Mary L. Lukos v. Stephen P. Lukos (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION # 219

The marriage of the parties was dissolved by the court on November 14, 2003.   At that time the parties entered into a separation agreement which defined their respective rights and obligations.   Both parties were represented by experienced counsel, who canvassed each of the parties extensively regarding their agreement.   The court accepted the agreement of the parties and incorporated said agreement into its judgment.

The plaintiff, Mary L. Lukos, alleges in her January 20, 2011 postjudgment motion for contempt that the defendant, Stephen P. Lukos has, among other things, failed to pay his portion of their adult children's educational expenses as required by paragraph seventeen of the separation agreement.   That specific provision of their agreement provides as follows:  “The Husband shall be responsible for and shall pay all private secondary school and college and professional school expenses for the parties' children.   Said obligation on the part of the Husband shall not exceed the total sum of Five Hundred Thousand ($500,000) Dollars.   Any expenses in excess of said Five Hundred Thousand ($500,000) Dollar sum shall be equally divided between the parties.   College expenses shall be defined as room and board tuition, books, and registration and sports related activities.   Husband shall pay 1/3 and Wife 2/3 of the special fees, travel to and from school at the beginning and end of the school year, allowance, and ordinary miscellaneous fees.   Said obligation on the part of the parties is nonmodifiable.   The Husband shall provide the wife with an annual accounting in writing concerning all of the aforesaid expenses paid by him.”

In an agreement filed with the court on April 29, 2013, the parties stipulated to the presentation of six interpretation issues connected to the plaintiff's motion for contempt.   The parties then submitted briefs on the stipulated issues, and the defendant submitted an additional addendum to his brief on August 20, 2013.   On August 21, 2013, the date of the hearing on the previously stipulated issues, the parties further stipulated, inter alia, that the Masters in Business Administration and Medical School programs that their children were attending were professional schools within the meaning of paragraph seventeen of their separation agreement.   The parties also agreed to limit the interpretation issues presented to the court at the August 21, 2013 hearing to the sole issue of whether paragraph seventeen of their separation agreement requires the plaintiff and defendant to pay for multiple professional-school degrees for their children.   This decision addresses that issue.

The defendant contends that the language of an agreement must be “afforded a reasonable interpretation ․ that does not lead to a bizarre result” and that “under the plaintiff's interpretation, the defendant's financial obligation is limitless ․ with a lifetime obligation to ․ pay for professional school programs ․ even after each of his children have obtained a professional school degree.”   According to the defendant, “[t]his was not the intent of the parties at the time they signed the agreement.   The defendant agreed to provide a professional school education for his children, not multiple professional school degrees seeded through a financial commitment of infinite duration.”   The defendant's position is that the agreement makes him responsible for the educational expenses of only a single professional-school degree for each child.

The plaintiff argues that paragraph seventeen “does not limit the parties' obligations based upon the age of the children, the number of institutions or programs they may be enrolled in, their marital status or a monetary maximum” and that this is in contrast to other provisions in the agreement that are limited by the children's age or educational status.   According to the plaintiff, “the court has no authority to impose limitations that the parties did not intend as demonstrated by the clear and unambiguous language of their contract.”   For the reasons stated below, the court agrees with the plaintiff.

Our Supreme Court has stated:  “It is well established that a separation agreement that has been incorporated into a dissolution decree and its resulting judgment must be regarded as a contract and construed in accordance with the general principles governing contracts ․ When construing a contract, we seek to determine the intent of the parties from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction ․ [T]he intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and ․ the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract ․ When only one interpretation of a contract is possible, the court need not look outside the four corners of the contract ․ Extrinsic evidence is always admissible, however, to explain an ambiguity appearing in the instrument ․ When the language of a contract is ambiguous, the determination of the parties' intent is a question of fact ․ When the language is clear and unambiguous, however, the contract must be given effect according to its terms, and the determination of the parties' intent is a question of law ․”

“The threshold determination in the construction of a separation agreement, therefore, is whether, examining the relevant provision in light of the context of the situation, the provision at issue is clear and unambiguous, which is a question of law ․ Contract language is unambiguous when it has a definite and precise meaning ․ concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion ․ The proper inquiry focuses on whether the agreement on its face is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation ․ It must be noted, however, that the mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous ․ A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity ․ Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from one party's subjective perception of the terms ․ Finally, in construing contracts, we give effect to all the language therein, as the law of contract interpretation ․ militates against interpreting a contract in a way that renders a provision superfluous.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Isham v. Isham, 292 Conn. 170, 180–82, 972 A.2d 228 (2009).

Isham makes clear that, as a threshold issue, the court must look at the relevant provision in context and determine whether it is susceptible to more than one interpretation.  Id. Both of the parties in the present case argue that the language of paragraph seventeen unambiguously supports their position.   The plaintiff argues that the paragraph seventeen contains no limits on the number of professional degrees the parties are responsible for paying and that finding any limits on the number of professional degree programs goes outside the contract's explicit terms.   The defendant argues that common sense dictates that the only way to read the agreement is as requiring the parents to pay for a single professional degree for each child because otherwise the contract would create the bizarre result of requiring the parties to provide unending academic support for their children, to which the parties would not have agreed.

It should be noted that the court is not addressing the hypothetical question of whether paragraph seventeen requires the parties to pay for limitless professional degrees for their children.   Rather, the court is concerned with the actual, relevant circumstances of this case involving whether the husband's responsibility to pay professional school expenses is limited to a single professional-school degree for each child.

The first sentence of paragraph seventeen establishes the types of education for which the defendant is responsible.   It states:  “The Husband shall be responsible for and shall pay all private secondary school and college and professional school expenses for the parties' children.”   The sentence makes the defendant “responsible for ․ all ․ professional school expenses ․” The language of that first sentence determines the responsibility for school costs based not on degrees, but on “expenses” and makes the defendant responsible for “all ․ expenses ․” for the three types of education.   Thus, the contract, by its clear terms, does not appear to limit the parties' requirement to paying the educational expenses of a single professional degree.   No such limit appears in paragraph seventeen.   The defendant contends, nevertheless, that, in the context of the situation, such an interpretation is unreasonable because it leads to the “bizarre” result that the parties would be responsible for limitless professional school for their children.

Under the agreement, the plaintiff is also required to pay for half of the educational expenses over $500,000 and still contends that the agreement is not limited to a single professional-school degree per child.   Her position undercuts the defendant's argument that nobody would have agreed to such a limitless responsibility.   Also, as the plaintiff suggests, looking at the separation agreement as a whole, the presence of limits on other parental responsibilities buttresses the position that the lack of a one-degree limit was the unambiguous intention of the parties.   For instance, paragraph fifteen of the separation agreement, which obligates the defendant to maintain health insurance coverage for the parties' children, limits that obligation to “for so long as each child remains a full-time student and remains eligible to be covered, but in no event, beyond the age of twenty-four (24) years.”   Such limitations elsewhere in the contract suggest that, where the parties intended to limit their financial responsibilities regarding their children, they did so explicitly.

Further, the defendant's proposed interpretation does not prevent the result that he argues necessitates that interpretation.   The defendant's reason for limiting his obligations to pay for professional school expenses under the agreement to one professional degree for each child is that, otherwise, the agreement could lead to the unreasonable result that the parties could be responsible for unlimited professional school expenses for each child.   The defendant's proposed interpretation, however, does not prevent the possibility of such a result.   If one of the parties' children were to go indefinitely from one professional course of study to another without obtaining a degree, the expenses the defendant would be liable for would be as unlimited under his interpretation of the agreement as under the plaintiff's.   This undercuts the defendant's argument that the bizarre result of the possibility of an endless education obligation necessitates his interpretation of the agreement, given that his interpretation is similarly insufficient in curtailing such an obligation.   The court cannot import into the parties' agreement a restriction that is not expressed in or implied by that agreement, especially where such a restriction is insufficient in preventing the purportedly unreasonable result that the defendant argues necessitates its inclusion.

Furthermore, individuals often obtain more than one professional degree in order to complete their education.   One professional degree may even be required to pursue another degree;  for instance, a master's degree may be required before enrolling in a doctoral degree program or be obtained in the course of pursing a doctoral degree.   Given these possibilities, it is significant that the parties did not define “professional school” and did not make explicit that the parties would only be responsible for “professional school expenses” for the first professional school from which their children secured a degree.   The lack of any such limits in this context suggests that the parties did not intend to limit their obligations under the agreement to a single professional degree per child.

The defendant is asking the court to import a limitation into his agreement that is not expressed therein.   To limit the obligations of the parties from those which appear in their agreement would not only torture the agreement's plain meaning, but would also require the court to set arbitrary limitations on the parties' obligations.   For instance, considering the unlimited educational issues that could be presented in the future, if the court were to limit the obligation to a single professional school degree, a court in the future might be expected to decide whether the first degree was one of a professional nature, and whether that degree was necessary to achieve a second professional degree.   Given that the parties' agreement does not contain any explicit limit on the number of professional degrees a child can earn before the parties are no longer required to pay for their professional school expenses, any such decision would necessarily be arbitrary.

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds and determines as a matter of law that paragraph seventeen of the parties' separation agreement is unambiguous in that it does not limit the professional-school educational expenses that the parties are responsible for to a single professional-school degree.

RESHA, J.T.R.

Resha, Robert T., J.T.R.