Amica Mutual Insurance Co. v. LLC (2013)

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS (# 101)

The defendant, Patterson Oil Company (“Patterson”), moves to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, claiming that the dispute at issue must be resolved pursuant to an arbitration agreement.   The plaintiff, Amica Mutual Insurance Company (“Amica”), objects to the motion.   This matter came before the court on October 28, 2013.   The motion is denied.

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action began with the filing of Amica's complaint on April 22, 2013.   The five-count complaint alleges that Amica insured certain property in Litchfield, Connecticut.   Amica claims that on July 13, 2010, its insured and the owner of the property, Richard Samal (“Samal”), contracted with Carlson Heating, LLC,¹ and with Robert Carlson, individually, to install an oil storage tank on Samal's property.   The complaint further alleges that on January 14, 2011, Samal entered into a heating system maintenance agreement with Patterson, which covered, inter alia, the oil storage tank.   Amica claims that Carlson Heating, LLC, and Robert Carlson, in the course of installing the oil storage tank, installed a filter on the tank that cracked on December 31, 2011, allowing fuel oil to escape.

The first count alleges breach of contract as to Carlson Heating, LLC. Count two alleges breach of contract as to Robert Carlson, individually, and count three alleges breach of contract as to Carlson Heating, Air and Hot Water, Inc. Counts four and five allege breach of contract and negligence, respectively, as to Patterson.

Patterson's motion to dismiss alleges that this matter must be dismissed because of the existence of a “binding inter-insurance company arbitration clause.”   Amica objects to the motion on the basis that the arbitration agreement on which Patterson relies does not apply in this litigation.

II

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In deciding this motion to dismiss, the court is obligated to “take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader ․ [A] motion to dismiss admits all facts well pleaded and invokes any record that accompanies the motion, including supporting affidavits that contain undisputed facts ․ If a resolution of a disputed fact is necessary to determine the existence of standing when raised by a motion to dismiss, a hearing may be held in which evidence is taken.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  May v. Coffey, 291 Conn. 106, 108–09, 967 A.2d 495 (2009).

The parties did not request oral argument.   Further, Patterson did not file affidavits in support of its motion.   Therefore, the motion will be decided on the basis of the well pleaded facts and the record.  Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 516, 923 A.2d 638 (2007).  “[I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ․ clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  May v. Coffey, supra, 291 Conn. 113.  “It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  New England Pipe Corp. v. Northeast Corridor Foundation, 271 Conn. 329, 335, 857 A.2d 348 (2004).

III

THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIESAPatterson's Position

Patterson asserts that Amica has brought a subrogation action in an effort to recover payments that it made following the spillage of fuel oil.   Patterson claims that it is insured by The Hartford Insurance Company (“The Hartford”).   According to Patterson, The Hartford and Amica are both members of Arbitration Forums, Inc., (“AFI”) and there is an agreement that disputes between insurance companies, when the insurer is the plaintiff, must be arbitrated.   Therefore, Patterson argues, this court lacks jurisdiction over Amica's claims.

Patterson did not support its motion with a copy of the arbitration agreement upon which it relies, nor did it include, in its memorandum of law, any relevant quotations from the arbitration agreement.   Finally, Patterson did not support its motion with, e.g., an affidavit of any kind.

B

Amica's Position

Amica objects to the motion to dismiss, arguing that the arbitration agreement upon which Patterson relies is inapplicable to this litigation.   Amica claims that not all parties to this case are signatories to the agreement that is at issue.   Amica acknowledges that it and The Hartford are signatories to an arbitration agreement with AFI, but that AFI only has jurisdiction over signatories to the arbitration agreement.   Amica claims that neither Carlson Heating, LLC, Robert Carlson, nor Carlson Heating, Air and Hot Water, Inc. (“Carlson defendants”) are signatories to the arbitration agreement upon which Patterson relies.   Amica attached an unsigned copy of the arbitration agreement, and the rules that accompany the agreement, to its memorandum of law.   Amica contends that it has no knowledge as to whether the Carlson defendants are insured.

IV

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, this court notes that even if a valid arbitration agreement exists relative to this case, such an agreement does not deprive this court of subject matter jurisdiction.   In Catrini v. Erickson, 113 Conn.App. 195, 966 A.2d 275 (2009), the Appellate Court held that the existence of an arbitration agreement does not deprive the court of jurisdiction.   Rather, “General Statute § 52–409 allows a court to enter a stay in a matter involving an arbitration agreement.”  Id., 197.   The existence of that statute necessarily means that an agreement to arbitrate does not oust the court of subject matter jurisdiction.  Id.;  see Kuryla v. Coady, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia–Milford, Docket No. CV–12–6009961–S (March 22, 2013, Hiller, J.) (“pursuant to Catrini, an agreement to arbitrate does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction”);  Sotheby's International Realty, Inc. v. The Relocation Group, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV–11–6011784–S (April 4, 2012, Jennings, Jr., J.T.R.) (53 Conn. L. Rptr. 849, 851) (holding that, pursuant to Catrini, the court had subject matter jurisdiction even if it found that the matter should be submitted for arbitration).

Furthermore, Patterson has made no showing that any of the Carlson defendants are insured or, if so, whether any such insurer is also a party to the arbitration agreement upon which Patterson relies.²  The arbitration agreement presented by Amica states in relevant part that “[n]o company shall be required, without its written consent, to arbitrate any claim or suit if:  (a) it is not a signatory company nor has given written consent.”  (Emphasis in original.)   Arbitration Agreement, Article Second.   Therefore, the arbitration agreement, by its own terms, establishes that the Carlson defendants cannot be compelled to arbitrate, at least based on the existing record.

V

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss the complaint is denied.

So ordered.

BY THE COURT,

John A. Danaher, III, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Amica claims that, at some point after Carlson Heating, LLC entered into its agreement with Samal, Carlson Heating, LLC continued as Carlson Heating, Air and Hot Water, Inc..  FN1. Amica claims that, at some point after Carlson Heating, LLC entered into its agreement with Samal, Carlson Heating, LLC continued as Carlson Heating, Air and Hot Water, Inc.

FN2. Indeed, Patterson has made no showing that Amica, or Patterson's insurer, are parties to any arbitration agreement.   However, Amica does not dispute the latter claim and so the court will presume that The Hartford and Amica are signatories to the arbitration agreement attached to Amica's memorandum..  FN2. Indeed, Patterson has made no showing that Amica, or Patterson's insurer, are parties to any arbitration agreement.   However, Amica does not dispute the latter claim and so the court will presume that The Hartford and Amica are signatories to the arbitration agreement attached to Amica's memorandum.

Danaher, John A., J.