Southport Congregational Church–United Church of Christ v. Betty Ann Hadley, Executor of Estate of Albert L. Hadley (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTER CLAIM (Motion # 123.00)

Introduction and Procedural Background

This matter is an appeal from a decision of the Fairfield Probate Court pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. 45a–186.   The present case is one of two appeals from probate involving the disposition of property of the estate of Albert L. Hadley, referenced herein as Probate No. 1 and No. 2. The parties are Southport Congregational Church, the United Church of Christ (the “Church”), appellants/defendants Betty Anne Hadley and Lee Snow, co-executors of the estate of Albert L. Hadley (“Co–Executors”) and Cheekwood Botanical Garden & Museum of Art (“Cheekwood”).   By way of history, Probate No. 1 was an appeal from the July 24, 2012 decree of the Fairfield Probate Court authorizing sale by the co-executors of certain real property which was owned by Mr. Hadley at the time of his death.   Following the July 12 decree, the Church filed a motion to reargue in the Probate Court and an appeal to the Superior Court.   On August 15, 2012, the Fairfield Probate Court issued an amended decree approving the subject sale subject to the approval of the Church.   On January 18, 2013, the Probate Court vacated the amended decree and reinstated the July 12, 2012 decree which authorized the sale of the subject property without the consent of the Church.   The Church has filed an appeal of that decision which is presently pending in the Appellate Court, on the issue of whether the Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction.

This action is the appeal by the Church of the January 18, 2013 probate decree.   The defendants have filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment consistent with its position in the previous case.   The Church maintains that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear a counterclaim for declaratory judgment, or any counterclaim, for that matter, because this proceeding is not a civil action, but rather, an appeal from probate pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. 45a–186.

The submissions by both sides are extensive, supplemented by transcripts of hearings conducted by Judge Radcliffe as well as orders issued by Judge Radcliffe.   Included among, in fact integral to the opposition of Cheekwood are extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law following the December 12, 2012 hearing which contain Judge Radcliffe's analysis of the relevant statutes and the threshold issue of jurisdiction.   In addition, Cheekwood also relies on Judge Radcliffe's order in which he granted Cheekwood's motion for summary judgment over the Church's objection on September 30, 2013.

CONCLUSION

Based on its review of the procedural history of this case and the related action, this court concludes that this is a case where the court will, in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency, exercise its broad discretion power to manage the docket by transferring the case from Judge Sommer to Judge Radcliffe.  “[T]rial courts have the authority to manage cases before [them] as necessary ․ Deference is afforded to the trial court in making case management decisions because it is in a much better position to determine the effect that a particular procedure will have on both parties ․ The case management authority is an inherent power necessarily vested in trial courts to manage their own affairs in order to achieve the expeditious disposition of cases ․ The ability of trial judges to manage cases is essential to judicial economy and justice ․ We will not disturb a trial court's decision regarding case management unless after carefully examining the factual circumstances of the case, we determine that there was an abuse of discretion ․ Abuse is not present if discretion is not exercised arbitrarily or willfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law, and [it is] directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Tate v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV–10–6011127–S (October 15, 2013, Sommer, J.), citing State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106, 256–57, 864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert. denied, Colon v. Connecticut, 546 U.S. 848, 126 S.Ct. 102, 163 L.Ed.2d 116 (2005).

It should also be noted that, contrary to the plaintiff's argument in the present case, the appeal of a final judgment does not preclude the applicability of collateral estoppel.  “The fundamental principles underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel are well established.   The common-law doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, embodies a judicial policy in favor of judicial economy, the stability of former judgments and finality.  State v. Ellis, 197 Conn. 436, 466, 497 A.2d 974 (1985), on appeal after remand sub nom.  State v. Paradise, 213 Conn. 388, 567 A.2d 1221 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Walsh v. Stonington Water Pollution Control Authority, 250 Conn. 443, 460, 736 A.2d 811 (1999).   Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is that aspect of res judicata which prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action between the same parties upon a different claim ․ In re Juvenile Appeal (83–DE), 190 Conn. 310, 316, 460 A.2d 1277 (1983).   For an issue to be subject to collateral estoppel, it must have been fully and fairly litigated in the first action.   It also must have been actually decided and the decision must have been necessary to the judgment ․ Virgo v. Lyons, 209 Conn. 497, 501, 551 A.2d 1243 (1988);  see also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970);  State v. Hope, 215 Conn. 570, 584, 577 A.2d 1000 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1089, 111 S.Ct. 968, 112 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1991).   An issue is actually litigated if it is properly raised in the pleadings or otherwise, submitted for determination, and in fact determined ․ 1 Restatement (Second), Judgments § 27, comment (d) (1982).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Lafayette v. General Dynamics Corp., 255 Conn. 762, 772–73, 770 A.2d 1 (2001).

“When it comes to collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, the Restatement is even more flexible, providing that final judgment includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Wargo v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. 95–470677 (August 31, 2011, Shortall, J.) (30 Conn. L. Rptr. 340).   The granting of summary judgment, as done here in probate appeal one by Judge Radcliffe, constitutes a valid final judgment on this issue, allowing for application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.   Nelson v. Dettmer, 305 Conn. 654, 674, 46 A.3d 916 (2012) (“A decision granting a motion for summary judgment would satisfy this definition of ‘judgment’ as summary judgment is a final judgment”).

ORDER

It is thus ordered that the Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim No. 123 and related pleadings be referred to the Hon. Dale Radcliffe for adjudication consistent with the court's prior rulings in this case.

SOMMER, J.

Sommer, Mary E., J.