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Robert Slater v. Magellan Terminal Holdings, LP
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND (# 120)
FACTS
The plaintiff, Robert Slater, commenced this premises liability action against the defendant, Magellan Terminals Holdings, LP. The original complaint dated December 1, 2011, alleges the following. On or about December 9, 2009, the defendant, authorized to do business in the State of Connecticut, operated a trucking/shipping terminal with its principal place of business located at 280 Waterfront Street, New Haven, Connecticut. On December 9, 2009, at approximately 5:45 a.m., the plaintiff, with a principal place of residence at 776 Paradise Avenue, Hamden, Connecticut, was a lawful invitee at the premises known as 85 East Street during the course of his employment with Carfora Transport, LLC. On or about December 9, 2009, the premises was owned, possessed and controlled by the defendant. The plaintiff alleges that among the many duties imposed by the defendant was the duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and that on December 9, 2009, the defendant had a duty to maintain the above mentioned premises in a reasonably safe condition including but not limited to be free of an accumulation of snow and/or ice.
The plaintiff further alleges that on December 9, 2009, as he was walking along side of his truck through the containment area with the intention of entering the terminal building, he was caused to slip and fall on an accumulation of snow and/or ice, causing injuries to his right leg. The plaintiff alleges that his fall was the result of the defendant's negligence in that: “7 (a) the Defendant, and/or its agents, servants, and/or employees failed to inspect said premises for defects, namely the accumulation of snow and/or ice on the premises; (b) the Defendant, and/or its agents, servants and/or employees failed to remedy the dangerous conditions of the accumulation of snow and/or ice on the premises; (c) the Defendant, and/or its agents, servants and/or employees knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care and inspection, should have known of the dangerous and defective condition; (d) the Defendant, and/or its agents, servants and/or employees failed to remove said accumulation of snow and/or ice from the premises or, in the alternative, to sand and/or salt said premises; (e) the Defendant, and/or its agents, servants and/or employees failed to provide any warning to the Plaintiff of the dangerous and defective condition of the premises; and (f) the Defendant, and/or its agents, servants and/or employees failed to provide adequate lighting in and about the general area of the Plaintiff's fall.” Pl. Compl., December 1, 2011.
The plaintiff filed a Request for Leave to Amend on October 31, 2013 to amend his complaint. The plaintiff attached the proposed amended complaint which amends the original complaint by adding the following to paragraph 7: “(g) the Defendant, and/or its agents, servants and/or employees failed to maintain the containment area of the premises and provide a slip resistant surface material in the containment area when said area can be generally slippery due to wet, oily or dirty operations.” Pl.'s Amend. Compl., October 31, 2013, par. 7(g).
Pursuant to Practice Book § 10–60, the defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff's request for leave to amend his complaint to add paragraph 7(g). As grounds for its objection the defendant argues that because the plaintiff has already alleged in his original complaint that he “was caused to slip and fall on an accumulation of snow and/or ice ․” he has already established that he slipped on snow or ice, not a surface that was rendered slippery by the defendant's operations and therefore the added allegation in paragraph 7(g) “asserts a new and separate cause of action.” The defendant argues that this amendment, asserted four years after the alleged incident, and two years after the original complaint, is not based on any new information or revelation. Rather, it is simply a “posthoc revision inserted to add a new cause of action in case the ‘ongoing storm’ rule is dispositive of the cause of action the plaintiff originally articulated.” Def.'s Obj. Req. to Amend. The defendant argues that this “new” cause of action is untimely, and because it is based on newly alleged facts, it does not revert back to the filing date of the original complaint.
The plaintiff filed a reply to the defendant's objection in which he argues that his original complaint contains, among other allegations, the allegation that “on December 9, 2009, the defendant had a duty to maintain the above mentioned premises in a reasonably safe condition including but not limited to be free of an accumulation of snow and/or ice.” The plaintiff's original complaint further alleges that, “among the many duties imposed upon the defendant, the defendant had the duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition.” Pl.'s Reply, November 21, 2013. The plaintiff argues that his proposed amended complaint is simply extending an alternate theory of liability based on the exact same facts and circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's slip and fall, and resulting injuries, and does not allege new facts. The plaintiff argues that the allegations of the proposed amendment relate back to the exact same date of loss, the exact same location of the exact same premises and the exact same defendant as in his original complaint. The plaintiff argues that the allegations of his original complaint and proposed amended complaint both resonate in theories of defective premises, namely that, the defendant owned, possessed and/or controlled the premises at issue and should have known of the dangerous and defective condition; had the sole duty to keep and maintain said premises in a reasonably safe condition, as well as the sole duty to warn any invitees, including the plaintiff, of the dangerous and defective condition of said premises; and that the premises at issue, was in a dangerous and defective condition in that the subject surface was slippery under the conditions present at the time of the plaintiff's fall. The plaintiff also argues that the instant matter has not been set for trial and the filing of the plaintiff's amended complaint will create no undue delay. The defendant's objection was scheduled on this court's November 25, 2013 nonarguable short calendar.
DISCUSSION
While neither the plaintiff nor the defendant cite to any legal authority to support their respective legal positions, the court, based on its own research and review of established legal principles regarding the amendment of a complaint, and the relation back doctrine, is persuaded by plaintiff's argument that its amended complaint does not assert a new cause of action, but rather is based on the same set of facts and occurrences as alleged in the original complaint.
“Our relation back doctrine provides that an amendment relates back when the original complaint has given the party fair notice that a claim is being asserted stemming from a particular transaction or occurrence, thereby serving the objectives of our statute of limitations, namely, to protect parties from having to defend against stale claims. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) ․ To relate back to an earlier complaint, the amendment must arise from a single group of facts ․ In determining whether an amendment relates back to an earlier pleading, we construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically ․ [T]he complaint must be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to the general theory upon which it proceeded, and do substantial justice between the parties ․ Our reading of pleadings in a manner that advances substantial justice means that a pleading must be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means, but carries with it the related proposition that it must not be contorted in such a way so as to strain the bounds of rational comprehension ․ Finally, in the cases in which we have determined that an amendment does not relate back to an earlier pleading, the amendment presented different issues or depended on different factual circumstances rather than merely amplifying or expanding upon previous allegations. See, e.g., Dimmock v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, Inc., 286 Conn. 789, 808–09, 945 A.2d 955 (2008) (allegation of negligence related to failure to inform plaintiff of surgical options did not relate back to allegation of negligence related to failure to ensure sterile surgical environment and failure to diagnose and treat plaintiff's resulting infection); Alswanger v. Smego, 257 Conn. 58, 61, 776 A.2d 444 (2001) (allegation of lack of informed consent regarding resident's participation in surgery did not relate back to allegation that defendants had failed to disclose all material risks in connection with plaintiff's surgery, care and treatment).” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 559–60 51 A.3d 367 (2012).
“Under our case law, it is well settled that a party properly may amplify or expand what has already been alleged in support of a cause of action, provided the identity of the cause of action remains substantially the same ․ If a new cause of action is alleged in an amended complaint ․ it will [speak] as of the date when it was filed ․ A cause of action is that single group of facts which is claimed to have brought about an unlawful injury to the plaintiff and which entitles the plaintiff to relief ․ A change in, or an addition to, a ground of negligence or an act of negligence arising out of the single group of facts which was originally claimed to have brought about the unlawful injury to the plaintiff does not change the cause of action ․ It is proper to amplify or expand what has already been alleged in support of a cause of action, provided the identity of the cause of action remains substantially the same, but [when] an entirely new and different factual situation is presented, a new and different cause of action is stated ․”When comparing [later] pleadings [to timely filed pleadings to determine whether the former relate back to the latter], we are mindful that, [i]n Connecticut, we long have eschewed the notion that pleadings should be read in a hypertechnical manner. Rather, [t]he modern trend, which is followed in Connecticut, is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically ․ [T]he complaint must be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to the general theory [on] which it proceeded, and do substantial justice between the parties ․” DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 297 Conn. 105, 140–41, 998 A.2d 730 (2010).
In the present case, the plaintiff has alleged negligence against the defendant based on one theory of liability, namely, premises liability, arising out of a single group of facts. In reading the original complaint broadly, although the plaintiff has alleged that he slipped on an accumulation of snow and ice on the defendant's premises, he also alleges that the defendant had a duty to maintain said premises in a reasonably safe condition, including but not limited to, be free of an accumulation of snow and/or ice.” (Emphasis added). Pl.'s Amend. Compl., par. 5 and 6. In addition, in construing paragraph 7(g) of the proposed amended complaint, it merely amplifies or expands on the plaintiff's allegation in the original complaint that the defendant had a duty to use reasonable care to maintain the premises in a safe condition including by “maintain[ing] the containment area of the premises and provide slip resistant surface material in the containment area when said area can be generally slippery due to wet, oily or dirty operations.” Again, this allegation expands on the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant had a duty to maintain the containment area in a reasonably safe condition including but not limited to be free of an accumulation of snow and/or ice. In other words, the defendant had a duty to not only maintain against ice and snow but also to maintain the containment area by providing slip resistant surface material in that area. That new allegation is an addition to a ground of negligence or an act of negligence arising out of the single group of facts which was originally claimed to have brought about the unlawful injury to the plaintiff. It therefore merely expands the original cause of action. It does not add an additional cause of action. The plaintiff's proposed amended complaint therefore relates back to the date of the original filing.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's objection to the plaintiff's Request for Leave to Amend is OVERRULED.
Wilson, J.
Wilson, Robin L., J.
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Docket No: CV126025781S
Decided: November 29, 2013
Court: Superior Court of Connecticut.
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