Andrew Piatek v. Meriden Zoning Board of Appeals et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Andrew T. Piatek (“Piatek”) has appealed, pursuant to General Statutes Section 8–8 from a July 10, 2012 decision of the defendant, Meriden Zoning Board of Appeals of the town of Meriden (“board”) granting the application for special exception and approval of location for the property sought by the defendants, Automotive Core Recycling, LLC (“Automotive”) and Rockfall Business Park, LLC (“Rockfall”).

The record shows that the plaintiff, Piatek is the owner of parcels of land known as 81 Cherry Street, a single-family residence and 87 Cherry Street, a multifamily residence, both located in Meriden, Connecticut.   The defendant, Rockfall is the owner and Automotive is the operator of property located at 29 Cooper Street and 80 Cherry Street, Meriden, Connecticut upon which they intend to operate a motor vehicle recycler's yard.

On May 21, 2012, the defendants made application to the defendant board for special exception approval pursuant to section 213–24B(2)(d) and approval of location pursuant to General Statutes Section 14–67(I) specifically stating “applicant requests permission to operate a motor vehicle recycler's yard in this zone at this site.”

On July 10, 2012, a public hearing was held at a special meeting of the defendant board with regard to the application.   Notice of said public hearing and special meeting was published in the Record–Journal on June 29, 2012 and on July 6, 2012 (plaintiff's brief page 2 and Exhibit 3) and notice had been mailed to the plaintiff (plaintiff's appeal paragraph 7 and Exhibit 2).   The plaintiff and other members of the public presented testimony to the defendant board with regard to the defendant's current use of the property, the hours of operation taking place at the property, the conditions of the property, the perceived violations with regard to the property, the noise generated at the property and the traffic impacts related to the use of the property (plaintiff's appeal paragraph 10).

After the members of the public voiced their opposition and the representative for the defendants offered rebuttal testimony and argument, the public hearing was closed.   After discussion by the defendant board, it voted unanimously to grant the application for special exception and approval of location for the property with seven specific conditions including that the hours of operation are limited to Monday through Friday, 8:00 A.M. through 5:00 P.M., Saturday 8:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M.;   that no work be allowed on Sundays or holidays;  that outside lighting must be shielded to prevent shining on neighboring properties;  that only one delivery truck is allowed on the site or in the street at a time;  that delivery trucks are not allowed to be on or near the railroad tracks;  that no vehicles are to be parked on the sidewalks and that the curb cut on Cooper Street must be widened to match the fence opening to the site.   These special conditions clearly demonstrate that the board carefully considered the evidence and testimony presented by the plaintiff as it impacts the health, safety and welfare of the public and of the immediate neighborhood.

The board specifically stated “The reason for the approval of this Special Exception include:  this is the proper zone for this use and the proposal meets all the special exception objectives of section 213–56B.”   Notice of the board's decision was published on July 13, 2012 (exhibit 8).   The plaintiff filed this appeal on July 25, 2012.

LEGAL STANDARD

In reviewing administrative proceedings, “the court may grant relief on appeal only where the local authority has acted illegally or arbitrarily or has abused its discretion.”  Rasbestos–Manhattan, Inc., v. Planning and Zoning Commission, 186 Conn. 466, 470 (1982) (citations omitted).   The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the commission acted improperly.   See Furtney v. Zoning Commission, 159 Conn. 585 (1970).  “[T]he commission's conclusions will be invalidated only if they are not supported by substantial evidence in the record.”  Raczkowski v. Zoning Commiss. of Naugatuck, 53 Conn.App. 636, 639 (1999).

Further, in an administrative appeal, “[c]ourts are not to substitute their judgment for that of the board, ․ and the decisions of local boards will not be disturbed so long as honest judgment has been reasonably and fairly exercised after a full hearing ․” Norwood v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 62 Conn.App. 528, 532 (2001) (citations omitted).   Rather, “the court's function is to determine on the basis of the record whether substantial evidence has been presented to the board to support its findings.”  Wing v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Cromwell, 61 Conn.App. 639, 644 (2001) (citations omitted).

“General Statutes 8–6 entrusts the commission with the function of interpreting and applying its zoning regulations ․ The trial court must determine whether the commission has correctly interpreted its regulations and applied them with reasonable discretion to the facts ․ The plaintiffs have the burden of showing that the commission acted improperly ․ The trial court can sustain the [plaintiffs'] appeal only upon a determination that the decision of the commission was unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal ․ It must not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning commission and must not disturb decisions of local commissions as long as honest judgment has been reasonably and fairly exercised.”  (Internal citations omitted.)  Newman v. Avon Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 2010 WL 3025545, citing Dimopoulos v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 31 Conn.App. 380, 383, cert. denied, 226 Conn. 917 (1993).

“When ruling upon an application for a special [permit], a planning and zoning board acts in an administrative capacity ․ Generally, it is the function of a zoning board or commission to decide within prescribed limits and consistent with the exercise of [its] discretion, whether a particular section of the zoning regulations applies to a given situation and the manner in which it does apply.   The ․ trial court [must] decide whether the board correctly interpreted the section [of the regulations] and applied it with reasonable discretion to the facts ․ In applying the law to the facts of a particular case, the board is endowed with a liberal discretion, and its action is subject to review by the courts only to determine whether it was unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal ․ Although a zoning commission or board possesses the discretion to determine whether a proposal meets the standards established in the regulations, it lacks the discretion to deny a special permit if a proposal satisfies the regulations and statutes.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Kilburn v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 113 Conn.App. 621, 626–27, 967 A.2d 131 (2009).  “In determining whether a zoning commission's action is illegal, arbitrary or in abuse of its discretion, a reviewing court's principal inquiry is whether the commission's action was in violation of the powers granted to it or the duties imposed upon it.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Clifford v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 280 Conn. 434, 440 908 A.2d 1049 (2006).

“A local board or commission is in the most advantageous position to interpret its own regulations and apply them to the situations before it.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Trumbull Falls, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 97 Conn.App. 17, 29, 902 A.2d 706, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 923, 908 A.2d 545 (2006).  “[D]ecisions of local boards will not be disturbed so long as honest judgment has been reasonably and fairly exercised after a full hearing.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Garlasco v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 101 Conn.App. 451, 456, 922 A.2d 227, cert. denied, 283 Conn. 908 927 A.2d 917 (2007).

“In reviewing a decision of a zoning board [or commission], a reviewing court is bound by the substantial evidence rule, according to which, [c]onclusions reached by the board must be upheld by the trial court if they are reasonably supported by the record.   The credibility of the witnesses and the determination of issues of fact are matters solely within the province of the board ․ The question is not whether the trial court would have reached the same conclusion, but whether the record before the board supports the decision reached ․ If a trial court finds that there is substantial evidence to support a zoning board's findings, it cannot substitute its judgment for that of the board ․ The board's decision must be sustained if an examination of the record discloses evidence that supports any of the reasons give.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Loring v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 287 Conn. 746, 756, 950 A.2d 494 (2008).

“The substantial evidence rule is similar to the ‘sufficiency of evidence’ standard applied in judicial review of jury verdicts, and evidence is sufficient to sustain an agency finding if it affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.”  Raczkowski v. Zoning Commission of the Town of Naugatuck, 53 Conn.App. 636, 639, 733 A.2d 862 (1999) (citing Cybulski v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 43 Conn.App. 105, 110–11, 682 A.2d 1073, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 949, 686 A.2d 123 (1996)).

“A special permit is a use which the zoning regulations expressly permit under conditions specified in the regulations.”   R. Fuller, 9 Connecticut Practice Series:  Land Use Law and Practice (2007), § 3:7, p. 38.  “The rationale for a special permit (or special exception) is that while certain specially permitted uses are generally compatible with uses permitted as of right in particular zoning districts, their precise location and mode of operation must be regulated because of topography, traffic problems, neighboring uses, etc. of the site.”  Id., p. 39.   In the special permit process, “the agency's function is to decide whether (1) the proposed use of the property is permitted under the zoning regulations, (2) the standards in the zoning regulations are satisfied, and (3) conditions necessary to protect public health, safety, convenience and property values, as provided in section 8–2 of the General Statutes can be established.”   R. Fuller, 9 Connecticut Practice Series, Land Use Law and Practice, § 21:9, p. 620.

“In situations in which the zoning commission does state the reasons for its action, the question for the court to pass on is simply whether the reasons assigned are reasonably supported by the record and whether they are pertinent to the considerations which the commission is required to apply under the zoning regulations.”  Irwin v. Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Litchfield, 244 Conn. 619, 629, 711 A.2d 675 (1998) (citing Zieky v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 151 Conn. 265, 267–68, 196 A.2d 758 (1963).

DISCUSSION

The plaintiff argues that:

It is the plaintiff's position that the Defendant Board erred in approving the application because the special exception requirements of the Meriden Zoning Code were never met or satisfied, and that, in making its decision, the defendant board never fully considered all the testimony and exhibits before them.   Moreover, the plaintiff believes that the approval granted by the Defendant Board was pursuant to the wrong zoning code section ․ (Brief of plaintiff page 1.)

The plaintiff, clearly an “aggrieved person” under the statute argues that the proposed use as a “motor vehicle recycling yard” is not permitted in this industrial M–3 zone.   The purpose of an industrial M–3 zone is specified in section 213–24A described as providing “opportunities for industrial and related activities ․ but which may be more intensive than M–1 or M–2 which may involve greater dependence upon trucks and are potentially noisier or otherwise more objectionable as neighbors to residential or institutional uses.”   In addition to the residences within the area of the applicant's property, there are two warehouses, an actively used railroad and a Yankee Gas facility.   The plaintiff argues, unconvincingly, that the application seeking “a special exception pursuant to section 213–24B(2)(d) to operate a motor vehicle recycler's yard” was defective because that section pertains to “heliports.”   This argument attempts to elevate form over substance.   The application clearly describes the applicant's intent to “operate a motor vehicle recycler's yard” and no one at the hearing was misled or confused by what amounts to a scrivener's error.   Moreover, the application was amended by applicant's attorney by letter dated July 17, 2012 to reference the correct subsection (Exhibit 1).

The defendant's use of this property as a motor vehicle recycler's yard is expressly allowed under section 213–24B(2)(a).   The plaintiff argues that while a “junkyard” is expressly permitted under the regulations, a “motor vehicle recycler's yard” is not.   The court can discern no meaningful difference.   In fact, the plaintiff in its reply brief at page 6–7 uses those terms interchangeably.

While the plaintiff argues that the board “failed to adequately consider all the testimony before them” and “merely went through the motions of the public hearing” the evidence is otherwise.

CONCLUSION

The court concludes that the use of a “motor vehicle recycler yard” is expressly allowed as a special exception use as “junkyard.”   The court finds that the board properly acted within its discretion in considering the evidence and applying that evidence to the standards contained in the relevant regulations.

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed.

BY THE COURT

Kenneth L. Shluger, Judge

Shluger, Kenneth L., J.