John Wolchesky v. William Wolchesky et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS (# 102)

Defendants move to dismiss the first count of this action on the basis that plaintiff lacks standing to assert the cause of action which he has pled therein.

This suit concerns title to a parcel of land in the town of Pomfret.   The complaint alleges that a family farm, once owned in its entirety by the parents of the principal parties, was reduced in size by a conveyance of the piece in question to the defendants via a 1954 deed, and that they remain owners of that piece.   That deed contained an inherent ambiguity.   By metes and bounds, the legal description depicts a square that is 418 feet on all four sides.   A lot of that size comprises slightly more than 4 acres in total.   The deed recites, however, that the parcel being conveyed consists of “2 acres, more or less.”   Thus, either the metes and bounds description includes a mistake, or the statement of the bulk amount of land conveyed is erroneous.

Plaintiff's first count seeks a reformation of deed correcting that error and resolving the consequent uncertainty as to the location of the boundary between the parties' lands.   The reformation of deed sought can be ordered when an instrument has been executed as the result of a mutual mistake and by reason thereof each party has done what neither intended;  Patalano v. Chabot, 139 Conn. 356, 359 (Conn.1952).   Plaintiff does not claim to be either grantor or grantee in the deed which he seeks to reform.   The complaint lays out his chain of title, and indicates that he acquired his present interest via deeds from other family members, all of whom were heirs to the surviving 1954 grantor.   Defendants argue that since he was neither a party to nor a third-party beneficiary of that instrument, he cannot now sue for a reformation of its provisions.

The motion to dismiss is a proper method by which to raise their challenge, as it amounts to a claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction in this court to hear this case.   Absent “standing,” plaintiff would not have the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion.  Blumenthal v. Barnes, 261 Conn. 434, 441 (2002).   While it is generally recognized that there are three types of standing (statutory, classical, and “taxpayer”), it is only the so-called classical form that applies here.   Classical aggrievement requires a two-part showing that a litigant has 1) a specific, personal and legal interest in the challenged action, as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole, and 2) that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the challenged action;  Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Hebron, 295 Conn. 802, 810 (2010).   Once raised, the court must consider and decide the issue of jurisdiction before proceeding further;  Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Harrison, 264 Conn. 829, 839 n.6 (2003).

Defendants cite three cases in support of their motion, Dow and Condon v. Brookfield Development Corporation, 266 Conn. 572 (2003), Grigerik v. Sharpe, 247 Conn. 293 (1998), and Lopinto v. Haines, 185 Conn. 527 (1981).   The Dow and Condon case involved a real estate broker's entitlement to a commission believed due upon the sale of a parcel of real estate, and did not involve the standing of a party to that transaction to raise issues concerning the adequacy of the conveyancing instruments.  Grigerik did not involve the adequacy of the deed in a real estate transfer, but whether the plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary of an understanding between the grantor of his land and a contractor who had provided professional services on the land.  Lopinto focuses upon the mutuality of the mistake alleged in an action for reformation of a real estate contract and a deed delivered in fulfillment of it, not upon the standing of either party to pursue the action.   In short, all are inapposite to the question now pending.

When the instrument a party seeks to reform is a deed, it is widely accepted that grantees in the chain of title do have standing to raise issues relative to the accuracy of the legal description, inter alia.   Proper parties to an action for reformation of a deed include “all persons having an interest in the subject matter which will be affected by a decree reforming [the] instrument ․ the original grantee and the parties to whom he conveyed are proper parties plaintiff in a suit to correct a deed;” 76 C.J.S. Reformation of Instruments, § 73.   A rationale for this rule is set forth in Am.Jur.2d, Reformation of Instruments, § 60, which explains that as applied to real estate conveyances “[p]rivity is defined as the mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property, title, or estate.   Privity with a party to a deed, for the purposes of determining whether a nonparty to a deed can seek reformation of the deed, refers to successive possessions that are connected by an understanding that the rights of the possessor will be transferred, and a transfer of possession in fact occurs ․ A grantee in property succeeds to the grantor's right to maintain a suit to reform a prior deed ․ If a mistake of description occurs in a series of conveyances under circumstances that would entitle any one of the grantees to a reformation as against the original grantor, the equity court will work back through all and give the last grantees a right of reformation against the original grantor.”  (Emphasis added, in both cases).

The rule certainly is consistent with Connecticut precedent on this issue.   Gavin v. Johnson, 131 Conn. 489 (1945), allowed a party subsequent in title to the original parties to the first deed to proceed to reform the legal description therein which was allegedly in error.   A later decision of the superior court, Lewis v. Maguder, Docket # CV 05 4001921, Superior Court, Windham Judicial District (2006;  Martin, J.), interpreted the holding in Gavin as allowing plaintiffs who succeeded to the rights of an original grantor of real estate to bring suit, on the grounds of mistake, to reform the original instrument and thus secure proper title to their purchase.   This court agrees with that analysis.

The motion to dismiss for lack of standing is denied.   By this ruling, the court expresses no opinion on the merits of the plaintiff's claims, which will be more fully determined at a later date.

Boland, J.

Boland, John D., J.