Christine Hemingway v. Stanley Battle et al. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS (# 101)

FACTS

The plaintiff, Christine Hemingway, filed a one-count complaint in this action on December 2, 2011, against the defendants, Stanley Battle, Jaye Bailey, and Amanda Salvo.   In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts.   The plaintiff was a student and full-time employee at Southern Connecticut State University (SCSU).   On May 4, 2010, the defendant Bailey notified the plaintiff that her employment was being terminated at the close of the business day on May 19, 2010.   At the time of her termination, the defendants Salvo and Bailey informed the plaintiff that she would not be permitted on the campus for any reason, even to attend class or to retrieve her grades.   As a result, the plaintiff's education has been interrupted and she has been denied the benefit of credit for the academic work she performed prior to May 2010.   The plaintiff now seeks a temporary and permanent injunction, requiring the defendants to permit the plaintiff on campus for academic purposes, and damages.

On April 26, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, accompanied by a memorandum of law, on the grounds that sovereign immunity applies and that the plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that an exception to the doctrine is applicable.   The plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to dismiss on May 13, 2013, along with a memorandum of law.   The defendants filed a reply to the plaintiff's objection on September 11, 2013.   This matter was heard at short calendar on September 23, 2013.

DISCUSSION

“[A] motion to dismiss ․ properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).  “A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301 Conn. 759, 774, 23 A.3d 1192 (2011).  “The grounds which may be asserted in [a motion to dismiss] are:  (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;  (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person;  (3) improper venue;  (4) insufficiency of process;  and (5) insufficiency of service of process.”  Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 687, 490 A.2d 509 (1985), citing Practice Book § 143, which is now § 10–31.

“[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003).  “[I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ․ clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 303 Conn. 402, 413–14, 35 A.3d 188 (2012).  “[I]t is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Keller v. Beckenstein, 305 Conn. 523, 531, 46 A.3d 102 (2012).

The defendants argue that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking in that sovereign immunity applies and that the plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that an exception to the doctrine applies.   The plaintiff counters that sovereign immunity does not apply because the defendants acted in excess of their statutory authority while acting in their official capacity.¹

“[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011).  “Claims involving the doctrines of common-law sovereign immunity and statutory immunity, pursuant to [General Statutes] § 4–165, implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Kelly v. Albertsen, 114 Conn.App. 600, 605, 970 A.2d 787 (2009).   Accordingly, “a motion to dismiss is the appropriate procedural vehicle to raise a claim that sovereign immunity [or statutory immunity] bars the action.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Manifold v. Ragaglia, 94 Conn.App. 103, 116, 891 A.2d 106 (2006).

Regarding the common-law exceptions to sovereign immunity, “[i]n the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of these exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is proper.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Markley v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 301 Conn. 56, 66, 23 A.3d 668 (2011).   Similarly, “[l]ack of a statutory waiver of [sovereign] immunity is a jurisdictional defect properly raised by a motion to dismiss.”  Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 650, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).

The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law ․ It has deep roots in this state and our legal system in general, finding its origin in ancient common law ․ Not only have we recognized the state's immunity as an entity, but [w]e have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state ․ Exceptions to this doctrine are few and narrowly construed under our jurisprudence ․ [T]his court has recognized the well established principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed ․ [When] there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity.”  Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, supra, 303 Conn. 456–57.

“The presumption of sovereign immunity is not absolute and may be overcome (1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state's sovereign immunity ․ (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer's statutory authority.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, supra, 303 Conn. 457.  “In the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of these exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is proper.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Markley v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, supra, 301 Conn. 66.

The Supreme Court has imposed specific pleading requirements for claims made under the exceptions to sovereign immunity.  “When a plaintiff brings an action for money damages against the state [under the first exception], he must proceed through the office of the claims commissioner pursuant to chapter 53 of the General Statutes, §§ 4–141 through 4–165.   Otherwise, the action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.   This is the case even if the claims are brought pursuant to the United States constitution.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 723, 937 A.2d 675 (2007).   In the present case, the first exception to sovereign immunity does not apply as the legislature has not authorized a direct suit against the state in this instance.

“For a claim made pursuant to the second exception, complaining of unconstitutional acts, [the Supreme Court requires] that [t]he allegations of such a complaint and the factual underpinnings if placed in issue, must clearly demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally protected interests.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 350, 977 A.2d 636 (2009).   The plaintiff's complaint alleges that the defendants, who were all employees of SCSU, wrongfully excluded the plaintiff from entering the campus, thereby interrupting her academic education, depriving her from receiving credit for completed courses, and causing her to suffer economic losses and emotional distress.   Here, the second exception does not apply as the plaintiff does not allege constitutional violations and the facts, as alleged, do not give rise to a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

“For a claim under the third exception [to sovereign immunity], the plaintiffs must do more than allege that the defendants' conduct was in excess of their statutory authority;  they also must allege or otherwise establish facts that reasonably support those allegations ․ In the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of these exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is proper.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, supra, 303 Conn. 460.   Here, the third exception also does not apply because the plaintiff has failed to allege that the defendants acted outside of their statutory authority.   Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that “she was informed by defendants Salvo and Bailey that she would not thereafter be permitted on the campus for any reason, even to attend class or to retrieve her grades.”   As a result of this, “the plaintiff's education has been interrupted through no academic fault of hers and she has been denied the benefit of credit for the academic work she performed ․” These facts, as alleged, are insufficient under the third exception to give rise to an allegation that the defendants acted outside of their statutory authority.   Such allegations by the plaintiff do not set forth facts “of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer's statutory authority.”  Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, supra, 303 Conn. 460.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.

Wilson, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiff concedes that the suit is brought against the defendants in their official capacities in her reply brief to the defendants' motion to dismiss.   Therefore, the court need not consider whether the action against the defendants in their individual capacities is barred by General Statutes § 4–165, which states, in relevant part:  “No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his or her duties or within the scope of his or her employment.   Any person having a complaint for such damage or injury shall present it as a claim against the state under the provisions of this chapter.”.  FN1. The plaintiff concedes that the suit is brought against the defendants in their official capacities in her reply brief to the defendants' motion to dismiss.   Therefore, the court need not consider whether the action against the defendants in their individual capacities is barred by General Statutes § 4–165, which states, in relevant part:  “No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his or her duties or within the scope of his or her employment.   Any person having a complaint for such damage or injury shall present it as a claim against the state under the provisions of this chapter.”

Wilson, Robin L., J.