Charles Ramey v. Tanya Ramey (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This dissolution of marriage action was initially brought by the plaintiff, Charles Ramey, against the defendant, Tanya Ramey, as a legal separation, by summons and complaint dated June 1, 2012 and bearing a return date of June 26, 2012.   Thereafter the plaintiff filed an amended complaint seeking a dissolution of marriage.   The plaintiff also served a third party complaint bearing a return date of April 16, 2013, upon the Essex Savings Bank as Trustee of the Jason I. Ramey Lifetime Trust (“Trust”).   The third party complaint, which seeks to set aside as fraudulent the transfer of monies into the Trust by the defendant, was later amended by an amended complaint dated April 23, 2013.

The case was tried on the amended complaint and the amended third party complaint before the court over several days on August 28th, September 13th, September 19th and September 20, 2013.   Additionally, defendant's Motion for Sanctions (No. 154.50) was heard at the time of trial.   The plaintiff was represented by Attorney Ellen C. Brown of Waller, Smith & Palmer, P.C. The defendant was represented by Gary Traystman of Traystman & Coric, LLC. The Trustee was represented by John A. Collins, III and Ryan W. Jaziri of Suisman, Shapiro, Wool, Brennan, Gray & Greenberg, P.C.

The court heard testimony from both parties as well as from their adult son, Jason Ramey.   Numerous exhibits were introduced into evidence.

Upon careful consideration of the evidence presented, the pertinent statutory law, in particular General Statutes §§ 46b–82 (alimony), 46b–81 (division of marital property), the relevant case law, the plaintiff's claims of defendant's dissipation of marital assets and having observed the demeanor of the parties at time of trial, the court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I

Jurisdiction

The plaintiff and the defendant, whose birth name was Tatiana S. Tchernikova, married on February 6, 1993 in Tacoma, Washington.   The plaintiff continuously resided in the state of Connecticut for at least one year before commencing this action.   Neither the parties nor their child have been the recipients of state or municipal assistance during the marriage.   The defendant is not currently pregnant.   The court finds that the allegations of the complaint are proven and true.   The parties' marriage has broken down irretrievably with no hope of reconciliation.   All statutory stays have expired.   The court has jurisdiction over this matter.

II

Factual Background and Findings

The parties met in Russia in 1992 while the plaintiff was there on business and married eight months later.   The defendant, who was approximately 35 years old at the time and held a Ph.D. in medicine, moved to the United States and pursued her medical degree here.   Both parties had been married previously.   The defendant's son, Jason, who was nine years old at the time of the parties' marriage, was adopted by the plaintiff approximately five years thereafter.   The parties have no other children issue of the marriage.   In 1994, the defendant's mother came to live with the parties and continued to reside with them throughout the marriage.

The plaintiff is 67 years old, suffers from severe cervical stenosis and holds a Masters Degree in Business Administration.   At the time the parties met, he was employed with North American Tire, a small company in the specialty rubber, namely tires, import/export market.   He held a small equity interest in the company for which he received approximately $46,000 in 1997.   In the Fall of 1997 he worked for USA Laboratories in Nashville for approximately 4–5 months.   He contends that from 1999 forward he was no longer able to work due to his poor health.   He did not begin receiving social security disability benefits until 2005.   On cross examination it was proven that in 2011 and as recently as the last quarter of 2012 the plaintiff engaged in consulting work for JM Tech regarding the development of a diagnostic video camera known as Snakescope.   (Exhibit TT.) Letterhead was introduced showing his email and home address as his business address.  (Exhibit E.) Additionally, e-mails between the plaintiff and another employee of the company were introduced as further evidence of the plaintiff's active employment with the company.  (Exhibits XXX, GGGG.) The evidence further demonstrated that the plaintiff and owner of JM Tech, Mr. Lee, with whom the plaintiff had a relationship extending back over 20 years, exchanged compensation packages for plaintiff's consulting services with Snakescope.   When confronted with the evidence, the plaintiff contended that he was not paid for any of the services he rendered as he and Mr. Lee were unable to reach an agreement as to his compensation.   Defendant's counsel further impeached the plaintiff's credibility with his sworn deposition testimony wherein plaintiff testified that he has not had any employment.   He testified that he is unable to work due to his lack of mobility, but then testified that he has applied for jobs as recently as this past year and that “[he does] volunteer work.”   The plaintiff's testimony regarding the topic of his employment was inconsistent, evasive and simply not credible.

The plaintiff testified in a like manner regarding the sale of certain assets.   He initially denied engaging in any such activity;  however, it was proven that he sold or attempted to sell several assets, including train sets, antique furniture and baseball cards and diverted the funds into a personal checking account at a bank in Washington of which his wife was unaware.   (Exhibits G, YYY, ZZZ, AAAA, BBBB, DDDD.) He realized $26,000 from the sale of the trains and several thousands from the sale of furniture and his baseball cards.   Defendant's counsel attempted to establish that the plaintiff was in possession of and was attempting to sell rare Ty Cobb baseball cards designated as T205 and T206. Defendant's counsel argued that one such card of another owner sold at auction for $250,000 and tried, unsuccessfully, to get the plaintiff to admit that he had the same card.   The plaintiff testified that his were not the same, but were cards of different players.   Though the court notes that the plaintiff was likewise coy and evasive when responding to questions regarding selling any assets and outright denied selling any assets until being confronted with documents proving the same, thus further impugning his credibility, the court cannot conclude that the cards in the plaintiff's possession were of such value.   The court finds, however, that the plaintiff's testimony that he considered the baseball cards “art” and therefore denied selling baseball cards ludicrous to the point where this testimony coupled with his selective memory lapses and feigned inability to answer even the simplest of questions throughout the trial served to taint his overall credibility.

The evidence clearly established that other than the $46,000 the plaintiff received for his interest in North American Tire and his social security benefits, he has not financially contributed to the parties' income or marital estate.

The plaintiff reports a net weekly income from Social Security of $459.74 on his financial affidavit and total weekly expenses of $1,240.   He reports outstanding liabilities totaling $15,170 and personal property of approximately $50,000.   He reported having no retirement accounts and only $800 in various bank accounts.   This is inconsistent with the evidence that he was prepared to build a home at the cost of $600,000–$650,000 and had 15–20% for a down payment in December of 2012 (Exhibits O, T, X, Y, WWW), cash on hand for the purchase of a building lot of $210,000 (Exhibit N), had financially assisted an individual in 2010 (Exhibit DDD) and pledged large sums of money to his fraternity to be paid in 2010 through 2012.  (Exhibit EEEE).

The plaintiff currently resides in the marital home, which is on the market for sale.   The defendant vacated the marital home in April of 2013 when she was required to relocate to Cambridge, Massachusetts in order to maintain her employment with Pfizer, Inc. She has continued to cover all of the household expenses.   The plaintiff claims that due to his deteriorating health issues he is in need of an assisted living facility.   The testimony established that the various facilities in the area range from approximately $3,300 to $7,500 per month depending on the level of services provided, the location of the unit within the facility and the level of luxuriousness of the facility.  (Exhibits 29, 33.)

Much time was spent at trial concerning the true extent of the plaintiff's disability.   The testimony as well as the medical records introduced into evidence contain conflicting information.  (Exhibits 27–30, LL, TT.) However, the plaintiff's mobility appeared to be restricted and it is undisputed that he has undergone two surgeries for his cervical stenosis.   He stopped driving in 2007 and in 2008 began taking his meals in his room, which is located on the second floor of the marital home.   He claims that he asked the defendant to install a chair lift to assist him in ascending and descending the stairs, but that her response was that she was “not turning [their] home into a nursing home.”   The defendant claims that she refused to pay for the chair lift because she came to realize that the plaintiff was a “con-man” testifying that “when no one is looking he flies up and down the stairs like a young deer.”   She also testified that he could have utilized his own funds to purchase the chair lift.

The defendant is 57 years old and is a cancer survivor.   In July of 2011 she was diagnosed with stage three gastric cancer and underwent two rounds of chemotherapy while continuing to work.   She is presently in remission.   She is employed by Pfizer, Inc. as an Associate Director of Clinical Development and works 60–80 hours per week for a gross weekly wage of $3,985 and nets $2,290 exclusive of her bonus.   Her 2013 gross bonus was approximately $54,000.   She shows weekly expenses of $2,459 and credit card debts of approximately $31,840 on her financial affidavit.

The marital home has negative equity.   It is currently on the market for sale.   The plaintiff testified that Pfizer, Inc. will purchase the home if it has not sold after three months.   Pfizer will purchase the home for $290,000 resulting in a deficiency of just over $102,000.

The parties own no other real property.

The defendant had an ownership interest in an apartment in Moscow, which she sold in 2010.   The apartment was a premarital asset that came to her through an inheritance from her parents as well as an acquisition by her and her former husband.  (Exhibit AAA.) The apartment was owned by her, her mother and her son Jason.  (Exhibits UU, AAA, FFFF.) Jason had a 50% ownership interest in the property.   It is this apartment that served as the basis of the plaintiff's third party complaint.   It is undisputed that from 1990 to 2001 the defendant spent approximately $500,000 in renovations to the apartment.  (Exhibit 41.)   The apartment was rented out until 2005.   It was sold in 2010 for $850,000.   The equivalent of a realtor's commission of $40,000 reduced the amount the defendant ¹ received to $810,000.   She paid capital gains in the approximate amount of $160,000.   Additionally, she applied $20,000 towards the second mortgage on the marital home.   The remaining sum of $630,000 was deposited into her personal account at Ledge Light Credit Union where it remained until she was diagnosed with cancer in July of 2011.   At that time, as part of her estate planning, she placed the remaining sums in trust for the benefit of Jason Ramey.   The defendant contends that she did so with the knowledge of the plaintiff who vehemently denies any knowledge of either the sale of the apartment or construction of the Trust until after the instant action was underway.   The plaintiff introduced into evidence the defendant's 2010 gift tax return for the purpose of showing that the plaintiff's name does not appear on the form.   Line 18 of part one of the gift tax return provides for the spousal acknowledgment of the gift.   However, the return is not executed by either party as it was filed electronically.   The plaintiff also maintains that his signature appearing on the IRS e-file Signature Authorization for the jointly filed 2010 tax return (Exhibit 7) was not signed by him.   On cross examination, defendant's counsel repeatedly asked the plaintiff whether he has taken any steps to amend the 2010 return or report the alleged false filing.   The plaintiff admitted that he has not.

The defendant leases a 2013 Mercedes C300. She owns no other vehicles.

The defendant has a Pfizer, Inc. 401k with an approximate balance of $159,486;  a Vanderbilt 403b with an approximate balance of $4,499.78 and a Pfizer pension that will pay her a monthly benefit of $3,601.19.   Neither party introduced any evidence regarding the present value of the Pfizer pension.   Additionally, the defendant has vested and unvested stock options that do not appear on her financial affidavit, but are set forth in Exhibit 21.

At the conclusion of the evidence the Trustee moved to dismiss the third party complaint seeking to set aside the Trust.   The court granted the motion finding that the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case and indicated it would consider whether the transfer of the monies into the Trust constituted a dissipation of marital assets.

III

DiscussionAAlimony

The plaintiff proposes that he receive $2,000 per week in alimony until such time as he receives his portion of the wife's pension or until the death of either party whichever comes first.   The defendant submitted proposed orders proposing alimony of $3,300 per month until the sooner of seven years, her retirement, the death of either party, or the plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation, but after the conclusion of the evidence argued that the plaintiff should not be entitled to any alimony whatsoever as he refused to comply with discovery orders, lied on the stand and admitted to hiding assets in out-of-state bank accounts.

“There is no absolute right to alimony ․ Awards of alimony incident to a marital dissolution rest in the sound discretion of the trial court.”   (Citations omitted.)  Weinstein v. Weinstein, 18 Conn.App. 622, 637, 561 A.2d 443 (1989).   In determining whether to award alimony and the duration and amount of the award, the court “shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the ․ dissolution of the marriage ․ the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b–81 ․” Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46b–82.   The court is not required to give equal weight to each factor, but “may place varying degrees of importance on each criterion according to the factual circumstances of each case ․” Kaczinski v. Kaczinski, 124 Conn. 204, 211, 3 A.3d. 1034 (2010).

This is a fairly long term marriage of individuals who are in the later years of their lives;  albeit the plaintiff several years older than the defendant.   Both are highly educated and both have faced significant health issues.   The court finds that the breakdown of the marriage was attributable more to the fault of the plaintiff than the defendant.   Though the plaintiff testified that the defendant treated him badly and even went so far as to testify that on one occasion while he was on the stairs she hit him in the spine causing him to fall down, the court found no factual basis for these allegations.   None of the medical reports document any abuse nor did the plaintiff ever report any incident of abuse to the police.   The defendant denies any incidents of abuse.   The parties' son, who lived with them through most of the marriage, testified that he never witnessed his mother abusing or treating his father badly.   While the defendant cannot be without any fault, the plaintiff's dishonesty, use of a post office box to hide financial dealings and diversion of monies into personal accounts caused the defendant to have a complete lack of trust in the plaintiff, which the court finds to be the primary cause of the breakdown of the marriage.   Though the plaintiff claims to be disabled and unable to work, the evidence showed that he was engaged in consulting work as recently as last year.   The plaintiff is an intelligent man with a high level of education and significant business experience.   Nevertheless he is 67 years old and does have physical limitations due to his affliction with cervical stenosis.   The court finds that his housing needs will greatly increase postjudgment when the marital home is sold, whether he resides in an assisted living facility or a private residence that accommodates his physical restrictions.   The orders that enter below will provide him with the ability to meet his living expenses until such time as he receives his portion of the defendant's pension and benefits.

B

Dissipation of Assets

As set forth above, the court dismissed the plaintiff's third party complaint finding the plaintiff did not meet his burden of proving the defendant had fraudulently conveyed marital funds into the Trust.   In ruling upon the motion to dismiss, however, the court stated that it would address the issue of whether the defendant's establishment of the Trust constituted an impermissible dissipation of marital assets.

Connecticut General Statute § 46b–81 vests the trial court with statutory authority to consider a spouse's dissipation of marital assets when determining the nature and value of property to be awarded to each party.  Finan v. Finan, 287 Conn. 491, 949 A.2d 468 (2008).   Before a spouse can be found to have dissipated marital assets there must be a showing of “a harmful or selfish expenditure of marital assets undertaken for a nonmarital purpose ․” Gershman v. Gershman, 286 Conn. 341, 350, 943 A.2d 1091 (2008).  “[C]ourts have traditionally recognized dissipation in the following paradigmatic contexts:  gambling, support of a paramour, or the transfer of an asset to a third party for little or no consideration.”  (Citation omitted.)  Gershman v. Gershman, supra, 346.

“Generally, dissipation is intended to address the situation in which one spouse conceals, conveys or wastes marital assets in anticipation of a divorce ․”[A] trial court should consider preseparation dissipation of marital assets, so long as the actions constituting dissipation occur either:  (1) in contemplation of divorce or separation;  or (2) while the marriage is in serious jeopardy or is undergoing an irretrievable breakdown.”  Finan v. Finan, supra, 287 Conn. 493.

In the present case, there was a lack of dispositive evidence to suggest that the defendant was aware that the marriage was in trouble or that the plaintiff was intending to file for divorce at the time she created the Trust.   She created the Trust in July of 2011 upon learning of her stage three gastric cancer diagnosis.   The plaintiff did not file the instant action against her until June 2012, nearly one year later.   Further, the court takes judicial notice of the fact that the plaintiff initially filed for a legal separation and not a divorce.   It was not until almost a year thereafter that the plaintiff amended his complaint for the purpose of seeking a dissolution of the parties' marriage.

Moreover, the court credits the defendant's testimony that upon learning of her stage three gastric cancer diagnosis she undertook to put her financial affairs in order by way of an estate plan.   The court finds this to be a legitimate undertaking in light of the history of the parties, the manner in which the apartment was acquired, its premarital acquisition and the ownership interests of her mother and son in the apartment.

Accordingly, it was not established that the aforementioned creation of the Trust constituted a dissipation of marital assets.

C

Division of Marital Property

The plaintiff proposes that he be awarded 50% of the marital estate, including 50% of the amount the defendant received from the sale of the Moscow apartment, except he waives any claim to the defendant's Vanderbilt 403b.   The defendant proposes she retain her retirement benefits, except for a distribution of $3,000 per month from her Pfizer pension to the plaintiff, and that her vested stock options be sold and applied towards the deficiency on the marital home mortgage with her retaining any remaining sums and all unvested options.

“The assignment of property in a marital dissolution rests in the sound discretion of the court.”  Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 180 Conn. 544 (1980).  “In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court ․ shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the ․ dissolution of the marriage ․ the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income.   The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.”  Gen.Stat. § 46b–81(c).

As discussed previously in the alimony context, the court has considered the statutory criterion and does not restate its relevant findings herein.   Additionally, the court has carefully considered the contributions of the parties and finds that the plaintiff did little to nothing to contribute to the parties' estate.   To the contrary, he intentionally hid income and assets from the defendant.   Even when the plaintiff made monies from selling assets, such as the baseball cards, he diverted the funds into a personal account of which the defendant had no knowledge and did not use them for the benefit of the family.   Further, it is clear to the court that the plaintiff has undisclosed monies as he would not have been able to make the loans and expenditures that he did on his social security monies alone.   On cross examination it was elicited that he has a lock box in his room into which he deposited monies from checks received.

Taking all of the statutory factors into account, the court enters the orders below assigning the marital estate factoring in the defendant's share of the Moscow apartment proceeds as well.

D

Discovery Abuse

The defendant made several discovery requests throughout the pendency of the litigation and up to and including the time of trial.   Pending at the time of trial was plaintiff's Motion to Compel and Sanctions, PL (No. 154.50) seeking to compel the plaintiff to sign authorizations to permit counsel to obtain bank records that plaintiff failed to produce.   Additionally, defendant's counsel made several oral motions during the course of the trial for the production of documents when he elicited testimony from the plaintiff on cross examination demonstrating that certain material documents that counsel previously requested through the discovery process and which plaintiff failed to produce, claiming no such documents existed, did in fact exist.   The court entered orders requiring the plaintiff to produce the same.   The plaintiff willfully did not comply with the discovery requests and certain of the court orders and thwarted the defendant's ability to properly prepare for trial.   Illustrative of this was the plaintiff's refusal to produce any records of accounts he held at Asahi Bank in Japan.   Plaintiff maintained and even advised his counsel that he never had any accounts at Asahi Bank. This was simply not true.   On cross examination, defendant's counsel introduced into evidence a loan application completed by the plaintiff wherein he lists Asahi Bank as the first of two financial institutions wherein he maintained an account.  (Exhibit B.) Clearly, the plaintiff was aware that he once maintained an account at Asahi Bank. The court can only conclude that the plaintiff did not want to produce the records regarding the account(s) as they would not have been favorable to his case.

Our Supreme Court held in Ramin v. Ramin, 281 Conn. 324, 915 A.2d 790 (2007), that “when a party has engaged in egregious litigation misconduct that has required the other party to expend significant amounts of money of attorneys fees, and where the court determines in its discretion, that the misconduct has not been addressed adequately by other orders of the court, the court has discretion to award attorneys fees to compensate for the harm caused by the misconduct, irrespective of whether the other party has ample liquid assets and of whether the lack of such an award would undermine the court's other financial orders.”  Id., 357.   Here, as in Ramin, the plaintiff flagrantly and repeatedly refused to comply with the court orders regarding discovery when he clearly had the ability to do so.   The plaintiff is a highly educated man yet during the course of the trial pretended misunderstanding even the simplest of questions or orders.   The plaintiff admitted to shredding bank records one month prior to his deposition claiming he was simply trying to get rid of paper.   Moreover, he refused to sign authorizations that would have permitted defendant's counsel to obtain the records directly from the financial institutions.

The court finds that the plaintiff's actions in failing to comply with the court orders warrant the entry of an order for sanctions.   The court and plaintiff's counsel were provided with an Affidavit of Attorneys Fees (Exhibit OOO) and the plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to address the same during the trial and closing arguments.   The court finds defendant's counsel's billings to be fair and reasonable ² and that a fair portion of them were incurred as a result of the plaintiff's bad faith obstruction and subterfuge.

IV

Findings and Orders

1. Dissolution:  The marriage of the parties is dissolved on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown.   The parties are declared single and unmarried.

2. Alimony:  The defendant shall pay periodic alimony to the plaintiff in the sum of $1,200 per week.   Said alimony shall terminate upon the earlier of 8 years from the date hereof, the defendant's retirement, the death of either party or the plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation pursuant to statute.   Said alimony shall be non-modifiable upward or outward beyond the 8 year term.

3. Life Insurance:  The defendant shall maintain her existing life insurance naming the plaintiff as a beneficiary in an amount sufficient to secure her alimony obligation to him.   The amount of life insurance coverage may decrease in relation to the outstanding alimony obligation.

4. Health Insurance:  Each party shall be responsible for his or her own health insurance and unreimbursed medical expenses.   The defendant shall cooperate in obtaining any necessary paperwork or forms in the event the plaintiff elects COBRA coverage.

5. Marital Residence:  The marital residence shall continue to be listed for sale.   The defendant shall continue to be responsible for all expenses associated therewith including the mortgage, taxes, insurance and the like, except that upon the sale of the property the parties will be equally responsible for the resulting deficiency as set forth in paragraph 9 below.

The court shall retain jurisdiction over the real estate for purposes of enforcing and effectuating the orders that enter herein with regard to the sale of the marital home and the resulting deficiency.

6. Motor Vehicles:  The defendant shall maintain use and possession of her leased 2013 Mercedes C300 and shall be solely responsible for all costs associated therewith and shall hold the plaintiff harmless and shall indemnify him for any liability arising therefrom.

7. Bank Accounts:  The parties shall each retain their own bank accounts and stocks free and clear of any claim by the other.

8. Retirement Assets:  With the exception of the defendant's Vanderbilt 403b, which shall remain her sole property, free and clear of any claim by the plaintiff, the parties shall share equally in all retirement assets valued as of the date of dissolution together with any losses and gains thereon throughout the date of distribution.

The parties shall share equally in the expense of preparing any Qualified Domestic Relations Orders (“QDRO”) necessary to divide the pension and retirement accounts in accordance with a 50–50 distribution.

The court shall retain jurisdiction over any QDRO for the purpose of its effectuation in accordance with the orders herein.

9. Stock Options:  The vested stock options shall be liquidated for the purpose of satisfying the deficiency owed in connection with the mortgage on the marital home with any remaining monies being shared equally between the parties.   Each party shall be responsible for 50% of any and all taxes whether capital gains or ordinary income taxes due as a result of the sale of said stock.

The parties shall share equally in all options vesting in 2014.   The defendant shall hold the plaintiff's options for him and immediately upon written request by the plaintiff, the defendant shall exercise his shares in accordance with company procedures and policies.   The defendant shall be entitled to withhold all reasonable and foreseeable taxes due on the transaction and shall tender the net balance over the plaintiff within 15 days of receipt of the same.

The options vesting after 2014 shall be the sole property of the defendant free and clear of any claim by the plaintiff.

10. Personal Property:  Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the issue of personal property distribution shall be submitted to arbitration before Attorney Timothy Lenes with the parties sharing equally in the expense thereof.

11. Liabilities:  Each party shall be liable for his or her individual debts as listed on their respective financial affidavits.

12. Taxes:  The parties shall each pay any taxes, penalties or interest which may result from any jointly filed federal or state income tax returns accordingly to whose income, deductions or omissions the liability is attributable.

The defendant shall be entitled to claim all mortgage interest and property tax deductions and credits associated with the marital home on her tax returns in 2013 and all years thereafter.

13. Attorneys Fees:  Each party shall be responsible for their own attorneys fees.

14. Sanctions:  The court is imposing sanctions in the amount of $7,750 against the plaintiff for failing to comply with the discovery requests and orders of the court.   Said sum is necessary to reimburse the defendant for the extra legal expenses she incurred as a result of the plaintiff's wilful noncompliance and dilatory tactics in complying with discovery and court orders.   Said sum shall be paid in full within 120 days to the law offices of Traytsman & Coric, LLC.

Connors, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The court credits the defendant's uncontroverted testimony that due to her son's minority at the time he obtained his interest in the apartment, the conversion of the title documents after the USSR became Russia and the way transactions were handled in Russia that the entirety of the proceeds were paid to her as opposed to her, her son and her mother..  FN1. The court credits the defendant's uncontroverted testimony that due to her son's minority at the time he obtained his interest in the apartment, the conversion of the title documents after the USSR became Russia and the way transactions were handled in Russia that the entirety of the proceeds were paid to her as opposed to her, her son and her mother.

FN2. The court notes that the attorneys fees as of August 20, 2013 totaled $47,011.53..  FN2. The court notes that the attorneys fees as of August 20, 2013 totaled $47,011.53.

Connors, Susan A., J.