathers because the court determined at a hearing that under General Statutes § 17a–111b such efforts are not required.

These proceedings are governed by General Statutes § 17a–112 et seq.   In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the petitioner must first prove by clear and convincing evidence, in the adjudicatory phase, a ground for termination alleged in the petition as of the date of the filing of the petition or the last amendment.  Practice Book §§ 32a–3(b) and 35a–7;  In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 163 (2009);  In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, cert. denied, 221 Conn. 901 (1991).   Only one ground need be established for the granting of the petition.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258 (1984);  In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 232, 242 (2000).   If a ground for termination is proven, the court must next consider the disposition stage.   Therein, the court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interest.  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 689 (1999).   As is permitted under our law, the evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases was heard at the same trial.   Practice Book § 35a–7(b).  As noted above, the termination of parental rights petition was filed on July 19, 2013 which is the adjudicatory date as of which the court must make its determinations as to reasonable efforts and the statutory grounds for termination.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The court has carefully considered the petition, the criteria set forth in the relevant Connecticut General Statutes, the applicable case law as well as all of the evidence and testimony presented, all orders and prior findings, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and the evaluation of their testimony with all other testimony and documentary evidence according to the standards required by law.   On the basis of the evidence presented and for the reasons stated below, this court makes the following findings of fact by clear and convincing evidence and finds that DCF has met its burden of proof with respect to the termination petition as to the parents of Rashawnna D. and hereby terminates the parental rights of the respondent mother and the respondent fathers.

Mother

Mother is presently twenty-two years of age.   Mother was placed in foster care when she was 15 years old due to her oppositional behavior.   She dropped out of high school in the 10th grade when she became pregnant with Rashwanna as the result of a relationship with putative father, Kharon D. She subsequently had two sons with another man.   Her sons presently reside with her in Texas.   Mother reports that she has a domestic violence history with the father of her two sons and that he is currently incarcerated.   Mother has a CPS history in Texas concerning her children including Rashawnna.   This history includes allegations of physical neglect and physical abuse.   This has resulted in Rashwanna being in the care of others for substantial periods of time.

Mother reports experimenting with marijuana and alcohol since the age of 18.

Mother has a significant criminal history.   She was arrested on September 30, 2010 for Capital Murder by Terror Threat/Other Felony.   Those charges were subsequently dropped.   She was arrested on December 13, 2011 for Forgery of Financial Instrument and Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity.   She was convicted in the Forgery charge and served a four-month sentence.   She was released on April 26, 2012 and received probation.   She was arrested on September 3, 2012 for Burglary 1 and Violation of Probation.   The Burglary 1 charge was substituted to Forgery and she was incarcerated as a result in Texas.   She was released in approximately October 2013.   At the time of the opening of this case, mother was incarcerated.   Mother was not incarcerated at the time of the trial of this matter.

Mother has not been able to complete her court-ordered services due to her incarceration.   Those services included individual therapy, parenting classes, substance abuse evaluation and drug screen.   During her most recent incarceration, she was on the waitlist for parenting and life skills classes.   She did take classes to obtain her GED. During the periods of time she was not incarcerated, mother did not engage in any of her court ordered services.

Putative Fathers

Kharon H. has been identified as the father of Rashawnna by mother.   However, he denies paternity and refuses to undergo paternity testing.   Mother reports that he has not seen Rashawuna since she was eight months old.   He has had no further contact with DCF and DCF has not been able to obtain any other information concerning him.   He refused to give his date of birth and current address when contacted by DCF in July 2013.   His present whereabouts are unknown.   He has not engaged in any of his court ordered services.   John Doe has not come forward to acknowledge paternity.

Rashawnna

Rashawnna was born on March 9, 2008.   On June 27, 2012, DCF received a report from Rashawnna's pre-school provider alleging physical abuse and physical neglect of Rashawnna by Keomesheya K., Rashawnna's caregiver.   The report alleged that Rashawnna had significant bruising to her stomach and back area.   She had a band-like bruising around her rib cage and an open cut under her rib cage.   In addition, she had bruising on the side of her rib cage and her inner thighs.   Some of the bruising appeared to be old.   Rashawnna initially reported that she sustained the injuries as the result of a fall and later reported that “mommy gave me a whooping” and reported that she was hit with a belt.   She also disclosed that she was beaten with a belt, was choked and held underwater in a bathtub, had food stuffed down her throat, was hurt by boiling water and being placed in a dark place for a whole day.   Medical examinations of Rashawnna revealed that Rashawnna had many significant injuries, new and old, that presented as inflicted and done by a belt.   At that time, mother resided in Texas.   Rashawnna had resided with mother's second cousin, Keomesheya K., since 2009.   Mother wrote and signed a notarized letter in 2009 which provided that Keomesheya K. had legal guardianship of Rashawnna until 12/31/2012.   Rashawnna refers to Keomesheya as “Mimi.”

Rashawnna was placed in a single-parent, non-relative foster home on June 28, 2012 where she presently resides.   She resides with her foster mother, her foster mother's 9–year–old adoptive daughter whom Rashawnna considers to be her sister.   Rashawnna is content in her foster home and has emotionally bonded with her foster family.   Foster mother is committed to Rashawnna and wishes to adopt her should become legally free to do so.   Foster mother is aware of Rashawnna's needs and looks to educate herself further to address Rashawnna's behaviors.   She has received additional training on how to address Rashawnna's behaviors.   Rashawnna continues to receive weekly individual therapy with a focus on trauma.   At the time of her placement in the foster home, Rashawnna had frequent nightmares which decreased to approximately once per month.   She has clearly stated that she does not wish to go back to Keomesheya K. nor does she want to return to Texas.   Rashawnna was initially resistant to taking baths and would flinch but has progressed to taking baths without crying.   She also would stuff food in her mouth and constantly ask for more food.   Her eating habits have since stabilized.   Notably, Rashawnna's behaviors regressed in May 2013 when she received cards from mother.   She became fearful of mother knowing where she resided and felt that foster mother wanted her to be sent to Texas to be beaten.   Rashawnna's demonstrated regression in her behavior which included increased nightmares, head banging, screaming, attempting to choke herself, threatening to kill herself, fighting her teachers and trying to run away from school.   Foster mother has had to rebuild her relationship with Rashawnna and continues to assure that she loves her and wishes to adopt her.   Most concerning, Rashawnna's nightmares returned and she has threatened to harm herself.   She consistently seeks reassurance from foster mother that she will be there for her.   Rashwanna's therapist and her clinical psychologist have recommended that Rashawnna have no contact with mother in light of her extreme reaction to receiving cards from her.

Rashawnna is now at therapeutic level of care and has received a complete psychological evaluation.   She has been referred for play therapy at The Village for Families and Children and has engaged in music therapy.   She is currently attending Kindergarten.   Since attending therapy, Rashawnna's behavior has improved significantly.   She continues to require therapy.

ADJUDICATION OF TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PETITION

Reasonable Efforts

“The hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition ․ In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exists by clear and convincing evidence.   If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase.   In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interest of the child.”  (Citation omitted.)  In re Shaun B., 97 Conn.App. 203, 206, 903 A.2d 246 (2006).   In order to terminate a parent's parental rights under § 17a–112, the petitioner is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that “it has made reasonable efforts to locate the parents and reunify the child with the parent unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts.”  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1);  In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn.App. 819, 837, 863 A.2d 720, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 43 (2005).  “[T]he statute imposes on the department the duty ․ to make reasonable efforts to unite the child or children with the parents.   The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof.   Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act by which the requirement was drawn ․ [R]easonable efforts mean doing everything reasonable, not everything possible ․” (Citation omitted;  emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 361, 776 A.2d 487 (2001).

DCF has proven by clear and convincing evidence that it used reasonable efforts to locate mother and fathers and to reunite them with Rashawnna as contemplated by C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(I).   The evidence clearly establishes that mother and fathers were served.   As noted above, the putative fathers were defaulted for their failure to appear.   Further, mother was properly served.   She “appeared” via telephone conference and was appointed counsel.   Further, mother was aware of the termination of parental rights trial as confirmed by her counsel at the time of trial.   Mother failed to appear for said trial and was defaulted as noted above.

DCF has also proven by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to reunify Rashawnna with mother and the putative fathers.   As noted above, DCF has alleged that it made reasonable and active efforts to reunify the children with mother and father and that, in the alternative, mother and father are unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reunification services.   With regard to mother, most of these efforts were thwarted due to mother's voluntary and continued involvement in the criminal justice system which resulted in her incarcerations.   She has not advised DCF as to whether she has employment or suitable housing.   DCF attempted to have mother engage in her court ordered services but she failed to do so.   The evidence also established that DCF attempted to provide father with services.   Kharon H. has refused to participate in services and has refused to let DCF know of his present whereabouts.   He continues to deny paternity of Rashawnna.   It is clear and convincing to the court that both mother and father are unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.   The court has considered mother's and father's failure to sufficiently address their issues and rehabilitate.   Neither has made significant gains with regard to their ongoing and significant issues.   It is clear and convincing to the court that mother and father do not have the resources to meet the basic needs of their child.   They have been unable to put their child's need ahead of their own and has been unable to do so for a majority of Rashawnna's life.   The court, therefore, finds that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify mother and putative fathers with their daughter.   In the alternative, the court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that, as of the adjudicatory date, mother and father have been unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification.   They will not make any adequate rehabilitative progress in the foreseeable future.   Therefore, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate and reunify as to mother and fathers.

Abandonment

“A parent abandons a child if the parent fails to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child ․ General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(A).   Abandonment focuses on the parent's conduct ․ Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare ․ General Statutes § 17a–112[ (j)(3)(A) ] does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of the child.   A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child.   Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Justice V., 111 Conn.App. 500, 513–14 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 911 (2009).

The clear and convincing evidence shows that mother has abandoned Rashawnna.   Mother placed Rashawnna with Keomesheya K. in 2009 and has not seen her since that time.   She has not provided care on a consistent basis since Rashawnna was 2 years old.   She has been involved in the criminal justice system which has led to at least two incarcerations.   Her actions have led to Rashawnna being subjected to physical abuse and substantial trauma.   As a result, Rashawnna has been in foster care for over a year and a half.   Rashawnna has clearly stated that she does not want any interaction with her mother nor anyone in Texas.   Mother has not provided any financial support to Rashawnna nor has she purchased any clothing or other supplies for her since Rashawnna has been in DCF's care.   She has not participated in Rashawnna's education or shown any interest in her health or welfare.   Most concerning, mother has never asked about Rashawnna's health or welfare since she has been in DCF's care.   Mother has clearly demonstrated by her actions that she has abandoned Rashawnna.

Fathers have clearly abandoned Rashawnna.   Father Kharon H. has not seen Rashawnna since she was 8 months old.   Father has denied that he is her father and has denied knowing mother.   He refuses to take a paternity test.   He has provided no financial support whatsoever for Rashawnna.   He has not purchased any clothing or other supplies for her nor has he ever sent cards, gifts or letters.   He has never acknowledged her birthday or other special days.   He has never participated in her education or shown an interest in her health or welfare.   John Doe has never acknowledged or seen Rashawnna.   He has never provided financial support, has never sent cards, gifts or letters to her nor has he participated in her education or shown an interest in her health or welfare.   Fathers have clearly demonstrate by their actions that they have abandoned Rashawnna.

Failure to Rehabilitate

General Statutes Section 17a–112(j) provides in relevant part “that the court may grant a petition for termination of parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ the child ․ has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ․ and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child ․” “Personal rehabilitation, as used in the statute, refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ [Section 17a–112] requires the court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   In re Jorden T., 119 Conn.App. 748, 755–56, cert. denied, 296 Conn. 905 (2010).  “The statute does not require [the parents] to prove precisely when they will be able to assume a responsible position in [the] child's life.   Nor does it require [the parents] to prove that [they] will be able to assume full responsibility for [their] child, unaided by available support systems.   It requires the court, to find by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation they have achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [they] can assume a responsible position in [their] child's life.”  (Citations omitted;  emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 628, 847 A.2d 883 (2004).   The ultimate question is whether the parent at the time of the filing of the termination petition is more able to resume the responsibilities of a parent than he or she was at the time of the making of the commitment.  In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112 (1992).   In making this determination, the court may properly rely upon events occurring after the date of the petition when considering whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time.  In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230 (2000).   The crux of the adjudicatory ground of failure to rehabilitate is whether a parent has sufficiently addressed the problems and deficiencies in parenting that led to state intervention in the family so that the parent can, considering the age and needs of the child, assume a responsible position in the child's life, or will be able to do so in the reasonably foreseeable future.   What is a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis depending on the age and needs of the particular child.   See In re Shannon S., 41 Conn.Sup. 145, affirmed, 19 Conn.App. 20 (1989).

In light of the statutory elements of this ground as well as the case law interpreting it, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has met its burden as to mother and fathers.   The court finds that Rashawnna was adjudicated neglected on October 10, 2012.   It is quite clear and convincing to the court that, as of the adjudicatory date, neither mother nor fathers have sufficiently rehabilitated themselves to assume a responsible position in Rashawnna's life in view of her age and needs, on that date or in the foreseeable future.   Further, the court finds that mother and father do not have nor have they gained the ability to care for the primary needs of Rashawnna.   As noted above, mother has had ongoing involvement with the criminal justice system resulting in her incarcerations which led to Rashawnna's placement with other individuals and resulting in her placement in the foster care system.   Her subsequent failure to sufficiently benefit from and consistently engage in services offered by DCF is clear and convincing evidence that mother has failed to rehabilitate.   Mother's continued and voluntary involvement with the criminal justice system has rendered her unavailable to care for Rashawnna and has prevented her from engaging in these services.   The court must consider the age and needs of the child.   There has been virtually no improvement in mother's ability to parent her child.   Clearly, she will not be able to assume a responsible position in Rashawnna's life within a reasonable period of time.   The court notes that mother did not present to participate in the termination of parental rights trial by her own choice.   No evidence was presented as to mother's present ability to care for Rashawnna including employment or suitable housing.

As noted above, fathers have not rehabilitated in any manner.   Neither father has stepped forward to acknowledge Rashawnna.   The court ordered specific steps as to father Kharon H. on June 29, 2012 to facilitate Rashawnna's return.   He has not complied with any of these steps.   He denies he is Rashawnna's father.   John Doe has not stepped forward to acknowledge paternity.   Neither father will be able to assume a responsible position in Rashawnna's life within the foreseeable future.   As such, it is quite clear and convincing to the court that, as of the adjudicatory date, neither mother nor father had sufficiently rehabilitated themselves to assume a responsible position in Rashawnna's life in light of her age and needs on that date or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

No Ongoing Parent–Child Relationship

The evidence presented clearly and convincingly proves that mother and fathers have no on-going parent-child relationship with Rashwanna pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D).  “This part of the statute requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis.   First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop ․ In considering whether an on-going parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance ․ The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent ․ Feelings for the natural parent connotes feeling of a positive nature only ․” (Citations omitted;  quotation marks omitted.)  In re Jonathan G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525 (2001).

As noted above, mother has not seen Rashawnna since she was two years of age.   Rashawnna has no positive memories of her.   Indeed, her paramount feeling as to her mother is fear.

She continues to have nightmares concerning the people with whom mother placed her including Keomeysha K. She fears that Keomeysha or mother will be coming to get her.   Further, mother has been advised of Rashawnna's concerning behaviors and the clinical services being provided to her yet she has not once inquired as to her well-being.   She appears not to have any insight as to how emotionally fragile and traumatized Rashawnna is as the result of the care she received here in Connecticut and in Texas.   Thus, it is clear that mother has no ongoing relationship with Rashawnna.   Further, Rashawnna is clearly resistant to any relationship with mother and clearly regresses when this is discussed with her.   It is clear that a substantial amount of time would be needed to attempt to rebuild a relationship with her and it is unlikely that this could be successfully done within a reasonable period of time in this young girl's life.

Both putative fathers are strangers to Rashawnna.   Kharon H. denies he is her father and has not seen her since she was 8 months old.   He refuses to cooperate with DCF. John Doe has not stepped forward to acknowledge paternity.   Neither putative father has an on-going relationship with Rashawnna.   To permit either father additional time to develop a parent-child relationship would clearly not be in Rashawnna's best interest.

Rashawnna has begun to stabilize in her placement.   She has spent the majority of her young life in the care of various relatives and the last year and a half in foster care.   She needs a permanent and stable living arrangement in order to grow and develop in a healthy manner.   She has made progress in her current foster home which provides a structured, safe and loving environment where she is well cared for especially in light of her traumatic history.   She has a loving relationship with her foster family where she feels safe and secure.   Her foster mother loves her and wishes to adopt her.   Rashawnna loves her foster mother and wishes to be adopted by her.   To return Rashawnna to her mother or father would be clearly be detrimental to her physical safety and well-being.   Indeed, to do so would clearly be devastating to Rashawnna and may result in significant serious regressions in her mental status.

Accordingly, in light of the statutory elements of this ground, as well as the case law interpreting it, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has met its burden as to Rashawnna.

DISPOSITION

As our courts have long observed, the deleterious effects of prolonged temporary care is well known.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).  “It is undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships with their parents or foster parents.   There is little that can be as detrimental to a child's sound development as uncertainty ․” Lehman v. Lycoming Country Children's Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513, 102 S.Ct. 3231, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982).

For all of the above reasons, the court, having found by clear and convincing evidence that the necessary statutory grounds alleged by the petitioner for the termination of the parent's parental rights have been proven, the court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in Rashawnna's best interest that her parents' rights be terminated.   The court must now consider and make findings on each of the seven criteria set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(k).

In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, “the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the child.”  In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 356–57 (1994).   During this dispositional phase, “the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent's parental rights is not in the best interest of the child.   In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in § 17a–112[k].”  In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 361–62 (1995).   We note that those “seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered ․ There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”   (Citation omitted.)  In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 261 (2003).

The seven statutory findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows:

1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.

This family has been involved with DCF since June 2012 due to substantiated allegations of physical abuse of Rashawnna.   Mother also has a CPS history in Texas with Rashawnna and her siblings due to allegations of physical neglect, physical abuse and incarcerations which led to Rashawnna being placed in foster care.   Rashawnna has been in foster care since June 28, 2012.   Prior to that time, she was being cared for by various family members and other people.   Mother has not taken care of Rashawnna on a consistent basis since Rashawnna was two years old due to mother's irresponsible behaviors and criminal activities.   Further, mother has been incarcerated for a substantial period of time during the pendency of this case.   Mother was ordered to participate in the following services:  individual therapy, parenting classes, substance abuse evaluation and drug screen.   DCF was not provided with confirmation that mother attended or completed these services.

Putative father Kharon H.'s whereabouts have remained unknown from the inception of the case.   He has contended that he is not Rashawnna's father and that he does not know mother.   He refused to take a paternity test and has had no further contact with DCF. Putative father John Doe has not come forward to be offered services.

2. Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

Reasonable efforts to reunify the child with mother and fathers were made by DCF pursuant to the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980.   Ample services to facilitate the return of Rashwanna to her parents were made.   As noted above, Mother was offered services towards reunification.   In addition, when mother was released from prison on April 26, 2012, DCF submitted an Application for Interstate Compact Home Study on July 31, 2012 to be completed on mother's home in Texas.   This ICPC application was denied because mother was not forthcoming with information and she did not make herself available to the child protective services agency in Texas to complete the home study.   She was also re-incarcerated on September 3, 2012.

Putative father Kharon H. has not come forward to be offered services.   He denies that he is Rashawnna's father and refused to take a paternity test.   Putative father John Doe has not come forward to be offered services.

3. The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order.

As discussed above, mother has not completed her court ordered specific steps.   She was incarcerated on September 3, 2012.   Prior to her incarceration, she failed to provide needed information for the ICPC and she failed to make herself available to the child protective services agency in Texas.   She has failed to fulfill her obligations as ordered by the court.

Putative father has not complied with any of his court ordered specific steps.   He was not been present at any court hearings.   He contends that he is not Rashawnna's father and has refused to take a paternity test.

Putative father John Doe has not come forward to participate in the court proceedings.

4. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person, and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.

Rashawnna has stated to her therapist, DCF worker and foster mother that she does not want any interaction with mother, Keomeysha K. nor anyone in Texas.   Rashawnna continues to have nightmares about Keomeysha K. coming to get her.   When mother was allowed to have telephone calls with Rashawnna, foster mother had to beg Rashawnna to speak with her.   Rashawnna reports that she is afraid of mother and Keomeysha K. She has threatened to kill herself and has attempted to choke herself with a rope and her hands because she fears being sent back to Texas.   Any emotional ties that Rashawnna has with mother are clearly of a negative nature.

Putative father Kharon H. reports that he is not Rashawnna's father and does not know mother.   Rashawnna has not feelings or emotional ties to him.

Putative father John Doe has not come forward to acknowledge paternity and has no relationship with Rashawnna.

Rashawnna is emotionally bonded to her foster mother and her 8–year–old daughter.   She has requested that her last name be changed to foster mother's last name.   Rashawnna has a familial relationship and significant emotional ties with foster mother's extended family.   She is aware that foster mother wants to adopt her and she is excited and happy about it.   She seeks assurance from foster mother that she continues to want to adopt her and loves her.

5. The age of the child

Rashawnna is five years old.   She was born on March 9, 2008.

6. The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.

Mother has made little effort to adjust to her circumstances to permit Rashawnna to safely return to her care.   She continues to have unresolved issues that impede her ability to safely and appropriately care for her daughter.   Mother has advised DCF that she want a relationship with her daughter and wants to be reunified with her.   However, mother's continued involvement with the criminal justice system and resulting incarcerations has limited mother's contact with Rashwanna.   Mother moved to two new prisons without notice to DCF which prevented mother from receiving pictures of Rashawnna sent by foster mother as well as telephone calls from Rashawnna.   DCF did write to mother in response to her some of her letters which included cards for Rashawnna.   However, due to setbacks suffered by Rashawnna after receiving two of mother's cards, DCF is following the clinical recommendation that Rashawnna not have any contact with mother until she is emotionally stable and seeks contact.   Foster mother continues to send photos of Rashawnna to mother as she has been directed to do.   Notably, in her correspondence to DCF, mother has not once asked about Rashawnna's well-being, behaviors and progress with treatment.

Putative father Kharon H. has made no attempt to contact Rashawnna as he reports he is not her father.

Putative father has made no attempts to contact Rashawnna and his identity and whereabouts remain unknown.

7. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.

No unreasonable act or conduct of any person or the other parent has prevented the parents from a meaningful relationship with their child.   DCF has encouraged mother and father to maintain a meaningful relationship with their child.   The economic circumstances of mother and father have not prevented them from having a relationship or visits with Rashawnna.   Mother and father were offered programs at no cost to assist them with their issues.   There has been no claim that mother and father were unable to obtain services due to lack of financial resources.   Legal counsel was appointed for mother at no cost to her.   Mother's conduct has rendered her unavailable to Rashawnna thereby preventing her from maintaining a meaningful relationship with her.   She has not taken care of Rashawnna on a consistent basis since she was two years old due to mother's irresponsible behavior and her ongoing involvement in criminal activities.   As a result, Rashawnna has had multiple caretakers throughout her young life, some of whom have left Rashawnna physically and emotionally scarred.

Putative father Kharon H. denies he is Rashawnna's father and this has prevented him from having a meaningful relationship with Rashawnna.   He has refused to take a paternity test and has had no contact with DCF.

Putative father John Doe has not come forward to acknowledge paternity of Rashawnna which has prevented him from maintaining a meaningful relationship with her.

BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD

The court must now address the issue of whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.   The best interest standard is inherently flexible and fact specific, giving the court broad discretion to consider all the different and individualized factors that might affect the specific child's welfare.   The factors to be considered in deciding whether it would be in the best interest of a child to permit further time for a relationship with her parent to develop include “(1) the length of stay with the foster parents, (2) the nature of the child and relationship with the foster parents, (3) the degree of contact maintained with the natural parent and (4) the nature of the child's relationship with his or her natural parent.”  In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 22 (1993).   In considering all the above noted factors and after weighing all of the evidence, the court finds that the clear and convincing evidence has established termination of the respondent parents' parental rights is in the best interest of Rashawnna.   It is clear that mother and father are in no better position today to provide for Rashawnna than they were at the time of the her removal.   The problems that led to the removal have not been rectified and the prospects of improvement particularly with regard to mother's ongoing criminal activity.   Mother and fathers have failed to consistently avail themselves of available services in order to improve their circumstances to the point where they can assume a responsible role in the lives of their child.   Both mother and fathers have failed to understand the impact their behaviors have on their child's physical and emotional needs.   They have not been able to put their child's interests ahead of their own.   Clearly, neither mother nor fathers are a resource for their daughter.   Rashwanna needs a permanent and stable living arrangement in order to grow and develop in a healthy manner.   This conclusion is supported by the testimony and evidence presented at the time of trial.

Rashawnna's needs are those of all children.   She has an interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, and a continuous, stable environment.   She has this with her foster family.   Mother will continue to need substantial help to maintain herself with no reasonable prospect for success in the foreseeable future especially with regard to her involvement with the criminal justice system.   Neither putative father has come forward.   Rashawnna has experienced significant trauma in her short lifetime.   She should not be required to wait into the indefinite future for mother to address her issues that have prevented her from parenting Rashawnna for the majority of her life.   The child's attorney recommends termination of parental rights and the court agrees.   DCF has proven by clear and convincing evidence that it is in Rashawnna's best interest to terminate the parental rights of her parents.

It is accordingly ORDERED that the parental rights of Amie D., Kharon H. and John Doe are TERMINATED as to their child Rashawnna D.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, based upon the foregoing findings and having considered all of the evidence, after due consideration of the child's need for a secure, permanent placement, the totality of the circumstances, and having considered all statutory criteria, and having found by clear and convincing evidence that efforts at reunification with mother and father were made, that the parents were and continue to be unable or unwilling to benefit from those efforts, and that further efforts are no longer required, that grounds exist to terminate mother's and fathers' parental rights as alleged, and that it is in the child's best interest to do so, it is accordingly ordered:

That the parental rights of the respondent mother Amie D., the respondent fathers, Kharon H. and John Doe, are hereby terminated as to their child, Rashawnna D., born March 9, 2008;

That the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed statutory parent of the child for the purpose of securing the child's adoption as expeditiously as possible;

That a written report of the plan for the child shall be submitted to the court within thirty days, and such further reports shall be timely filed and presented to the court as required by law;

The Clerk of the Probate Court which has jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of Rashawnna shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford when and if any such adoption is finalized, or DCF shall file a Petition for Adoption with the Superior Court.

Judgment shall enter accordingly.

BY THE COURT

BURGDORFF, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The trial court may take judicial notice of relevant court actions.   In re Amanda A., 58 Conn.App. 451, 452–53 (2000)..  FN1. The trial court may take judicial notice of relevant court actions.   In re Amanda A., 58 Conn.App. 451, 452–53 (2000).

Burgdorff, Mary–Margaret D., J.