Preston Housing Authority v. Lori Aguiar (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This summary process action came before the Court for a hearing on the Plaintiff's Affidavit re Non–Compliance with Stipulation and request for eviction on the following dates:  September 24, 2013, October 23, 2013, and November 7, 2013.   Both parties were represented by counsel at the hearing.   After consideration of all of the testimony, evidence and the record below, as well as the applicable law, the court finds the following by a preponderance of the evidence.

1. Pursuant to a lease agreement, the defendant tenant resides in an apartment owned by the plaintiff Preston Housing Authority, which apartment is part of an elderly housing residential building.   Although the defendant is not elderly, she resides at the plaintiff's building as a result of her social security disability status.

2. The parties entered into a stipulated agreement on 1/30/13, which stated in relevant part:  “Defendant shally [sic] comply with all the rules and regulations of Plaintiff;  specifically Defendant shall not have any overnight guests for more than 3 nights in any month, and shall insure her guests comply with applicable parking regulations.   If Defendant fails to comply with the terms of this agreement, Plaintiff may file an affidavit requesting an execution without further court hearing.”

3. On August 23, 2013, the plaintiff filed an Affidavit Re Non–Compliance with Stipulation, alleging that as of the date of the affidavit, the “Defendant has violated the terms of the Agreement on several occasions by failing to insure that her guests comply with Plaintiff's parking regulations.”

4. Although counsel for the defendant initially alleged that the defendant was incapable of voluntarily entering into the stipulated agreement on 1/30/13, due to defendant's mental and emotional deficiencies, counsel ultimately abandoned that claim during the hearing, waiving any claim regarding voluntariness of the stipulated agreement.   Based upon the evidence at the preliminary hearing regarding the question of voluntariness, the court made a finding that the defendant voluntarily and knowingly entered into the stipulated agreement.

5. The defendant did not testify at the hearing regarding the alleged parking violations.   The defendant's defense at the hearing was that there had been no parking violations, and left Plaintiff to its proof.

6. On November 7, 2013, without objection from the plaintiff, the court granted the defendant's request to allow third-party intervention by the defendant's son, Colby Secl, due to Secl's recent appointment through the Probate Court as conservator of the defendant's estate.

7. Defendant does not own a motor vehicle.   However, the defendant was assigned a shared parking space by the plaintiff.   New regulations implemented by the Parking Authority provided that individuals who have shared parking spaces may not allow guests to park in the spaces for more than four hours at one time.

8. Plaintiff elicited credible evidence at the hearing that the defendant had violated the parking regulations by allowing a guest or guests to park in the defendant's shared space in excess of the four-hour parking rule on six occasions during the month of August 2013.   Pl's Ex. 4.

9. Defendant's Exhibit C is a copy of the Preston Housing Authority Tenant Policies, Rules and Regulations signed by the defendant on 8/9/10.   The document indicates that it is effective February 6, 2008.   Paragraph 23 of the document addresses the parking rules which were in effect on 8/9/10, which rules do not include the so-called four-hour rule.

10. Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 is a copy of the Preston Housing Authority Tenant Policies, Rules and Regulations, also indicating an effective date of February 6, 2008.   This document is unsigned.   Paragraph 23 contains the so-called four-hour rule relating to shared parking spaces.  “Not to exceed a four hour time span.   Violators will be towed at owner's expense.”

11. At no time did the plaintiff cause any motor vehicle parked in the defendant's shared parking space to be towed.

12. Plaintiff elicited credible evidence at the hearing that the defendant was given oral notice of the four-hour parking rule, and that she received a copy of Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 when the new rules took effect.   However, the plaintiff failed to offer proof that the defendant signed a copy of the new regulations containing the four-hour parking rule.

13. C.G.S. 47a–9(b) states “[i]f a rule or regulation that would result in a substantial modification of the terms of the rental agreement is adopted after the tenant enters into the rental agreement, such rule or regulation is not valid unless the tenant consents to such rule or regulation in writing.”

14. The court finds that, under the circumstances of this case, the four-hour parking rule contained in Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 is a substantial modification of the terms of the rental agreement.

15 The court finds that at the time the new parking rules in Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 took effect, the defendant did not consent to the new rules in writing.

16. The court finds that the evidence is insufficient to conclude that when the defendant signed the stipulation on 1/30/13, agreeing to “comply with applicable parking regulations,” she agreed to comply with the rules and regulations as outlined in Plaintiff's Exhibit 5. Although the rules and regulations outlined in Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 were in effect on the date that the defendant signed the stipulation, the defendant never consented to those rules or regulations in writing.

17. The court finds that although the defendant was non-compliant with the parking regulations set forth in Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, her breach of the stipulated agreement was neither willful, nor grossly negligent.  19 Perry Street, LLC v. The Unionville Water Company et al., 294 Conn. 611, 629 (2010).   The court finds that if eviction is granted in the present matter for the breach alleged by the plaintiff, the defendant will suffer injury that is disproportionate to that of the plaintiff.  Id. The court also finds that the injury to the plaintiff resulting from the few incidents of over-time parking is not irreparable.  Id. The court concludes that those equitable principals bar forfeiture in the present matter.  Id.

Accordingly, the court concludes, based upon the evidence at trial, the procedural history, the findings of fact and applicable law, and based upon all of the facts and circumstances of the case, that the defendant was negligent in allowing her guest(s) to remain parked in excess of the four-hour rule on six occasions in August 2013.   However, the court cannot find, based upon the evidence, that the defendant's negligence constituted a violation of the stipulation.   The stipulation signed by the defendant, in relevant part, simply states that the defendant “shall insure her guests comply with applicable parking regulations ” (emphasis added), without any mention of the four-hour rule, for which the defendant never consented in writing.   Furthermore, to order the eviction of the defendant based on the relatively minor alleged violations in this case would cause the defendant to suffer an injury disproportionate to the injury of the plaintiff, which harm was not irreparable.

The plaintiff's request for execution (eviction) is denied.

BY THE COURT,

Goodrow, J.

Dated:  November 14, 2013

Goodrow, Karen, J.