Sheila Hall, Co–Administrator of the Estate of Kenneth R. Hall et al. v. CAMRAC LLC (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Pursuant to Practice Book § 17–49, the defendants, CAMRAC, LLC d/b/a Enterprise Rent–A–Car (“CAMRAC”) and EAN Holdings, LLC (“EAN Holdings”) have moved for summary judgment against the plaintiff, Sheila and Tyco Hall, co-administrators of the Estate of Kenneth R. Hall, and Sheila Hall, individually.   For the reasons set forth below, summary judgment is granted.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 2, 2010, the plaintiffs' decedent, State Trooper Kenneth R. Hall, was tragically killed in the line of duty.   Trooper Hall had stopped a vehicle on Interstate 91 for an infraction and was in his police cruiser on the shoulder of the highway writing a summons when a 2010 Dodge Ram pickup rented from the defendant CAMRAC and driven by Michael Pajak left the traveled portion of the highway and collided with Trooper Hall's cruiser, causing his death.

The operative facts are largely undisputed.   The Police Accident Report listed EAN Holdings, LLC as the owner of the 2010 Dodge Ram pickup.   CAMRAC and EAN are “affiliated” companies—although the exact nature of the corporate relationship is not specified.   CAMRAC entered into a written agreement with Michael Pajak for the rental of the vehicle on August 27, 2010.   It is undisputed that on August 27, 2010 Pajak was in possession of and presented to the CAMRAC employee a facially valid and unexpired driver's license.   The CAMRAC employee, Seth Peckham, has stated in an affidavit that he inspected the license, verified that it was facially valid and unexpired, and compared the signature on the license to the rental agreement that Pajak had signed in Peckham's presence.

It also appears undisputed that, at the time he rented the vehicle from CAMRAC, Michael Pajak had a driving history and criminal record marked by at least one conviction for driving under the influence, narcotic-related convictions (not involving operation of a motor vehicle), and multiple administrative license suspensions (at least one of which was related to driving under the influence).   Pajak's license had been restored only five months before he rented the vehicle from CAMRAC.   At the time of the collision with the decedent's vehicle, it was reported that Michael Pajak was under the influence of illegal drugs and alcohol.

In their revised January 8, 2013 complaint, the plaintiffs assert negligent entrustment and loss of consortium claims in four counts against defendants CAMRAC and EAN Holdings.   The First Count is brought against CAMRAC, alleging that it is in the business of renting motor vehicles, and that on August 27, 2010, it “entered into a contractual agreement” to rent a 2010 Dodge Ram to Michael Pajak.  (Complaint, First Count ¶ 3.)   The plaintiffs allege that CAMRAC had a duty to “take reasonable and sufficient steps to ensure it was not renting or leasing motor vehicles to individuals, which it knew, or should have known, posed an increased risk of causing harm to others through unsafe operation of the motor vehicle.”  (Complaint, First Count ¶ 7.)

The plaintiffs further allege that if CAMRAC had reviewed Pajak's driving and criminal conviction record at the time of the August 27, 2010 rental, it would have learned of his “multiple license suspensions, DUI and narcotics-related convictions,” and concluded that he had “dangerous propensities which posed an increased risk” of injury to the public at large.  (Complaint, First Count ¶ 8.)   The plaintiffs allege that CAMRAC was negligent in failing to require Pajak to disclose his past motor vehicle convictions and license suspensions or revocations, failing to screen his driving history, failing to require a credit card with rental, and permitting Pajak to rent a vehicle when it knew or should have known that “he had an unsafe driving history.”  (Complaint, First Count ¶ 10.)

The Third Count is brought against EAN Holdings.   The plaintiffs allege that EAN Holdings “owned” the 2010 Dodge Ram pickup that was rented to Michael Pajak.   Other than ownership of the vehicle in question, the plaintiffs allege no other role by EAN Holdings in the August 27, 2010 transaction whereby the vehicle was leased to Pajak.

The negligence allegations against EAN Holdings are identical to those against CAMRAC, alleging that EAN Holdings failed to “take reasonable and sufficient steps to ensure its motor vehicles were not rented or leased to individuals, which it knew, or should have known, posed an increased risk of causing harm to others through unsafe operation of the motor vehicle” (Complaint, Third Count ¶ 7);  that if EAN Holdings had reviewed Pajak's driving and criminal conviction record at the time of the August 27, 2010 rental, it would have concluded that he had “dangerous propensities which posed an increased risk” of injury to the public at large (Complaint, Third Count ¶ 8);  and that EAN Holdings was negligent in failing to require Pajak to disclose his past motor vehicle convictions and license suspensions or revocations, failing to screen his driving history, failing to require a credit card with rental, and permitting Pajak to rent a vehicle when it knew or should have known that “he had an unsafe driving history.”  (Complaint, Third Count ¶ 10.)

The Second and Fourth Counts are loss of consortium claims brought against CAMRAC and EAN Holdings, respectively.

The defendants have moved for summary judgment as to all the plaintiffs' claims, advancing the following arguments:

the plaintiffs' negligent entrustment claims are insufficient as a matter of law because Pajak's alleged incompetence to operate a motor vehicle was not readily apparent and the defendants had no duty to investigate his driving or criminal history.

General Statutes § 14–153 defines the scope of the duty of care with respect to the lease or rental of a motor vehicle and, based on the undisputed facts, the defendant CAMRAC has complied with that statutory duty.

There is no genuine issue of material fact that the defendant EAN Holdings did not participate in the rental transaction and cannot be liable to the plaintiffs on a theory of negligent entrustment because it did not “entrust” the vehicle to Pajak.

Plaintiff Sheila Hall's loss of consortium claims are derivative of the negligent entrustment claim.

In opposition to the motion, the plaintiffs argue that

The cause of action for negligent entrustment includes an obligation to acquire facts.

It cannot be said as a matter of law that the obligation to acquire facts in connection with rental of a motor vehicle is satisfied by merely examining the proposed renter's driver's license issued by the State of Connecticut.

Whether the defendants exercised reasonable diligence to acquire facts is a question best left to the jury.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment, Generally

Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law.  Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318, 901 A.2d 1207 (2006).  “A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  United Oil Co. v. Urban Development Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 379, 260 A.2d 596 (1969).

“[T]he use of a motion for summary judgment to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint is appropriate when the complaint fails to set forth a cause of action and the defendant can establish that the defect could not be cured by repleading.”  Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 401, 876 A.2d 522 (2005).   While breach of duty and proximate cause generally involve mixed questions of fact and law best left to trial, Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Constitution National Bank, 167 Conn. 478, 482, 356 A.2d 117 (1975);  Spencer v. Good Earth Restaurant Corp., 164 Conn. at 198, the existence of a duty is a question of law that the court can decide upon motion for summary judgment Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 151, 444 A.2d 1379 (1982).

B. The Graves Amendment

The defendants argue that the plaintiffs' claims are preempted by the Graves Amendment.¹  The Graves Amendment prohibits the imposition of vicarious liability by any state on the lessors of motor vehicles for injury resulting from the use, operation or possession of a rental vehicle during the period of the rental.

The plaintiffs counter that their claims fall under the exemption from preemption in 49 USCS § 30106(a)(2) because they have put forth sufficient evidence to show that the defendants were negligent in renting the vehicle to Pajak.   The plaintiffs contend that the defendants had a duty to inquire into Pajak's criminal record and driving history which they breached by failing to make any inquiry at all.   The plaintiffs maintain that, had the defendants made an inquiry, they would have determined that Pajak was not competent to operate the vehicle without the likelihood of injury to others.

The defendants do not deny that a duty of care exists with respect to determining a renter's fitness to operate a motor vehicle.   The defendants disagree with the plaintiffs as to whether that duty includes an obligation to affirmatively inquire as to facts about a renter's criminal record and driving history.   Therefore, this motion requires the court to decide the scope of a duty.

A duty of care may arise from a contract, from a statute, or from circumstances under which a reasonable person, knowing what he knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result from his act or failure to act.  [Citations omitted].   Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 186 Conn. 370, 375, 441 A.2d 620 (1982).

The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established:  duty;  breach of that duty;  causation;  and actual injury ․ Contained within the first element, duty, there are two distinct considerations ․ First, it is necessary to determine the existence of a duty, and then, if one is found, it is necessary to evaluate the scope of that duty ․ The existence of a duty is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular situation at hand ․ If a court determines, as a matter of law, that a defendant owes no duty to a plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot recover in negligence from the defendant ․

Sic v. Nunan, 307 Conn. 399, 406–07, 54 A.3d 553 (2012).

C. Negligent Entrustment

In Greeley v. Cunningham, 116 Conn. 515, 518, 165 A. 678 (1933), our Supreme Court first recognized a cause of action for negligence in connection with entrusting a motor vehicle to another person:

․ [L]iability cannot be imposed upon an owner merely because he intrusts [a vehicle] ․ to another to drive upon the highways.   It is, however, coming to be generally held that the owner may be liable for injury resulting from the operation of an automobile he loans to another, when he knows or ought reasonably to know that the one to whom he entrusts it is so incompetent to operate it, by reason of inexperience or other cause that the owner ought reasonably to anticipate the likelihood that in its operation injury will be done to others.  Id.

Beyond Greeley, there are few decisions on the appellate level regarding negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle.   However, numerous Superior Court decisions have since fleshed out the elements of the cause of action:

The essential elements of the tort of negligent entrustment of an automobile [are] that the entrustor knows or ought reasonably to know that one to whom he entrusts it is so incompetent to operate it upon the highways that the former ought to reasonably anticipate the likelihood of injury to others by reason of that incompetence, and such incompetence does result in injury ․ Liability cannot be imposed on a defendant under a theory of negligent entrustment simply because the defendant permitted another person to operate the motor vehicle ․ Liability can only be imposed if (1) there is actual or constructive knowledge that the person to whom the automobile is loaned is incompetent to operate the motor vehicle and (2) the injury resulted from that incompetence.  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)

Griffin v. Larson, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia–Milford at Derby, Docket No. CV 02 0079364 (August 18, 2004, Lager, J.).

It is clear from a review of this and other cases that liability can only be imposed if there is actual or constructive knowledge that the person to whom the automobile is loaned is incompetent to operate the motor vehicle.   In this case, “actual knowledge” is not claimed;  the plaintiffs' negligent entrustment claim is not based on actual knowledge of any incompetency or a failure to appreciate some visible or demonstrable impairment at the time of rental.

The plaintiffs' negligent entrustment claim is premised on constructive knowledge.   The plaintiffs take the position that constructive knowledge in the context of negligent entrustment of an automobile by a car rental company should be based not only upon what is apparent and observable, but also upon any state of facts that would be revealed by inquiry into the driver's motor vehicle record or criminal history.

The plaintiffs' position is at odds with several Superior Court decisions holding that a rental car company can only be charged with constructive knowledge of a renter's driving “incompetence” based on facts that are openly apparent and readily discernible, with no duty to investigate the renter's criminal background or driving history.   See, e.g., DeRosa v. Evans, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 10 6015111 (October 27, 2011, Gold, J.) [52 Conn. L. Rptr. 803];  Donnelly v. Rental Car Finance Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 10 6016545 (May 17, 2011, Wagner, J.T.R.) [51 Conn. L. Rptr. 899];  Hollis v. Alamo Financing, LP, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 08 5024043 (February 4, 2011, Robaina, J.) [51 Conn. L. Rptr. 434];  Chapman v. Herren, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 07 5005067 (June 24, 2010, Cosgrove, J.) [50 Conn. L. Rptr. 228];  Griffin v. Larson, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia–Milford, Docket No. CV 02 0079364 (August 18, 2004, Lager, J.);   Shah v. Brooks, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. PJR 0591221 (September 27, 1999, Lavine, J.) [25 Conn. L. Rptr. 554].

The plaintiffs acknowledge these decisions, but argue that they are based on a flawed analysis of the origins of the cause of action for negligent entrustment of an automobile.   A more careful analysis, the plaintiffs insist, demonstrates that the legal obligation to avoid entrusting an automobile to someone who is not competent to operate that vehicle includes or implies a duty to “acquire facts” regarding a driver's competence.   The plaintiffs build their case for a duty to acquire facts upon the language employed by the Greeley court in recognizing a cause of action for negligent entrustment ( “․ ought reasonably to know that one to whom he entrusts is so incompetent to operate it upon the highways ․” Greeley v. Cunningham, supra, 116 Conn. at 518, 520).   The phrase “ought reasonably to know,” the plaintiffs contend, has been used in other contexts to describe situations where, if by application of reasonable care or diligence a person should have known a fact, he or she is deemed to have constructive knowledge of that fact.   By using this specific language, the plaintiffs suggest that the Greeley court “in essence” adopted a duty to inquire (Plaintiffs' July 8, 2013 Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment at p. 9).

The court has closely read the Greeley decision and the earlier decisions of Burbee v. McFarland, 114 Conn. 56, 59, 157 A. 538 (1931), and Wolcho v. Rosenbluth, 81 Conn. 358, 364, 71 A. 566 (1908), which were cited in Greeley as demonstrative of the tort of negligent entrustment.   The court has also reviewed the common law of negligent entrustment set out in 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 390.   See, Short v. Ross, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 12 6028521 (February 26, 2013, Wilson, J.) [55 Conn. L. Rptr. 668] (Superior Court decisions have long recognized that the Greeley court “virtually adopted” the approach to negligent entrustment provided by the Restatement).   The court finds no basis in any of those authorities for a broad interpretation of the Greeley holding that would define the duty of a person renting or lending an automobile to include a duty to affirmatively inquire as to the renter or borrower's driving history.

For its part, CAMRAC contends that General Statutes § 14–153 defines the scope of its duty with respect to determining a renter's fitness to operate a motor vehicle.  Section 14–153 provides (emphasis added):

Any person, firm or corporation which rents a motor vehicle without a driver for a period of thirty days or less shall inspect or cause to be inspected the motor vehicle operator's license of the person initially operating such motor vehicle, shall compare the signature on such license with that of the alleged licensee written in his presence and shall keep and retain for a period of one year a record of the name of such licensee, the number of his license and the date of issue thereof, the registration number of the motor vehicle so rented and the mileage reading displayed by the odometer of such vehicle at the time such vehicle leaves and returns to the lessor's place of business, which record shall be subject to the inspection of any police officer, any Department of Motor Vehicles inspector or any Department of Motor Vehicles employee designated by the commissioner;  provided no person shall rent or lease any motor vehicle without a driver to a minor without the written consent of a parent or guardian of such minor.

CAMRAC argues that, as a matter of law, it discharged its legal duty to determine whether Pajak was a competent renter by assessing the facial validity of his license and comparing his signature on the license to that on the contract, as required by General Statutes § 14–153.   In opposition, the plaintiffs argue that compliance with a statute does not conclusively prove due care and, in the case of § 14–153, compliance with the statute provides no useful information that would inform the defendants' judgment of a renter's fitness to operate a motor vehicle.

Both parties have directed the court to, and extensively discussed, Judge Cosgrove's decision in Chapman v. Herren, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 07 5005067 (June 24, 2010, Cosgrove, J.) [50 Conn. L. Rptr. 228].   In that case, the court explicitly held that a rental car company has no duty to perform an investigation into the driving history of its prospective lessee.  Id.

The plaintiffs argue that the Chapman court did not have the benefit of the arguments made by the plaintiffs in opposition to the present motion regarding the “ought reasonably to know” formulation of constructive knowledge used in Greeley.   Perhaps not.   But it is apparent that a very similar argument was made based on Greeley:

The plaintiff relies upon Greeley v. Cunningham, 116 Conn. 515, 165 A. 678 (1933), in support of her argument that Camrac owed a duty to the plaintiff.   In Greeley, the unlicensed driver was operating the vehicle under the supervision of a licensed driver, as authorized by statute ․ While Greeley undoubtedly recognizes the validity of a negligent entrustment cause of action, it cannot be said that the case recognizes or creates a legal duty upon rental car companies to investigate a renter's driving record.

The plaintiff has cited no legal authority for its position that a rental car company has a duty to investigate a potential renter's driving record before entering into a rental agreement.   Further, this court's own research has not disclosed that such legal authority exists within Connecticut or elsewhere.

In analyzing whether rental car companies have an affirmative duty to investigate driving records, the Chapman court engaged in a thorough and comprehensive public policy analysis as to whether the courts should impose a duty when the relevant statutes are silent.   In all candor, this court cannot improve upon Judge Cosgrove's logic and reasoning, and adopts it as persuasive on this issue.   Accordingly, this court finds that there is no legal duty imposed upon a rental company to investigate a prospective renter's fitness to operate a motor vehicle beyond the statutory requirements outlined in General Statutes § 14–153.

Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the jury, rather than the court, ought to be allowed to decide whether the defendants have met their duty of care under the elements of the tort of negligent entrustment (Plaintiffs' July 8, 2013 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 7).   That is a general truth, but it misses the point.   It is the function of the court to determine the existence, nature and extent of a duty of care.  “[T]he issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care is an appropriate matter for summary judgment because the question is one of law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Mozeleski v. Thomas, 76 Conn.App. 287, 290, 818 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 904, 823 A.2d 1221 (2003).

Since this court has not extended the duty of the rental companies to require anything more than assessing the facial validity of a renter's license and comparing the signature on the license to that on the contract, as required by General Statutes § 14–153, if there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the performance of that duty, the issue may be decided by means of summary judgment.

As previously noted, there is no genuine dispute as to the fact that on August 27, 2010.   Pajak was in possession of and presented to the CAMRAC employee a facially valid and unexpired driver's license.   The defendant CAMRAC has provided an affidavit of its employee, Seth Peckham, stating that on August 10, 2010 he inspected the license, verified that it was facially valid and unexpired, and compared the signature on the license to the rental agreement that Pajak had signed in Peckham's presence.   The plaintiffs have offered no evidence of Pajak's behavior, appearance or demeanor on August 27, 2010 while in Peckham's presence that would relate to his ability to operate a motor vehicle or his propensity to cause harm while operating a motor vehicle.   Accordingly, the court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to an essential element of the plaintiffs' negligent entrustment claims:  that CAMRAC or EAN Holdings had actual or constructive knowledge of Pajak's “incompetence” to drive based on an inspection of his driver's license or other facts that were readily apparent at the time of the rental transaction.

In the absence of any direct negligence on the part of the defendants, the Graves Amendment becomes operative and the defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law.   See, generally, 49 USCS § 30106;  Rodriguez v. Testa, 296 Conn. 1, 26, 993 A.2d 955 (2010).

D. Liability of EAN Holdings

The defendant EAN Holdings has also moved for summary judgment as to the negligent entrustment claim on the separate ground that there is no triable issue of fact as to whether EAN Holdings was a participant in the act of “entrusting” the vehicle to Pajak.   While there is no dispute that EAN Holdings was the owner of the vehicle, the actual rental transaction was carried out by CAMRAC.   EAN Holdings had no dealings with Pajak.  “Connecticut law is clear that liability can only be imposed if the defendant entrusts the vehicle to the driver.”   Johnson v. Amaker, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 07 5013242 (January 29, 2008, Bellis, J.).   See also, Jordan v. Sabourin, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 537041 (November 22, 1996, Hurley, J.) (liability for negligent entrustment arises from the negligent act of entrustment, not from ownership status).

Therefore, as to EAN Holdings, summary judgment is granted on the plaintiffs' negligent entrustment claim for the additional reason that there is no genuine issue of material fact that EAN Holdings did not participate in any way in the act of “entrusting” the vehicle to Pajak and mere ownership of the vehicle is not sufficient to impose liability for negligent entrustment.

E. Loss of Consortium Claims

Counts Two and Four, Sheila Hall's loss of consortium claims, are derivative of, and inextricably tied to, the negligent entrustment claims.  “As a derivative cause of action, loss of consortium is dependent on the legal existence of the predicate action ․ That is to say, if an adverse judgment bars the injured spouse's cause of action, any claim for loss of consortium fails as well.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cavallaro v. Hospital of Saint Raphael, 92 Conn.App. 59, 62 n.5, 882 A.2d 1254, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 926, 888 A.2d 93 (2005).   For the reasons set forth above, judgment must enter in favor of the defendants as to the negligent entrustment claims in the First and Third counts.   Therefore, the court also grants judgment in favor of the defendants on the derivative loss of consortium claims contained in the Second and Fourth counts.

III. CONCLUSION

Summary judgment will enter in favor of the defendants on all counts of the plaintiffs' amended complaint.

BY THE COURT,

Sheridan, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The Graves Amendment, 49 USCS § 30106, states in pertinent part:  “a) An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if—(1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles;  and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner).”.  FN1. The Graves Amendment, 49 USCS § 30106, states in pertinent part:  “a) An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if—(1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles;  and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner).”

Sheridan, David M., J.