Anthony Jones v. Warden (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

THE COURT:  At this point—during the morning recess, the Court has taken the opportunity and I actually reviewed all the exhibits in the file that were presented by the parties.   I have also, obviously, listened to the evidence that was presented here, and the Court is more than familiar with the case law, and at this point the Court is prepared to rule on this matter.

The petitioner brings two claims;  both ineffectiveness against trial counsel.   One claim that trial counsel was ineffective for inadequately advising him on the plea.   And the second, that she was ineffective in her preparation and presentation for the petitioner at sentencing.

The Court is, in this case, going to use some rather strong language, and I think this case is one of those cases that sort of cries out for some sort of reform or resolution.   When a petitioner can, frankly, just come into a courthouse and make things up, and to take the Court's time up to have a hearing on claims that, frankly, again, are just made up.   And that is not a personal attack on the petitioner;  that is based on the solid weight of the evidence in this matter.

The petitioner claims that his trial counsel—or claims some fantasy that trial counsel, while writing him every single letter that she wrote him, which indicates that the only offers in the case indicate that he's going to get a minimum of double.   The first one says ten, the second one says twelve, and then the next one goes to fourteen years, which is, I think, a day or two before jury selection starts.   However, somehow the petitioner comes up with some fabricated story that counsel, behind the scenes, is telling him don't worry about it, you are going to get five years.

Then they go into court, not a word about five years.   In fact the Court makes it clear, you are not getting anything less than ten, you are in between ten and fourteen.   Not a word from the petitioner, not a question, not a nothing, which is an indication to this Court that Mr. Jones knew exactly one hundred percent full well what he was getting into, especially with his history and background, what he was going to be sentenced to.   And, if not, at some point there would have been a question, yet there was nothing.   So, the Court makes it clear.   The Court engages in a detailed and constitutionally valid canvass.   And, again, I think the Court takes that all as substantive evidence that these claims by Mr. Jones are nothing but fabrication.

Counsel testified competently and credibly before this Court that she had consistently—and frankly the letters that were Full Exhibits in here, backup the fact that she had consistently advised the petitioner that he was looking at sentences in double-digit ranges.   And the Court credits her testimony, that the only time five years came up, it was five years mentioned by—or requested by Mr. Jones.

The Court finds, therefore, that counsel was in no way deficient, nor does the Court find that Mr. Jones, in that matter, was anyway prejudiced.   Because on the other side, the Court, frankly, does not credit, and does not believe Mr. Jones's testimony that at the time he was prepared to go to trial in lieu of accepting a pretrial offer, and was only talked into the offer by counsel's advice.   He was in the middle of jury selection, he was—he was exercising his right to trial, and, again, the evidence is clear that it was not client—counsel's advice, but, frankly,—and the Court believes Mr. Jones's own decision, he frankly realized at some point that the gig was up, that the offers weren't coming down, that they were going to go up.   His own confession was going to be used against him and it was just a matter of how much time he was going to get for sentencing, and, so, either way, whether there is no deficient performance here or because there is no prejudice, the Court finds that the petitioner has failed to prove count one.

And again, with regards to the second count;  claim that counsel's attorney was ineffective with regards to sentencing.   Again, it is the petitioner's burden if they're claiming that an attorney has failed to present some evidence or failed to present some testimony from witnesses that could have or had some probability in affecting the outcome.   Here, the Court finds first that, even if the additional testimony that was presented here by the witnesses was heard by the Court, that the petitioner has failed to prove that there was any prejudice suffered.   The testimony that was presented by the girlfriend and the sister—although the Court has no reason not to credit what they said—is not of a nature that would be so compelling that this Court can find that it would have resulted in the trial court modifying or changing its disposition to a sentence that was more favorable to the petitioner.

The Court also does not find that based on the claims here, that counsel was at all ineffective.

The trial—the sentencing Judge was the trial Judge, and I think counsel and the Court make it very clear that the Court made it clear that they—he was very familiar with the petitioner from the arguments counsel had made during the pre-trials.   And could things have been laid on the record more accurately, sure.   But the question really is whether or not there was some information or counsel failed to properly present information and arguments to the Court as a reasonably defense attorney did.

The Court reviewed the sentencing transcript and this—and the plea transcript, and Judge Damiani made it very clear that he was very aware of the petitioner's drug history, his drug problems, and, frankly, his statement was, I know about it and I am not giving you any credit for it because that is something that should have done a long time ago.   That evidence only could have come from one place, or two places, and that's either from the petitioner or from counsel.   The Court clearly was aware of it and indicated that they were not going to—or—he was not going to give much credit for it.   The—again, whether or not counsel reviewed the presentence investigation with the petitioner, the petitioner has presented no evidence here before this Court that there was anything inaccurate, anything missing, anything substantive in the presentence investigation that could have or may have resulted in a more favorable outcome.   That would have been the petitioner's burden, and without that evidence the Court can find no prejudice.

The—again, the indication that trial counsel did not adequately argue for a lesser sentence at petitioner's sentencing hearing—and, again, the petitioner has presented no evidence here that would lead this Court to believe that there was information missing from counsel's argument that was so compelling that it would have resulted in a sentence or that there was a probability that it would have resulted in a sentence more favorable to the petitioner.

There was a claim that trial counsel did not move to withdraw the petitioner's guilty plea after he informed him that he wished to withdraw.   There was no evidence here presented by the petitioner as to what grounds or what basis there would have been to withdraw the petitioner's guilty plea.   If at all, the only evidence that may be in that realm was his fabricated claim that counsel had misadvised him that he was going to get a five-year deal from the state's attorney's office and, frankly, the plea canvass on April 30th before Judge Damiani, would have negated any such claim, because Judge Damiani made it clear that the sentencing rec was an open recommendation, that it was unlikely he was going to get anything less than ten years, and that, I believe he quotes ten to fourteen years is the range we are working in.   And, again, the petitioner makes it through the entire plea canvass without so much as a question to the Court.

The petitioner makes it through the sentencing without so much as a question to the Court, which all negates any claim by a man who has got a ten-year prison sentence, three other drug felony convictions on his record, not to mention others that were discussed here, who stands up in front of the Court and ask not a single question;  that indicates to the Court that he is fully aware and fully knowledgeable of exactly what is happening, and we are here for no reason but for the petitioner wants to try to take a second bite at the apple and believe that if he can make up a story, and if he believes it hard enough, we will believe it and he might get some relief.   But, again, the evidence here strongly indicates that there is not a scintilla of truth to any of the claims here, and that is borne out not only by the counsel's testimony but by all the written documentation and transcripts that if there was anyone that believed that five years on the table, the petitioner was the only one that believed it and the only one that was talking about it.

For all of those reasons, the Court denies the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The Court will order the clerk to present the petitioner, through counsel, with notice of his rights to appeal, which the record will note is being done.

The petitioner's counsel will prepare and file a judgment file with the clerk within thirty days.

If there is going to be an appeal, notwithstanding that thirty-day requirement for the filing of the judgment file, any and all appellate notices and paperwork shall be filed within the timeframes required by practice book and statutory requirements.

I will order—in lieu of a written memorandum of decision, I will order a transcript of today's proceedings for my signature, which will be submitted to the file, again, in lieu of the Court's memorandum of decision.

Newson, J.

Newson, John M., J.