Mark Heinonen v. Martin Landgrebe, Judge et al. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (# 127)

This is an action styled as an appeal from probate by the plaintiff Mark Heinonen.   Specifically, the plaintiff is appealing from “The Probate Decree—For Sale or Mortgage of Real Property.”   The probate decree which is the subject of this complaint was issued by the Probate Court for the Housatonic Probate District (f/k/a/ District of New Fairfield/Sherman) on December 28, 2011, authorizing the executor to sell the real property located on Route 138 in the town of Sherman (“the Property”).   The defendants are Martin Landgrebe, the probate judge who issued the decree to sell;  James Powers, attorney;  John Tower, attorney;  and Karl Heinonen.

BACKGROUND

This action is one in a long line of cases brought by the plaintiff to contest the disposition by the New Fairfield/Sherman Probate Court of the assets of the estate of Barbara H. Scott, the plaintiff Mark Heinonen's late mother, who died on December 1, 2006.   The principal asset of her estate is the Property referred to above.   The summons and complaint in this matter were filed with the Danbury Superior Court on February 9, 2012.

The forty-nine (49)-page complaint contains numerous allegations of error and fraud on the part of the defendants including Judge Landgrebe and Attorneys Powers and Tower, some involving conduct as far back as November 2006, prior to the death of Barbara Scott.

The plaintiff did attach what purports to be two decrees of the Housatonic Regional Probate Court, both dated December 28, 2006.   The first is a decree for sale of the Property in which it was expressly noted that “the will of the said deceased (Scott) does not prohibit the sale or mortgage of said property.”   The second decree references the Court's awareness of Mark Heinonen's declination to receive his interest in the Property and his transfer of that interest to his three children via an irrevocable trust.

The balance of the complaint consists of numerous personal correspondence and drafts of pleadings addressed to the Probate Court outlining the plaintiff's claims of conspiracy by the defendants to deprive him and his children of their home and estate.

Also appended are copies of portions of the irrevocable trust to his children and excerpts from his complaints in three prior civil cases made returnable to the Danbury Superior Court in which the named defendants are Arthur Scott, Benjamin Keeney and James Powers.

MOTION TO DISMISS

The defendants have moved the court to dismiss the instant action on one or more of five grounds:  lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of:  (I) plaintiff's lack of standing;  (II) nonjusticiability and/or mootness;  (III) res judicata and/or collateral estoppel;  (IV) the impropriety of the plaintiff's attempt to seek a violation of Conn. Gen. Statutes Sec. 45a–128(b) and or 45a–24 revocation of decrees authorizing the sale of real estate;  and (V) an untimely appeal of prior Probate Court decrees.   In support of their motion to dismiss, the defendants have provided the court with a memorandum of law in support of the motion, a request for judicial notice (Conn.Code of Evidence Sections 2–1 and 2–2), exhibits including certified copies of documents from the Housatonic Regional Probate Court and an affidavit of defendant James Powers.

“A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.  Blumenthal v. Barnes, 261 Conn. 434, 442 (2002).  “In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.”  Brookridge District Ass'n v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 607, 611 (2002).  “Where ․ the motion is accompanied by supporting affidavits containing undisputed facts, the court may look to their content for determination of the jurisdictional issue and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint.”  Ferreira v. Pringle, 255 Conn. 330, 346–47 (2001).  “A ruling on a motion to dismiss is neither a ruling on the merits of the action ․ nor a test of whether the complaint states a cause of action ․ Motions to dismiss are granted solely on jurisdictional grounds.”  Pitruzello v. Muro, 70 Conn.App. 309, 312 (2002).

“A motion to dismiss ․ properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.”  Bacon Construction Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 294 Conn. 695, 706 (2010).

LACK OF STANDING

The defendants maintain that the plaintiff, Mark Heinonen, by his own testimony, has conceded that at the time of the decree to sell the Property he had declined his interest in the Property and had conveyed away any right or title he may have had to it in the form of an irrevocable trust in which his three children were the beneficiaries.

“Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion.   One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless [one] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action ․ Ardmare Construction Co. v. Freedman, 191 Conn. 497, 501, 467 A.2d 674 (1983).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Tomlinson v. Board of Education, 226 Conn. 704, 717, 629 A.2d 333 (1993).   Standing focuses on whether the party initiating the action is the proper party to request adjudication of the issues.  Nye v. Marcus, 198 Conn. 138, 141, 502 A.2d 869 (1985).   In general, a party does not have standing to raise rights belonging to another.  Third Taxing District v. Lyons, 35 Conn.App. 795, 798, 647 A.2d 32, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 936, 650 A.2d 173 (1994).

Based upon the facts in the instant case, the court finds that at the time of the probate decree complained of, the plaintiff was not the owner of the Property and is without standing to bring this action.

For the forgoing reason, the defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.   The court, having so ruled, has not made any findings regarding the four remaining grounds to dismiss cited by the movants.

BY THE COURT,

JOSEPH W. DOHERTY, JUDGE

Doherty, Joseph W., J.