John Kaminski v. Lynn Millings et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (# 102)

Defendants request that the court grant their motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) to the extent that the plaintiff is attempting to sue the defendants in their individual capacity, the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants due to insufficient service of process, and (2) to the extent that the plaintiff is attempting to sue the defendants in their official capacity, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff's claims as to money damages are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

I

FACTS

On March 7, 2013, the plaintiff, a self-represented incarcerated individual, John S. Kaminski, filed a three-count complaint against the defendants, Lynn Millings, the Director of the Department of Corrections, Leo Arnone, the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, an unidentified shift supervisor (shift supervisor) at the MacDougall–Walker Correctional Institution (MacDougall), and an unidentified hospital supervisor (hospital supervisor) at MacDougall.

In count one, the plaintiff alleges that Commissioner Arnone failed to ensure that inmates are provided with meaningful access to the courts as mandated by law.   Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that Commissioner Arnone failed to ensure that the request for the proposal that solicits bids for the contract that provides legal services to inmates complied with the law, that he failed to ensure that the contract effectively provides legal assistance in compliance with the constitution, and that he advised his institutions that they no longer have to provide inmates with legal materials or legal assistance.   In addition, the plaintiff has filed suit against the current legal services provider, Inmate Legal Assistance Program (ILAP), but, despite the conflict between the plaintiff and ILAP, Commissioner Arnone has not provided independent counsel to the plaintiff, whom he alleges effectively denies him meaningful access to the courts and forced him to file the complaint without representation.

In counts two and three, the plaintiff alleges that on April 17, 2012, the hospital supervisor acted with deliberate indifference and negligently authorized the plaintiff's transfer from MacDougall, where he had been hospitalized for nerve pain and the inability to walk, to the Corrigan–Radgowski Correctional Institution (Corrigan), where he was placed in a cell.   As a result of being placed in a cell, the plaintiff claims that he was unable to retrieve his medication from the dispensary and was unable to shower.   He further claims that the hospital supervisor should have advised Corrigan to hospitalize the plaintiff upon arrival and that she also acted with deliberate indifference both by not sending an ambulance for the plaintiff's transfer and by failing to alert the medical unit at Corrigan of the plaintiff's medical needs and prognosis.   The plaintiff also alleges that the shift supervisor with deliberate indifference by not sending an ambulance for the plaintiff's transfer.

The plaintiff further alleges that Millings and the shift supervisor acted with deliberate indifference and negligently authorized the plaintiff's transfer to Corrigan to complete an unnecessary security “swap,” where the plaintiff was placed in a cell instead of the medical ward, despite Millings' and the shift supervisor's knowledge that the plaintiff was hospitalized at MacDougall and unable to walk.   As a result, the plaintiff claims that he suffered damages.

On April 4, 2013, the defendants Arnone and Millings ¹ filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) to the extent that the plaintiff is attempting to sue the defendants in their individual capacity, the court lacks personal jurisdiction due to insufficient service of process, and (2) to the extent that the plaintiff is attempting to sue the defendants in their official capacity, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff's claims as to monetary damages are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.   On April 23, 2013, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to dismiss.   On July 22, 2013, at the request of the parties, the court was asked to consider this motion without oral argument.

II

DISCUSSION OF LAW

“The grounds which may be asserted in [a motion to dismiss include a] ․ lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter ․ [and] ․ insufficiency of service of process.”  Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 687, 490 A.2d 509 (1985) (citing Practice Book (1985) § 143 (now § 10–31)).   “In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader ․ A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.”  Brookridge District Assn. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 607, 611, 793 A.2d 215 (2002).

The defendants, in their supporting memorandum of law, argue that their motion should be granted as to the entire complaint because, to the extent they are being sued in their individual capacity, the defendants were improperly served under General Statutes § 52–54.   Specifically, the defendants argue that the plaintiff failed to serve the defendants personally or at their usual place of abode.   Alternatively, the defendants argue that, to the extent they are being sued in their official capacity, the motion should be granted as to the plaintiff's claims for monetary damages because the defendants are immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity as they were acting within the scope of their employment.

The plaintiff counters that, as an incarcerated individual, he is denied access to the home addresses of state employees per corrections' policy and is similarly denied under Connecticut Freedom of Information laws.   Therefore, the plaintiff relied on General Statutes § 52–57(f)(2) to effectuate sufficient service on the defendants.   The plaintiff also argues that the motion should be dismissed because the attorney general failed to comply with § 52–57(f)(2).   Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the attorney general failed to deliver a copy of the summons and complaint to the defendants' employers.   Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that under General Statutes § 52–68, sufficient service was made on the defendants in their individual capacity.

As for the defendants' arguments regarding the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff counters that the doctrine is not absolute, that the plaintiff will present evidence at trial demonstrating that the defendants acted in excess of their authority and are liable for damages pursuant to General Statutes § 52–557n(a)(1), and that should the court conclude that the defendants are being sued in their official capacity, the motion should be denied pursuant to Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overturned in part by Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 308, 828 A.2d 549 (2003).

Construing the complaint in a manner most favorable to the plaintiff, the court assumes that he is suing the defendants in their official capacity and their individual capacity.  “The construction of a pleading is a question of law ․” Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 308, 828 A.2d 549 (2003).  “Our Supreme Court has set forth criteria to determine whether an action is against the state or against a defendant in an individual capacity.   The four criteria for an action against the state are:  (1) a state official has been sued;  (2) the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state;  (3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought;  and (4) the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Hultman v. Blumenthal, 67 Conn.App. 613, 621, 787 A.2d 666 (2002).  “We have ․ recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state.”   Id., 620–21.  “[T]he identities of the parties are determined by their description in the summons.”  Id., 620.  “The state is said to be the real party against whom relief is sought if damages are sought for injuries allegedly caused by the defendant[s] for performing or not performing acts that are part of [their] official duties.”  Kenney v. Weaving, 123 Conn.App. 211, 216, 1 A.3d 1083 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 929, 12 A.3d 569 (2011).

In the present case, the first criterion is met because in the summons and the complaint, the defendants are identified in their official titles as “Lynn Millings, Director, OCPM, Department of Corrections (State of Ct)” and “Leo Arnone, Commissioner, Dept of Corrections (State of Ct).”  The second criterion is met because the suit involves the defendants” actions while representing the state of Connecticut.   The third criterion is met because the plaintiff alleges that the defendants acted in administering the legal assistance program or authorizing the transfer of the plaintiff from MacDougall to Corrigan, both of which are part of the official duties of the defendants” positions.   See, e.g., Brahm v. Newbould, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–12–5034199–S (December 26, 2012, Zemetis, J.).   The fourth criterion is met because any judgment against the defendants would operate to control the activities of the state, specifically, the role of the Director of Corrections in transferring prisoners to medical facilities and the role of the Commissioner of Corrections in providing legal services to prisoners.   Accordingly, the defendants are being sued in their official capacity.

Given that the defendants are being sued in their official capacity, the defendants argue that the plaintiff's claims as to monetary damages are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  “[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011).  “We have long recognized the common-law principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent.”  Bloom v. Gershon, 271 Conn. 96, 107, 856 A.2d 335 (2004).  “There are exceptions:  (1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the states' sovereign immunity ․ (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights ․ and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer's statutory authority.”  (Citations omitted.)   DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 720, 937 A.2d 675 (2007).  “In the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of these exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is proper.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Markley v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 301 Conn. 56, 66, 23 A.3d 668 (2011).

In the present case, the plaintiff seeks both money damages and injunctive relief in his prayer for relief.   It is not clear how such relief is sought with regard to the counts in the complaint, where there is no reference to such relief and the final paragraph alleges only “compensatory and punitive damages as well as other relief.”   Because the motion seeks only to dismiss claims for monetary damages relating to claims against the defendants in their official capacity, only the first exception to sovereign immunity shall be analyzed as to all of the plaintiff's claims.  “For a claim made pursuant to the first exception, this court has recognized the well-established principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed ․ Where there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 349–50, 977 A.2d 636 (2009).  “The doctrine of sovereign immunity operates as a strong presumption in favor of the state's immunity from liability or suit.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  DePietro v. Dep't of Public Safety, 126 Conn.App. 414, 418, 11 A.3d 1149 (2011).  “[T]o circumvent the strong presumption of sovereign immunity in an action for monetary damages, the burden is on the plaintiff ․” Id.

“In the absence of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff may not bring an action against the state for monetary damages without authorization from the claims commissioner to do so.  [A] plaintiff who seeks to bring an action for monetary damages against the state must first obtain authorization from the claims commissioner ․ General Statutes § 4–160(a) provides as follows:  ‘[w]hen the Claims Commissioner deems it just and equitable, the Claims Commissioner may authorize suit against the state on any claim which, in the opinion of the Claims Commissioner, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable.’   When sovereign immunity has not been waived, the claims commissioner is authorized by statute to hear monetary claims against the state and determine whether the claimant has a cognizable claim ․ This legislation expressly bars suits upon claims cognizable by the Claims Commissioner except as he may authorize, an indication of the legislative determination to preserve sovereign immunity as a defense to monetary claims against the state not sanctioned by the [claims] commissioner or other statutory provisions.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 293 Conn. 351–52.

In the present case, the plaintiff does not allege, nor does he provide evidence, that this action was brought before the claims commissioner and authorized.   Accordingly, the first exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply to the plaintiff's claims for money damages in all counts brought against the defendants in their official capacity.   Therefore, the plaintiff's claim for money damages in all counts is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.   See, e.g., Canady v. Lantz, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV–07–5013120–S (January 2, 2008);  Laliberte v. O'Meara, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV–08–5008140–S (March 18, 2009) (47 Conn. L. Rptr. 427).

Finally, the plaintiff argues that the defendants are liable pursuant to § 52–557n.  “The common-law doctrine of governmental immunity has been statutorily enacted and is now largely codified in General Statutes § 52–557n.”  Kastancuk v. East Haven, 120 Conn.App. 282, 286, 991 A.2d 681 (2010).  “Governmental immunity, which applies to municipalities, is different in historical origin, scope and application from the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state.   A suit against a municipality is not a suit against a sovereign ․ Municipalities do, in certain circumstances, have a governmental immunity from liability ․ But that is entirely different from the state's sovereign immunity from suit ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted;  emphasis omitted.)  Vejseli v. Pasha, 282 Conn. 561, 573, 923 A.2d 688 (2007).

In the present case, the plaintiff's argument that the defendants are liable pursuant to General Statutes § 52–557n(a)(1) ² is misplaced.   The defendants are not alleged to be the employees of a municipality.   Rather, they are alleged to be the employees of a state agency.   Accordingly, the plaintiff's claims are against the state.   Therefore, the exceptions to governmental immunity pursuant to § 52–557n(a)(1) do not apply.

For the foregoing reasons, the claims for money damages made against the defendants in their official capacity are hereby dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.³

As relates to the plaintiff's claims against the defendants in their individual capacity, the motion should be granted as to the entire complaint on the ground that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants in their individual capacity because they were not served in accordance with General Statutes § 52–54.⁴  “[A]n action commenced by ․ improper service must be dismissed.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Alldred v. Alldred, 132 Conn.App. 430, 434, 31 A.3d 1185 (2011), cert. dismissed, 303 Conn. 926, 35 A.3d 1075 (2012).  “[W]hen a particular method of serving process is set forth by statute, that method must be followed ․ Unless service of process is made as the statute prescribes, the court to which it is returnable does not acquire jurisdiction ․ The jurisdiction that is found lacking ․ is jurisdiction over the person ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Morgan v. Hartford Hospital, supra, 301 Conn. 400.  “Failure to comply with the statutory requirements of service renders a complaint subject to a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack or personal jurisdiction ․ Facts showing the service of process in time, form, and manner sufficient to satisfy the requirements of mandatory statutes in that regard are essential to jurisdiction over the person.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 401.

“In order for a court to have personal jurisdiction over a state employee in his individual capacity, [the employee] has to be served by leaving a true and attested copy of [process], including the declaration or complaint, with the defendant, or at this usual place of abode, in this state.”   Hanton v. Williams, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–09–5030962–S (June 3, 2011, Wilson, J.).   See, e.g., Brown v. Trestmoon, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV–09–5005045–S (March 4, 2010, Nazzaro, J.);   Perillo v. Quiros, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–12–5034247–S (November 14, 2012, Wilson, J.).

In the present case, the plaintiff argues that sufficient process was effectuated under § 52–57(f)(2).⁵  The plaintiff's reliance on this statute is misplaced because the method of service established in § 52–57(f)(2) only applies to actions specifically enumerated in General Statutes § 52–57(f).⁶  Because the plaintiff's suit is grounded in tort and constitutional claims, § 52–57(f)(2) does not apply.   Further, the plaintiff does not cite to any legal authority to support his argument that reliance on § 52–57(f)(2) is proper in situations where the plaintiff does not have access to the defendants' personal addresses because of his incarceration status.

Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that sufficient service was effectuated under § 52–68.⁷  “Pursuant to General Statutes § 52–68(a), an order of notice may be utilized as an alternative means of service only when the adverse party, or any persons so interested therein that they ought to be made parties thereto, reside out of the state, or when the names or residences of any such persons in interest are unknown to the party instituting the proceeding.”  (Footnote omitted;  internal quotations marks omitted.)   Tarnopol v. Connecticut Sitting Council, 212 Conn. 157, 164, 561 A.2d 931 (1989).  “In order to effect constructive service, a plaintiff must make an application for an order of notice pursuant to Practice Book § 11–4.   [Sec.] 11–4 provides:  “Applications for orders of notice, whether made to a court, a judge, a clerk, or an assistant clerk, shall be made in writing, shall state the residence of the party whom the notice is sought to reach or that all reasonable efforts have been made to ascertain the residence and have failed, and shall further state what notice is considered most likely to come to the attention of such person, with the reasons therefore, unless they are evident;  and such applications shall become a part of the file of the case.”   Walker v. Syms, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford–New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV–98–0581210–S (June 22, 1999, Mulcahy, J.).

In the present case, the plaintiff has neither alleged nor does the record reveal that an order of notice was obtained by the plaintiff prior to service effectuated on the defendants.   While § 52–68 provides an alternate means of constructive service when the residence of an interested person is unknown, an order of notice pursuant to Practice Book § 11–4 must be obtained prior to reliance on this statute.   Therefore, service of process pursuant to § 52–68 was not properly effectuated by the plaintiff.   Because the plaintiff failed to effectuate sufficient service in accordance with § 52–54 or alternatively, in accordance with § 52–68, the court grants defendants' motion to dismiss against the defendants in their individual capacity on the ground that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

ORDERS

The motion is granted.   All claims for monetary damages against the defendants in their official capacity are hereby dismissed on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such claims under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.   All claims against the defendants in their individual capacity are hereby dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.   The plaintiff is hereby ordered to file an Amended Complaint consistent with this decision on or before December 2, 2013.

James W. Abrams, Judge

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Lynn Millings, Leo Arnone, an unidentified shift supervisor, and an unidentified hospital supervisor are all defendants in this action.   Millings and Arnone filed appearances on April 11, 2013.   The other two defendants, identified only as “unidentified hospital supervisor and “unidentified shift supervisor” have not filed appearances.   Hereafter, Millings and Arnone will be referred to as the defendants..  FN1. Lynn Millings, Leo Arnone, an unidentified shift supervisor, and an unidentified hospital supervisor are all defendants in this action.   Millings and Arnone filed appearances on April 11, 2013.   The other two defendants, identified only as “unidentified hospital supervisor and “unidentified shift supervisor” have not filed appearances.   Hereafter, Millings and Arnone will be referred to as the defendants.

FN2. General Statutes § 52–557n(a)(1) provides in relevant part:  “Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by:  (A) The negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivisions or any employee, officer, or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties ․”.  FN2. General Statutes § 52–557n(a)(1) provides in relevant part:  “Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by:  (A) The negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivisions or any employee, officer, or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties ․”

FN3. While the court finds no basis for the contention that the defendants are being sued in their individual capacity, that determination has no bearing on the ultimate result as the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants in their individual capacity because they were not served in accordance with General Statutes § 52–54..  FN3. While the court finds no basis for the contention that the defendants are being sued in their individual capacity, that determination has no bearing on the ultimate result as the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants in their individual capacity because they were not served in accordance with General Statutes § 52–54.

FN4. General Statutes § 52–54 provides:  “The service of a writ of summons shall be made by the officer reading it and the complaint accompanying it in the hearing of the defendant or by leaving an attested copy thereof with him or at his usual place of abode.   When service is made by leaving an attested copy at the defendant's usual place of abode, the officer making service shall note in his return the address at which such attested copy was left.”.  FN4. General Statutes § 52–54 provides:  “The service of a writ of summons shall be made by the officer reading it and the complaint accompanying it in the hearing of the defendant or by leaving an attested copy thereof with him or at his usual place of abode.   When service is made by leaving an attested copy at the defendant's usual place of abode, the officer making service shall note in his return the address at which such attested copy was left.”

FN5. General Statutes § 52–57(f)(2) provides in relevant part:  “When a party to an action under this subsection is employed by an employer with fifteen or more employees, by personal service upon an official of the employer designated as an agent to accept service of process in actions brought under this subsection.   Each employer with fifteen or more employees doing business in this state shall designate an official to accept service of process for employees who are parties to such actions.   The person so served shall promptly deliver such process to the employee.”  (Emphasis added.).  FN5. General Statutes § 52–57(f)(2) provides in relevant part:  “When a party to an action under this subsection is employed by an employer with fifteen or more employees, by personal service upon an official of the employer designated as an agent to accept service of process in actions brought under this subsection.   Each employer with fifteen or more employees doing business in this state shall designate an official to accept service of process for employees who are parties to such actions.   The person so served shall promptly deliver such process to the employee.”  (Emphasis added.)

FN6. General Statutes § 52–57(f) provides in relevant part:  “[I]n actions concerning the establishment, enforcement or modification of child support orders other than actions for dissolution of marriage, including, but not limited to, such actions under sections 17b–122, 17b–124 to 17b–132, inclusive, 17b–136 to 17b–138, inclusive, 17b–194 to 17b–197, inclusive, 17b–222 to 17b–250, inclusive, 17b–256, 17b–263, 17b–340 to 17b–350, inclusive, 17b–689b, 17b–743 to 17b–747, inclusive, and 46b–212 to 46b–213w, inclusive, and chapters 815, 815p, 815t, 815y and 816, and actions to implement garnishments for support under section 52–362, service of process may be made upon a party to the action by one of the following methods ․”.  FN6. General Statutes § 52–57(f) provides in relevant part:  “[I]n actions concerning the establishment, enforcement or modification of child support orders other than actions for dissolution of marriage, including, but not limited to, such actions under sections 17b–122, 17b–124 to 17b–132, inclusive, 17b–136 to 17b–138, inclusive, 17b–194 to 17b–197, inclusive, 17b–222 to 17b–250, inclusive, 17b–256, 17b–263, 17b–340 to 17b–350, inclusive, 17b–689b, 17b–743 to 17b–747, inclusive, and 46b–212 to 46b–213w, inclusive, and chapters 815, 815p, 815t, 815y and 816, and actions to implement garnishments for support under section 52–362, service of process may be made upon a party to the action by one of the following methods ․”

FN7. General Statutes § 52–68 provides in relevant part:  “The Superior Court, and the judges, clerks and assistant clerks thereof, may, except where it is otherwise specially provided by law, make such order as is deemed reasonable, in regard to the notice which shall be given of the institution or pendency of all complaints, writs of error and appeals from probate, which may be brought to or pending in the Superior Court, when the adverse party, or any persons so interested therein that they ought to be made parties thereto, reside out of the state, or when the names or residences of any such persons in interest are unknown to the party instituting the proceeding ․ [s]uch notice, having been given and proved by the affidavit of the officer who served the notice or by other competent evidence, shall be deemed sufficient service and notice, and the court may proceed to a hearing, unless otherwise provided by law, or may order further notice as it deems reasonable.”.  FN7. General Statutes § 52–68 provides in relevant part:  “The Superior Court, and the judges, clerks and assistant clerks thereof, may, except where it is otherwise specially provided by law, make such order as is deemed reasonable, in regard to the notice which shall be given of the institution or pendency of all complaints, writs of error and appeals from probate, which may be brought to or pending in the Superior Court, when the adverse party, or any persons so interested therein that they ought to be made parties thereto, reside out of the state, or when the names or residences of any such persons in interest are unknown to the party instituting the proceeding ․ [s]uch notice, having been given and proved by the affidavit of the officer who served the notice or by other competent evidence, shall be deemed sufficient service and notice, and the court may proceed to a hearing, unless otherwise provided by law, or may order further notice as it deems reasonable.”

Abrams, James W., J.