Michel Robertson v. Shane Terry et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 103)

The complaint in this case alleges as follows.   On March 25, 2010, the plaintiff, Michel Robertson, was driving her vehicle on Route 214 in Ledyard, Connecticut, and stopped at a red light.   Her vehicle was hit from behind by a pickup truck driven by the defendant Shane Terry with the permission of the truck's owner, defendant Krista Koziol.   Count one alleges, at paragraph 5, that Terry violated General Statutes § 14–227a by driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the collision, as well as other grounds of negligence, and that he fled the scene.   As a result of the collision, the plaintiff was injured, in some respects permanently, and incurred medical expenses and lost wages.   Count two substitutes for paragraph 5 of count one the allegation that Terry violated General Statutes § 14–295 in that he “intentionally, or with reckless disregard, violated Conn. Gen.Stat. Section 14–227a, and/or 14–222 [reckless driving] and/or 14–218a [traveling unreasonably fast] and such violation(s) was a substantial factor in causing the [plaintiff's] injuries.”   The plaintiff seeks double and treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14–295.

On June 15, 2012, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that, by a release dated March 13, 2012, the “plaintiff released the defendants from any and all claims and actions arising out of the motor vehicle accident that occurred on March 25, 2010.”   The release was “for and in consideration of the sum of Five Hundred Dollars and 00/100 ($500.00),” which was paid to the plaintiff.   The defendants filed no affidavit with their motion, but, on July 19, 2013, submitted an affidavit of Progressive Direct Insurance Company Claims Representative Matthew Morrison with six letters from Morrison to the plaintiff concerning her claim.

On August 1, 2012, the plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.   She argues that the settlement must be rejected, and the motion denied, for “(1) mutual dispute as to consideration;  (2) mistake;  (3) duress;  (4) lack of good faith and fair dealing;  and (5) misleading comments by Progressive.”   The motion was argued on July 22, 2013.

FACTS

Mindful of the standard against finding facts on motions for summary judgment, and of the fact that neither defendant admitted any of the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, the court finds that the following facts do not appear to be disputed.   There was a motor vehicle collision on March 25, 2010, on Route 214 in Ledyard, which caused the plaintiff injury and loss.   The defendant Shane Terry, driving a vehicle owned by defendant Krista Koziol, was involved.   Progressive Direct Insurance Company (Progressive) was the insurer for one or both defendants and a claim (number 10–5811450) was made for losses caused by the collision.

On or about February 21, 2012—about one month before the statute of limitation ¹ on suit against the defendants would have run out—Progressive, by Matthew Morrison of the claims department, sent a letter to the plaintiff which reads as follows:

Claim Information

Mrs. Robertson:

I received your February 20, 2012 voice mail regarding your bodily injury claim for the March 25, 2010 motor vehicle accident.   I called the work and cell numbers, and left a voice mail at the cell number.   As indicated in previous correspondence, I am able to resolve your claim for $500.   I have enclosed the needed release.   Please bear in mind that the statute of limitations for a bodily injury claim in the State of Connecticut is two years.   The statute for this claim will expire March 25, 2012.   Thank you.

Matthew Morrison ․

That letter constituted an offer by Progressive of a settlement agreement.   On March 13, 2012, the plaintiff accepted that offer by signing the “Full Release of All Claims with Indemnity” (the release), a copy of which is attached to the defendants' brief.   The release provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

I, Michel Robertson, ․ for and in consideration of the sum of Five Hundred Dollars and 00/100 ($500.00), the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, ․ hereby for myself and my heirs ․ release, acquit and forever discharge Krista Koziol, Shane Terry and Progressive Direct Insurance Company of and from any and all claims, actions, causes of action, rights, demands, damages, costs, loss of wages, [and] expenses ․ on account of or in any way arising out of any and all known and unknown personal injuries and damages resulting from an automobile accident which occurred on or about March 25, 2010 at or near RT 214, Ledyard, CT ․

[T]his settlement is in full compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim as to both questions of liability and as to the nature and extent of the injuries and damages, and ․ neither this release, nor the payment pursuant thereto shall be construed as an admission of liability, such being denied ․

[The plaintiff] relies wholly upon [her] judgment, belief, and knowledge of the nature, extent, effect, and duration of said injuries and liability therefore and is made without reliance upon any statement or representation of the ․ parties hereby released or their representatives ․

THE UNDERSIGNED HAS READ THE FOREGOING RELEASE AND FULLY UNDERSTANDS IT.

Despite the release, the plaintiff filed the complaint described above.   Additional facts will be discussed as needed.

DISCUSSION

The purpose of summary judgment is to resolve litigation without the delay and expense of trial when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534–35, 51 A.3d 367 (2012).   In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court cannot decide issues of material fact;  rather, it must determine whether any such issues exist.  RMS Residential Properties, LLC v. Miller, 303 Conn. 224, 233, 32 A.3d 307 (2011).   The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of submitting evidence that proves the nonexistence of any genuine issue of material fact.  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10–11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).   Once the movant has met that burden, however, the opposing party may defeat the motion only by presenting evidence that reveals a material, factual dispute.  Id., 11.   The court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Id. “[S]ummary judgment ‘is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way.’  ․ ‘[A] summary disposition ․ should be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the moving party.’   “ (Citations omitted.)  Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003).

The essence of the defendants' motion is that the plaintiff entered into a contract to settle all claims in this suit—she received five hundred dollars and gave the defendants the subject release—and that that fact is so clearly true that the defendants are entitled to judgment.   The essence of the plaintiff's opposition is that the contract is not enforceable—or at least is not so clearly enforceable that summary judgment may be granted—due to mistake and four other reasons.   The plaintiff has testified through her affidavit that she asked the Progressive adjuster if she could seek treatment from a physician for her injuries due to continued pain, but she was told that “it was too late in the game because of the statute of limitations.”   She also testifies that:  “Progressive understood I needed to see a physician for further treatment, since I was still having pain and problems with my neck and shoulder,” but “[b]ased on my conversations and the letter from the Progressive adjuster, I believed I had no choice, and that I was forced to accept their offer of only $500 or I would get nothing.”   Other than the above, though, what Progressive's representative or representatives told the plaintiff in negotiations of her claim, and how much Progressive knew about the facts of the collision and the plaintiff's injuries and losses, including the over $1,800 in claimed medical bills, is not clear enough from the evidence of either party to treat as undisputed on the present motion.   The court finds for the plaintiff on the ground of mistake—particularly unilateral mistake.

In general, a person is responsible for a document she signs and for the legal effects of that document.   See National Publishing Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 287 Conn. 664, 674, 949 A.2d 1203 (2008);  Robert Lawrence Associates, Inc. v. Del Vecchio, 178 Conn. 1, 21–22, 420 A.2d 1142 (1979).   This principle is emphasized by the capitalized last sentence from the release in this case, quoted above.   When a valid settlement agreement has been made, it cannot be repudiated by either party.   Ozkan v. Gallo, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV–07–5003672–S (April 8, 2008, Upson, J.) (45 Conn. L. Rptr. 392, 393), citing Hess v. Dumouchel Paper Co., 154 Conn. 343, 347, 225 A.2d 797 (1966);  see also Shine v. Pawlak, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV–12–6013233–S (November 23, 2012, Devine, J.) (a party cannot change its mind once a binding agreement has been reached).   The court does not unmake bargains unwisely made.  Robert Lawrence Associates, Inc. v. Del Vecchio, supra, 21.

To determine whether a bargain—a valid release—has been made here, the court must analyze basic contract law.   A release is an agreement to give up or discharge a claim through a surrender of the rights stated in the release, and it is subject to the rules governing the construction of contracts.  Viera v. Cohen, 283 Conn. 412, 427–28, 927 A.2d 843 (2007).   Offer and acceptance sufficient to create an enforceable contract must be based on an identical understanding by the parties:  if their minds are not truly met, no enforceable contract exists.  Duplissie v. Devino, 96 Conn.App. 673, 688, 902 A.2d 30, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 916, 908 A.2d 536 (2006).

There are two kinds of mistakes that will render contracts unenforceable and the plaintiff's motion does not specify which is charged here.   The first is mutual mistake.   A mutual mistake is a misunderstanding by both parties as to a material fact, creating a result that neither intended.  BRJM, LLC v. Output Systems, Inc., 100 Conn.App. 143, 148, 917 A.2d 605, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 917, 925 A.2d 1099 (2007).   That does not apply here because there is no basis for concluding that Progressive did not know what the plaintiff was giving up by entering into the $500 settlement manifested by the subject release.

The second kind of mistake is unilateral.   A unilateral mistake involves a mistake of only one party to a contract which mistake induces him to sign a contract he would not have signed but for the mistake.  Bender v. Bender, 292 Conn. 696, 730–31, 975 A.2d 636 (2009).   Unilateral mistake is a ground for cancelling a contract in cases where (1) the mistake was induced by the conduct of the other party, or (2) the other party seeks unconscionably to take advantage of the mistake.²  Id., 731.   As to the second basis for claiming unilateral mistake, unconscionability may be shown by an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties combined with contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other party.  Id., 732.   Whether a party was mistaken as to a material aspect of a contract is generally a question of fact.  Id.

In this case, the plaintiff has claimed mistake and, by her affidavit, alleged sufficient facts showing the elements of unilateral mistake to defeat the defendants' claim that the release she signed is enforceable as a matter of law.   She testified that she did not know what her options were—she did not know what she was giving up, including the ability to sue for much more than five hundred dollars—when she signed the release for only five hundred dollars.³  She testified that the Progressive adjuster told her that “it was too late in the game [to seek treatment for her injuries due to continued pain] because of the statute of limitations.”   The defendants have failed to show that, to the summary judgment standard, the plaintiff was not actually mistaken or, if she was, that Progressive was unaware that she was mistaken.   Indeed, the Morrison affidavit acknowledges that, after he told the plaintiff that Progressive would not pay for more medical treatment because of the settlement but before the statute of limitation ran, the plaintiff indicated to him that she made a mistake in signing the release.   There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the release should be cancelled on the basis that the plaintiff was mistaken and the insurance company representing the defendants induced or took advantage of that mistake, pursuant to the standard outlined in Bender v. Bender, supra.   Put another way, only by weighing credibility—by rejecting the plaintiff's testimony and crediting the defendant's claim that the release was free of mistake—could the court enter judgment for the defendants.   That the court cannot do.

There is an inadequate basis for denying the defendants' motion on the other four grounds claimed by the plaintiff.   Sufficient facts to base this ruling on three of those grounds—duress, lack of good faith and fair dealing, and misleading comments by Progressive—are not apparent to this court.   The fourth ground, “mutual dispute as to consideration,” appears to be a UCC concept from General Statutes § 42a–3–311(a)(ii), a statute pertaining to accord and satisfaction by use of a negotiable instrument tendered to settle a claim where the amount is unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute.   This ground is of questionable pertinence, was not briefed and is deemed abandoned.

The defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied without prejudice to their right to try their special defense that the plaintiff's suit is barred by the plaintiff's release.

Cole–Chu, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The applicable statute of limitations for a negligence claim, as prescribed by General Statutes § 52–584, provides in relevant part:  “No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct ․ shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered ․”.  FN1. The applicable statute of limitations for a negligence claim, as prescribed by General Statutes § 52–584, provides in relevant part:  “No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct ․ shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered ․”

FN2. This standard for cancelling a contract due to unilateral mistake is derived from Connecticut case law from the early twentieth century, as cited in Bender v. Bender, supra, 292 Conn. 731.   The Supreme Court in Bender noted, however, that the Appellate Court has instead adopted its standard for unilateral mistake from the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153 (1981).   The Appellate Court's approach allows a party to void a contract for unilateral mistake if he does not bear the risk of the mistake and (1) the effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable, or (2) the other party had reason to know of the mistake or his fault caused the mistake.  Bender v. Bender, supra, 731, citing Shoreline Communications, Inc. v. Norwich Taxi, LLC, 70 Conn.App. 60, 65, 797 A.2d 1165 (2002).  Bender did not disapprove of or invalidate the Appellate Court's reliance on the Restatement;  rather, Bender seems to imply that courts can validly rely on a combination of the two standards..  FN2. This standard for cancelling a contract due to unilateral mistake is derived from Connecticut case law from the early twentieth century, as cited in Bender v. Bender, supra, 292 Conn. 731.   The Supreme Court in Bender noted, however, that the Appellate Court has instead adopted its standard for unilateral mistake from the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153 (1981).   The Appellate Court's approach allows a party to void a contract for unilateral mistake if he does not bear the risk of the mistake and (1) the effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable, or (2) the other party had reason to know of the mistake or his fault caused the mistake.  Bender v. Bender, supra, 731, citing Shoreline Communications, Inc. v. Norwich Taxi, LLC, 70 Conn.App. 60, 65, 797 A.2d 1165 (2002).  Bender did not disapprove of or invalidate the Appellate Court's reliance on the Restatement;  rather, Bender seems to imply that courts can validly rely on a combination of the two standards.

FN3. Besides the practical importance of the consideration for the plaintiff's release (for example, if the plaintiff had received five thousand dollars, she might not have brought this suit), the amount paid for the release and the reasonableness of that amount under the circumstances is material to the analysis of the unconscionability element of unilateral mistake..  FN3. Besides the practical importance of the consideration for the plaintiff's release (for example, if the plaintiff had received five thousand dollars, she might not have brought this suit), the amount paid for the release and the reasonableness of that amount under the circumstances is material to the analysis of the unconscionability element of unilateral mistake.

Cole–Chu, Leeland J., J.