710 II LLC v. Georges Korsun (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE SPECIAL DEFENSES NO. 131.00

Plaintiff 710 Long Ridge Road Operating Company II, LLC commenced this action in March of 2012 to recover monetary damages from defendant Georges Korsun.   The plaintiff alleges that the defendant breached his obligations as “Responsible Party” pursuant to a written agreement (the “Admission Agreement”) for nursing home care and services rendered to the defendant's mother (the “Resident”) over the course of approximately eighteen months.   The plaintiff, in its single-count Complaint dated February 29, 2012, alleges that the defendant is liable to it due to his failure to perform certain obligations under the Admission Agreement including taking all steps necessary and proper to obtain and maintain Medicaid benefits for his mother after she had been admitted to the plaintiff's nursing home facility.   The plaintiff alleges that breach of the Admission Agreement by a Responsible Party imposes personal liability upon him for costs of the Resident's stay at the facility.   In response, the defendant has filed his Third Amended Special Defenses dated May 8, 2012 in which he contends that notwithstanding the breach of contract alleged by plaintiff in its Complaint, the plaintiff is unable to recover against him personally as the Admission Agreement by its own terms limits any recovery to the income and assets of the Resident.   The defendant further alleges in his special defenses that his liability, if any, terminated upon appointment of a conservator of his mother, which occurred on November 17, 2010.   The plaintiff has moved to strike the First, Second and Fourth Special Defenses filed by the defendant on the ground they are all legally insufficient.¹

Facts

The facts of this case as set forth in the Complaint, Answer, Third Amended Special Defenses and Amended Counterclaim are as follows:  On or about April 4, 2009 the defendant placed his mother in the care of the plaintiff which is in the business of providing long-term convalescent and nursing home care to elderly patients.   On said date, the defendant executed a written agreement entitled “Admission Agreement” which included several addenda.   According to the plaintiff, the Admission Agreement required the defendant, as Responsible Party, to “make prompt payment out of the Resident's income and resources for allowable fees and charges imposed by Long Ridge” and to “take all steps necessary and appropriate to secure and maintain eligibility of the Resident for Medicaid.”   The plaintiff alleges it performed all of its obligations under the Admission Agreement by providing all required services to the defendant's mother from the date of her admission to the date of her death on December 8, 2010, while the defendant, according to the plaintiff, did not.   Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the defendant breached the Admission Agreement (1) by failing to make payment to them from his mother's resources and (2) by not taking all required steps to secure and maintain his mother's eligibility for Medicaid.   As a result, the plaintiff alleges that it suffered financial losses, which it claims are properly chargeable to the defendant as the Responsible Party to the Admission Agreement.   The defendant admits execution of the Admission Agreement but claims that by its own terms the Admission Agreement limits liability of Responsible Parties such as himself to the income and assets of the Resident.   The defendant also disputes the allegation that he failed to take all steps necessary to obtain and maintain his mother's eligibility for Medicaid assistance.

Analysis

“Whenever a party wishes to contest ․ (5) the legal sufficiency of any answer to any complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any part of that answer including any special defense contained therein, that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof.”  Practice Book § 10–39.  “The proper procedural vehicle to challenge legal sufficiency of a proposed pleading is a motion to strike ․” Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, 280 Conn. 225, 256, 905 A.2d 1165 (2006).   A motion to strike for failure to state a claim under Practice Book Section 10–39 will be granted unless the “facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action.”  Waters v. Autori, 236 Conn. 820, 826, 676 A.2d 357 (1996).  “In ruling on a motion to strike the court must assume that all well-stated allegations of fact, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, are true.”   Parker v. Colgate–Palmolive Co., 2003 Conn.Super. LEXIS 2487 at 2 (Conn.Super.Ct. Aug. 8, 2003).  “[H]owever, opinions and legal conclusions in the pleading, unsupported by alleged facts, are not grounds to deny a motion to strike.”  “A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded;  it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.”  Faulkner v. United Techs.   Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).  “Although we are mindful that our jurisprudence requires us to interpret pleadings broadly, we must construe them reasonably to contain all that they mean but not in such a way as to ‘strain the bounds of rational comprehension.’  “ Nazami v. Patrons Mut. Ins. Co., 280 Conn. 619, 629, 910 A.2d 209 (2006).  “The allegations of the pleading involved are entitled to the same favorable construction a trier would be required to give in admitting evidence under them and if the facts provable under its allegations would support a defense or a cause of action, the motion to strike must fail.”  Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108–09, 491 A.2d 368 (1985).

The Rules of Practice require that certain defenses be specially pleaded.   Practice Book § 10–50 states “[n]o facts may be proved under either a general or special denial except such as show that the plaintiff's statements of fact are untrue.   Facts which are consistent with such statements but show, notwithstanding, that the plaintiff has no cause of action, must be specially alleged.”

The question therefore as to the legal sufficiency of the defendant's special defenses is whether the allegations contained therein are (1) consistent with the allegations of the complaint but (2) nevertheless would, if proven, defeat the plaintiff's cause of action.   If the facts and legal ground stated therein would not defeat the plaintiff's cause of action, then they should not be affirmatively pleaded and should be stricken as special defenses.  “The fundamental purpose of a special defense, like other pleadings, is to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, so that basic issues are not concealed until the trial is underway ․ Whether facts must be specially pleaded depends on the nature of those facts in relation to the contested issues ․ In Pawlinski, we clarified this distinction by explaining that the denial of a material fact places in dispute the existence of that fact.   Even under a denial, a party generally may introduce affirmative evidence tending to establish a set of facts inconsistent with the existence of the disputed fact ․ If, however, a party seeks admission of evidence which is consistent with a prima facie case, but nevertheless would tend to destroy the cause of action, the ‘new matter’ must be affirmatively pleaded as a special defense.”  (Internal citations omitted.)  (Emphasis in the original.)   Coughlin v. Anderson, 270 Conn. 487, 501–02, 853 A.2d 460 (2004).

In the present case, the defendant asserts as his first and second special defenses the language of the Admission Agreement itself.   As to these two special defenses, in contract enforcement actions where a special defense is based solely on the language of the contract, it is not necessary or appropriate for the party defending to plead affirmatively a different interpretation of the contract provisions in question.   No ‘new matter’ inconsistent with the allegations of the complaint has been introduced by either of these two special defenses, and they are therefore not properly pleaded as special defenses.   The defendant's general denial suffices to put in dispute the plaintiff's interpretation of the Admission Agreement, and the defendant is free to introduce evidence as to his interpretation of these contract provisions at trial or in a motion for summary judgment.   The court therefore grants the plaintiff's Motion to Strike the First and Second of the Third Amended Special Defenses and the burden will remain on the plaintiff to prove the legal force and effect of these contract provisions.

The defendant's Fourth Special Defense asserts estoppel as a basis for denying the relief which plaintiff claims.   Viewing this pleading in the light most favorable to sustaining it, the court finds that the thrust of the defendant's Fourth Special Defense is that it would be unfair to impose liability upon him for failure to perform his obligations under the Admission Agreement after he no longer had the legal authority to perform those obligations.   Specifically, he alleges that after appointment of a conservator for his mother, he no longer had the authority to take the steps required to discharge his obligations regarding Medicaid eligibility.   And because the appointment of a conservator was done at the request of the plaintiff, it would be unfair to impose continuing liability on him after the appointment.   Thus, the defendant appears to be asserting a defense of equitable estoppel.   The court agrees with the plaintiff's argument that estoppel generally and equitable estoppel in particular requires some action or representation by the party against whom estoppel is claimed that causes the other party to change his position in reliance thereon.   In Bozzi v. Bozzi, 177 Conn. 232, 413 A.2d 834 (1979) the Appellate Court, quoting 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th Ed.1941) 804, p. 189, explained this defensive doctrine as follows:  “Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed, ․ as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse.   Its two essential elements are that one party must do or say something which is intended or calculated to induce another to believe in the existence of facts and act on that belief, and that the other party, influenced thereby, must change his position or do some act to his injury which he otherwise would not have done.”  Bozzi, supra, at 242.

In the present case, applying the same analysis as before, and viewing the pleading in the light most favorable to the defendant, the court finds that the Fourth Special Defense does contain some factual ‘new matter’ appropriate for a special defense.   But the court must also consider the legal basis of the special defense, in this case equitable estoppel, and whether, if proven, it would defeat or even limit the plaintiff's cause of action.   The court finds as a matter of law that the Fourth Special Defense as currently pleaded would not, if proven, defeat or limit the plaintiff's cause of action because the defendant does not allege the act or misrepresentation by the plaintiff intended to induce the defendant to act a certain way, and that the defendant reasonably relied on it to his detriment.   Therefore, the court finds the defendant's Fourth Special Defense insufficient as a matter of law.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above the plaintiff's Motion to Strike the First, Second and Fourth Amended Special Defenses dated May 8, 2013 is granted.

By the Court,

Anthony D. Truglia, Jr., J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiff has also moved to strike the defendant's Fifth Special Defense filed on May 8, 2013.   The defendant has agreed that the Fifth Special Defense may be stricken, so the court will strike it without further comment..  FN1. The plaintiff has also moved to strike the defendant's Fifth Special Defense filed on May 8, 2013.   The defendant has agreed that the Fifth Special Defense may be stricken, so the court will strike it without further comment.

Truglia, Anthony D., J.