State of Connecticut v. 1199 NP SNAP (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The parties in this case are the New England Health Care Employees Union, District 1199, acting on behalf of Carolyn Baker, a member of the defendant and an employee of the plaintiff, the State of Connecticut, Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (“DMHAS”).   The collective bargaining agreement between the parties provided, inter alia, that certain employment disputes be resolved through arbitration.   Pending before the court is the plaintiff's motion to vacate an arbitration award.   In his opinion and award, the arbitrator found the following facts:  “Grievant, Carolyn Baker entered the State's employ on September 30, 2005, and has been an MHA 1 ¹ in the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services with a work location at CT Valley Hospital.”   On February 16, 2012, Grievant [Baker] was notified by the Chief Executive Officer of the Department that she was being dismissed, effective February 21, 2012, based on the results of an investigation in which it ‘was concluded that you fraudulently obtained benefits to the State of Connecticut's Department of Social Services administration of the Disaster Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (D–SNAP).’   According to the termination letter, evidence disclosed ‘in the investigation established that you provided false information on your D–SNAP application that allowed you to receive benefits for which you were not eligible.’   A Loudermill hearing was held with Baker on February 16, 2012.”

Baker filed a grievance challenging the termination of her employment on the ground that it was not for just cause.   DMHAS issued an answer denying the grievance.   The arbitrator accepted the factual summary provided in the answer as accurate, including that the agency conducted an investigation of the allegations made against Baker and determined that she had provided false information on her D–SNAP application as follows:  “1) Reported her bi-weekly income to be $1,600 or $3,200 monthly when in fact her monthly income is approximately $7,498.   2) She failed to report approximately $9,300 available to her in her savings account ․ No additional information was provided by the Grievant or Union.”   Based on the information submitted by both sides, DMHAS found that it had just cause for termination and denied the grievance.

The parties stipulated that the following issues be presented for arbitration:  (1) “Did the State have just cause to dismiss the Grievant?” and (2) “[i]f not, what shall the remedy be consistent with the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement?”   The arbitrator first found that the grievant herself acknowledged “that she offered misleading information when applying for benefits from the Federal Disaster Relief Fund.” He also found that the misconduct “reflects a lack of candor required of an employee in her position ․ [and] there is a sufficient nexus for the State to seek a disciplinary penalty against a State employee who has misrepresented an application for public benefits.”   In addition, “the Arbitrator identifies the State's significant interests in ensuring the public that it will not tolerate its employees obtaining public money under circumstances reflecting less than total honesty.”   Nonetheless, the Arbitrator observed that “the just cause concept mandates not only that the penalty be in accord with the nature of the misconduct but also that the penalty is in the line with the discipline that similarly situated employees have received for the same type of misconduct.”   He also noted that the “Grievant's misconduct, does not stand alone because of the evidence that any number of employees in the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services engaged in essentially the same type of misconduct and these employees have not been terminated ․” He cited as an example “the expedited Arbitration Awards found in the record wherein “Arbitrator [Susan] Meredith consistently found that termination ‘was too severe’ of a penalty and that the dismissal should be reduced to a suspension without back pay and an authorized leave of absence without back pay.”   He also references two other Arbitration decisions wherein the employees were returned to their former position.   The arbitrator further “finds that he would be hard put to issue a penalty of termination that would be more severe than what seems to have emerged as a pattern of discipline for similar misconduct.”   Accordingly, [he concludes] “that just cause does not exist to support [Baker's] termination” and that her dismissal should be reduced to a 120–day suspension without back pay.   Finally, the arbitrator ordered that [Baker] should be reinstated within ten business days of the award and “issued any back pay in excess of the 120–day unpaid suspension.”

On March 7, 2013, the plaintiff filed an application to vacate the arbitration award (docket entry # 100.31) and a memorandum in support (docket entry # 106) on May 8, 2013.   Subsequently, the defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to the plaintiff's motion on (docket entry # 107) on June 3, 2013.   Pursuant to an order of the court, following the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 391, 309 Conn. 519 (2013), issued August 6, 2013, the parties filed supplemental memoranda by September 6, 2013.   The parties stipulated that the case be submitted to the court on the papers.

I

SCOPE OF REVIEW

“Judicial review of arbitral decisions is narrowly confined ․ When the parties agree to arbitration and establish the authority of the arbitrator through the terms of their submission, the extent of our judicial review of the award is delineated by the scope of the parties' agreement ․ When the scope of the submission is unrestricted, the resulting award is not subject to de novo review even for errors of law so long as the award conforms to the submission ․” Industrial Risk Insurers v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 86, 92, 868 A.2d 47 (2005).

“Where the submission does not otherwise state, the arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and legal questions and an award cannot be vacated on the grounds that ․ the interpretation of the agreement by the arbitrators was erroneous.   Courts will not review the evidence nor, where the submission is unrestricted, will they review the arbitrators' decision of the legal questions involved ․ In other words, [u]nder an unrestricted submission, the arbitrators' decision is considered final and binding;  thus the courts will not review the evidence considered by the arbitrators nor will they review the award for errors of law or fact.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 93.  “A submission is unrestricted when ․ the parties' arbitration agreement contains no language restricting the breadth of issues, reserving explicit rights, or conditioning the award on court review.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Id., 89 n.3.

“The resulting award can be reviewed, however, to determine if the award conforms to the submission ․ Such a limited scope of judicial review is warranted given the fact that the parties voluntarily bargained for the decision of the arbitrator and, as such, the parties are presumed to have assumed the risks of and waived objections to that decision ․ It is clear that a party cannot object to an award which accomplishes precisely what the arbitrators were authorized to do merely because that party dislikes the results ․ The significance, therefore, of a determination that an arbitration submission was unrestricted or restricted is not to determine what the arbitrators are obligated to do, but to determine the scope of judicial review of what they have done.   Put another way, the submission tells the arbitrators what they are obligated to decide.   The determination by a court of whether the submission was restricted or unrestricted tells courts what its scope of review is regarding the arbitrator's decision.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Id., 93–94.

The parties do not contest that the award is an unrestricted submission.²  The plaintiff argues that the award should be vacated under two exceptions to the above standard of review.  “Even in the case of an unrestricted submission, we have ․ recognized three grounds for vacating an award:  (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute ․ (2) the award violates clear public policy ․ [and] (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of [General Statutes] § 52–418.”   (Citations omitted.)  Garrity v. McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 6, 612 A.2d 742 (1992).   The application of one of the above exceptions can greatly modify the above standard of review.   The plaintiff argues that second exception applies in that “the award violates the State's public policy on defrauding a public community by false receipt of a government benefit,” and therefore, the award should be vacated on this ground.   In addition, the plaintiff also argues that the arbitrator acted in excess of his authority in contravention of § 52–418(a)(4) by failing to properly adjudicate the instant grievance in violation of the collective bargaining agreement.

A

Public Policy Exception

Most recently, our Supreme Court reviewed the public policy exception in the case of State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 391, supra, 309 Conn. 526.  “We have consistently stated that arbitration is the favored means of settling differences and arbitration awards are generally upheld unless an award clearly falls within the proscriptions of § 52–418 ․ A challenge of the arbitrators authority is limited to a comparison of the award to the submission ․ Because we favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution ․” (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id.

“In spite of the general rule that challenges to an arbitrator's authority are limited to a comparison of the award to the submission, an additional challenge exists under § 52–418(a)(4) when the award rendered is claimed to be in contravention of public policy ․ This challenge is premised on the fact that the parties cannot expect an arbitration award approving conduct which is illegal or contrary to public policy to receive judicial endorsement any more than parties can expect a court to enforce such a contract between them ․ When a challenge to the arbitrator's authority is made on public policy grounds, however, the court is not concerned with the correctness of the arbitrator's decision but with the lawfulness of enforcing the award ․ Accordingly, the public policy exception to arbitral authority should be narrowly construed and [a] court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's interpretation of [collective bargaining agreements] is limited to situations where the contract as interpreted would violate some explicit public policy that is well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests ․ The party challenging the award bears the burden of proving that illegality or conflict with public policy is clearly demonstrated ․ Therefore, given the narrow scope of the public policy limitation on arbitral authority, the plaintiff can prevail in the present case only if it demonstrates that the board's award clearly violates an established public policy mandate.”  (Emphasis original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 526–27.

The plaintiff argues that the award should be vacated under the public policy exception, and accordingly, is entitled to de novo review.  “[W]here a party challenges a consensual arbitral award on the ground that it violates public policy, and where that challenge has a legitimate, colorable basis, de novo review of the award is appropriate in order to determine whether the award does in fact violate public policy.”  Id., 527.  “That de novo review is limited, however, to the two critical questions:  (1) whether there is an explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy and (2) whether the award violates that policy ․ It does not extend to the facts found by the arbitrator ․ This necessarily means, therefore, that, if the plaintiff has established a legitimate colorable basis for its public policy challenge to the arbitrator's reinstatment decision, although we defer to the historical facts found by the arbitrator, the arbitrator's conclusion of no just cause for termination is not entitled to deference but is, instead, subject to our de novo review to determine whether it is in violation of public policy.”  Burr Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. New England Health Care Employees Union, District 1199, 142 Conn.App. 213, 223–24 (2013).   See also Schoonmaker v. Cummings & Lockwood of Connecticut, P.C., 252 Conn. 416, 429, 747 A.2d 1017 (2000).

The plaintiff argues that defrauding a public community constitutes criminal misconduct punishable as a larceny, and establishes a civil public policy framework within which to view the grievant's conduct.  General Statutes § 53a–119(6) ³ establishes “an explicit public policy” of our state which is “well defined and dominant.”  Id. Based on the existence of application of this statute to Baker's conduct, the plaintiff argues that the arbitration award reinstating her to a public position also violates public policy.   Because there is a colorable basis to the plaintiff's argument, de novo review is appropriate giving due deference to the arbitrator's findings of fact.⁴

“The courts employ a “two-step analysis ․ [in] deciding cases such as this.   First, the court determines whether an explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy can be identified.   If so, the court then decides if the arbitrator's award violated public policy.”  State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 391, supra, 309 Conn. 529.   In determining whether there is “an explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy,” the court may refer “to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.”   The Appellate Court has recognized the existence of an important public policy in § 53–119(6):  “This state's compelling public policy of not tolerating the knowing misappropriation of state funds by state officials or employees cannot be disputed.  General Statutes § 53a–119(6), which explicitly proscribes such conduct, represents an unequivocal legislative articulation of this policy.   The public policy of discouraging fraud generally is firmly rooted in our common law as well.”  State v. Council 4, AFSCME, 27 Conn.App. 635, 641 (2000).   Many other cases have also held that embedded within the general public policy against theft, fraud and embezzlement is the public policy that an employer “should not be required to retain in a position of financial trust an employee who has been established to have stolen.”   Groton v. United Steelworkers of America, 254 Conn. 35, 48, 757 A.2d 501 (2000) (holding that a trial court properly vacated an award reinstating an employee who was discharged after entering a nolo contendere plea to charge of embezzling funds from his employer);  see Board of Education v. Local 566, Council 4, AFSCME, 43 Conn.App. 499, 504, 683 A.2d 1036 (1996), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 957, 688 A.2d 327 (1997) (holding that enforcement of award reinstating an employee to a position with responsibility for publicly owned property after a conviction for fraudulently diverting union funds to his own use violated public policy);  State v. Council 4, AFSCME, supra, 27 Conn.App. 641 (holding that where employee had admittedly misappropriated funds through his position with the state, an arbitration award reinstating his employment violated public policy).

Having identified an explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy, the court must now determine whether enforcing the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract would violate this policy.   As previously noted, the arbitrator found that Baker acknowledged “that she offered misleading information when applying for benefits from the Federal Disaster Relief Fund” and that her misconduct “reflects a lack of candor required of an employee in her position.”   He also found a sufficient nexus for the State to seek a disciplinary penalty against a State employee who has misrepresented an application for public benefits.   In addition, the arbitrator acknowledged that the State had a significant interest in demonstrating to the public that it will not tolerate its employees obtaining public money under circumstances reflecting less than total honesty.   Nevertheless, the arbitrator observed that “the just cause concept mandates not only that the penalty be in accord with the nature of the misconduct but also that the penalty is in the line with the discipline that similarly situated employees have received for the same type of misconduct” and that Baker's misconduct did “not stand alone because of the evidence that any number of employees in the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services engaged in essentially the same type of misconduct and these employees have not been terminated.”   He cited as an example the expedited arbitration awards found in the record wherein another arbitrator “consistently found that termination ‘was too severe’ of a penalty and that the dismissal should be reduced to a suspension without back pay and an authorized leave of absence without back pay.”   He also referenced two other arbitration decisions wherein the employees were returned to their former position.   Finally, he found “that he would be hard put to issue a penalty of termination that would be more severe than what seems to have emerged as a pattern of discipline for similar misconduct.”

Under Connecticut's regulations pertaining to state agencies, Baker's conduct gives rise to “just cause” for discipline, which includes suspension, demotion or dismissal.   See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 5–240–1a.⁵  Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement and by statute, the plaintiff is vested with the authority to determine appropriate discipline for its employees by statute;  General Statutes § 5–240(c) (“An appointing authority may dismiss any employee in the classified service when the authority considers the good of the service will be served thereby ․”);  and under the collective bargaining agreement.⁶

According to the plaintiff, the nature of Baker's misconduct alone justifies vacating the arbitration award.   However, this conclusion considers only the first of the requisite two-step public policy analysis.   In State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 391, supra, a Department of Corrections (“DOC”), employee filed a grievance upon being terminated by DOC “for engaging in an open pattern of sexual harassment in knowing violation of the department's administrative directive 2.2,” which established a zero tolerance policy for sexual harassment defined to include “ ‘[g]raphic or sexually suggestive comment about an individual's dress, body, sexual attributes, gender identity, or sexual orientation’;' [j]okes, pranks, vandalism or banter that tends to denigrate or show hostility toward an individual or group on the basis of gender, sexual attributes, or sexual orientation;' and ‘[u]nnecessary touching ․ of another person.’  “ Id., 322, n.1. Following a five-day hearing, the arbitrator issued an award that reduced the grievant's termination to a one-year suspension without pay or benefits, finding that “[t]he dismissal of the grievant was not for just cause.”

As in that case, this court must assume for purposes of its consideration of the State's motion to vacate “that the arbitrator correctly determined that there was no just cause to terminate the grievant [Baker] under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement;” Id., 530;  and that, instead, a 120–day suspension without back pay “was the appropriate sanction under the agreement.”  Id., 531.   Rather, the question that the court must answer “is whether, under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, a contract provision requiring the reinstatement of the grievant violates a well-defined and dominant public policy.   In other words ․ whether public policy required the grievant's dismissal.”  Id.

Based on this foregoing standard, this court cannot find based on the specific facts and circumstances of her case, that Baker's conduct was so egregious that it requires nothing less than termination of her employment so as not to violate public policy.   In State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 391, supra, the grievant's conduct of sexual harassment was egregious, repeated over a substantial period of time and directed at co-workers in the workplace.   On the other hand, Baker's conduct, although it involved a violation of an explicit public policy in the form of General Statutes § 53a–119(6), was a one-time event that occurred outside of work.   When viewed in the light of the facts found by the arbitrator, including his finding that punishments for similar misconduct by other DMHAS employees did not result in dismissal, and accordingly, that just cause under the collective bargaining agreement did not support termination, this court cannot conclude that the award reducing Baker's termination to 120–day suspension without back pay, violates public policy.   See Id., 531, 534–35.

B

General Statutes § 52–418(a)(4)

The plaintiff also argues that the award should be vacated under the “recognized ground for vacating an arbitration award [when that] award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of General Statutes § 52–418.”  International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 361 v. New Milford, 81 Conn.App. 726, 730, 841 A.2d 706 (2004).  General Statutes § 52–418(a)(4) provides in relevant part:  “Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court ․ shall make an order vacating the award if it finds ․ the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”

“In determining whether an arbitrator has exceeded the authority granted under the contract, a court cannot base the decision on whether the court would have ordered the same relief, or whether or not the arbitrator correctly interpreted the contract.   The court must instead focus on whether the [arbitrator] had authority to reach a certain issue, not whether that issue was correctly decided.   Consequently, as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of authority, the award must be enforced.   The arbitrator's decision cannot be overturned even if the court is convinced that the arbitrator committed serious error ․ Moreover, [e]very reasonable presumption and intendment will be made in favor of the award and of the arbitrator's acts and proceedings.   Hence, the burden rests on the party challenging the award to produce evidence sufficient to show that it does not conform to the submission.”  (Citations omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  Teamsters Local Union No. 677 v. Board of Education, 122 Conn.App. 617, 623–24, 998 A.2d 1239 (2010).

Where a party claims under § 52–418(a)(4) that the arbitration award is inconsistent with the contractual rights of the parties, the court should:  “compare the agreement with the award to determine whether the arbitrator has ignored his obligation to interpret and apply that agreement as written ․ This additional analysis is conducted pursuant to such a claim because an arbitrator's award is legitimate only so longs as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.   When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of this award ․ If, for example, there was evidence that revealed that [the arbitrator] had reached his decision by consulting a ouija board, [it would] not suffice to say that the award conformed to the submission ․ It must be emphasized, however, that merely claiming inconsistency between the agreement and the award will not trigger judicial examination of the merits of the arbitration award.   Rather, in the face of such a claimed inconsistency, this court will review the award only to determine whether it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement ․ [A court] will not, however, employ a broader standard of review simply as an alternative means for determining whether the arbitrator correctly decided the issues that were submitted to arbitration.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 624–25.

In the present matter, the plaintiff argues that the arbitrator “abdicated his mission which required him to adjudicate the precise factual context of the grievance before him” by relying “solely on the expedited awards” in determining whether there was just cause for terminating Baker's employment.   The plaintiff maintains that “[r]ather than adjudicate the instant grievance, not someone else's, Arbitrator Rinaldo simply references the other expedited awards and without any further analysis, reinstated [Baker] to her job, with a suspension.   This is not what the State bargained for.”   The plaintiff further argues that this manner of arbitration avoids a “nuanced consideration of [the] grievance, based on the evidence, of the grievant's conduct and whether the State had a material basis to terminate her.”   The plaintiff emphasizes that “all grievances arising from the D–SNAP scandal are not the same,” and the state was entitled to an independent consideration of Baker's grievance without consideration of the outcomes of expedited awards.

An examination of the award and the collective bargaining agreement do not support the plaintiff's assertions.   The plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the award must be vacated because the arbitrator “ignored his obligation to interpret and apply [the] agreement as written” by wrongfully using the expedited arbitration awards to create a standard of appropriate discipline for Baker's conduct, or that the arbitrator failed to adjudicate the facts immediately before him.   Nor did the plaintiff otherwise demonstrated that the arbitrator's award did not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.

First, the collective bargaining agreement does not contain any provisions prohibiting the arbitrator from considering other arbitration awards.   While the agreement does provide for “[e]xpedited arbitration ․ by mutual agreement” of the parties, there is no language limiting the consideration of an expedited award in a normal arbitration proceeding.   Nor is there any language describing the decision-making procedures the arbitrator must follow.   Therefore, there is nothing express in the collective bargaining agreement prohibiting the arbitrator's actions.

Second, the arbitrator noted in making the award that the concept of just cause under the contract mandates not only that the penalty imposed be “in line with the discipline that similarly situated employees have received for the same type of misconduct” but also that the penalty be “in accord with the nature of the misconduct.”   In addition, the use of the expedited awards did not deprive the plaintiff of due consideration of its arguments.   The arbitrator found that “any number of employees ․ engaged in essentially the same type of misconduct and these employees have not been terminated.”   He also found that in addition to the expedited arbitration awards, “at least two other Arbitration decisions returned the employees to their former position.”   This language demonstrates that the arbitrator did not simply rely on other awards, but considered the underlying facts of those awards in relation to the facts of Baker's grievance.   While the plaintiff may disagree with the arbitrator's opinion on those awards based on the facts found therein, this alone is not a basis for vacating the award under § 52–418(a)(4).

Finally, the plaintiff's other arguments do not support its position.   The plaintiff's reliance on Stratford v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL–CIO, Local 998, 248 Conn. 108 (1999) is misguided.   In that case, the Supreme Court found “as a matter of public policy, arbitrators are not required to give collateral estoppel effect to prior arbitral awards.”  Id., 109.   It does not support the plaintiff's argument that arbitrators should not consider other arbitration awards, and this court could not find any authority that stands for such a proposition.   Further, the plaintiff's arguments that the arbitrator misapplied the law is unavailing under the standard of review for § 52–418(a)(4), since this exception is not a “means for determining whether the arbitrator correctly decided the issues that were submitted to arbitration.”  Teamsters Local Union No. 677 v. Board of Education of Danbury, supra, 122 Conn.App. 624–25.   Because the arbitration award does draw its essence from the contract, it cannot be vacated under the theory that the arbitrator “exceeded [his] powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”  General Statutes § 52–418(a)(4).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's application to vacate the arbitration award is hereby DENIED.

Peck, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The general description of Mental Health Assistant 1 is “assisting in the assessment, planning and implementation of paraprofessional nursing, clinical and/or rehabilitative interventions designed to support clients short and/or long term needs.”.  FN1. The general description of Mental Health Assistant 1 is “assisting in the assessment, planning and implementation of paraprofessional nursing, clinical and/or rehabilitative interventions designed to support clients short and/or long term needs.”

FN2. The defendant expressly concedes this point, and the plaintiff does not raise it as an issue nor does it make any arguments under the default standard of review for restricted and unrestricted submissions.   Instead, the plaintiff argues solely under the two exceptions to the default standard of review..  FN2. The defendant expressly concedes this point, and the plaintiff does not raise it as an issue nor does it make any arguments under the default standard of review for restricted and unrestricted submissions.   Instead, the plaintiff argues solely under the two exceptions to the default standard of review.

FN3. General Statutes § 53a–119(6) provides in relevant part:  “A person is guilty of defrauding a public community who (A) authorizes, certifies, attests or files a claim for benefits or reimbursement from a local, state or federal agency which he knows is false;  or (B) knowingly accepts the benefits from a claim he knows is false;  or © as an officer or agent of any public community, with intent to prejudice it, appropriates its property to the use of any person or draws any order upon its treasury or presents or aids in procuring to be allowed any fraudulent claim against such community ․”.  FN3. General Statutes § 53a–119(6) provides in relevant part:  “A person is guilty of defrauding a public community who (A) authorizes, certifies, attests or files a claim for benefits or reimbursement from a local, state or federal agency which he knows is false;  or (B) knowingly accepts the benefits from a claim he knows is false;  or © as an officer or agent of any public community, with intent to prejudice it, appropriates its property to the use of any person or draws any order upon its treasury or presents or aids in procuring to be allowed any fraudulent claim against such community ․”

FN4. In State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 391, the Court noted, “[i]t is clear ․ that this court's ruling in Schoonmaker [Schoonmaker v. Cummings & Lockwood of Connecticut, P.C., supra, 252 Conn. 429] is in no way inconsistent with the principle that, “[w]hen a challenge to the arbitrator's authority is made on public policy grounds ․ the court is not concerned with the correctness of the arbitrator's decision but with the lawfulness of enforcing the award ․ Thus, when the issue before the arbitrator involves the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, the court presumes the correctness of the arbitrator's interpretation, even when the award implicates some public policy ․ Accordingly, the sole question that the court must decide, in the exercise of its plenary power to identify and apply the public policy of this state ․ is whether, under the arbitrator's presumptively correct interpretation of the contract, the contract provision violates a well-defined and dominant public policy.”  (Citations omitted;  emphasis original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 391, supra, 309 Conn. 528–29..  FN4. In State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 391, the Court noted, “[i]t is clear ․ that this court's ruling in Schoonmaker [Schoonmaker v. Cummings & Lockwood of Connecticut, P.C., supra, 252 Conn. 429] is in no way inconsistent with the principle that, “[w]hen a challenge to the arbitrator's authority is made on public policy grounds ․ the court is not concerned with the correctness of the arbitrator's decision but with the lawfulness of enforcing the award ․ Thus, when the issue before the arbitrator involves the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, the court presumes the correctness of the arbitrator's interpretation, even when the award implicates some public policy ․ Accordingly, the sole question that the court must decide, in the exercise of its plenary power to identify and apply the public policy of this state ․ is whether, under the arbitrator's presumptively correct interpretation of the contract, the contract provision violates a well-defined and dominant public policy.”  (Citations omitted;  emphasis original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 391, supra, 309 Conn. 528–29.

FN5. Section 5–240–1a of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides in relevant part:  “ ‘Just cause’ means any conduct for which an employee may be suspended, demoted or dismissed and includes, but is not limited to, the following:  ․“7. Theft, willful neglect or misuse of any state funds, property, equipment, material or supplies ․“8. Deliberate violation of any law, state regulation or agency rule.”.  FN5. Section 5–240–1a of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides in relevant part:  “ ‘Just cause’ means any conduct for which an employee may be suspended, demoted or dismissed and includes, but is not limited to, the following:  ․“7. Theft, willful neglect or misuse of any state funds, property, equipment, material or supplies ․“8. Deliberate violation of any law, state regulation or agency rule.”

FN6. Article 5 of the collective bargaining agreement at issue provides in relevant part:  “[T]he State reserves and retains, whether exercised or not, all the lawful and customary rights powers and prerogatives of public management.   Such rights include ․ the suspension, demotion, discharge or any other appropriate action against its Employees ․”.  FN6. Article 5 of the collective bargaining agreement at issue provides in relevant part:  “[T]he State reserves and retains, whether exercised or not, all the lawful and customary rights powers and prerogatives of public management.   Such rights include ․ the suspension, demotion, discharge or any other appropriate action against its Employees ․”

Peck, A. Susan, J.