Anna Marquez v. Housing Authority of the City of Norwalk et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO STRIKE COUNT TWO OF THE COMPLAINT (NO. 103) AND MOTION TO STRIKE COUNT THREE OF THE COMPLAINT (NO. 104);  AND OBJECTION TO MOTIONS TO STRIKE (NO. 111)

Procedural/Factual Background

The plaintiff, Ana Marquez, has served and filed a three-count complaint against the defendants, the Norwalk Housing Authority (“the Housing Authority”) and defendant John Hinson (“Hinson”) the Director of Housing Operations of the Housing Authority,¹ alleging conversion as to the Housing Authority (Count One), intentional infliction of emotion distress as to Hinson (Count Two), and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42–110a et seq.  (“CUTPA”) as to the Housing Authority (Count Three).   The plaintiff alleges the following facts in her complaint.   Since on or about March 26, 2009, the plaintiff was a resident of the Housing Authority residential dwelling located at 261 Ely Avenue, in apartment 14–1D (“the apartment”).   The Housing Authority was the owner, manager and lessor of affordable housing for residents in the city of Norwalk.   On March 9, 2011, the Housing Authority served the plaintiff with a summary process execution issued by the Superior Court, Housing Session at Norwalk, ordering a state marshal to remove her from the apartment.

On March 22, 2011, while the plaintiff was absent from the premises seeking to secure a place to store her possessions, plaintiff alleges that the Housing Authority unlawfully entered the plaintiff's apartment, took all of her possessions, and discarded them.   The plaintiff alleges that such possession and control of her property was wrongful conversion, and that she has suffered the loss of the use of her property thereby.   She further alleges that Hinson authorized the removal and/or discarding of her property, which was extreme and outrageous conduct that caused her to suffer severe emotional distress.   Finally she alleges that conduct of the Housing Authority was an immoral, outrageous, unfair and deceitful trade practice in violation of CUTPA.

On October 3, 2012, the defendants filed a motion to strike count two of the complaint.   On October 11, 2012, the defendants filed a motion to strike count three of the complaint.   Accompanying memoranda were filed with each motion.   The defendants attached to these motions:  testimony from the summary process proceeding from January 11, 2011, testimony from the summary process proceeding from March 22, 2011, a letter from Attorney Lattarulo, representing the defendant, Housing Authority to Attorney Miller, representing the plaintiff, unreported cases.   On November 27, 2012, the plaintiff filed her objection and a memorandum in opposition to the motions to strike.   The matter was heard at the short calendar on August 8, 2013.

I. Discussion

“A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 529, 69 A.3d 880 (2013).  “[I]t is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 116–17, 19 A.3d 640 (2011).  “We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint ․ and ․ construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).  “A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged.”  Id.

II.

As a preliminary matter, in the present case the defendants have attached three exhibits to their motions to strike.  “It is well established that a motion to strike must be considered within the confines of the pleadings and not external documents, such as the agreement between the parties.   We are limited ․ to a consideration of the facts alleged in the complaint.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Zirinsky v. Zirinsky, 87 Conn.App. 257, 268–69 n.9, 865 A.2d 488, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 916, 871 A.2d 372 (2005).   See also Rowe v. Godou, 209 Conn. 273, 278, 550 A.2d 1073 (1988) (holding court cannot resort to information outside of complaint in ruling on motion to strike).   In Massad v. Windham, Superior Court, Judicial District of Windham, Docket No. CV–00–0062413–S (June 18, 2001, Foley, J.), 2001 Ct.Sup. 8153 the defendants, as in this case, attached pleadings, motions and decisions from a previous related case.   As the plaintiff had not attached any of those documents to his complaint, however, the court refused to consider such evidence when deciding whether to grant or deny the motion.   The defendants' attachment of testimony from the summary process proceedings and the letter from Attorney Lattarulo to Attorney Miller was improper and such evidence shall not be considered.

III. Count Two

The defendant moves to strike count two on two separate grounds, both of which are premised on the complaint insofar as it alleges that count two is directed only at Hinson individually.   The court will address each in turn.

A. Respondeat Superior

First, the defendant argues that as a matter of law, Hinson is shielded from liability by the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior.   Specifically, the defendant claims that only the town can be held liable when an agent or employee commits intentional torts while acting within the scope of his or her employment.   The defendant argues that Hinson can only be liable if he was acting in his individual capacity when he authorized the removal of the plaintiff's property.   In the defendant's view, the second count of the complaint alleges that all of Hinson's activities were performed within the scope of his position as the Director of Housing Operations, therefore only the town can be held liable, and the count against Hinson cannot survive.   The plaintiff did not address this ground in her opposition to the motion to strike, but during oral argument contended that the second count was pleaded against Hinson in both his individual and official capacity.   That argument is rejected.   It is alleged in ¶ 12 that Hinson was at all relevant times the Director of Housing Operations for the Housing Authority and in ¶ 13 that he “authorized” the removal and discarding of plaintiff's property.   There is no allegation of any conduct in his personal capacity, but that alone does not establish that he is shielded from personal liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

The defendant is, in effect, invoking the New York doctrine ² of “corporate shield” or “fiduciary shield,” which stands for the proposition that personal jurisdiction over a director or officer of a corporation must be based on his or her own personal conduct rather than acts taken in the director or officer's official capacity.   Although there is a split of authority among Superior Court decisions as the applicability of the doctrine, this court has aligned with those decision holding that the doctrine does not apply under Connecticut law.   Cece–York v. Saturn of Connecticut, Inc., Superior Court, Complex Litigation Docket at Stamford, Docket No X08 CV09–5012420S (September 22, 2010, Jennings, J.), 2010 Ct.Sup. 18657 at 18655–66.   Compare Under Par Associates, LLC v. Washington Depot A., Inc. 47 Conn.Sup. 319, 31 Conn. L. Rptr. 20 (December 11, 2001, Blue, J.) (Fiduciary shield doctrine finds no place in the text or underlying policy of Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52–59b) with Weis v. Friedman, Docket No. CV88–0094242S, Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, (May 22, 1990, Nigro, J.) [1 Conn. L. Rptr. 647], 1990 WL 284330 (doctrine applied).

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not protect employees from personal liability for their own acts.  “[U]nder the common-law principle of respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for compensatory damages arising out of the tortious conduct of his employee when that conduct occurs during the course of the employee's employment.”  Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 839, 836 A.2d 394 (2003).   However, “[w]hen vicarious liability is alleged, the injured plaintiff may look for reparations from either the [employee] or the [employer].”  Colon v. City of New Haven, 60 Conn.App. 178, 188 n.4, 758 A.2d 900, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 908, 763 A.2d 1034 (2000).

Moreover, even if the employees or agents are acting on behalf of the principal, they are not relieved from individual liability when they participate in the tort.

It is well established that an officer of a corporation does not incur personal liability for its torts merely because of his official position.   Where, however, an agent or officer commits or participates in the commission of a tort, whether or not he acts on behalf of his principal or corporation, he is liable to third persons injured thereby ․ Thus, a director or officer who commits the tort or who directs the tortious act done, or participates or operates therein, is liable to third persons injured thereby, even though liability may also attach to the corporation for the tort.  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 132, 2 A.3d 859 (2010).

See also Coppola Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Ltd. Partnership, 309 Conn. 342, 354, 71 A.3d 480 (2013) (it is “black letter law that an officer of a corporation who commits a tort is personally liable to the victim regardless of whether the corporation itself is liable”).

In count two, the plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to strike on this ground.   The plaintiff alleges that Hinson was the Director of Housing Operations and that he authorized the removal and disposal of the plaintiff's property.   Because the plaintiff has alleged that the plaintiff, as an officer of the Housing Authority, participated in the tort that harmed the plaintiff;  the defendant's motion to strike is denied on this ground.³

B. Elements of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The defendant also moves to strike the second count on the ground that the plaintiff has not pleaded all of the required elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, in that the actions performed by the defendants were not outrageous and extreme enough to warrant the claim and the plaintiff cannot prove that the defendant acted with intent to cause severe emotional distress.   The plaintiff argues that, viewed in the light most favorable to herself as the nonmoving party, the actions stated in the complaint of allegedly taking possession of all of the plaintiff's household goods and disposing of them while the plaintiff was absent from the premises are outrageous and extreme enough to warrant the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

“Liability [for intentional infliction of emotional distress] has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”  Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 443, 815 A.2d 119 (2003).  “Conduct ․ that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or results in hurt feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action based upon intentional infliction of emotional distress.”  Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 211, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000).  “Whether the defendant's conduct and plaintiff's resulting distress are sufficient to satisfy ․ these elements is a question, in the first instance, for [the] court.   Only where reasonable minds can differ does it become an issue for the jury.”  Bell v. Board of Education, 55 Conn.App. 400, 409–10, 739 A.2d 321 (1999).   The two seminal Connecticut cases that address the issue of extreme and outrageous behavior are Carrol, cited above, in which the Supreme Court ruled that a homeowner's insurer did not engage in extreme and outrageous conduct by erroneously concluding, without a thorough or reasoned investigation, that a fire resulted from arson, not a service station's mistake in filling kerosene container with gasoline, and Morrissey v. Yale University, 268 Conn. 426, 844 A.2d 853 (2004), in which a private university's alleged failure to deal with comments directed toward an administrative assistant by a co-worker and the co-worker's boyfriend, including comments on administrative assistant's weight and failure to procreate, and a threat to attack her, was not sufficiently outrageous to give rise to liability on the part of the university for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The standard for extreme and outrageous behavior has historically been construed very strictly.⁴  Booker v. Thomas, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV–05–40102111–S (April 15, 2009, Arnold, J.), which the plaintiff cites in her objection to the motion, concerns allegations that the defendant on two occasions entered the premises without the plaintiff's knowledge or permission and dispossessed him of the premises despite the plaintiff's rent being current.   The trial judge considered this behavior to be “more than merely insulting or bad manners resulting in hurt feelings ․ [it] is calculated to cause and does cause serious mental distress” Booker, supra;  and, viewing the allegations contained in the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff;  denied the motion to strike.   On the other hand, in Johnson v. Palmieri, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV–10–08098–S (February 24, 2010, Moore, J.), in which the execution date for eviction from an apartment had been set and passed, the fact that “the removal [of the plaintiff's possessions] was done improperly by the defendant landlord ․ does not rise the defendant's behavior to the elevated standards needed to sustain a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.”  Johnson v. Palmieri, supra.   The court emphasized that it was clear that “the plaintiffs knew that once they left the apartment ․ their status would change.”  Id. The court in Valadez v. Peruta, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV–10–6012594–S (June 17, 2013, Sheridan, J.) held that an allegedly unlawful eviction, some shouting, attempting to enter the residence by force, detaining the plaintiff and physically restraining her, causing pain, ordering the plaintiff to leave the residence, attempting to pack the plaintiff's belongings and, in the process, damaging or destroying some of those belongings was not sufficiently extreme or outrageous to sustain a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The complaint alleges that the plaintiff was “absent from the premises.”   It is unclear from the complaint whether the execution date of the eviction had arrived or whether the plaintiff was presently living at the apartment.   But even if those allegations were to be read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the court were to presume that the plaintiff was living at the apartment and the execution date had not yet arrived, the actions in this case would still be less egregious than those in Valadez, which were not considered extreme and outrageous.   There are no allegations of shouting, restraint, touching or physical pain.   According to the complaint, the plaintiff in this case was not present during the alleged incident.   This case is also distinguishable from Booker, as the plaintiff in Booker had fully paid his rent, had been dispossessed twice, and had not been subject to any summary proceedings.

It is the court's view that this case is closer to Valadez and Johnson than to Booker and therefore the allegations of the complaint do not adequately state a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and count two cannot survive the motion to strike.

IV. Count Three

The defendant also moves to strike count three on the ground that a CUTPA ⁵ claim cannot be maintained against the defendant as there was no allegation of a violation of Connecticut's entry and detainer statute.   The defendant maintains that such an allegation is required to satisfy the public policy prong of the “cigarette rule,” the established state test for determining whether an unfair trade practice has been committed.   It is also argued that the acts performed by the defendant in relation to the plaintiff's property were in no way immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous.   Lastly, the defendants argue that there cannot have been a CUTPA violation because the plaintiff has not alleged the extent of her ascertainable loss, which is a required element for a recovery.   The defendant claims this element must be satisfied at the pleading stage by an accounting of any of the possessions allegedly disposed of, or an estimated value of the damages allegedly caused.

The plaintiff counters in her memorandum in opposition to the motion to strike that specifically pleading a violation of the entry and detainer statutes is not required to satisfy the first prong of the cigarette rule.   Apparently misconstruing the defendant's second argument, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant's efforts to regain possession of the premises was not the basis for her claim, and does not further address the argument that all of the defendant's actions as described in the complaint were not immoral, unethical, unscrupulous or oppressive.   Lastly, the plaintiff asserts that her complaint, which pleaded “damages in loss of all of Plaintiff's household goods, clothing and personal items,” is sufficiently detailed to sustain her CUTPA claim.

“The cigarette rule is the well settled three-pronged test established by the Connecticut Supreme Court for determining if an unfair trade practice has been committed in violation of CUTPA.   A plaintiff must establish that one or more of the defendant's alleged practices meet at least one of the three following criteria:  1) it offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law or other established concept of unfairness;  or 2) it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;  or 3) it causes substantial injury to consumers, competitors, or other business persons.   All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of unfairness.   A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or to a lesser extent it meets all three.”  (Emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted).   Artie's Auto Body, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk, Docket No. X08–CV–03–0196141–S (June 5, 2013, Jennings, Jr., J.);   see also Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 19, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).

It is unnecessary for the court to address the arguments of counsel, as the court finds as a threshold matter from a review of the allegations of the complaint that the plaintiff has failed to plead an actionable CUTPA claim against the Housing Authority which enjoys a statutory exemption from CUTPA liability.⁶

The complaint in this case alleges in Count Three (by incorporating from Count One) that “At all relevant times herein Defendant Housing Authority was the owner, manager, and lessor of affordable housing for residents of the City of Norwalk.   Norwalk Housing Authority provides Section 8 rent subsidies and other supportive services to occupants of its affordable housing.” (¶ 2).   But our Supreme Court in Connelly v. Housing Authority, 213 Conn. 354, 567 A.2d 1212 (1990), has held that the conduct of a Connecticut municipal housing authority is exempt from CUTPA liability under Conn. Gen.Stat., § 42–110c(a) which provides:

Nothing in this chapter shall apply to:  (1) Transactions or actions otherwise permitted under law as administered by any regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of the state or of the United States ․

As the Court held in Connelly:

The plaintiff's claims for damages in count two of their complaint [failure of housing authority to provide adequate heat and hot water to apartments rented to plaintiffs] fail because they are premised solely on CUTPA.   Even if it is assumed, arguendo, that the defendant is engaged in “trade” or “commerce” as defined by that act, the defendant nonetheless is exempted from CUTPA scrutiny because, as a municipal housing authority regulated by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD], its actions fall within the ambit of General Statutes 42–110c.

Id. 360–61.

Because the allegations of Count Three of the complaint are directed solely against the transactions or actions of the defendant Norwalk Housing Authority which is exempt from scrutiny under CUTPA, the motion to strike Count Three must be granted.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to strike count two of the complaint, and the motion to strike count three of the complaint are both granted.

Alfred J. Jennings, Jr.

Judge Trial Referee

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Both defendants in this case are represented by the same law firm, which has filed this motion to strike on behalf of both parties:  Hinson as to count two and the Housing Authority as to count three.   Use of the word defendant will refer to Hinson as to count two and the Housing Authority as to count three..  FN1. Both defendants in this case are represented by the same law firm, which has filed this motion to strike on behalf of both parties:  Hinson as to count two and the Housing Authority as to count three.   Use of the word defendant will refer to Hinson as to count two and the Housing Authority as to count three.

FN2. Even New York has now rejected the doctrine.   See Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 522 N.E.2d 40 (1988)..  FN2. Even New York has now rejected the doctrine.   See Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 522 N.E.2d 40 (1988).

FN3. It is irrelevant, for the purposes of this motion, to determine whether count two is also against Hinson in his “individual capacity.”.  FN3. It is irrelevant, for the purposes of this motion, to determine whether count two is also against Hinson in his “individual capacity.”

FN4. In the following cases, the issue has turned on whether behavior was considered to be extreme and outrageous by the trial court:  Szekeres v. Szekeres, 126 Conn.App. 829, 16 A.3d 713, cert. denied, 300 Conn. 939, 17 A.3d 475 (2011) (conduct of landlord's daughter and son-in-law, assisting landlord in breaking into house to regain possession, was not extreme or outrageous, and thus daughter and son-in-law could not be liable to tenants on claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress);  Schmidt v. Housing Authority of City of Bristol, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV–06–5001979–S (October 4, 2007, Shapiro, J.) (plaintiff's allegation that defendant refused to return her personal property did not rise to the extreme and outrageous level);  Ward v. Benoit, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV–00–0558800–S (April 3, 2003, Corradino, J.) (defendant exceeding terms of roof repair contract by beginning to remove the entire roof and support structures and rendering house inhabitable was extreme and outrageous so as to sustain a motion to strike);  Caulkins v. Meade, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV–00–0340513–S (October 17, 2001, Holden, J.) (30 Conn. L. Rptr. 595) (the alleged intentional damaging of a car, not witnessed or experienced first hand by the plaintiff, does not rise by itself, without more, to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct subject to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress);  Hixon v. Eilers, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV–99–0592937–S (February 14, 2001, Fineberg, J.) (29 Conn. L. Rptr. 254) (extreme and outrageous conduct was not shown where the defendants entered the plaintiff's property and intentionally cut down trees, shrubbery and plants);  Scappaticci v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV–98–0582189–S (November 27, 2000, Freed, J.) (in action arising out of a foreclosure proceeding and subsequent sale, the allegations in the complaint that the defendant issued threats to eject the plaintiffs from their residence, under the authority of the foreclosure judgment, and then subsequently ejected the plaintiffs and their family from the residence, do not give rise to extreme and outrageous conduct);  DeLeo v. Reed, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford, Docket No. CV–00–0172435–S (January 3, 2000, Hickey, J.) (26 Conn. L. Rptr. 213) (defendant hiring workers to trespass on plaintiff's property and cut down the fence and trees not extreme and outrageous as a matter of law)..  FN4. In the following cases, the issue has turned on whether behavior was considered to be extreme and outrageous by the trial court:  Szekeres v. Szekeres, 126 Conn.App. 829, 16 A.3d 713, cert. denied, 300 Conn. 939, 17 A.3d 475 (2011) (conduct of landlord's daughter and son-in-law, assisting landlord in breaking into house to regain possession, was not extreme or outrageous, and thus daughter and son-in-law could not be liable to tenants on claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress);  Schmidt v. Housing Authority of City of Bristol, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV–06–5001979–S (October 4, 2007, Shapiro, J.) (plaintiff's allegation that defendant refused to return her personal property did not rise to the extreme and outrageous level);  Ward v. Benoit, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV–00–0558800–S (April 3, 2003, Corradino, J.) (defendant exceeding terms of roof repair contract by beginning to remove the entire roof and support structures and rendering house inhabitable was extreme and outrageous so as to sustain a motion to strike);  Caulkins v. Meade, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV–00–0340513–S (October 17, 2001, Holden, J.) (30 Conn. L. Rptr. 595) (the alleged intentional damaging of a car, not witnessed or experienced first hand by the plaintiff, does not rise by itself, without more, to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct subject to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress);  Hixon v. Eilers, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV–99–0592937–S (February 14, 2001, Fineberg, J.) (29 Conn. L. Rptr. 254) (extreme and outrageous conduct was not shown where the defendants entered the plaintiff's property and intentionally cut down trees, shrubbery and plants);  Scappaticci v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV–98–0582189–S (November 27, 2000, Freed, J.) (in action arising out of a foreclosure proceeding and subsequent sale, the allegations in the complaint that the defendant issued threats to eject the plaintiffs from their residence, under the authority of the foreclosure judgment, and then subsequently ejected the plaintiffs and their family from the residence, do not give rise to extreme and outrageous conduct);  DeLeo v. Reed, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford, Docket No. CV–00–0172435–S (January 3, 2000, Hickey, J.) (26 Conn. L. Rptr. 213) (defendant hiring workers to trespass on plaintiff's property and cut down the fence and trees not extreme and outrageous as a matter of law).

FN5. “CUTPA” is the acronym for the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42–110a et seq..  FN5. “CUTPA” is the acronym for the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42–110a et seq.

FN6. “Even if adequately specific, of course, the pleadings may reveal that the alleged conduct did not violate CUTPA, or was outside the scope of the act.”   Langer, Morgan, & Belt Unfair Trade Practices, Business Torts, and Antitrust 2013–14 Ed. § 8.2, p. 1017 citing, inter alia, Lomaglio Construction v. Town of Berlin, et al., Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford Docket No. CV93–0529998 (March 16, 1994, Wagner, J.) 11 Conn. L. Rptr. 239, 1994 WL 474039, 1994 Ct.Sup. 2866 (Allegations of municipal misconduct exempt under CUTPA, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42–110c transactions or actions of a regulatory board or officer);  Martino v. Town of Darien, Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield, Docket No. CV92–300230S (March 23, 1993, Ford, J.) [8 Conn. L. Rptr. 517], 8 CSCR 418, 1993 Ct.Sup. 2936 (employment relationship itself alleged in complaint is not conduct of trade or commerce for purposes of CUTPA, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42–110b);  and Agento v. Patient Aid Center, Inc., Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV91–0118943S (August 12, 1993, Rush, J.) 8 CSCR 916, 1993 Ct.Sup. 7165 (Allegations of straight forward claims of negligence and breach of warranty not sufficient to raise a claim of conduct sufficient to establish a CUTPA violation)..  FN6. “Even if adequately specific, of course, the pleadings may reveal that the alleged conduct did not violate CUTPA, or was outside the scope of the act.”   Langer, Morgan, & Belt Unfair Trade Practices, Business Torts, and Antitrust 2013–14 Ed. § 8.2, p. 1017 citing, inter alia, Lomaglio Construction v. Town of Berlin, et al., Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford Docket No. CV93–0529998 (March 16, 1994, Wagner, J.) 11 Conn. L. Rptr. 239, 1994 WL 474039, 1994 Ct.Sup. 2866 (Allegations of municipal misconduct exempt under CUTPA, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42–110c transactions or actions of a regulatory board or officer);  Martino v. Town of Darien, Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield, Docket No. CV92–300230S (March 23, 1993, Ford, J.) [8 Conn. L. Rptr. 517], 8 CSCR 418, 1993 Ct.Sup. 2936 (employment relationship itself alleged in complaint is not conduct of trade or commerce for purposes of CUTPA, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42–110b);  and Agento v. Patient Aid Center, Inc., Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV91–0118943S (August 12, 1993, Rush, J.) 8 CSCR 916, 1993 Ct.Sup. 7165 (Allegations of straight forward claims of negligence and breach of warranty not sufficient to raise a claim of conduct sufficient to establish a CUTPA violation).

Jennings, Alfred J., J.T.R.