Frank Altmon, Administrator of the Estate of Pamela Winston v. Michael J. Ploch, Jr. et al. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This case arises from a motor vehicle collision on September 28, 2012 on Middlebury Rd. in Waterbury, Connecticut.   The plaintiff as administrator of the Estate of Pamela Winston brought suit to recover damages for personal injuries and death allegedly sustained in the accident.   At issue in the defendants' Motion to Strike are Count Two alleging common-law recklessness against defendant Ploch and by agreement and implication Count Three of the complaint alleging statutory recklessness.¹

The parties recognize that there is a split in authority among the Superior Courts regarding the standard necessary to sustain Connecticut General Statute § 14–295 claim of recklessness against a defendant's motion to strike such a count.

Plaintiff further alleges that the defendant violated certain statutes §§ 14–218a, 14–219, 14–222 et al. which constitute recklessness under Connecticut General Statutes § 14–295.

The court is relying on Practice Book § 10–25 which allows the plaintiff to plead in the alternative, sounding in both negligence and recklessness.   Robbins v. Gondek, 2008 Conn.Super. Lexis 650 5–6 (March 18, 2008);  Hand v. Moore, 2005 Conn.Super. Lexis 2657 (September 26, 2005) [40 Conn. L. Rptr. 83].   In this case, the Court adopts the majority position concerning any claims of recklessness.

Therefore the allegations contained in the Second and Third Counts are on their face, legally sufficient to survive the defendants' Motion to Strike.   Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 321 (2003).

Therefore the defendants' Motion to Strike Count Two and Three of the complaint is hereby denied.

BY THE COURT

V. ROCHE, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The defendant expanded its motion to strike to include Count Three of the complaint in its Reply Memo (# 106)..  FN1. The defendant expanded its motion to strike to include Count Three of the complaint in its Reply Memo (# 106).

Roche, Vincent E., J.