Michael Edwards v. Warden, State Prison (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The petitioner, Michael Edwards, seeks habeas corpus relief from a conviction, following a jury trial, for assaulting a corrections officer, in violation of General Statutes § 53a–167a, for which crime he received a nine-year prison sentence, consecutive to a term of imprisonment for an unrelated matter.   The amended petition claims that the petitioner's defense counsel, Attorney Robin Watkins, provided ineffective assistance and that the prosecutor and judge violated the petitioner's right to an impartial jury under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).   The petitioner proffered neither evidence nor argument as to the Batson clam, and the court regards that claim as abandoned.

Our Supreme Court has adopted the two-pronged Strickland test for evaluating ineffective assistance claims.  Johnson v. Commissioner, 218 Conn. 403, 425 (1991);  Ostolaza v. Warden, 26 Conn.App. 758, 761 (1992).   The Strickland criteria requires that the petitioner demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, both that his attorney's performance was substandard and that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.  Id.

As to the performance prong of Strickland, the petitioner must establish that trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  Johnson v. Commissioner, supra.

This standard of reasonableness is measured by prevailing, professional norms.  Id. The habeas court must make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight and to reconstruct the circumstances surrounding counsel's conduct from that attorney's perspective at the time of the representation.  Id.

If it is easier to dispose of a claim of ineffective assistance on the ground of insufficient proof of prejudice, the habeas court may address that issue directly without reaching the question of counsel's competence.  Pelletier v. Warden, 32 Conn.App. 38, 46 (1993).   In order to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, the petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there exists a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.  Levine v. Manson, 195 Conn. 636, 640 (1985).   Reasonable probability means a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict.  Daeira v. Commissioner, 107 Conn.App. 539, 542–43 (2008), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 911 (2008);  that is, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that he remains burdened by an unreliable determination of guilt.  Id.

Essentially, the petitioner asserts that Attorney Watkins improperly failed to convince the petitioner to accept a judicially indicated sentence, on a guilty plea, of one year consecutive to his other term of imprisonment.   Because analysis of the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard is dispositive, the court addresses that issue directly.   The court determines that nothing Attorney Watkins did or did not do played any role in the petitioner's decision to persist in his desire for a jury trial to resolve the charge against him.   The court finds the following facts.

On May 10, 2011, Judge Clifford proposed that if the petitioner pleaded guilty, he was likely to impose the one-year prison term, consecutive to the sentence already being served.   Attorney Watkins recommended that the petitioner change his plea, but the petitioner was adamant that he wanted to view the video recording of the purported assault before he would consider withdrawing his election for a jury trial.   On that day, Attorney Watkins informed the court of the petitioner's decision.

Jury selection was scheduled to commence within a few months, however, the petitioner received permission to represent himself and relegate Attorney Watkins to the role of standby counsel.   Despite that development, the proposed disposition remained available to the petitioner.

While representing himself, the petitioner viewed the video of the alleged assault.   Present at that viewing was the petitioner, Attorney Watkins, the prosecutor, and the prosecutor's investigator.   After seeing the video, the petitioner remained firm in his desire for a jury to determine his fate.   He declared at that time that the recording, in his opinion, showed little to cause him to rethink his refusal to accept the disposition of a one-year consecutive sentence.

Attorney William Koch, Jr., was later appointed to represent the petitioner for his jury trial.   Attorney Koch also urged the petitioner to change his plea rather than gamble his future with a jury trial.   The petitioner also spurned this advice.

At the habeas hearing, the petitioner testified and denied that Attorney Watkins discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the case with him.   He also denied viewing the video recording of the incident before his trial.

Attorney Watkins also testified at the habeas proceeding.   She related that she had thoroughly investigated the petitioner's case, communicated the strengths and weaknesses to him, and informed him of the likely consequences if convicted by a jury.   She also refuted the petitioner's claim that he never viewed the video before trial.   Her testimony as to that event was corroborated by the testimony of the prosecutor, Attorney Thomas DeLillo, and his investigator, Joseph Illinger.   The court found their testimony very credible and that of the petitioner unworthy of belief.

The court finds that the petitioner would have been steadfast in his choice of a jury trial no matter what Attorney did or said on the topic.   His low regard for the prosecution's video evidence drove his decision rather than the cogent advice of his counsel.

In 2012, the United States Supreme Court recognized the legitimate use of habeas corpus as a source of relief when an inmate contends that trial counsel inadequately communicated to the client information necessary for the client to make a prudent decision whether or not to accept a plea offer before the offer lapsed, Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012);  Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012).   The legal analyses of these cases were adopted by the Connecticut Supreme Court, Ebron v. Commissioner, 307 Conn. 342 (2012).

In order to meet the prejudice component as adopted by the Ebron case, the petitioner had to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that but for his attorney's missteps he would have changed his plea to guilty in order to effectuate the judge's proposed disposition.   In this case, the petitioner has failed to satisfy this burden, Ebron v. Commissioner, supra, 349–50.

The amended petition for habeas corpus relief is therefore, denied.

Sferrazza, S.J.

Sferrazza, Samuel J., S.J.