Gary Eastman v. LLC (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 142)

On July 1, 2013, the defendants, Norwich Taxi, LLC and Nito Araujo,¹ submitted a motion for summary judgment and a memorandum of law in support of the motion, arguing that no genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to count one of the plaintiff's amended complaint and they are therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law, because they did not breach the duty owed to the plaintiff.   Attached to their memorandum of law, the defendants submitted excerpts and the certification page of the plaintiff's deposition testimony,² an affidavit of the defendant, Nito Araujo, and a superior court decision.   On August 14, 2013, the plaintiff, Gary Eastman, filed a motion and memorandum of law in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, arguing that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether the defendants' actions met the requisite standard of care.   In support of his motion, the plaintiff submitted three superior court cases.   This matter was heard at short calendar on September 23, 2013.

BACKGROUND

On December 19, 2012, the plaintiff filed a five-count amended complaint, which is the operative complaint, alleging the following facts.   On the morning of May 12, 2010, the plaintiff was a passenger in a motor vehicle operated by the defendant, Nito Araujo.   The motor vehicle that Araujo was operating was owned by defendant Norwich Taxi, LLC (Norwich Taxi).   At all relevant times, the vehicle that Araujo was operating was maintained as a family car by Norwich Taxi, and Araujo was a family member operating the vehicle within his general authority to do so, and/or Araujo was an agent or employee of Norwich Taxi and was operating the vehicle in the course of that agency or employment.

As Araujo was traveling westbound on West Thames Street in Norwich, Connecticut with the plaintiff as his backseat passenger, his vehicle was struck from behind by a vehicle operated by Vichitra Chanpong, whose vehicle had been struck by an unidentified vehicle.   As a result of the collision, the plaintiff sustained injuries, which were caused by the defendants' negligence and carelessness in that, inter alia, they did not properly signal, stopped suddenly, failed to keep proper lookout, were operating a vehicle with inadequate brakes and lights, failed to safely change lanes, ignored the traffic and surrounding conditions, failed to properly reduce speed, failed to properly avoid the collision, and failed to wear corrective lenses.   The plaintiff seeks money damages from the defendants.

LAW RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

“Practice Book [§ 17–49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ․ In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  Patel v. Flexo Converters U.S.A., Inc., 309 Conn. 52, 56–57, 68 A.3d 1162 (2013).  “[T]he ‘genuine issue’ aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred ․ A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002).  “In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact ․ To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.”  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10–11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).

DISCUSSION

In the present case, the defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law with regard to count one of the plaintiff's complaint, as no genuine issues of material fact exist.   Specifically, the defendants argue that, while they did owe a duty to the plaintiff, there is no evidence that they breached that duty.   Contrarily, the plaintiff argues that the defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the defendants' actions met the requisite standard of care.

“Litigants have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury ․ Summary judgment procedure is especially ill-adapted to negligence cases, where, as here, the ultimate issue in contention involves a mixed question of fact and law, and requires the trier of fact to determine whether the standard of care was met in a specific situation ․ [T]he conclusion of negligence is necessarily one of fact ․ Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Spencer v. Good Earth Restaurant Corp., 164 Conn. 194, 198–99, 319 A.2d 403 (1972).

Furthermore, “credibility issues are not appropriately resolved on summary judgment and must be decided by a jury.   See State v. Beavers, 290 Conn. 386, 414, 963 A.2d 956 (2009) (The determination of the credibility of a witness is solely the function of the jury);  Wason v. Myer, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk, Docket No. CV 98 0164806 (January 6, 2003, Lewis, J.) (denying motion for summary judgment and holding [the] court cannot substitute its own judgment concerning the credibility of [the witness] for that of the jury).  [B]ecause the jury has the opportunity to observe the conduct, demeanor and attitude of the witnesses and to gauge their credibility, it is axiomatic that evidentiary inconsistencies are for the jury to resolve, and it is within the province of the jury to believe all or only part of a witness' testimony ․ State v. Morgan, 274 Conn. 790, 800, 877 A.2d 739 (2005).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Philadelphia Indem.   Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Risk, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–06–4018752–S (July 30, 2009, Holden, J.).

In the present case, the defendants have failed to show the absence of any issue of material fact.   The defendants have provided only defendant Araujo's account of the events and excerpts of the plaintiff's deposition testimony.   Contrary to the defendants' assertion that there is no evidence of negligence, evidence that the defendants attached to their memorandum of law in support of their motion demonstrates that there could be a genuine issue of material fact.   Specifically, in the plaintiff's deposition testimony, he stated that if the defendant Araujo “had gone a little slower, and he had slowed down a little bit slower, the car behind us might have had a little more time to realize that he was stopping.”   Based on the evidence presented by the defendants, factual inconsistencies do exist.   Thus, the defendants have failed to satisfy their burden.   The affidavit the defendant submitted to establish that there is no evidence of a breach is self-serving.   Moreover, statements in an affidavit are not sufficient to overcome the existence of a disputed issue of material fact.   See Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 239 Conn. 574, 583, 687 A.2d 111 (1996).   The apparent conflict between the statements by defendant Araujo and the plaintiff's deposition testimony demonstrates an issue of credibility.   See State v. Beavers, 290 Conn. 386, 414, 963 A.2d 956 (2009).   Issues of credibility should be reserved for jury determination.   Therefore, the motion for summary judgment must be denied.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied.

Devine, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Although there is another defendant in this case, Norwich Taxi and Nito Araujo are the relevant defendants for purposes of this motion for summary judgment and will therefore be referred to as the defendants throughout this memorandum..  FN1. Although there is another defendant in this case, Norwich Taxi and Nito Araujo are the relevant defendants for purposes of this motion for summary judgment and will therefore be referred to as the defendants throughout this memorandum.

FN2. “Whether to admit deposition testimony into evidence is within the discretion of the trial court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Strode v. Hamden, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–99–0432459 (November 8, 2002, Zoarski, J.T.R.)..  FN2. “Whether to admit deposition testimony into evidence is within the discretion of the trial court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Strode v. Hamden, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–99–0432459 (November 8, 2002, Zoarski, J.T.R.).

Devine, James J., J.