Laura A. Thorp v. Andrew Thorp (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR ORDER # 143

A review of the record reveals that the parties were divorced pursuant to an agreement dated April 10, 1995.   Under a paragraph captioned “IV. Property distribution” the parties agreed that “the plaintiff shall receive by way of a property settlement twenty percent of that amount of defendant's pension with the town of Wallingford which accumulated through the years of the marriage.”   (Emphasis provided.)

The defendant, through his attorney, filed a motion for order seeking that the court dissolve and/or release the qualified domestic relations order issued in the matter on June 25, 1995 because the plaintiff is now deceased and the defendant, now retiring, “wishes to access full benefits through the town of Wallingford's employee pension plan.”

The defendant appeared to argue this motion in the absence of his attorney on December 9, 2013.   The court urged the defendant, more than once, to rely on his attorney and not argue this motion as a self-represented litigant but the defendant insisted.   When questioned, the defendant admitted that he had no legal authority to support the relief requested.   The court expressed doubts that it could or should issue what amounts to a postjudgment modification of a property settlement.   The defendant urged the court to rule on the pending motion so that he need not return to court or involve his attorney.

In an effort to protect the defendant from his own lack of legal education, the court gave the defendant 30 days within which to file a memorandum of law in support of his position.   He filed no such document.

Although this motion was captioned “motion for order” it is in reality a motion to modify the property settlement granting to the wife 20% of the pension.   It is black letter law that postjudgment modifications of a property distribution are not permitted.  “A court, therefore, does not have the authority to modify the division of property once the dissolution becomes final ․” Stechel v. Foster, 125 Conn.App. 441, 446–47 (2010).   The court was presented with no facts or law suggesting an exception to this rule.   If the wife was awarded 20% of another asset and thereafter passed away, her share would not simply go to her ex-spouse, it would go to her estate.   The court sees no difference in this circumstance.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion is denied.

BY THE COURT

Kenneth L. Shluger, Judge

Shluger, Kenneth L., J.