Karen DeLillo v. Esad Bekric et al. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO SERVE NON–STANDARD REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION # 146, MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER # 148 AND MOTION TO QUASH # 149

On March 9, 2010, the plaintiff, Karen DeLillo, commenced this action against the defendants, Esad Bekric, Dee Zee Transportation, LLC (Dee Zee), and Allstate Insurance Company, to recover for the injuries she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident.   In the complaint, the plaintiff claims that she was operating her motor vehicle when she was struck by another vehicle driven by Bekric, who, at the time, was acting as an agent for Dee Zee. The plaintiff alleges that as a result of the collision caused by the negligence and recklessness of Bekric, the plaintiff sustained mental suffering and a multitude of physical injuries.   On October 11, 2013, Bekric moved for permission to file non-standard requests for production in order to obtain the records, reports, and bills of Dr. Dana Gionta, who at all relevant times served as the plaintiff's treating psychologist.   On October 24, 2013, the plaintiff filed an objection wherein she claims that such documents are not discoverable and, further, that the disclosure thereof could impinge upon the psychologist and patient relationship and ultimately be detrimental to the mental health of the plaintiff.   The plaintiff also filed a motion for protective order regarding the proposed deposition of Dr. Gionta and a motion to quash the subpoena to be served upon Dr. Gionta, the keeper of records.   On November 8, 2013, Bekric filed objections thereto.   The court heard argument on these motions and objections at short calendar on November 12, 2013.

The Supreme Court has “long recognized that the granting or denial of a discovery request rests in the sound discretion of the [trial] court ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 280 Conn. 1, 16–17, 905 A.2d 55 (2006).  General Statutes § 52–146c governs the disclosure of communications between psychologists and their patients and generally requires consent of the individual who consults a psychologist for purposes of diagnosis or treatment in order for such communications to be disclosed.   Subsection (c), however, provides for exceptions to this general rule.   Subsection (c)(2) provides that consent is not required “[i]f, in a civil proceeding, a person introduces his psychological condition as an element of his claim or defense or, after a person's death, his condition is introduced by a party claiming or defending through or as a beneficiary of the person, and the judge finds that it is more important to the interests of justice that the communications be disclosed than that the relationship between the person and psychologist be protected ․” General Statutes § 52–146c(c)(2).

In the present case, the plaintiff has undoubtably placed her psychological condition as an element of her claims for negligence and recklessness.   The plaintiff's complaint alleges that she experienced mental suffering as a result of the collision and, as a component of her claim for mental suffering, she claims to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder.   Inasmuch as the plaintiff has placed her psychological condition at issue and the defendants must defend against the plaintiff's claims of mental suffering, the court finds that the interests of justice favor disclosure of Dr. Gionta's records and reports relating to her treatment of the plaintiff over the preservation of the psychologist and patient relationship.   See Levine v. Diaz, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia–Milford, Docket No. CV–99–0067457–S (December 4, 2003, Moran, J.) (36 Conn. L. Rptr. 137, 138) (granting the defendant's motion to compel the plaintiff to answer questions regarding her psychiatric and psychological history and treatment because the plaintiff put her psychological condition at issue by claiming an injury of headaches, which, “by their very nature, originate in the head and therefore have a mental and psychological component”);  Kerzner v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV–98–0488926–S (January 30, 2002, Berger, J.) (31 Conn. L. Rptr. 377) (denying the plaintiff's motion for protective order because the plaintiff placed his psychological condition at issue by seeking damages for pain and suffering);  Kelly v. Giguere, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV–99–69450–S (December 19, 2000, Sferrazza, J.) (denying the plaintiff's motion to quash and for protective order in part because the plaintiff placed her mental status and history in issue by claiming that a motor vehicle accident caused her head trauma, which resulted in symptoms concerning depression, mental distress, loss of concentration, anxiety, and sleep disruption);  Padgett v. Capitol West Associates, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford–New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV–91–397573–S (December 30, 1992, Aurigemma, J.) (8 Conn. L. Rptr. 161) (ordering the plaintiff to respond to the defendant's interrogatory and to disclose records relating to the plaintiff's prior psychiatric and psychological treatment because the plaintiff placed her mental condition at issue by seeking recovery for psychological and drug counseling).   Based on the foregoing, Bekric's motion to serve non-standard requests for production is granted and the plaintiff's motion for protective order and motion to quash are hereby denied.

BY THE COUR

Jack W. Fischer, Judge

Fischer, Jack W., J.