Thomas Arras et al. v. 14 (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR STAY

A motion for stay of action (# 105) by the Regional School District defendants (movants) appeared on the short calendar as a take papers matter on November 12, 2013.   The plaintiffs filed an objection (# 107).   After consideration, for the reasons stated below, the court grants the motion for stay.

I

Background

The return date in this matter was August 20, 2013.   In their revised complaint (# 110), the plaintiffs, Thomas Arras et al., who allege that they are homeowners, taxpayers, and residents of the Town of Woodbury or the Town of Bethlehem, which are parts of Regional School District No. 14, allege that the defendants failed to publish legal notices to warn residents concerning a June 18, 2013 referendum on the question of expending $63.8 million for renovating the Nonnewaug High School (renovations).   They seek a declaration that the results of the referendum are null and void, and a permanent injunction against any funding and implementation of the resolutions approved at the referendum, including the renovations.

The movants seek to stay this action until the issuance of a final judgment in another action, Town of Woodbury v. Board of Education, Regional School District No. 14, Docket No. LLI CV 13 6009045 S, pending in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Litchfield, which challenges the same proposed renovations.   Regional School District No. 14 is a defendant in both cases.¹

II

Standard of Review

“Generally, a court with jurisdiction over a case has not only the right, but also the duty, to exercise that jurisdiction, and to render a decision in a case before it.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Second Injury Fund v. Lupachino, 45 Conn.App. 324, 351, 695 A.2d 1072 (1997).

“In the absence of a statutory mandate, the granting of ․ a motion for a stay of an action or proceeding is addressed to the discretion of the trial court ․ [T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.   How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Lee v. Harlow, Adams & Friedman, P.C., 116 Conn.App. 289, 311–12, 975 A.2d 715 (2009).

“Connecticut courts have taken note of at least six factors in ruling on motions to stay.   They are as follows:  (i) similarity of subject matter between actions;  (ii) promotion of judicial economy;  (iii) possibility of causing injustice or prejudice to the plaintiff;  (iv) whether the foreign suit was initiated to the forestall domestic suit;  (v) possibility of conflicting judicial decisions;  and (vi) ability of the court to monitor parallel litigation.”   KI, Inc. v. KP Acquisition Partners, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. X05 CV 09 60027474 (September 24, 2010, Blawie, J.).

III

Discussion

The movants argue that a stay is appropriate here where the other action, Town of Woodbury v. Board of Education, remains pending.   They contend that judicial economy would be served by a stay, that there is a potential for inconsistent rulings, and that the plaintiffs will not be prejudiced by a stay.

The court has reviewed the allegations in the plaintiffs' revised complaint and the complaint and counterclaims asserted in Town of Woodbury v. Board of Education.   The court also has reviewed the docket summary in that matter.

The court has considered and balanced the various reasons for and against granting a stay in this matter.   The court below addresses the factors listed in KI, Inc. v. KP Acquisition Partners, LLC, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. X05 CV 09 60027474.

As to similarity of subject matter between the actions, both challenge the legality of the referendum and the renovations.   Significantly, in the prayers for relief, each complaint seeks a permanent injunction enjoining actions as a result of the June 18, 2013 referendum.

In contrast to the Town of Woodbury v. Board of Education action, the plaintiffs here allege that the movants deprived them of rights protected under the United States and Connecticut Constitutions.   See revised complaint, counts two, three, and five.   The plaintiffs also seek relief under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42–110b et seq., including attorneys fees.   See revised complaint, count six.   They assert that implementation of the renovation project will result in additional taxes, increased bond costs, and increased existing and potential litigation fees.   Thus, the claims made in the two actions differ to some extent.   Clearly, judicial economy is promoted “by minimizing repetitive litigation.”   Rosenfield v. Cymbala, 43 Conn.App. 83, 87–88, 681 A.2d 999 (1996).   In view of the similarity of the actions, there is significant potential for conflicting judicial decisions.   Conflicting decisions, which create “a confused and unsettled state of the law,” Kelly, Administrator v. New Haven Steamboat Co., 74 Conn. 343, 346, 50 A. 871 (1902), should be avoided, if possible.

The instant matter is in its preliminary stages.   Although declaratory relief is sought in the plaintiffs' prayer for relief, it does not appear that they have complied with Practice Book § 17–56(b), concerning notice to interested parties, which requires that “[t]he party seeking the declaratory judgment shall append to its complaint or counterclaim a certificate stating that all such interested persons have been joined as parties to the action or have been given reasonable notice thereof.”   See plaintiffs' objection, p. 8 (no argument made concerning compliance).

While “failure to provide notice ․ is nonjurisdictional, ․ failure to provide notice ․ may implicate due process concerns that would compel a court to require notice or joinder before proceeding with the action.  [A] court may refuse to proceed with litigation if a claim cannot properly be adjudicated without the presence of those indispensable persons whose substantive rights and interests will be necessarily and materially affected by its outcome ․ Joinder of indispensable parties is mandated because due process principles make it essential that [such parties] be given notice and an opportunity to protect [their] interests by making [them] a party to the [action].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Batte–Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277, 289–90, 914 A.2d 996 (2007).

In contrast, the other action has been tried, and briefed, and is awaiting decision by the court.   See the court's (Pickard, J.) November 6, 2013 ruling (# 110.01) in Town of Woodbury v. Board of Education, denying the Arras plaintiffs' motion to transfer that action to the judicial district of Waterbury.²

A decision in the other action may render unnecessary adjudication of a significant portion of the plaintiffs' claims here.   Since the other matter has been tried and is awaiting decision by the court, it appears that any delay in affording the plaintiffs an opportunity to proceed with this action, subject to any challenges by motions or defenses, would be relatively short in duration.³

The movants do not contend that the instant matter was initiated to forestall the other case.   Clearly, the parties and the court can monitor the other litigation.

On balance, after weighing the factors discussed above, the court concludes that a stay is warranted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to stay is granted.   This matter is stayed pending the final judgment in Town of Woodbury v. Board of Education.   It is so ordered.

BY THE COURT

ROBERT B. SHAPIRO

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Although the plaintiffs here are not parties in Town of Woodbury v. Board of Education, for ease of reference, the court below refers to them as the Arras plaintiffs when discussing that matter..  FN1. Although the plaintiffs here are not parties in Town of Woodbury v. Board of Education, for ease of reference, the court below refers to them as the Arras plaintiffs when discussing that matter.

FN2. By separate order, the court denies the plaintiffs' motion to consolidate (# 108), which, in effect, seeks to transfer Town of Woodbury v. Board of Education to the judicial district of Waterbury in order to be consolidated with the instant action..  FN2. By separate order, the court denies the plaintiffs' motion to consolidate (# 108), which, in effect, seeks to transfer Town of Woodbury v. Board of Education to the judicial district of Waterbury in order to be consolidated with the instant action.

FN3. The court declines to speculate concerning the movants' proposed motion to dismiss based on General Statutes § 9–371b (concerning complaints arising from referenda).   See movants' memorandum of law (# 106), p. 8. Such a motion is not before the court for adjudication..  FN3. The court declines to speculate concerning the movants' proposed motion to dismiss based on General Statutes § 9–371b (concerning complaints arising from referenda).   See movants' memorandum of law (# 106), p. 8. Such a motion is not before the court for adjudication.

Shapiro, Robert B., J.