State of Connecticut v. Jayevon Blaine (2013)

MOTION TO SUPPRESS DECISION

(EXCERPT)

(WHEREUPON, the preceding proceedings were not requested).

THE COURT:  And I do have a decision on the motion.   Yesterday the Court heard evidence on the motion to suppress the gun that was found at 467 Wood Avenue in Bridgeport when the arrest warrant—two arrest warrants of the defendant were executed.   I heard the testimony of Miss Carson and the testimony of Detective Martin.   I have a decision relating to that that I'd like to put on the record now.   And I'll order a transcript of this portion so that the Court can sign it and it'll become the Court's decision.

The decision on the motion to suppress for the reasons stated below the motion is denied.   The defendant moves to suppress the gun seized from 467 Wood Avenue in Bridgeport on the ground that there was no warrant to establish probable cause to justify the search and seizure.   The state claims that the defendant lacks standing to object to the search because he cannot establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the search areas.   The state claims that there was oral and written consent to search the bedroom on the second floor of that residence.   And even if there was no consent the search was justified as a search incident to arrest.   The Court heard testimony from Miss Carson, the individual who leased the premises, and from Detective Martin.

The Court finds the following facts were proven by a preponderance of the evidence;  on September 8th, 2009 at approximately 5:40 A.M. Bridgeport police officers assigned to the United States Marshals Fugitive Taskforce went to a second floor apartment at 467 Wood Avenue in Bridgeport to execute two arrest warrants for the defendant, Jayevon Blaine, on charges involving the use of firearms, including robbery and assault.   At the time the apartment was leased to Miss Carson and she lived there with her daughter, Ebony, Ebony's son, Deandre, and several other minor children.   The defendant who had been thrown out of his home was staying in the apartment and sleeping in a bedroom with Deandre and a nine-year-old child.   The officers knocked on the door and announced they had two arrest warrants for Jayevon Blaine, the defendant in this case.

Miss Carson allowed them to enter the apartment and her daughter, Ebony, directed them to the bedroom where the defendant was sleeping.   Shortly after entering the bedroom and locating the defendant the officers asked the defendant whether there were any weapons in the room.   The defendant responded, not that he was aware of.   Detective Martin asked Miss Carson if she consented to a search of the bedroom for weapons and she gave oral consent.   Underneath one of the mattresses that Deandre and the nine-year-old were sleeping in that day the police located two firearms.   After the weapons were located Miss Carson advised the police that they were located under the mattress or bed typically used by Jayevon Blaine.

Miss Carson subsequently gave written consent to the search of the bedroom.   She understood her rights and she was consenting to the search because she had nothing to hide.   She did not, according to her statement, she—which the Court credits, she denied any coercion or pressure by the police to consent to the search.   She had dealt with the police on numerous occasions in the past and was fully aware of her rights and was not intimidated by the police.

As to the legal issues, as for standing;  a person has standing to challenge the legality of a search if the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the search area.   That's Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) case.   Also, under State v. Reddick, 207 Conn. 323 (1988) case.   Absent such an expectation, the subsequent police action has no constitutional ramifications.   That's under State v. Brown, 198 Conn. Report 348 (1986) case.   In order to meet this rule of standing a two-part subjective objective test must be satisfied.   One;  whether the person contesting the search manifested a subjective expectation of privacy with respect to the invaded premises.   And two;  whether the expectation is one that society would consider reasonable.   This determination is made on a case by case basis.   Whether a defendant's actual expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable involves a fact specific inquiry into all relevant circumstances and the defendant bears the burden of establishing the facts necessary to demonstrate a basis for standing.   And that the Court is also citing State v. Harris, 122 Conn.App. 521 (2010) case.

The state claims that the defendant lacks standing to challenge the search of the apartment and basement of 144—of 467 Wood Avenue because he has not shown facts sufficient to establish that he had a relationship with the location and was personal in nature.   That the state claims that his location was more sporadic or irregular and that he does not have standing, notwithstanding the state's assertions however.   The capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment does not depend upon a property interest, permanency of residence or payment of rent, but upon whether the person who claims the Fourth Amendment protection has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the invaded area.   And that again is State v. Reddick.

In the present case the Court finds that the defendant had an expectation of privacy in the bedroom on the second-floor apartment.   The defendant's legal status there was as a resident not a permanent resident, but a temporary resident, and he was staying in that location after he was kicked out of his home and whether or not he's on the lease is not the determinative factor.   The location of the defendant at the time of the execution of the arrest warrant he was sleeping in that bedroom and the evidence shows that he was, at least two to three times—at least twice a week, if not more, staying at that location indicates that he was using it as his residence and therefore he had an expectation of privacy in the bedroom which society recognizes as reasonable.

So, the Court does find that he has standing to challenge the search.   However, as to the second issue whether the search was reasonable or improper or proper the Court finds that the search and seizure of the weapon was proper because the police obtained oral consent and written consent to search the premises, specifically the bedroom that the defendant was located in.   The consent was given voluntarily and knowingly by Miss Carson.   There has been no showing that the consent to the search was coerced or otherwise not voluntary.   Therefore, the police had consent from Miss Carson to search the bedroom and the search and seizure was proper.

Even if the police had not obtained the consent the Court also agrees with the state that the police had a right to search the immediate surroundings where the defendant was located in order to secure the premises as a search incident to the arrest.   They're going into a home, arresting an individual on charges involving firearms, into a small bedroom where the firearms were located and therefore the police had a right to secure the area to apprehend the defendant pursuant to the fugitive warrants.

So, even if a court—even if the Court were to have found there was no consent, which I'm not finding that, the Court would also uphold it on the basis that it was a valid search incident to arrest.   And so for those reasons I'm denying the motion.

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Honorable Maria A. Kahn

Kahn, Maria Araujo, J.